The Redhunter

COL. HORT: Thank you, Bryan, and good morning, everybody. Colonel John Hort, as Bryan said, commander of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

But first of all, we've got the Adhamiya District on the east side of the river on the northeast side of Baghdad as well as Sadr City. So they're two very large districts -- Fort Baghdad, about 4 million strong, in terms of the population density. About 40 percent of the Baghdad population kind of resides in our area of responsibility, as well as one Iraqi army division, the 11th Iraqi Army Division, which comprises the 42nd Iraqi Brigade as well as the 44th Iraqi Brigade that partners with us in the security component of our responsibilities over here.

Significant amount of progress, as I'm sure that you all know, has been made in the last year in terms of security, as well as the local governance and economic and essential services progress that we're seeing here on the ground.

To start off with Adhamiya briefly, we've -- when I got here, we were averaging roughly around six to seven attacks a day, which was actually down from the 14 attacks they were -- they were seeing prior to the surge. Since I've been here, in about a year now, we're down to less than one attack a day in the Adhamiya District, which is primarily a Sunni area, just on the river. And then it kind of transcends over to the Shi'a side as you move farther to the east. So a significant reduction in violence in that part of our area of responsibility. And I attribute that largely to what the Iraqi security forces have been able to do over the last year as we partner with them in defeating al Qaeda, which tends to be our biggest threat over here, as well as some special groups of criminals that do, in fact, operate in the Adhamiya district.

What I would call our main effort -- Ted and I's main effort -- is Sadr City, comprised of about 2.5 million people, as most of you might be familiar with; a large population density -- probably the largest density of Iraqis living in one area in Baghdad and probably all of Iraq; prior to the March time frame a very very kinetic area to operate in, not only for coalition forces but for Iraqi security forces.

But through the March-April-May time frame, a significant amount of combat operations were conducted in this area against the special- groups criminals, and some Jaish al-Madhi militia, that resulted in the cease-fire that you probably heard about in May that has really turned the corner, in our estimate, in terms of the special groups being significantly disrupted over here and, some would argue, actually defeated in some cases.

But they're certainly on the run inside and outside of Sadr City....

Most of the key leaders fled around the middle of May, went to various countries or south of Baghdad, and today we're seeing some of those individuals try to make it back, but what's different -- what's different today that they did not see before is that they are, in fact, fugitives now. The Iraqi army is in pursuit of them, attacking them, capturing them and bringing them to justice. And I think that's one of the most significant changes that I have seen in my 12 months, is the Iraqi security forces' willingness and capability to actually go after some of the special-groups criminals that really did not have that to worry about, about seven months ago....

We've been able affect health clinics, schools, parks, to some extent, the electricity in this part of Sadr City as well as trash and sewage, which has been a major focus. And that has worked extremely well, not only in the security component but also giving the people a sense of normalcy and bringing this part of the city back to life.

And it's also had an impact on the government of Iraq, as they have watched kind of our support to the local government down here, in the south part of Sadr City, also start to see some progress up in the northern parts or the parts beyond the gold wall, as we call it.

So once again we see the success of the surge. Not only did it quell the violence, but it has led to political progress. The Iraqi security forces are picking up the pace, and local Iraqi governments are stepping up. As Col Hort noted at the end, there's a cascading effect whereby the central government is affected by success at the local level. Some have said that it progress could only happen from the top down, but this has been disproven by facts on the ground.

Next was the Q & A between Hort, Williams, and the assembled reporters. As mentioned above, we'll concentrate on those questions that touched on the SOFA.

A Status of Forces Agreement is a legal document that provides the legal basis for one country to keep military forces in another. It also covers all manner of legal issues that pertain to individuals and property, both those of regular military personnel and civilian contractors. For example, it covers whose court system tries a soldier or civilian if they are accused of A or B crime. It covers damages that might be made to civilian property by military vehicles in the course of exercises or warfighting. The United States has a SOFA with every country where we have troops.

As everyone knows, a long-awaited SOFA was signed between the governments of the United States and Iraq over the weekend. I have neither the time, the inclination, nor the expertise to analyze the details and all that they mean. That said, The Washington Post has a useful backgrounder(and see this Post story. The Iraq Oil Report claims to have a leaked copy of the agreement itself, though I'll let readers judge the reliability of it for themselves.

So far, Maliki's cabinet has unanimously approved the SOFA, which is good news. Now it must go before the Parliament, and like in any democracy there will be at least some disagreement.

Let's go to the Q & A:

Q Colonel, this is David Morgan from Reuters... The question is this: Given the Sadrist opposition to the SOFA agreement, how do you assess the threat of violence on that count? And is it possible that the May cease-fire could be vulnerable to violence coming from opposition to the SOFA?

