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April 11, 2005
War with China: 2008 - 2010?
In an earlier post called "The Looming Threat", I wrote that China would likely attack Taiwan sometime "before 2015". In light of better information, I am revising my estimate to say that if there is a war it will occur sometime between 2008 and 2010.
I've changed my time estimate because of two factors; first, additional research has let me to conclude that the military "window of opportunity" for the Chinese will start to close in 2008, and second I have given more thought to the meaning of the 2008 Olympic Games, which will be held in the Chinese capital of Beijing.
I. Why a Chinese Attack?
Many would dismiss a Chinese attack as improbable. The point out that from a logical standpoint, China has no need to occupy or control Taiwan. By attacking China risks throwing their economy into chaos, being isolated on the world stage if not becoming an outright pariah, risking a nuclear escallation, and even if the succeded they would lose the ability to use the issue of Taiwan to whip up popular sentiment at home. And, as the outcome of war is never certain, if they lost it might spark a revolution at home that could topple the leadership. Certainly this is enough to give the pause.
At the same time that we take these objections seriously, we must remember the fallacy of "mirror image" thinking. If we have learned nothing else since 9-11 is should be that others do not share our way of thinking. What we consider logical others see as illogical. Facts we consider important are not even in other people's mental universe. Not everyone else works off of our set of assumptions.
Let us therefore consider reasons why, in light of the above objections, China might still make a move against Taiwan:
Saving Face
The Oriental concept of "face" is very important and something that we often underestimate. The simple fact is that rightly or wrongly the Chinese feel that they were embarrassed by the West in the 18th, 19th, and first half of the 20th century and that they must recover. This is no place to recite Chinese history, but suffice it to say that during this time China was colonialized by foreign powers and her people often treated quite shabbily. The Chinese also believe that they lost several territories during this time and to regain face need to reacquire them.
The "lost territories" are Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. The Chinese reacquired Tibet by force in the 1950s and Hong Kong by diplomacy in 1997. Only Taiwan remains, and by all accounts that I have come across they are bound and determined to get it back. For example, I recall an article several years ago by John Derbyshire, writing in National Review, in which he said that the one thing that struck him during a visit to China is that despite disagreement on a variety of issues, all of the Chinese people he spoke with were unanimous in their attitude toward Taiwan: "We want it back."
Isn't it the Economics, Stupid?
The biggest objection that I can find is that a military move on China, even if successful, would result in boycotts and embargoes (and maybe even a blockade) that would cripple their economy. And in normal circumstances this would keep them from attacking. However, as I will show below, there may come a time in which the leadership ignores the danger and starts to believe their own propaganda. In short, they may become overconfident.
II. Why Defend Taiwan?
It is reasonable to ask why we should defend Taiwan in the face of Chinese aggression. Some, like the libertarian Cato Institute, say that we ought to let Taiwan defend itself. This is not the place for a full treatment of Taiwan's own actions and drift towards declaring independence, so suffice it to say that I believe that we ought to defend Taiwan for the following reasons:
We have obligated ourselves to help defend the island democracy with the Taiwan Relations Act (1979). American presidents, including President Bush, have given their word that we would help to defend Taiwan. We must be good to our word or need to abrogate the treaty and speak clearly that we will not come to Taiwan's aid.
The government of Taiwan ("Republic of China") is now a democracy. We should defend democracies against tyrannies. Even when Taiwan was ruled by the authoritarian Kuomintang, it was still better than the Communists on the mainland, thus worth defending under the concept of comparative justice.
Defense of Taiwan easily meets the requirements of Just War Theory.
Taiwan will not sit still and let us do all of the fighting. They will, in fact, end up doing most of the fighting and dying. It is often forgotten, for example, that during the Korean War the South Koreans suffered more casualties than did Americans.
III. The Preparation
We are currently seeing signs that the Chinese are preparing to make a move. The preparation falls into three categories; the legal, the military, and the morale
The Legal
Last month China's rubber-stamp "National People's Congress" passed an "anti-secession law" authorizing the use of "non-peaceful means" against Taiwan. It was assumed by many analysts that China is setting the legal grounds for action against Taiwan, military or otherwise.
The Military
Under Deng Xiaoping China embarked on a modernization program. One of the "four modernizations" was the military. During the Cold War, the bulk of China's military was oriented towards the Soviet threat. When the USSR dissolved, the military threat went away also. As such, China has been free to move her forces to face new challenges. One of those is retaking Taiwan.
The Chinese are engaged in a crash program to build up their navy, the branch that would have the biggest role in an attack.
