The Redhunter

GEN. AUSTIN:...this great progress happened for several reasons. First and foremost, this happened because our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines performed tirelessly and expended every effort for the Iraqi people through the last six tough years in Iraq.

About a year ago, we endured some very challenging times. As we continued to pressure al Qaeda in the north, we found ourselves in a rather significant struggle with Shi'a extremists in the south in Basra and in Sadr City in Baghdad. It was a struggle that could have reversed the gains that we achieved the previous year, but we were able to respond to the challenge because our young men and women in uniform that are serving in Iraq today are just as dedicated to our mission as they were six years ago.

Another reason for the progress over the past year was that we were able to maneuver our forces against the enemy throughout the country. This allowed us to remove seams and gaps that extremists were using in the past. And by -- and by maneuvering the core elements along with the Iraqi security forces, we were able to pursue the enemy over more terrain than we had before.

And through this maneuver, we had great effects on reducing the flow of foreign fighters coming across the border and through the Jazirah Desert in the north, and we were able to expand our footprint in the south to better confront Shi'a extremists and criminals that were moving lethal accelerants into Baghdad and other parts of the country. The combined pressure of coalition and Iraqi security forces on al Qaeda and Shi'a extremist groups greatly reduced their capabilities to operate in this country.

A third reason for the great progress was our partnering efforts with the Iraqi security forces over the past year. And since the Charge of the Knight's operation in Basra a year ago, we have partnered with them in a very meaningful way, and our relationship has strengthened and evolved over time. And today, all of our operations are combined Iraqi and coalition operations. And through partnership, we were able to transition from deconflicting operations to conducting synchronized operations.

The recent safe and secure provincial elections are a testament to this concept of joint synchronized operations towards a common goal.

And the development of our relationship with the Iraqi security forces over the past year has been a testament as well, and the results have been impressive. The 11 attacks on election day, compared to over 300 attacks on election day in 2005, illustrate exactly that point. And in Baghdad, there were zero attacks on the day of elections. Now, this was all due to the tremendous partnering efforts between the coalition and the Iraqi security forces.

And finally, there were several other factors that contributed to the progress of last year. We successfully transitioned the Sons of Iraq program to the Iraqi government, which demonstrates Iraq's commitment to reconciliation. The improved border security strategy has greatly reduced the number of foreign fighters and lethal accelerants making their way into Iraq, and the improving civil capacity and essential services are positively affecting millions of Iraqi citizens. And the passage of key legislation through the central government, to include the security agreement, has demonstrated progress by the Iraqi government as well.

In summary, the reasons Austin offered that we have been successful in 2008-on were:

1. The outstanding effort by the men and women of the United States Armed Forces
2. Our superior ability to maneuver our forces to trap and destroy an elusive foe
3. The ability to successfully partner with the Iraqi security forces
4. Successfully transitioning the Sons of Iraq (SOI) into other employment
5. Securing the border, or at least slowing down the inflow enough to make a difference
6. Improved Iraqi government services at the local level
7. Passage of key legislation by the national Iraqi government

Let's take a quick look at some briefings last year and this by our combat commanders to see some of the reasons they have given in briefings for our success at putting down the insurgency.

Last December, Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, commander of the the 1st Armored Division (which headquartered Multi-National Division-North) gave several reasons why we were successful in his AOR (Area of Responsibility):

1. An improved Iraqi government. Trust, coordination, and execution of budgets have improved.
2. The performance of the US military.
3. The performance of the PRTs (Provisional Reconstruction Teams, a Department of State operation).

Similar reasons were provided by Col Tom James, commander of the 4th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Multi-National Division - Center), in a briefing on July of 2008in which he explained that the progress they had made and said that security improvements were based on three factors:

1. A highly professional and greatly improved Iraqi security force
2. The Sons of Iraq program
3. Combined security operations

Later, in December, Col James explained that they had moved beyond simply defeating the insurgency, and offered these reasons for their ability to stabilize the area:

1. The population knows that they are secure, and because of this they have turned from worrying about their personal safety to focusing on improving their economic situation.
2. The Iraqi security forces, in particular the army, is now confident and capable
3. The Iraqi government is relatively competent now, at least at the local level, and the economy is turning around
4. With the improving situation, both we and the Iraqis are able to concentrate on post-insurgency nation-building.

We need to keep in mind that there wasn't one insurgency in Iraq, but many. Each was regional and each had a different cause, and as such we resolved each one using different methods. A primary lesson of Petraeus' U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 was that an insurgency can vary dramatically from village to village, let alone region to region.

For example, last July, Steve Shippert of Threatswatch explained how the situation was turned around in Anbar (and how Obama was completely wrong on the matter):

1. The Anbar Salvation Council took matters into their own hands and began to fight back against al Qaeda
2. The U.S. Marine Corps seized the opportunity and aided them in their fight

Many other commanders have offered similar reasons as well. I think these are fairly representative. Select one of the "Iraq" at right for more.

