The Redhunter

The problem in Afghanistan is summed up by Tim Lynch, as quoted by Bill Roggio in The Weekly Standard:

America cannot bring security to the rural population of Afghanistan if every time they interact with that population they treat them as potential enemy fighters. The military believes "force protection" is the job number one and I have listened to officers wax eloquent on the subject of protecting their men and woman no matter what because this country is not worth the noble sacrifice that their young troopers would represent if they lost life or limb here. I have used all my self control to avoid kicking these idiots in the teeth which is what they deserve. That kind of thinking will lead to our defeat just as certain as day follows night. It is ridiculous and based on an inflated self centered egotism which I find alarming. Infantry officers are paid to think - to think about the best way to beat those who ask for it while maintaining the cohesion and high morale amongst their troops. The job of military leaders is to spend blood, American blood, and spend it wisely in pursuit of the missions and objectives given them by their civilian masters. I know what those masters have said is our mission in Afghanistan. I also know the current American TTP (tactics, techniques and procedures) do not in any way support the mission they have been given and in fact do the exact opposite by alienating the very population we are supposed to be "winning." I might be being a little harsh here but how else do you explain the performance of our military to date?

Ouch. I have little way of knowing whether such criticism is accurate or not, but Roggio is generally a reliable source.

Roggio also says this about how U.S. and allied forces are operating

Unfortunately in Afghanistan, the United States and NATO have learned little from the success in Iraq, and are still largely operating from large bases (there are of course exceptions to this, but as a whole, combat power is concentrated in large bases).

This is very bothersome, if true. Roggio is dead right about Iraq. Prior to the surge, we tended to keep our troops on 5 large bases and only send them out on raids (a simplification to be sure, but as a general observation correct). We did this because we wanted to protect our troops, and thought that keeping them secure on bases was the way to do it. No one likes casualties.

Then came then-Lt. Gen. David Petreaus, who in October of 2005 returned from his second tour in Iraq to take command of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He took charge of the team that was writing what would eventually become the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, released on December 15, 2006.

FM 3-24 revolutionized how we fought the war in Iraq. The 5 additional surge brigades to bolster the existing 15 in Iraq weren't just sent to do the same thing; there was a radical change in strategy. No more were we going to stay on our bases and only head out on raids.

Not only did this lead to a more successful prosecution of the war, it also made our troops safer. Here is one of the key insights from 3-24 as it applies to the problem in Afghanistan stated above:

1-149 SOMETIMES, THE MORE YOU PROTECT YOUR FORCE, THE LESS SECURE YOU MAY BE. Ultimate success in COIN (counterinsurgency) is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained...These practices endure access to the intelligence needed to drive operations. Following them reinforces the connections with the populace that help establish real legitimacy.

In other words, get off the bases and be among the people. Get to know them personally. Know your area of operations backwards and forwards; economics, religious sects, clans, tribes, ancient rivalries, who owns every store and shop, what holidays the celebrate and how, who the village/clan/tribal leaders are, local politics, on and on. Yes kinetics are important. It's just that alone firepower cannot win.

Petraeus' team wrote about this in FM 3-24

7-7 ...Effective commanders know the people, topography, economy, history, and culture of their area of operations (AO). They know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance within it...

7-8 Another part of analyzing a COIN (counterinsurgency) mission involves assuming responsibility for everyone in the AO. This means that leaders feel the pulse of the local populace, understand their motivations and care about what they want and need. Genuine compassion and empathy for the population provide an effective weapon against insurgents.

You can't do this if your emphasis is on "force protection," and indeed as stated above such an emphasis is counterproductive, as counterintuitive as that may sound. Now, I understand that it's easy for me to sit here and type these words, never having served myself. And I'm not an original thinker here; all I'm doing is relaying what other more learned and experienced men and women have said.

Here are just a few posts in which our commanders in Iraq explained how they did these things and more:

Iraq Briefing - 04 Feb 2008 - "We do not drive or commute to work"
Iraq Briefing - 22 February 2008 - "We are Living with the Population"
October 12, 2008 - Gen Petraeus' Speech on Iraq - How We Did It

Earning the trust of the people is critical to beating an insurgency. As Lt. Col. (Dr.) David Kilcullen wrote in FM 3-24

A-60 ...Whatever else is done, the focus must remain on gaining and maintaining the support of the population. With their support, victory is assured; without it, COIN efforts cannot succeed.

What is important to note that this emphatically does not mean "making the people like us." The people can hate the counterinsurgents for all it matters. What is important is that they believe the counterinsurgents will win and that it is in their best interests that they win. It is a hard-headed calculation of self interest, not emotion.

In some recent Afghanistan briefings (here and here), our commanders discussed something called "Human Terrain Teams." Essentially, the HTT is part of a "counter-insurgency effort of the United States military which embeds anthropologists with combat brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan to help tacticians in the field understand local cultures."

All fine and good, but Tim Lynch isn't convinced it's all working (direct link to his post here). He points out that although we can beat the Taliban every time even when outnumbered 10-1, this doesn't mean we are winning. Kinetics, as stated above, alone will not beat an insurgency. More to the point, he lays out the relationship between the HTT and the concept of "living with the people" as discussed above:

The mixing of civilian experts with the military in the current Human Terrain Team program has not gone well and I don't care what you read in the press on the subject believe me when I say the program is an abject (multi-million dollar) failure. HTT teams can only venture off base when embedded with large American convoys and therefore seldom get out. Because their offices are on base they use the military computer networks which will not allow them to access the very Jihadist website they are supposed to be monitoring. They will not be a useful tool to any commander until they are let off base and given the freedom of action to move about their areas of responsibility, develop relationships with the tribal elders and basically gather the information the program is supposed to gather.

In other words, force protection is more important than getting out among the people, however risky that may seem. No one, including Lynch, is saying that we send the HTT civilians out unprotected. What is being said is that they're being sent out with too large a force, one that intimidates the very people whose trust we're supposed to be winning. Send them out with a smaller security force and let them do their job. Keep airpower and other resources on standby but that's it.

Let's hope that President Obama takes heed of this and more. Sending more troops to Afghanistan to do the same thing is not only unlikely to produce results, it will lead to declining popular support for the war. It's not only the population in Afghanistan that matters, but the one back home as well.