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November 26, 2005
"More Troops"
One of the things that is often heard is that we should have committed more troops to Iraq. The criticism of "more troops" comes from all sides, and for a variety of reasons. When we hear it from John McCain, we can be sure it is honestly made, with the best of intentions in mind. When we hear it from leftist war critics, their motivations may not always be so kind.
Nevertheless, it is one I will consider in my series on "Iraq War Fallacies. I take it up because we hear it so often, and because those who make it are so vague when they say it.
This post is not so much military analysis as it is an attempt to define how we should think about the matter.
Lastly, please understand that because this is a blog post and not a book or academic treatise, I am not going to set things up by quoting those who have said we need or have needed more troops. Anyone who has listened to the news these past few years knows who they are.
Timeframe Matters
When do the critics say we should have had more troops? We need to remember that broadly speaking the war in Iraq has consisted of two phases; the initial invasion, and the insurgency.
Unfortunatly, it has been my observation that most of those who say that we need "more troops" are either not specific on this point or they get it wrong. Most who say that we need "more troops" seem to be saying that we should have had them there from the beginning.
If they say that we should have had them there from the beginning, it is my contention that they have it exactly backwards. From everything I saw the initial invasion was brilliantly planned and executed, and the forces used were almost exactly right.
And indeed the success of that initial invasion is too often forgotten. Those who never supported the war from the beginning crow all too often that "we have been proven correct." Nothing, of course, is further from the truth. The critics predicted thousands of American casualties in the initial invasion, as well as the famed "Battle of Baghdad", neither of which took place. But my intentions here are not to make the critics eat their words.
It was only later, once the insurgency started, that we should have sent in more troops. One problem we have faced is that after we have cleared an area of insurgents (or "terrorists" if you prefer. I prefer not to quibble over terms), and our forces have moved on, the terrorists move back in. In other words, we can clear but not hold. Another problem is that the insurgency is supplied with men, material, and intelligence from Iran and Syria. We do not have enough troops to secure the border against their infiltration.
These problems are slowly but surely being alleviated with the emergence of the new Iraqi army. Unfortunately this is a slow process, burdened by a tradition of incompetence among Arabs in general and Iraqis in particular in military affairs. In another post I will tackle the fallacy that "we should have kept the Iraqi army(Saddam's army)" after the initial invasion. For now suffice it to say that we should have had more troops in the country to secure the areas we have cleared of insurgents.
But it's not that simple.
Where Would they Come From?
The most absolutely frustrating thing in listening to the critics is that I have never heard a one of them say exactly where the additional troops are supposed to come from.
There are two choices for obtaining more troops; bringing them from another theater, and raising new units. Each has advantages and disavantages.
Another Theater
The main advantage of bringing in troops from another theater is that it could be done quickly. It would also be cheaper than raising new units.
The disadvantage is that we have those troops in various places around the world for a reason; we need them there. We face threats around the world, and these days troops are likely to be used for anything from humanitarian relief during a natural disaster, to peacekeeping missions, to what the military calls high-intensity warfare.
So where are they to be taken from? The critics rarely say. We have troops in South Korea, so maybe we can take them from there. "Can't they defend themselves?" is something we often hear. The answer is that yes, they could, but this misses the point. We have our troops there not because the South Koreans coulnd't defend themselves (they could), but to prevent a war from breaking out in the first place. Kim Jong Il might mistakenly calculate that he can take the south, but the risks grow immesurably when American forces are involved.
Ok perhaps we take the risk and move those troops to Iraq (to continue our example). The point is that those who say we need more troops in Iraq, and want to use existing forces, have an obligation to tell us 1) where they would come from and 2) why the risk is acceptable. That they almost never do so is simply irresponsible.
New Forces
The next option is to increase the size of our military. After all, we are told, we need "more troops" both at home and abroad.
The advantage to this is that given the level of threats around the world, and the use to which our forces are put, we do need more troops. We constantly hear that our forces are "stretched thin", and in this the critics are right.
One disadvantage is that the process of reactivating units takes time. Most sources that I've read put the time at about two years. That new units would not be ready for action for some time raises two issues; one that in the meantime they are not where they are needed, and two that when they are ready they might not be needed.
"Not needed!?!" you say. Yes, "not needed". Far too many critics seem to think that they have a perfect crystal ball and can predict with absolute certainty what the future will hold. They act like they predicted the insurgency, when few of them did. They act like they know how long it will last, which none of them do.
The other problem is one of money. We already face a mounting federal deficit. Where are we to get the money from? There are two options; raise taxes or increase the deficit. Either would hurt the economy. Again, my problem is not that we should not do one or the other, but rather that those who are on the "more troops!" bandwagon have an obligation to tell us where we will get the money and why the negative effect on the economy is worth it. But they almost never do.