COL. HORT: What -- my assessment right now of that particular part of the insurgency is that it is -- it is severely disrupted. As I mentioned, a lot of the leaders left, and they -- we've seen some return of the leadership, either from different countries like Iran or Syria or wherever they fled to, or in parts from the south that they've come back. But they have not all come back. And so that part of the leadership -- at least 50 percent, in my estimation -- is still missing that we saw prior to the May cease-fire. So the leadership itself is not completely intact yet to really affect a large-scale uprising or anything that we have seen before. We still watch that very closely.
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Q Ken Fireman from Bloomberg News. A question for both Colonel Hort and Dr. Andrews. It now looks like there's a good chance that the SOFA will take effect, given what happened in the cabinet yesterday. If it does take effect, how will that affect the environment -- the political and the security environment in which both of you and your people operate? And how will it affect your day- to-day operations?

COL. HORT: Did you want to --

DR. ANDREWS: Let me just -- excuse me, let me just take an initial swing at that. I don't see any immediate effect on our operations. Our -- (audio break) -- in promoting governance, promoting economic development, promoting essential services for the people.

On this day-to-day level, the SOFA is not a big issue, not with the local-level politicians with whom we're working most closely. It's obviously a piece of the background news and people, I think, will be a little bit apprehensive in the day or so after it, but there's no great apprehension of major problems.

The election is coming up. A lot of the leaders down at the provincial level are really concerned about that. A lot of them are going to be running for the election. And they're also really worried about how are they going to get services in their area. And that's the focus of things, not the SOFA.

COL. HORT: I would just say from the -- taking the security standpoint as we look at SOFA -- (audio break) -- obviously been able to read, kind of, exactly what all of the points and pieces of it are, but as I understand it, it will probably look something like a transition period for coalition to move more to a perimeter type of, you know, support to the Iraqi security forces inside of Baghdad.
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And so, I think there will be some transition that we have to work through if that's, in fact, where's going. But in general right now, with the exception of Sadr City, we're kind of already moving in that direction, even prior to the SOFA with the Iraqi army taking more and more responsibility, more and more of the lead, particularly the targeting of the bad people -- and I talked about, the special groups, but also the al Qaeda that is not -- is still somewhat out there within certain parts of our area. So I don't -- I don't see a significant change.

We do have some joint security stations and combat outposts that are inside the city that we would probably have to push more out towards the perimeter of the city, but I think that we can work through all of that. And I just will say that the Iraqi army today, more so than when I was an adviser, has got a tremendous amount of confidence in themselves and is doing more and more each and every day that we work with them.

Q For Dr. Andrews, you said that some people in your area may feel a little bit of apprehension about the SOFA. Could you specify what the source of their apprehension would be? What will they be concerned about?

DR. ANDREWS: No, I think -- I'll backtrack a little bit from that, but the issue's that they hear the news stories and just wonder whether things might happen. A few days ago we met with some leaders and they said: Oh, did you hear, the -- you know, that the cabinet had made this decision? Do you think anything is going to happen? And we could say we don't think anything serious will happen.

So it's an issue in the news. People here have been through a lot over the last few years, and they've got very -- you know, they have paid, almost all of them, some sort of personal price. So they've got an obvious concern, but I don't think there's anything specific that they know that we don't know about, of any great danger, that's going to arise simply by the signing of this.

I'll take these two at their word because it makes sense that the signing of the SOFA would cause little immediate effect in Sadr City. It will be interesting to see what happens in future briefings, especially by senior commanders such as Lt. Gen. Austin or Gen. Odierno.

As for the larger picture, an article in yesterday's Washington Times says that the Iraqi PM sees the pact in terms of restoring sovereignty. Iraq is an "honor society," and as such image and perception are all-important. All people want to run their own affairs, and the Iraqis are no different. What is different between them and post-WWII Germany and Japan is that we beat the latter two into oblivion before occupying their countries. Their people were so war-weary they were in no mood to resist whatever treaty or constitution we foisted on them. Our experience in Iraq has been dramatically different, to the point where the Iraqis are asserting themselves sooner.

From our perspective, there certainly are problems with the SOFA. First, although our troops will be tried in our military courts for any alleged crimes they commit while in Iraq, our contractors will have no such protection. Second, we cannot use Iraq as a base for operations against other countries. Third, all U.S. troops must be out by 2011.

Even with these I'm not as worried as some. All this is renegotiable and it won't be for a year or so before we know where things are really headed.

The editors at National Review see mostly good in the pact, saying that it's successful conclusion is "a blow to the schemers in Iran -- and to their cat's-paw, Moqtada al-Sadr -- who did all they could to torpedo the pact." True enough.

On the other side, Andrew McCarthy, also writing at National Review, sees cause for worry. He says that "behind the smiles" lies the inconvenient fact that "the Iraqis don't like us," and he cites polls to support his thesis. To McCarthy, winning is not about establishing a democracy, it is about defeating radical Islam. Because of the terms of the SOFA and leaks as to how the negotiations went, he concludes that the "Iraqis are more concerned about prosecuting Americans than embracing them."

