The Redhunter

3. THE BOTTOM LINE:

a. The United States is now clearly in the end game in Iraq to successfully achieve what should be our principle objectives:

• The withdrawal of the majority of our US ground combat forces in Iraq in the coming 36 months.
• Leaving behind an operative civil state and effective Iraqi security forces.
• An Iraqi state which is not in open civil war among the Shia, the Sunnis, and the Kurds.
• And an Iraqi nation which is not at war with its six neighboring states.

b. The security situation is clearly still subject to sudden outrage at any moment by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or to degradation because of provocative behavior by the Maliki government. However, the bottom line is a dramatic and growing momentum for economic and security stability which is unlikely to be reversible. I would not characterize the situation as fragile. It is just beyond the tipping point.

• Daily attacks hit a high of 180+ in July of 2007--- they are now down to 20+ per day.
• Civilian deaths dropped from 3700 per month in Dec 2006 --- to 400 + in October 2008.
• US military deaths dropped from 110 in May of 2007---to 10 in October 2008.
• Iraqi Security Forces KIA dropped from 310 in June 2007--- to 50 in October 2008.)

c. The genius of the leadership team of Ambassador Ryan Crocker, General Dave Petraeus, and Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has turned around the situation from a bloody disaster under the leadership of Secretary Rumsfeld to a growing situation of security. Ambassador Crocker will be very, very difficult to replace in February 2009. We are fortunate that General Ray Odierno has stepped in to take Joint command of MNF-I. He is very experienced, knows all the players and has sophisticated situational awareness. The Iraqis trust him enormously--- they refer to him as the "big man with the quiet voice."

All this is very good. We have come a long ways and should be thankful for it. President Bush belatedly recognized that things were going wrong, and appointed the new team of Gates, Fallon, and Petraeus to fix things. They did. Later in his report McCaffrey details some of the errors that we made early in the war, remarking that "It is hard to not be bitter about the misjudgments and denial of the DOD leadership during the first years of the war. It did not have to turn out this way with $750 billion of our treasure spent and 36,000 US killed and injured."

True enough, and I do not doubt that his assessment of what we did wrong is incorrect. I won't list it all here, though, because my purpose is what we should do going forward, not what we should have done.

McCaffrey's report is only 9 pages long, and every paragraph a gem, so it's tempting just to reprint the entire thing. Here, though, are a few key statements from his "Context" section

It is unarguable that the past 18 months have witnessed a dramatic, positive change in the Iraqi internal security situation. Iraqi and Coalition Security Force casualties in a comparative sense are now at rock bottom. Ethnic strife between the Shia and the Sunnis has all but stopped. The Shia militias have in general been neutralized--- and the Sunni insurgents bought out by the Sons of Iraq Program....

The lawless disintegration of the state at province and municipal level which was apparent on my earlier visits has now largely abated....

Iranian intervention is relentless, lethal, and implacably hostile to US interests--- but has to a great extent alienated the southern Iraqi Shia and been largely ineffective.

The Maliki government remains largely dysfunctional in its ability to deliver services to the population (jobs, electricity, clean water, infrastructure repair, oil production, budget expenditure, etc)... (but) Mr. Maliki clearly has matured and gained stature as a political leader....

We should have a sense of empathy for these Iraqi politicians. They have survived a poisonous Saddam regime and a culture of intrigue and murder from every side.....

Indeed what has always struck me is the lack of respect Iraqis in general get from people in the U.S. on both sides of the political isle. Conservatives tend to ignore them, crediting everything to the U.S. military, usually even ignoring Amb. Crocker himself. Liberals tend to use them in casualty counts to "prove" how brutal the U.S. led war has been to the Iraqi people. Both sides tend to denigrate Iraqi politicians, caricaturing all of them as corrupt and incompetent.

No doubt the Iraqi government has a long ways to go. We're all familiar with the infighting based on sect, factional, tribe, and clan loyalties. Many have used the security services to murder not just opponents but numbers of ordinary civilians. Corruption is not just rife, but a way of life there, as it is in most of the Third World.

Because the surge has been so successful, we now hear from some on the left "let's immediately stop spending $10bl per month, bring the troops home, downsize the Pentagon and get on with life."

This message comes from those who either never wanted Iraq to succeed in the first place or gave up on it completely sometime after the insurgency started. They opposed the surge, saying that only political progress could save Iraq. Long after it was obvious that the surge was working they continued to deny the obvious progress. Now that the lack of violence is undeniable, and there is a relative stability, they don't even care enough to want to make sure the country does not backslide. All we hear is the same tired mantra; "troops out now!"

