The Redhunter

Here's the quote in context:

From my vantage point here east of Baghdad, the surge was the right decision at the right time, and the Sledgehammer Brigade was put in the right spot and we're kicking the extremists' butt. We are at the front door of Baghdad, checking ID cards and positively affecting the lives of the good people in the Madain qadha as well as Baghdad.

However, our success cannot be attributed solely to security operations or the application of greater amounts of combat power. We attacked the problems in the Madain qadha by applying pressure on insurgents along all six lines of operation -- being security, governance, economics, transition, information, and rule of law. It requires projecting army units and American soldiers out of large forward-operating bases and into the population centers. We do not drive or commute to work. We live in the towns with the people that we are here to help. We walk to work.

By doing this immediately upon our arrival, we were able to develop strong relationships with governmental, Iraqi security forces, and perhaps most importantly out here, the tribal leaders, and catch insurgents off balance. Our efforts to assist the government and spark the economy, along with our constant presence, have demonstrated to the population and its key leaders that we are trustworthy and committed to the cause of stabilizing the communities we work in and that we will help them, always.

This is important because we did not always operate like this in Iraq. Before Gen Petraeus, our troops largely operated out of five large bases, and did "commute to work". Wesley Morgan explains in "Iraq Reborn" (Feb 11 2008 print edition of National Review, digital subscription required to view on-line)

Soon after the president's address, Petraeus and his civilian counterpart, Amb. Ryan Crocker, gathered a team of well-regarded officers, including Cols. H. R. McMaster, Peter Mansoor, and Bill Rapp. This team drew up a campaign plan that incorporated creative counterinsurgency solutions at all levels, with an emphasis on getting fighters out into hostile areas, keeping them there, and following up on their successes. One key innovation was the formation of a "strategic engagement cell" to lead reconciliation efforts with former insurgents. Another was the relentless emphasis on pushing combat units off the large bases from which they had "commuted to combat" in 2006, and onto outposts from which they could secure the population....

Most important, it was at the tactical level, overseen by battalion commanders, that the strategic emphasis on combat outposts was implemented. Across central Iraq, colonels and lieutenant colonels shouldered the risk of stationing their troops in exposed outposts from which they could more effectively secure the population....

The center of gravity in counterinsurgency operations is the population, not the enemy, and the objective is the population's security, not the destruction of all insurgents -- an impossible goal....

We could not have implimented this new strategy without the "surge brigades", but by the same token we are not succeeding in Iraq simply because we sent more troops.

"Sons of Iraq"

The formation of Concerned Local Citizens groups has been an integral part of our "Hearts and Minds" strategy. They've apparently been renamed to "Sons of Iraq".

Q Colonel, it's Luis Martinez with ABC News. I've just picked up lately that the new term, I guess, is Sons of Iraq. Can you tell us, is this a term for concerned local citizens that they have themselves come up or the Iraqis have come up with, or this is the American forces that have come up with this name? And if so, can you tell us why?

COL. GRIGSBY: This term, Sons of Iraq, I think, came from the government of Iraq. And it just shows -- from my perspective, it just shows that these individuals that are providing security, that are standing up for their country, are exactly what the government of Iraq wants for their country. They want the sons of Iraq to stand up and take care of their country and focus on improving the life of the good people of Iraq.

Q So can I infer, then, that you will no longer be calling the local Iraqis who assist U.S. forces concerned local citizens?

COL. GRIGSBY: That's correct. In the Madain qadha we will call them sons of Iraq, and I think that's throughout Iraq as well.

In response to an earlier question by Courtney Kube from NBC News Col Grigsby said that there were 6,093 Sons of Iraq in the Madain quadha, and that they were a mix of Sunni and Shia. 507 have applied to be national police.

Al Pessin asks the tough questions

Q: Colonel, it's Al Pessin from Voice of America. In your opening remarks you made a very strong case for the importance of numbers in your area. You explained it was 72 soldiers, then went up to 3,500. There was the unit that I guess went away for a while then came back, and you talked about their impact. I understand as you said another brigade's coming in behind you in your specific AOR, but thinking a bit more broadly, given the importance of the numbers, how can U.S. forces keep the lid on, keep the progress going in Iraq after they lose one quarter of the combat power they have now?

