The Redhunter

From their opening remarks:

COL. PIATT:...Salah ad Din is also the home of the al-Askari, or Golden Dome, mosque. The major industries are agriculture and oil.

The security situation here has improved dramatically in the past year, and much of that progress is directly attributable to the provincial Iraqi police, almost 17,000 strong, commanded by Major General Hamed. I tell him every time I see him that he's one of my bosses, and I sincerely mean that. I'm here to enable his police force to secure the province.

GEN. AL-JUBOURI:...we would have been not able to achieve this process, the elections, without good security in the province of Salah ad Din. The police of Salah ad Din played a very big role and also put tremendous effort -- (audio break) -- succeeding the elections. And that's with the assistance and support of coalition forces and also the Iraqi army and the Sons of Iraq.

We also cannot forget the role of the citizens of Iraq, how they cooperated and assisted the Iraqi security forces in general.

Col Piatt looks very proud of Gen Al-Jubouri, beaming at times as if he was the proud father to his son or daughter who has come far and done well.

As is often the case, the Iraqi is a lot less comfortable in front of the camera than the American. I'm not sure completely sure why this is so. Perhaps because under Saddam no one had to explain themselves before the public.

Col Piatt, on the other hand, looks comfortable and confident throughout. This, I have noticed, is typical of all American briefers, whether military or civilian.

I do not want to disparage all Iraqi commanders, as I have seen a few who spoke confidently. It's just that they seem to be in the minority.

The Sons of Iraq (SOI, originally Concerned Local Citizens), played an integral part in defeating the insurgency. I have discussed them at length on this blog, but essentially they 1) got unemployed Iraqi males off the streets and into a paying job, 2) put them in charge of their own country's fate, 3) provided psychological "buy in", and 4) were a sort of "super neighborhood watch" that provided local intelligence you can't get any other way. They supplied their own weapons, everyone in Iraq seeming to own an AK-47.

Now that the insurgency is mostly over, they need to be disbanded, as you can't have a large militia force that might threaten the government. At the same time it would be dangerous to just let them go, as there is high unemployment as it is. So the idea is to transition them into civilian or military jobs.

One problem is that the SOI were mostly (though hardly exculsively) Sunni, and the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is mostly Shite. Early in the transition, there were signs that al-Maliki didn't want to transition Sunni SOI.

Acting on this, last September MNC-Iraq commander Lt. Gen. Austin issued what I believe was a stern warning to al-Maliki on this issue. Apparently Maliki took it to heart, because from what I read the transition of the SOI has gone relatively smoothly.

Q Okay. Courtney Kube from NBC News. You mentioned that you have about 17,000 Iraqi police in Salah ad Din. Could you give us some of the other statistics? How many U.S. service members continue to serve there?

And then if -- for either of you, if you could tell us how many Sons of Iraq are still in Salah ad Din and what are the plans for that, will they be eventually transitioned into police, army?

COL. PIATT: Yes. So in my brigade, I have over 3,600 soldiers in Salah ad Din province. And for the Sons of Iraq, we have over 9,000 Sons of Iraq in all of Salah ad Din.

The process that we're in right now with Sons of Iraq is, we're in the middle of transitioning. It's a two-phase -- first, we will transfer the Sons of Iraq oversight, contract and payment to the Iraqi army, and then we will transition Sons of Iraq to other employment, starting with Iraqi security forces, police and army...

Next month, beginning 1st of March, we will register all the Sons of the Iraq...And then we will execute payment alongside of our brothers in the Iraqi army, of all of the Sons of Iraq. And then the Iraqi army on 1 April will help pay them with us, and then on 1 May they will have complete oversight and control for the execution of the contracts of the Sons of Iraq.

With that, some percentage, about 20 percent, will be transitioned relatively soon to Iraqi security forces, police and army. And then the others will remain in their positions where they -- (audio break) -- along checkpoints, along -- throughout Salah ad Din province, until they are transitioned to other -- either other jobs, schools, or to other Iraqi security forces.

Q What's the basic timeline for when you expect those 9,000 Sons of Iraq to be in some other capacity? And so is it and it's -- the expectation is that only the 20 percent that will be transitioned to ISF will remain in Iraqi security force capacity.

COL. PIATT: No. That's the start point...

So what will happen is, they immediately -- some will transition over to police and army. Others will maintain their positions along checkpoints, along key routes in infrastructure, until they are transitioned either to other employment, through vocational schooling, or to the future hires for the police and the army.

So there's no set timetable. But the commitment up front is that they will remain Sons of Iraq, just under the oversight of the Iraqi army, until which time they are transitioned to other employment..

Everybody is interested in when the IA can stand on it's own so we can withdraw more troops. In this next exchange, journalist Joe Baten makes reference to this Feb 17 article in the Financial Times.