Readers of this blog know that I have a lot of respect for McCarthy, and time will tell whether he's right or not. For now I think he's being a bit too pessimistic. Recall the Nov 10 briefing by Maj. Gen. Martin Post (USMC) in which addressed the issue of whether "the Iraqis" want us to leave or not and said that

Candidly, it depends upon who you talk to. In some cases, if you talk to the local man on the street, they'll look at us and say, "Hey, I think we're ready for you to go."

If you talk to the -- the leadership -- you know, the IP leadership or the Iraqi army leadership or the provincial leadership, they would probably tell you, "Hey, we need you here for some period of time longer." Not really ever saying, "We need you here for one year or two years," but I think we're still, if you would, that security blanket for them, in the -- standing behind them....

This makes sense. Things could go either way in Iraq but right now I'm cautiously optimistic.

More than that, though, I've always taken the long view with regard to Iraq. I know this sounds terribly Wilsonian (not to mention neoconservative!) but I do think that a pluralistic society in Iraq will serve American and indeed Western interests. It's not so much about this or that policy, or whether they allow us to have bases on their soil, but whether it changes their attitude towards the relationship of government to the individual and the role of religion. Sure, Islam is enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution, and I'm less than pleased about it. This may well though prove to have been a temporary measure to satisfy entrenched interests. The enemy of radical Islam or jihadism is pluralistic societies more than it is military bases or particular policies. I think McCarthy is wrong in that there is a link between democracy (or liberty or a pluralistic society, choose your term) and defeating jihadism.

Further, although in the long run having the Iraqis "like us" would be nice, in the short term it's not the point. Much of counterinsurgency revolves around winning the "hearts and minds" of the populace, and note that this is probably the most misunderstood term in all of warfare. From the book that then Lt. Gen Petraeus wrote (ok he led the team that wrote it), the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24

"Hearts" means persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN success. "Minds" means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless. Note that neither concerns whether people like Soldiers and Marines. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, successful trusted networks grow like roots into the populace. They displace enemy networks, which forces enemies into the open, letting military forces seize the initiative and destroy the insurgents.

Of course, I could be wrong.

Before we end, let's look at two other exchanges that highlight issues of importance. In this first one, in response to a question Dr. Andrews discusses something that goes to the heart of counterinsurgency warfare:

DR. ANDREWS: I would just add to that that the biggest problem that we would face is not the -- the biggest problem we would face is that people sometimes feel a little bit hopeless after all the years of fighting that they've had. And the thing we're trying to push them for is not to feel that, not to feel helpless, to let them know they've got institutions that can work to represent their interests, to push their interests. And we're trying to show that there's benefits of working in a democratic way, and I think the vast majority of people in our area get that. So there are services, there is pressure to get more services and that's -- (audio break).

Read this post at Small Wars Journal for the complete explanation.

Beating insurgents is about a lot more than what the military calls "kinetic operations." That's important, to be sure, but in the long run you can't shoot your way out of an insurgency. Sure, violent military operations are important, and no one is saying otherwise. But in the end you have to give the people a reason to side with the government other than that you'll kill them if they don't. This is where the "hearts" part of the phrase comes into play.l

See then-Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno's "exit interview" of February 2008. Odierno said of the Iraqi people that

As long as they (the Iraqi people) feel safe... they will continue to support us... if they feel rejected by their government.. that will be a turning point on what decision they make.

Dr. Andrews and his team are trying to make sure the Iraqi people believe that the government has their best interests at heart. Only if they do will final victory and a stable Iraq be assured.

And speaking of how the people see their situation, this last exchange is important:

Q Okay. This is Joe Tabet with Al Hurra. Quick question. Based on your assessment, how do you see the current status of Jaish al-Mahdi, and how do you see its future?

COL. HORT: ...talking with the Iraqi military that operates a lot inside the parts of Sadr City that I don't go to, they are not seeing the militia that we used to see before, which was brandishing weapons, controlling neighborhoods, extorting money.

And one of the true signs that we see in change is the Jamila market. This market is inside Sadr City. It's the largest market in Baghdad, and I think in Iraq, if I'm not mistaken. It basically distributes out to all different parts of the city, as well as receives the goods in.

So it's a large, large market that supports, you know, millions of people in the city of Baghdad. That market used to be the primary funding -- financing of the Jaish al Mahdi militia, as well as parts of the special groups. Today, that's a free market, controlled by the market owners, the businessmen, as well as those that lease the stalls in that area, and we're not seeing any extortion at all. So that's a sign of progress that the Jaish al Mahdi militia are trying to step away from that type of nefarious activity that they were doing before.

Free markets, owned and operated by Iraqis, largely free of corruption, and where people feel safe, will save Iraq as much as any round from an M-4.