It's the Logistics, Stupid
The old aphorism "amateurs talk strategy, pros talk logistics" is true. Modern armies consume vast amounts of food, ammunition, fuel, and a million other things without which they would deteriorate rapidly.
During the Gulf War of 1990-91 we had access to the excellent port facilities of Saudi Arabia, and also to bases thoughout the country. Ever since the 1970s we had contingency plans for putting troops in that country, and years of building facilities paid off.
Saudi Arabia did not want lots of additional American troops coming to their country for an invasion of Iraq. As such, their help was limited to what we already had in the country, and the use of some clandestine bases for special ops work.
American troops, therefore, were limited to Kuwait as their staging area for Operation Iraqi Freedom(OIF). Kuwait's port facilities are smaller than that of Saudi Arabia, and the country itself is much smaller. The first meant that the amount of material that we could off-load into the country every day/week/month was limited and could't support a Desert Storm size force. The second meant that it would be harder to keep a large army dispersed enough to prevent preemptive attack by Saddam.
Dynamic vs Static Thinking
A static thinking model assumes that if you change one thing in history, everything else would have turned out just the same.
A dynamic thinking model understands that if you change one thing, everything else may change too, and not necessarily for the better.
Consider for a minute that you had married a different person. Today you wouldn't just have a different person in the house, everything else about your life would probably be different too. You would probably have a different job, be living in a different house in a different city, and so on.
The Fallacy of only Assuming the Good
Suppose you conclude that you should have gone to a better college. With a degree from a better institution you would have a higher-paying job. This is good. But while daydreaming you forget that you met your spouse at your current job, and you have a wonderful marriage. If you had a different job you would not have met him or her, and indeed might be in a bad marriage.
The point of course is that people who say that we should have done this or that tend to only assume the good results that would have come from such a decision.
People who say that we “need(ed) more troops” or that we should have “kept the Iraqi Army together” assume that only positive results would come from such a decision. They seem not to realize that there were potential negative consequences from taking a decision other than what we did.
For example, we are often told by war critics that the mere presence of American troops upsets the region. Ok...so wouldn't more troops make things worse?
Suppose we took troops from the western pacific, and China took that opportunity to make a move against Taiwan? Or, to return to our previous example, we took them from South Korea and Kim Jong Il decided that the time was ripe for an attack? What would the critics say then?
The Advantages of a Small Force
As Rich Lowry of National Review pointed out last year in "What Went Wrong" (subscription required), there were significant disadvantages to having put more troops in the field of battle:
If more troops would have enhanced security in the aftermath of thw war (a debateable proposition, as we shall see), the lighter and more mobile force had significant advantages in the prosecution of it. "The decision was made to collapse the regime as quickly and violently as possible," says a senior administration official. the most kimportant advantage of this approach, he sways, was simple: "A quick collapse saves American lives and Iraqi lives."It served other objectives as well. It made it possible to take the oilfields - crucial to Iraq's rebuilding - mostly intact before Saddam had time to destroy them. And there was the political consideration. It was thought important to avoid a drawn-out war, and the destabilizing effect it might have on the region. "You don't want an American army slogging it's way to an Arab capital," is how one official puts it.
The Most Wrongheaded Criticism
"We shouldn't have invaded if we didn't have enough troops"
This is actually something I heard from a caller to a radio talk-show last week, and figured I may as well use it in this post.
First, we needed to take down Saddam. OIF was right for many reasons, but that is not the subject of this post.
Second, we did have enough troops for the invasion, as events proved correct. That we did not anticipate the insurgency was a failure, but one that was largely unforseen by anyone at the time. And that includes war critics, who spent their time telling us about the tens of thousands of American casualties that would result from battle with the regular Iraqi army, especially in the "Battle of Baghdad" that would resemble Stalingrad of WWII fame.
Final Thoughts
Simply put, we had the right number of troops for the invasion but should have sent more in later. We should have taken them from Europe, especially the former Yugoslav republics and demanded the Europeans pick up the slack. We should have increased the size of the Army and Marines (and let the Navy and Air Force remain at current levels). Taxes should not have been increased, and painful as it is for me to say this, it should have been done through deficit spending. The economy is doing relatively well, and the worse option would be to increase taxes.
While the President is partially at fault, both parties in Congress must also shoulder much of the blame. The Republicans because they lack the courage of their convictions, and the Democrats because they seem intent on reverting to Jimmy Carterism.
So there you have it.
Posted by Tom at November 26, 2005 7:48 PM
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Comments
We couldn't secure the area from looting; and the lack of troops created an atmosphere of chaos. Both of these things predated the insurgency.
That we did not anticipate the insurgency was a failure, but one that was largely unforseen by anyone at the time.
