The Redhunter

4. A third assertion is to blast the Sunni politicians who "ventured" into supporting the current Parliament, Government and Armed forces. Those "Sunnis" are the internal enemies of Zarqawi, for they have shifted the community into the Iraqi political process by accepting to integrate the various layers of Government. In his eyes, these politicians, including the speaker of the assembly, a Sunni, are obstructing his plans, and therefore his leadership.

5. A fourth assertion is about the other "insurgents." Few weeks ago, the chat rooms aired a number of releases from the "al Qiyada al Muwahhada lil Muwqawama." The "Unified Leadership of the Resistance" is a federation of other Jihadists and insurgents. They have rejected the extreme behavior of Zarqawi, especially the violence against Shiites and Iraqi civilians. At the time, observers in the West thought this was a rejection of Zarqawi as a leader of al Qaida. In fact this was a move by other Jihadists to distance themselves from the misdeeds of al Qaida-Iraq. The "Leadership" didn't criticize Bin Laden per se, but said Zarqawi is deflecting energies by waging an indiscriminate religious war (takfiri) against the Shiites.

Looks like there's some dissention in the ranks. This is no huge surprise. The letter we intercepted last summer (and released in October) from OBL's deputo Al-Zawahiri's to al-Zarqawi showed dissatisfaction with the way the latter was running the campaign in Iraq.

Bill Roggio analyzes the military and propaganda messages in the video. Roggio has moved to The CounterTerrorism Blog, so reset your bookmarks. Among his points

1) MANPADS. First and foremost, as Evan Kohlmann has noted, some of the terrorists standing guard during the scene in the desert are brandishing shoulder-fired surface to air missiles (MANPADS). While this indicates al-Qaeda in Iraq has this capability, very few Coalition aircraft have been shot down in Iraq. The likelihood here is Zarqawi's 'command element' has top priority in fielding these weapons systems. ...

5) The briefing. Zarqawi goes a long way to show he is the military planner and tactical commander. He pours over maps with four other masked terrorists. In one section of the tape, he appears to be pointing at the region around the city of Kirkuk. But remember that this scene, as all the others, were planned through in advance. Zarqawi knows U.S. intelligence will be thoroughly dissecting this tape, and may want to through the Coalition off of his scent.

Again, it seems as if Zarqawi is worried that he's losing control, or at least the confidence, of his fellow terrorists.

Douglas Farah, on the other hand, believes that it and and the latest bin Laden Tape Show Growing al Qaeda Propaganda Strength

What is interesting about the new bin Laden and Zarqawi tapes, besides some of the analysis done by my colleagues on the Counterterrorism Blog, is the fact that al Qaeda has grown increasingly adept at getting its propaganda videos quickly enough to be relevant to current events. This is new, and shows increased capacity and increased interest in keeping their message out in front, even it it may hint at internal problems.

Andrew Cochran, however, notes that while propaganda is all very fine and good, it is no substitute for battlefield victories. I hate to say it, but the VC and NVA didn't win any substantial victories against us in Vietnam, but they beat us in the end anyway. Victory is determined by achieving your political goals, which may or may not be achieved by tactical battlefield successes.

A story in todays Washington Times quoting an Arizona State University study shows that the jihadists propaganda very seriously as a weapon

The report found that jihadist operations use consistent patterns of outreach that establish them socially and religiously, generate public sympathy and intimidate opponents. Threats, in fact, are part of terrorist "talking points."

"Jihadis pursue these strategies using sophisticated, modern methods of communications and public relations," Mr. Corman said. "There's evidence in the documents that jihadis segment audiences and adapt their message to the audience."

Meanwhile, the always valuable StrategyPage believes that it shows that al Qaeda is on the verge of defeat.

Trends are often difficult to make out in this murky conflict, but the recent release of an audio message from Osama bin Laden on April 23rd, and a few days later, a rare video from Abu Musab al Zarqawi delivered the same message. Both sent out signals that failed to connect. Bin Laden urged his followers to go to Sudan and Israel and support the fight against Jews and Christian "crusaders." In Sudan, bin Laden was offering his services to kill Western peacekeepers that have not yet shown up in western Sudan (Darfur), where northern (largely Arab) Sudanese Moslems are killing southern (largely black African) Sudanese Moslems. Islamic radicals in Palestine (Hamas) and Sudan (the government) promptly and publicly rejected bin Laden's offer. This is a visible, to Western eyes, example of how Bin Laden's vision, of using Islamic terror to accomplish anything, has been discredited in the Islamic world. This shift in opinion was played out in Moslem media over the last three years, as Islamic terrorism was applied to Islamic populations in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The end result was that Islamic terrorism was no longer fashionable. Bin Laden is still something of a folk hero, but in the same iconic way that Che Guevara on a t-shirt or poster is. Ignored, but not forgotten. Bin Laden wannabe Abu Musab al Zarqawi followed with a video, where he urged Iraqi Sunni Arabs to buck up and get on with the war against "foreign occupiers" and the blasphemous (elected) government of Iraq. Zarqawi was basically pleading for the Iraqi Sunni Arabs to stop joining the government. This reflects the shift in Sunni Arab attitudes, against al Qaeda, in the last year. In an attempt to preserve it as a viable movement, Zarqawi has been demoted from commander of al Qaeda in Iraq, to figurehead and pitch man.

Their conclusion is that

No amount of hot air and spin will change the fact that al Qaeda has accomplished none of its goals, and has gotten lots of Moslems killed in the process.

Al Qaeda may not be destroyed, but they are defeated. Bin Laden and Zarqawi just said so.

This is true. The insurgency in Iraq we've been fighting is not the danger anymore. The new danger is these militias, mainly the Sadr and Badr armies. My prediction is the in the next phase we will concentrate on taking them down. This will start once the new government is consolidated. Stay tuned, because I've got a post planned on the phases of the war and where we are now.

Lastly, retired General John Keane has visited Iraq several times and believes that the insurgency is considerably weaker

"I think the insurgency is considerably weaker in one very large respect and its the most important respect. It doesn't enjoy the same support of the people it once had. The people are reaching for democracy and they do not support the insurgents. The majority of the Sunnis is what I'm talking about."

The Key to Success

The key to success has shifted from the military to the political. No great insight there, I realize, but it needs to be said. Last week Iraq achieved a great success with the formation of a new government. Much still needs to be done, such as assigning cabinet posts, resolving constitutional issues left hanging, and getting the resolved constitution approved by the people in a vote. But we can only take it one step at a time.