COL. GRIGSBY: That's a great question, and I appreciate that. All's I can do is talk about the Madain qadha, and this is what I can tell you.

...by us communicating more with the Sons of Iraq, which causes us to communicate out in the Madain qadha, more with the sheikhs and more with the people and more with the government, then we're starting to -- they're starting to trust us more. They start to realize that we are here to support and assist, and if and when we do reduce some forces in the Madain qadha, the people of Iraq will have a strong stable security element because you have a stood up Iraqi police, you have the Sons of Iraq that are protecting infrastructure and are protecting their neighborhoods.

But most importantly, you now have a functioning government, a government that can now help the people of -- help the people of the Madain qadha....

Q So, Colonel, do you think that -- in the near term that we're talking about, later this year, that the combination of the Iraqi army, the Iraqi police and these irregular Sons of Iraq forces will be able to take the place of one quarter of the U.S. combat power in terms -- in terms of maintaining security?

COL. GRIGSBY: What I'm saying is this is conditions based, and I -- all's I can focus on is the -- in the Madain qadha, and what I see happening in Madain qadha is pretty incredible. I see the individual person standing up and saying, "I do not want this type of violence in the Madain qadha anymore."...

...So as you can see, as these individuals stand up, the extremists can no longer hide where they used to hide in the populace because the populace no longer wants them in the Madain qadha...

Q But sir, if I may, even with all that, accepting all that, you've told us that your brigade's going to be replaced with another brigade, a one-for-one swap, but it won't be possible to do that nationwide. So if the local citizens and the Iraqi security could accomplish as much in security terms as you're saying, then it seems it wouldn't be necessary to replace your brigade with another full brigade.

COL. GRIGSBY: All's -- again, all's I can state is what's happening in the Madain qadha.

Again, this brigade was one of the first coalition force brigades that came out here. We came out here with 3,500 soldiers just about 10 or 11 months ago. We've made some great gains, but conditions-based, and we have a lot more to do still out here. I gave a couple examples of that as well, sir, where in certain areas we still need to go out and take care of some extremists. And also, we would need to work very hard with the qadha government so they have that linkage back into Baghdad with the Baghdad governorate. So we have some positive momentum but there's still a lot of work that still needs to be accomplished out here in the Madain qadha.

Q Thank you.

In his first question, Pessin tried to ask about the whole of Iraq, when we reduct our brigades from 20 to 15 ("...after they lose one quarter of the combat power they have now? ) Experienced reporter as he is, I am surprised he didn't know that the Colonel wasn't going to take the bait. Having watched many of these briefings and read many interviews, I can tell you that they are very disciplined about not discussing things either above their rank or outside of their physical area of responsibility.

It would seem to me that the situation in the Madain qadha is such that at this point we don't have enough confidence that our gains will hold if we don't do a one-to-one swap. Pessin makes the accurate observation that there are places in Iraq that we can't do a one-to-one swap, with the implication that those areas might regress. The strategy is to keep our troops in areas that we fear most might go to al Qaeda and other anti-Iraqi elements, and withdraw them from areas we are most confident about. Only time will tell whether this works.

So as far as the Madain qadha is concerned, it seems that this is an area were we are not completely confident that Iraqis can take control by themselves. This doesn't mean that Col Grigsby was blowing smoke in his introdction That Iraqis aren't ready to assume responsibility isn't necessarily "proof" that we aren't succeeding. As Max Boot pointed out in a recent article; "We Are Winning. We Haven't Won."

Yes we want the Iraqis to take over total responsibility as soon as possible. We also have to recognize that this is going to be a very long process. Lt Col (Dr) David Kilcullen pointed out to Charlie Rose a few months ago that there has never been a successful counterinsurgency that took less than 10 years to win. This does not mean that the same number of troops is needed throughout the entire war, because this is not World War II but rather what they call a low-intensity conflict.

Another good interview which contributes to our understanding of the situation in Iraq.