Nevertheless, as this Navy War College paper makes clear, the Chinese will not have the ability to stage a "D-Day" style amphibious invasion of Taiwan:
The most dramatic but least feasible PRC threat is an amphibious attack with hundreds of thousands of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops supported by ballistic missile barrages, aircraft, naval forces, and all manner of modified merchant ships. A host of analysts and government reports have poured cold water on this frequently discussed scenario, revealing China’s sea and airlift shortcomings, the numerous force-concentration problems associated with Formosa beach landings, and, not the least, Taiwan’s super-hardened land defenses. Piers Wood and Charles Ferguson, for example, persuasively argue that China lacks not only the amphibious assault ships to bridge the strait with enough firepower and men but also the port capacity to employ hundreds of potentially useful civilian craft.12 Their conclusion was shared by Admiral Dennis Blair, former commander of the U.S. Pacific forces, who not long ago reported that “the PLA is still years away from the capability to take and hold Taiwan.”13
By comparison, a naval blockade could bring Taiwan to its knees with relative ease and minimal international protest. A sustained interruption of key sea lines of communications would be economically disastrous for the Taiwanese economy, which relies heavily on shipping for its lifeblood trade and energy needs, some two-thirds of which are fulfilled by fossil fuel imports.14 Even a temporary closure would likely prove debilitating for the import/export-dependent economy. Shortly prior to Taiwan’s 1996 election, for example, all merchant marine traffic to Taiwan was halted for days after China fired several unarmed DF-15 short-range missiles toward the island’s two largest ports, the closest of them falling approximately twelve miles from land. Traffic into Taiwan’s northern port was similarly blocked the previous year after China lobbed six DF-15s into the strait some eighty-five miles north of the island.1
Most likely, therefore, the Chinese would force Taiwan to negotiate "at missile point" and would come away with favorable terms if not outright annexation. Amphibious invasion or airborne attack is extremely unlikely.
Another Naval War College Paper puts it in starker terms still:
Given the many weaknesses of the PLA Navy, the U.S. Navy will remain superior to the Chinese fleet for many years to come. That is not the issue. The danger, rather, is the possibility of an expansive, even bellicose, Chinese foreign policy provoking open conflict with a weaker neighboring state. Arms races and exacerbated regional tensions, on the one hand, and an entangling of American armed forces, on the other, are opposite evils to be avoided. However, the Chinese navy has markedly improved in capabilities and is clearly aiming for a blue-water capacity. It has already developed an "active defense and inshore warfare" strategy commensurate with its improving ability to deal with limited wars and regional conflicts, at the same time as the U.S. Navy is concentrating on the world's littorals in support of its own new maritime strategy. The U.S. Navy's recent white papers ". . . From the Sea" and "Forward . . . from the Sea" have changed its focus to operations near land. There is irony in the fact that while the U.S. Navy is slowly shifting away from its sea control mission, the PLA Navy is actively pursuing command of the regional waters.
Window of Opportunity
According to the authors of the first Naval War College paper cited above, the Chinese will have a "window of opportunity" that will begin to close in or around 2010:
PRC - People's Republic of China. The official name of Communist China. Typically called just "China"
PLA - People's Liberation Army. All branches of the military are referred to as the "PRC" as in "PLA Navy" or "PLA Air Force"
ROC - Republic of China. The official name for the government of Taiwan, on the island of Formosa.
...China’s military power will peak relative to that of Taiwan and the regional forces of the United States sometime between 2005 and 2008. In this window, improved naval and air capabilities—including ballistic and cruise missiles—will give China its best chance to effect Taiwan’s acquiescence. After 2008, Taiwan’s expected defensive gains and the seemingly exponential military advances of the United States will preclude a successful attack on the island.
For a full discussion of the military details see the two papers cited above.
Barring a major technological surprise, espionage action, or plain bad luck on our part, the US Navy will be able to successfully defeat the PLA Navy and Air Force, even during the "window of opportunity." We will suffer losses, perhaps serious.
But as the author of the NWC paper above stated, the question is speed; can the United States get enough forces into the area fast enough, and defeat the Chinese fast enough, before Taiwan is forced to capitulate?
The Nuclear Wildcard
One cannot discuss war between the United States and China without discussing nuclear weapons. Indeed, some have used the threat of escalation as a reason why China would not attack. This may well be so. But it also may be an example of the "mirror image" thinking that we need to avoid.
During the Cold War we adopted the theory of MAD, or Mutual Assured Destruction. MAD said that neither side would dare to attack the other because both would end up destroyed. But while the Soviets gave lip service to this theory, a review of their internal literature showed that they did not necessarily buy into it. They conducted war games with the express intent of finding a way to fight and win a nuclear war.
So it may be with China. Not that they would want to fight such a war, but they may well believe that they can "absorb" losses better than we could. During the 1950s, when the Soviets and Chinese were still on somewhat friendly terms, the former "...professed not to fear nuclear war because they did understand the force of nuclear weapons, but the believed they could afford to lose a few hundred million of their people, people being the one thing they had in abundance." (Operation Solo, p 94). Although the days of Mao's rule are long gone, his government is still in place.
