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August 23, 2006

The Word from the Generals

Via Powerline, interviews with the Generals running the war in Iraq.

In one Hugh Hewitt interviews General John Abizaid,,commander of CENTCOM. The second is a DOD press conference with Lt. Gen. Sir Robert Fry, deputy commander of the Multinational Forces-Iraq and the senior British representative in Iraq.

Both interviews are especially interesting in light of some good news about Baghdad. Both ABC News and The Washington Times are reporting significant drops in sectarian violence in the capital as a result of Operation Together Forward, the ongoing joint US-Iraqi effort to stabilize the situation.

Following are excerpts from each interview. First is Hewett's interview with General Abizaid,

HH: Can you begin, General, by giving us an overview of the situation in Iraq as of mid-August, 2006?

JA: The situation in Iraq right now, as you've seen, of course, there's an awful lot of sectarian violence, particularly in the Baghdad area. We've found it necessary to move additional troops down into the Baghdad area by extending some forces that we were going to redeploy to help shore up some of the work that the Iraqi Security Forces are doing. We're putting additional Iraqi Security Forces in the field there as well. It's very clear to all of us that have been serving in this region that Baghdad's the key to Iraq, and that we've got to get the levels of sectarian violence down in order for Iraq to stabilize. We're confident it can be done. We've seen some changes already that are somewhat positive. It's still too early to say, but the combination of Iraqi Security Forces and our forces, along with some measures being taken by the new government, we're confident can, over time, move Baghdad in the right direction.

HH: General Abizaid, are you confident as well that victory is possible in Iraq? And what will that look like?

JA: Yeah, no, I'm very confident that victory's possible, not only in Iraq, but in the broader Middle East, if you consider victory being a Middle East where extremism is not tolerated, and doesn't have a chance of going mainstream in the region. I certainly think that in Iraq, there'll be violence after the time that American forces depart. I think that the sectarian issues are deep, but they don't need to be fatal. I believe that over time, as you build institutional capacity and the Iraqi government, and especially in the Iraqi armed forces, that Iraqis will be able to do more and more of the day to day security work. And as that happens, we'll be able to bring our forces down.

Next is Lieutenant General Robert Fry at the DOD briefing. I found this one to be a bit more interesting. General Fry talked about many issues facing Iraq, and the questions were varied. But since the question of whether or not the situation in Iraq constitutes a "civil war" or not is oft-discussed, I thought I'd just excerpt that part of the interview.

GEN. FRY:...The second point I made was about the scale of the enterprise that we're involved in here in Iraq, and I think that still is at the very top of the list of what we're doing here. We're involved in trying to transfer -- transform a whole society, to take it from autocracy to liberal democracy, to take it from something which is entirely state controlled in economic terms to bring it to the disciplines of the market. And perhaps as importantly as anything now, we've got a free and sovereign and competent government to deal with. So I think that all those dimensions make life here complicated. ...

Now, something I didn't mention last time but will mention this time is the rather contentious issue of civil war. With the valedictory message of the erstwhile British ambassador being leaked as he was leaving Baghdad, it seems to cause an awful lot of comments, both in London and also in Washington as well. And I'd just like to offer my views on where we are on that issue.

In my judgment, we are not in a situation of civil war, and I think that we collectively have a lot of experience in what civil war looks like. I know what a civil war looks like from experience in the Balkans and parts of Africa. I also know what sectarian violence looks like from all the time that I've spent in Northern Ireland, and it seems to me it's the second of these two conditions rather than the first that we confront here in Iraq at the present time. But if you want to pick me up on my assertion, I'd be delighted for you to do so.
...

Q:Sir, this is Pam Hess with UPI... What difference does it make from a military perspective whether or not you call it civil war or sectarian violence? Does that change what you do? And is that difference -- does it even matter? Back here, when we look at the number of deaths and the level of violence, what difference does a label make?

GEN. FRY: Well, I think it makes a great deal of difference in this particular case. If you have a civil war, then typically and characteristically, you have the collapse of the central institutions of government. In an absence of government, there's the possibility of chaos. You also tend to lose the instruments of security, and if the army takes part on one side or the other, then, of course, that can have equally significant implications. So I don't think we're talking about labels or military semantics here. I think we're talking about qualitative differences.

There is a very intense sectarian conflict going on, but it is geographically defined. It is not resulting in the mass movement of population, which is characteristically what civil wars do. And it's still being conducted in an environment which has the central institutions of the state functioning. Now, that's the situation that I recognize at the present time. I do not see that as civil war, and neither do I draw glib differences between civil war and sectarian conflict. I think the differences are very substantial and still in existence in Iraq today.