Per Rumsfeld, what's dangerous is what you can't foresee, not what you can foresee. The corollary, which Rumsfeld chose to ignore so he could test the Rumsfeld Doctrine of a small & agile force, is that one should plan for the worst.
Posted by: jpe at November 28, 2005 2:24 PM
Wonderful post Tom!
a. The invasion of Iraq will most likely be viewed as "brilliant" only in Military academia for the next decade or so. Conventional "history" will catch up eventually.
b. Thanks for explaining the "when" part. I've always imagined that the critics were demanding that there be troops on every corner in every city and all over the rural areas in effect shutting down the entire country. That would definitely be an "occupation".
I have no doubt that the planners envisioned the looting and anarchy that took place when Baghdad fell. They most likely knew that it could not be stopped, only managed. A million more boots on the ground would not have contained all of it.
I had not thought of the "cleared" areas being re-inhabited by the terrorists, with the exception of Fallujah. You make a great point here.
c. What happened to the troops who were in Saudi Arabia on the base(es) we closed? I assume many were redeployed to Iraq.
d. 20/20 hindsight is great! When the Monday morning quarterbacks create a time machine, I might start listening. The last thing we need are military planners who are paralized with fear over unseen dangers despite the fact that they've planned for every contingency imaginable.
e. When you write about Saddam's army being dispersed, please explain exactly how it happened. I heard an interview with L. Paul Bremmer who flatly denied that any such order was given. Everyone else (read 'critic') says that there was some kind of command decision. Personally, I think Saddam's troops simply faded into the woodwork on their own.
Posted by: GunnNutt at November 28, 2005 7:10 PM
Thank you both for your comments.
GunnNutt, you are correct that Saddam's army simply faded away. I did not mean to imply otherwise, and if I did it was sloppy writing.
History is a wonderful thing, if read properly. Victory usually goes to the side that makes the fewest mistakes, something we tend to forget. We made a zillion in WWII, yet still managed to win.
As for the looting, one wonders what exactly additional troops would have done. Shoot them? Detain them? Fire tear gas? The international press and human rights groups would go ballistic if we had taken any of the above actions("I was just out to go buy a loaf of bread and the mean Americans arrested me!"). And if the simple presence of more troops would have done the trick(which is problematical), how many more would have been needed, and where would they have come from?
Even "planning for the worst" entails risks. Overallocation of resources means fewer will be available elsewhere. McClellan always wanted more troops, and refused to invade the south unless he got them. He didn't get them, so he didn't attack. When other Union generals finally did attack, they suffered huge losses and were often defeated. Was McClellan right? Not in this instance, because by waiting he sqandered much time, allowing the South to build up their defenses.
During WWII field commanders always wanted more troops, yet Eisenhower, Nimitz, MacArthur etc only had so many go go around. During the drive across France after D-Day Patton and Montgomery each demanded more fuel than was available, so Ike had to ration between them, satisfying neither. Patton always said that he could have won the war earlier if he had the gas, and maybe so. Yet giving it to him would have run the risk of another Stalingrad, with his army cut off inside Germany. On and on it goes.
So if we had invaded Iraq with more troops, or added more later, and another area of the world would have gone without. Everything is a calculated risk.
But again, if you're going to advocate "more troops", it seems to me you have an obligation to say roughly where they would come from, what other area of the world can do without, or how more units will be financed.
Posted by: Tom the Redhunter at November 28, 2005 9:33 PM
"The invasion of Iraq will most likely be viewed as "brilliant"
You smashed up a third world army with no air force and you think you are "brilliant?"
Then you get your arse kicked by a bunch of guys with RPG's and Ak47s. not quite so smart
Posted by: sonic at November 28, 2005 10:10 PM
Well, every comment thread needs its idiot troll. Sonic seems to be serving that purpose well here.
Posted by: Tom the Redhunter at November 29, 2005 9:52 PM
Tom, you made no mention of what happened to Saddam's army, only that you would write about it in another post. I wasn't accusing you of taking a side! I've heard so many critics say that "it was a mistake to disband them" that it seems like its become the truth, or at least common knowledge. I tend to believe the guy who would have given the order, and Bremmer flatly denies doing so. I think its another case of history rewritten.
Then you get your arse kicked by a bunch of guys with RPG's and Ak47s.
Sorry to disappoint you sonic, but we're the one's doing the ass kicking. I wish CENTCOM would create one of those tote-boards showing Dead Terrorists To Date.
Posted by: GunnNutt at November 29, 2005 11:22 PM
Oops, apparently I didn't understand you, Gunn. I wrote about why we didn't keep Saddam's army together a few months ago in a post here
StrategyPage also has a paragraph about the subject in this article
Posted by: Tom the Redhunter at November 29, 2005 11:53 PM