Q Colonel, this is Joe Tabet with Al Hurra. The U.S. commander in charge of developing the ISF, General Frank Helmick, told the Financial Times that the Iraqi security forces need at least three years to face or to fight against the insurgents. Would you give me your assessment on that?

COL. PIATT: Well, I can tell you here in Salah ad Din the Iraqi security forces, especially the provincial police, are ready now. What they will need is continued support in professionalization, equipping and training. But when it comes to fighting and combating terrorism in Salah ad Din, the police are the ones who take action first.

In the FT piece t Gen Helmick says that he "hopes the Iraqi army will be equipped and able to stand alone by the end of 2011." This seems about reasonable from what else I read. On the one side we do need to push the Iraqis, on the other we must have reasonable expectations, and remember that we risk all that we have gained if we give in to the extreme anti-war crowd and insist on a precipitous pullout.

Logistics has always been a problem with the Iraqi Army and Iraqi police. In briefing after briefing we've seen this come up. Although in general Gen Hamed seemed to give pretty scripted answers, he did make clear that they do need real military vehicles. We've all seen the photos of the IA and IP driving around in pickup trucks.

Q General Hamed, this is Joe Tabet with Al Hurra again. Just to follow up on what you said, if you could tell us what kind of equipment you need in the near future to handle your mission, your security mission in your area?

GEN. AL-JUBOURI: As far as supplies, we are very good with supplies. We are in a good situation at this time, but the only thing we lack at this time are up-armored vehicles, Humvees in particular. We are talking with -- (audio break) -- about getting a supply of up- armored vehicles, particularly Humvees. And we do have a good understanding that we will get Humvees in the very near future. The Ministry of Interior will supply the provinces of Iraq with up-armored vehicles.

But with regard to the supplies as far as light weapons, all types of weapons, I believe that we have enough at this time. Even vehicles, we do have enough. And I must say that the Ministry of Interior has provided us with whatever we've needed in the past, and they're a good support to us. They provide us several when we need it to endure the fight and continue providing security for the people of this province. Thank you.

This next exchange is important because of the issue of expectations and cultural differences. Of the mistakes we made before going into Iraq, perhaps the worst was that we didn't appreciate the cultural differences that would make our job so difficult.

Q (Joe Tabet/Al Hurra) Quick question, General Hamed, we've heard in the past about corruption cases among the ISF in your area. Could you update us on that?

GEN. AL-JUBOURI: I speak on behalf of the police of Salah ad Din.

And I must say that we have not had any indications of corruption within the police of Salah ad Din.

We also have a team that works closely with us and are -- that checks and also visits different IP police stations throughout the province. It visits police stations in the districts and subdistricts and villages of the province -- (audio break) -- and no indications. So be assured that there is no corruption amongst the police of Salah ad Din. And I don't believe that we've had corruption in the last six years.

However, there were some U.S. units that did have some -- that did think that there was some type of corruption in the police force of Iraq or in the police force of Salah ad Din. However, they searched that -- they investigated it. They did not find anything and there is no corruption....

COL. PIATT: I have a note to add, that I agree with General Hamed...we work side by side with our Iraqi partners every single day.

... I completely agree with him that in the police force we just are not seeing corruption. We're seeing uniformed officers on the street manning checkpoints. We're seeing professional leaders leading district police stations throughout Salah ad Din province. It's just amazing to see.

Maybe, but I'm not totally convinced. Did Joe Tabet really expect an admission of corruption? Maybe he was just looking to compare their answers what what he's discovered or heard elsewhere.

Corruption is a way of life in third-world countries. The issue is one of legitimacy, not corruption per se. In the end, the key to winning insurgencies is that the people must believe that the government is working toward their interests. The reality is that in third-world countries the people tolerate, or expect, a higher level of corruption that we do. As long as we can hold it down to tolerable levels we'll be ok.

Finally, the Golden Mosque:.

Q Hi, Colonel. This is Michael Carden from American Forces Press. Can you talk a little about the infrastructure situation in your province, mainly update us on the ...construction of the Golden Mosque?

COL. PIATT: One thing I will tell you is, our brigade was here in 2006-2007. And we were in Northern Iraq. And we were gone only 12 months. And when we -- (audio break) -- Salah ad Din, what we saw on the ground was really absolutely amazing, to see the security progress that this province has made....

So the golden mosque, it was, again, a very, very good scene for us to come back here and see the progress made in Samarra, where so much was destroyed and so much hope was destroyed and the town was very, very violent last time we left here. And it required a heavy force of coalition forces, police and army. Now you see markets are opened up. The mosque is being reconstructed at an accelerated rate. But not only is it being reconstructed and there's some normalcy returning to Samarra, pilgrims are returning. And we see thousands of pilgrims from other countries coming into Iraq to visit the shrine and they're not having any security incidents.

Col Piatt inspires a lot of confidence, General Hamed Nameq Yaseen Al-Jubouri less so. We'll see how it plays out, but the news from Iraq is good and getting better.