The Redhunter

Q Good morning, General. David Morgan from Reuters. Can you tell us, please, what security goals you think are reasonable for the upcoming year, given the influx of U..S. forces into RC South? And specifically, do you think that you will be able to break the stalemate that General McKiernan has spoken about? ...

GEN. DE KRUIF: Thank you, David. To start with your first question, when we talk about stalemate, I think it's fair to say that from an ISAF point of view, we are not stopped by the insurgency, but we just run out of troops.

What do I mean with that? It's clear to say that two years ago, the insurgents changed their overall strategy from attacking our strength, being ISAF, towards focusing on terrorizing the local nationals, the Afghan people. And one of the elements of that is the use of IEDs. For ISAF, that means that we have to deliver a 24/7 security in the focus areas where we are placed. It's no use of getting into a village at 8:00 in the morning and then leave that village at 5:00 in the evening.

So once we start the shape, clear, hold and build concept in a region, we have to stay there. And with the available troops we have currently right now in theater, we were able to clear parts of central Helmand and in central Oruzgan. But to be able to extend these focus areas, we definitely need more troops. That's one.

What I think what's going to happen is that once we will see the influence of the U.S. forces that will give us that capability and the capacity not only to expand the areas where we do the shape, clear, hold, build, but also put significant more pressure on the insurgency, on the leadership and on the nexus between that leadership, the narcotics and the IEDs.

So that will lead in the first couple of months after the influx of U.S. forces to what I think is going to be a significant spike in incidents. After that and after the elections, however, I think that what we are doing now is actually planting the seeds and that we will view a significant increase in the security situation across southern Afghanistan next year....

What we learn is that

1. NATO does not have enough troops to do the job


2. Two years ago the insurgents switched strategy from attacking our troops to targeting civilians


3. The additional U.S. troops will allow us to hold and build as well as shape and clear

As Clausewitz once said, "the enemy is an animate object that reacts." Too many forget that lesson. They may be evil but they're not stupid.

MNF-Iraq commander Gen. George Casey learned that not having enough troops will allow you to clear areas of insurgents, but when you leave they'll just come back. His operation to clear Baghdad in the fall of 2006 met just such a fate, and I think led to his dismissal.

The good news is that President Obama is sending 17,000 more troops, which is not enough but better than nothing. Unfortunately, our allies told him they aren't.

Worse, Obama is going to cut the Department of Defense by some 10%, which includes some Army ground-combat vehicles. Not a good idea. Fortunately, 14 US Senators sent a letter to the President today protesting the planned cuts.

But we shouldn't have to do it all. It would be nice if our allies stepped up to the plate and sent more troops. A lot more. After all, Afghanistan is supposed to be the war we all support, isn't it? Now that George Bush is no longer in power, no one has that as an excuse either. The population of NATO countries is several hundred million, and that they can only muster 23,000 or so troops for Afghanistan is a disgrace.

Q General, Barbara Starr from CNN. Can I ask you, what are you looking for in President Obama's upcoming Afghanistan strategy? What can he do in that strategy that would be most helpful, in your mind, to you and your troops?

And if I could also follow up, when you say that you see the Quetta shura as being responsible for the insurgent activity in your area, that suggests that you see direct command and control, perhaps, from across the border in Pakistan. Could you talk a little bit about the organization of the insurgency you see? How well-trained? How well-equipped? Where's the money coming from to fund these guys? What are you really dealing with out there?

GEN. DE KRUIF: Okay. Starting with your first question, I think there are two -- on my level, on the RC South level, I think there are two very important factors, which hopefully are included in the policy of President Obama. The first, of course, is the influx of additional forces, which will really be a game changer from my point of view.

But the second point, and perhaps the most important point I want to make, is that it needs to be nested within a comprehensive approach. So it's not just bringing in the military capability, it's also bringing in the capability to support governance and reconstruction and development....

Once again don't let anyone on the left tell you that we're not just pursuing a military solution. This has been a talking point of theirs for years and it's just as untrue of Afghanistan as it was and is of Iraq.

As I've discussed numerous times on this blog, counterinsurgency requires civilian tasks as well as military ones. Human Terrain Teams and Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams have made huge contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan and have been discussed many times on this blog.

Q General, this is David Wood from the Baltimore Sun. You mentioned that you'd like to see as part of Obama's strategy a civilian surge. Could you tell us more specifically, in terms of capabilities and numbers, what you mean?

GEN. DE KRUIF: Yes. What we absolutely need is that we build the institutions that support the governance at the provincial, district and sub-district level, in governing and administrating their region. What we see time after time is that district governors and provincial governors are appointed. But especially in RC South, with a very high rate of illiteracy, it's very hard to find people who have the capabilities to translate policy and implement the policy into clear action.

So the whole system of administration, building the institutions which are able to support the governance at the provincial and district level into actions, I think that is absolutely critical, and that is number one on my list.

If Obama and our allies follow through on this my hat is off to them.

Although this next question is about IEDs, the interesting part is in the answer

Q General, Barbara Starr again from CNN. Can I come back to this issue of the IEDs? And what can be done, for further protection of your forces, especially when you get the U.S. increased forces?

So many of the hits have been against the armored humvees. What have you requested or do you want to see, in terms of the MRAP vehicles and more protection? Do you have enough MRAPs for your forces right now? Will you have enough when the U.S. troops get there?

GEN. DE KRUIF: Okay.

Well, getting more protection against IEDs is not just a matter of putting more armor on vehicles.

The first step is having an approach in which you win the hearts and minds of the people. So that means that every day, although we have an IED threat, our forces will go out and have a 24/7 presence amongst the Afghan people. Because by the end of the day, it is the Afghan people who will deny the use of IEDs by the insurgency....

"Hearts and Minds" is probably the most misunderstood term in all of warfare. Please please please follow the link its true definition.

All in all one of the better Afghanistan briefings in that we learned a lot.