Lastly, there is the October 2000 testimony by Senator Jon Kyle that in 1995 "...General Xiong Guangkai warned a visiting U.S. official that China could use military force to prevent Taiwan's gaining independence without fear of U.S. intervention because American leaders `care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.' An editorial in a military-owned newspaper this March was more blunt, warning that, `The United States will not sacrifice 200 million Americans for 20 million Taiwanese.'"
IV. The Olympics
The 2008 Olympics will be held in Beijing. Although it is a matter of national pride for any country to host the Olympic games, it assumes special importance for totalitarian regimes. One will recall that the Soviets felt more hurt by our boycott of the 1980 games than we did by their boycott of the 1984 games in Los Angeles. Likewise, the Chinese will place great importance on putting forth the best front during the games. The entire thing is a chance for them to showcase their "national greatness" and to show the world that they are not "backward".
If China makes a military move against Taiwan before the games they risk a boycott by large numbers of countries, regardless of how the war turns out. The US would certainly boycott, and would put great pressure on other countries to do likewise. Even if most countries attended despite US pressure, the games would be forever marred. Given the importance the Chinese put on "face", I cannot believe that they would allow this to happen.
I therefore do not believe that China would attack Taiwan before the 2008 games. Given the military "window of opportunity" cited above, I do not think that they can wait much after 2008 either. This leads me to the conclusion that if they move it will be between 2008 and 2010.
The Propaganda
Discussion of the Olympics leads to another observation, one about the importance of setting the stage for an attack; the importance of propaganda. China will not only use the Olympics to make themselves look good, they will use the occasion to remind us of how Taiwan should be part of the PRC. Unfortunately, there will be all too many Western journalists who will lay their critical faculties aside during the games.
The Hitler Analogy
The 1936 Olympic games were held in Berlin, Germany. Hitler saw them as an occasion to showcase his regime, which is exactly what he did. Although many Americans believe that runner Jesse Owens spoiled Hitler's plans, the fact is that is not so. Although the story of Owens winning a gold medal and Hitler refusing to shake hands with him is literally true, it was not seen as important at the time. The story did not gain prominence until the 1950s, when the civil rights movement picked up in the United States. Rather, the Olympics were seen at the time as a huge propaganda victory for Nazi Germany.
The benefit to Germany of a successful Olympics was that it raised their "self esteem" and made them feel that they could, in fact, conquer the world, or at least the European part of it. This, of course, is precisely what they set out to do.
V. The Allies
The United States had two allies in the region, Japan and South Korea. We can most likely count on the former to help us, but assistance from the latter will probably not be forthcoming.
The Japanese have shown great interest in recent years in missile defense. They are extremely worried about both China and North Korea. Their military is larger than I think is commonly believed, a fact well-known by the Chinese. Politically, they have shown the will to "step out" beyond their traditional post-World War II military isolation, sending troops to Iraq, for example.
South Korea has moved in the opposite direction. With the ageing of the Korean War generation, the youth do not feel beholden by past American sacrifices. Anti-American demonstrations have become more and more common in recent years. The South Korean government's "Sunshine Policy" towards the North is often at odds with US goals. They will likely not risk antagonizing China by aiding the US during a war.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
Here are the main points made in this paper:
- The Chinese want to incorporate Taiwan into their country, and will do so by force if they believe they can be successful.
- The United States should come to the aid of Taiwan in the event of a crisis
- Chinese military action, if it occurs, will come by way of blockade and threat of missile attack, not by traditional amphibious or airborne attack.
- The United States will be able to defeat the PLA forces, but perhaps not in time to prevent Taiwanese capitulation.
- If the Chinese decide to take military action, it will occur sometime shortly after the 2008 Olympics.
- The United States will have the assistance of Japan but not South Korea
- State clearly and unambiguously that we will defend Taiwan if the Chinese attack.
- Maintain a high level of military preparedness in the western Pacific region.
- Conduct regular military exercises in the western Pacific region.
- Sell Taiwan advanced weaponry, but with an eye towards not unnecessarily provoking the Chinese.
- Encourage, even demand, that the Taiwanese not declare their independence. To do so would be unnecessary and might provoke Chinese military action.
Be sure to check out By Dawn's Early Light's most recent post on a possible war with Taiwan. While you're there, check out his past articles on the subject too (listed in the sidebar at right). Bill takes on several issues that I have not, including "why the US will create strong alliances with India and continue to strengthen its Japanese and Australian security arrangements to avert a war over Taiwan and wait out for a democratic China."
In my post I argued that China would use the 2008 Olympics to showcase their regime and demoralize Taiwan. In the comments section to a post of his last week I asked Bill about this and he responded:
I think it is more likely that Taiwan will use the Olympics than China. What if Taiwan declares independence a month prior to the Olympics? That makes much more sense than China invading immediately before or after.
I hadn't thought of that, but it makes sense to me too.
Correction
As per Bill Rice's comment, the Taiwanese angle was actually made by Dan.
Posted by Tom at April 11, 2005 11:00 AM
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