Both generals are cautiously optimistic, as is Army Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, the main source for the Washington Times story cited above. Overall, the violence in the capital has dropped 20-33%, depending on whose numbers are cited. Obviously, we've had reason to be optimistic before, only to see setbacks. The next several months will tell.

For Additional Information: Bill Roggio of the Counterterrorism Blog has an excellent summary of the situation in Baghdad. Kirk H. Sowell of ThreatsWatch says that we're now in Phase II of Operation Together Forward. Both of them are also cautiously optimistic, but warn of dire consequences if we do not succeed.

Posted by Tom at August 23, 2006 9:34 PM

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Comments


The crux of the Baghdad quandary highlights the problems with the Iraq police. If we are to succeed in Iraq, and if we are ever going to leave, there needs to be some police force capable of providing security. We repeatedly hear they’re being trained, they operate ‘side by side’ with coalition troops, and we will ‘stand down as they stand up.’ I believe Bill Roggio summarizes my concerns nicely from the link you provided:

“And the Shiite dominated police force is not trusted by the Iraqi public. They have been accused of corruption and complicity in the sectarian violence. In some cases, the police stand by as Sadr's militias rampage, and in other instances have actively participated in the murders. The Iraqi police must be reigned in if Baghdad is to be secured.”

According to official sources cited in the Kirk Sowell article, the police are almost all trained up and ready to do the job:

Iraqi Interior Ministry forces, considered the national police, have reached 92 percent of the intended strength of 188,000, and are 90 percent trained and 83 percent equipped.


These statements on such an important issue seem contradictory to me. One says they are corrupt, untrustworthy and complicit in sectarian violence, while the other claims they are a professionally trained force ready to do the job. I suspect the truth is somewhere in between, they have all been trained, but some (the important questions is how many) are ineffective (either thugs themselves or incapable of standing up to the militias). Conservative sources play up the co-operation of Coalition forces and the Iraqi’s and how the new uniform design will prevent death squads from copying the uniforms (this assumes the death squads are not comprised of rogue police units who get official uniforms anyway). On the other side are sources such as Time, which provide some stories about the Ministry of the Interior, run by Bayan Jabr:

To help facilitate his transformation of the police forces, Jabr made sure to enlist the help of SCIRI's armed wing, the Badr Organization. Members of the militia have been a growing presence in the National Police, which now consists of nine brigades, with about 17,500 members divided between the Special Police Commandos, the Public Order brigades and a mechanized brigade, which will soon be transferred to the Ministry of Defense. "Leadership in the commando positions has been turned over to Badr," said Matt Sherman, a former CPA advisor to the Interior Ministry. "And new recruits are mostly Badr."

Indeed, outside the ministry headquarters, banners proclaiming solidarity with Imam Hussein, one of Shi'ites' holiest figures, snap in the spring breeze alongside — and sometimes instead of — Iraqi flags. Most of the guards' beards are invariably cut in the close-cropped Iranian style, making them stand out in Baghdad, where beards are less common.

According to Wikipedia, Jabr fled to Iran amid Saddam Hussein's crackdown on Shiite political groups and joined the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). He later headed SCIRI's office in Syria.

Let me get this straight, the current Iraqi Ministry of the Interior was trained in Iran and worked with the Iranian backed SCIRI in Syria, a hornets nest of Iranian backed terrorists. Is it a mute point to be concerned that Iranian agents are infiltrating Iraq and helping insurgents when an Iranian trained Shi’ite agent already runs the Ministry of the Interior (and the police)? In light of this information, it is no surprise to me that allegations of Shi’ite death squads seem to often be traced to the police forces. Yet the official line remians that these Iraq police will someday provide security for all Iraqi’s, even though their leader worked with Badr/SCIRI in Iran and Syria. I do agree with the bottom line of to be "cautiously optimistic, but warn of dire consequences of we do not succeed. "

Posted by: jason at August 24, 2006 1:08 PM

Thanks for your comment, jason, especially when you stay on topic. Lots of good info, and the Time article is interesting.

I don't see a contradiction between Sowell and Roggio. It is quite possible for the IP to "have reached 92 percent of the intended strength" and yet be corrupt and not"trusted by the Iraqi public." All the training and equiping figures mean is that we've set them up. What they do with our training and equipment is another matter. They can sit in the classes and pretend to buy what we're telling them and then go out and do something different.

Continuing in this vein, I was listening to Col David Hunt on the Jerry Doyle show today. Col Hunt was talking about how we had special ops advisors imbedded in the Iraqi army, but that we needed more of them, especially in the IP.

Posted by: Tom the Redhunter at August 24, 2006 9:17 PM

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