Despite our progress, regular readers of this blog know that most commanders, including Petraeus, still say the situation in Iraq is "fragile." Just click on "Iraq II 2007 - 2008" and search for "fragile" and you'll see what I mean.

Knowing this, McCaffrey lays out four scenarios where "success in Iraq could turn to collapse." Download the report and read all four yourself, but here's one:

Precipitous US military withdrawal before the Iraqis have developed a fully functional security presence among all eighteen provinces would also imperil the enterprise. The Iraqis do not have a functional Air Force (lift, gunships, transportation, and close air support). They do not have a Navy and Marine Corps yet capable of protecting their Gulf transportation and petroleum infrastructure. Their Border Security Forces are still anemic. The Iraqi Armed Forces in general lack adequate armor, artillery, maintenance, logistics, medical, and communications to function in counter-insurgency operations or border defense without US support. Their military officer corps is immensely better than a year ago--- but the bench is thin. The young officers at company and battalion level show great promise and courage. The legacy of the Saddam nightmare weighs heavily on the culture of the more senior officers. Finally, the confidence of the Iraqi combat force is still dependant on US mentoring and backup. Their officers are very explicit on this point---THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES DO NOT WANT THE US COMBAT UNITS TO LEAVE---YET.

So much for blanket statements like "the Iraqis want us to leave." Indeed, USMC Maj. Gen. Martin Post offered a more nuanced statement in a press briefing that I covered Nov 11 when he said, in response to a question on the subject;

Candidly, it depends upon who you talk to. In some cases, if you talk to the local man on the street, they'll look at us and say, "Hey, I think we're ready for you to go."

If you talk to the -- the leadership -- you know, the IP leadership or the Iraqi army leadership or the provincial leadership, they would probably tell you, "Hey, we need you here for some period of time longer." Not really ever saying, "We need you here for one year or two years," but I think we're still, if you would, that security blanket for them, in the -- standing behind them....

This makes sense. If I was an Iraqi I'd say that I want the Americans gone too. No one wants foreign troops in their country. We're lucky we got the Germans to accept such large numbers for so long, Soviet threat or no.

Further, although it has been a maddeningly slow journey to get the Iraqi security forces as far as they are, Gen. Petraeus warned about this in the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. Take the time to read it if you want to understand where we've been and where we're going.

Driving home the point, at the end of his report McCaffrey says that

...It is essential for both US and Mid East security that we pull out of Iraq in a deliberate and responsible manner--- and leave a stable and functioning state. This is clearly within our capabilities.

Again; "pull out of Iraq in a deliberate and responsible manner," not in the helter-skelter manner advocated by anti-war types.

Two more excerpts from the report and they I'll wrap it up. He has this to say about the senior military leadership:

Finally of note--- the senior leadership at general officer and brigade command is remarkable. They are visible to their troops and share the personal risk of the battlefield. (This is in marked contrast to the stacked helicopters of the Vietnam War commanders.) General Odierno has personally been under direct small arms fire and IED attack during his three combat tours at Division, Corps, and now theater command. LTG Lloyd Austin nearly got nailed by direct machine gun fire while directing forward operations during the recent battle to control SADR City in Baghdad. LTG Frank Helmick and BG Tony Thomas both recently survived an IED attack of an 800 lb suicide vehicle bomb which totally destroyed their MRAP vehicle. (The survivability of the MRAP vehicles has drastically reduced casualties among our forces.)

I've heard our generals talk about how they go out with the troops, and read stories on this too, but didn't know about the attacks they'd survived. We are lucky to have such able and brave leaders.

Lastly, a note to the future:

The likely strategic outcome will be a more rapid forced drawdown than desirable in Iraq in order to enhance combat power for Afghanistan. It will be a tricky balance--- but in my judgment we will pull this off successfully. Iraq will stabilize with the rapidly increasing power of the Iraqi Security Forces ---while we reinforce the inadequate NATO combat power in Afghanistan.

I'd already figured that my own coverage would see a shift to Afghanistan in coming months and years. I've noticed that I've posted more "Afghanistan Briefings" of late.

Previous McCaffrey Reports on Iraq
The December 2007 General Barry McCaffrey Report on Iraq
Barry McCaffrey on Iraq II, March 29, 2007
"The Most Brilliantly Led Military We Have Ever Fielded" May 14, 2006