Looking at the "big picture," in the February 11, 2008, print edition of National Review, Wesley Morgan identified four interconnected efforts that led to the success of the surge throughout Iraq:

1. The adoption of classic counterinsurgency tactics, with U.S. battalions spreading out among the population and earning their trust;
2. The grassroots reconciliation of many Sunni and some Shiite communities;
3. A series of meticulously planned corps-level offensives across Baghdad and its surrounding areas. All of these efforts have hinged on one major change:
4. During 2007, every echelon of the U.S. command -- from the four-star headquarters down through the critical corps and divisional levels to the brigades and battalions in the field -- was closely integrated into a cohesive whole. Without this integration, none of the four efforts that have brought Iraq forward would have made much difference.

Perhaps most famously, there was Gen Petraeus' speech on Iraq to the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting and Exposition in Washington, DC, October 7, 2008, which I termed his "How We Did It" address. You simply must watch it in its entirety. I encourage readers who really want to understand what happened to follow the link and watch the whole thing, but here are a few of his main points:

1. The surge focused on securing the population.
2. The only way to secure a population is to live with the population, to share the risk. You cannot "commute to the fight."
3. You must use all the tools in your kitbag. Military force, yes and necessary. But you can't win with that alone. Yes before you can have legislation you must have security. But by the same token once military force has done it's part you then move into economics and building projects.
4. We must promote reconciliation by reaching out to those who are willing to be part of the new Iraq
5. Get the irreconcilables out of society, detain them, and take the pressure off the population. Eventually you might be able to reconcile some of them though and release some.
6. Education, social services, and job opportunities are important to long term success.
7. All units must work as an integrated whole. "Fusion Cells" that broke down barriers between intel centers and government departments. Everyone must work together.

My take is that the reasons offered by the various commanders do not contradict but rather complement each other.

On to the Q & A. For our purposes we'll only consider a few of the exchanges. First is a question on the sustainability of what we have achieved so far.

Q General, Chris Lawrence from CNN. With fewer troops there, are you worried about areas that don't seem to be controlled, like Mosul, and some of the tensions that seem to be rising between the Arabs and Kurds?

GEN. AUSTIN: There are always a number of things that could cause us problems. And certainly, you know, I've been clear about the fact that there's work to be done yet in Mosul, in Diyala. There are things that can pull us off track and cause violence to really reignite in a greater way. And so we continue to watch those things and we develop contingencies to address those issues should they arise.

But bear in mind -- you know, I take you back to what I said as a part of my opening statement. You know, I came in or we came in at the end of the surge brigade period there, so as soon as the 18th Airborne Corps came in, we began to off-ramp surge brigades. And so I have been faced with trying to not only maintain the gains that we had achieved, but also continue to improve upon them with fewer forces.

So we've been doing this for some time. And not only were we able to maintain what we had achieved, we were able to drop the level of violence down even further. Again, you know, it's a question of using every instrument of power that you have in the arsenal. It's a question of making sure that you have thought through to significant detail of what your future challenges may be, and it's a question of how much you partnered with your Iraqi security forces to be able to address those emerging issues.

Next we have a question on the Sons of Iraq program. I've noted time and again the importance of this program in defeating the insurgency, as it was discussed time and again in these briefings from 2007 on. Essentially, the SOI (originally Concerned Local Citizens) was a sort of "super neighborhood watch" that employed local Iraqis to take charge of their own neighborhoods. While we did not arm them, everyone in Iraq seems to have an AK-47. Now that the insurgency is mostly over, the program is being correctly disbanded. But because no one wants tens of thousands of newly unemployed young men roaming the streets, it is vital to move them into other employment. This is mostly the job of the Iraqi government, and as with everything else in Iraq there are speedbumps to negotiate.

In a briefing a year ago Gen Austin issued a veiled warning to the government of Prime Minister al Maliki that his government needed to successfully transition SOI personnel to other employment or he was risking reigniting the insurgency.

With this in mind, let's follow the exchange:

Q (Off mike) -- General, final question from Voice of America, and this is related to the previous question. How would you assess the level of political reconciliation in the country -- you talked about a couple of areas -- but also in Baghdad among the parties? And how will that level of reconciliation impact on security leading up to the elections and after the elections?

GEN. AUSTIN: Well, you know, reconciliation has been a work in progress for some time and will continue to be so in the future.

I can tell you -- I can point to one significant thing that demonstrates that the government is serious about reconciliation, and that is what I mentioned earlier, the Sons of Iraq program.

You know, a year ago, a lot of people told me that the Iraqi government would never take this program on and manage it themselves. And so here we are, a year later, you know -- the Iraqi government is in control of most of the entire program. And every time that they've made a move to annex more of the program, they've done it in a measured way, and it is a success story across the country. And that's near 100,000 Sons of Iraq that they have integrated and are now in control of and are paying them on a daily basis.

So according to Austin, the speedbumps are being successfully negotiated. I haven't seen other stories to contradict this assessment. Further, and perhaps most importantly, I have not heard the journalists at these briefings ask questions challenging the briefers on this matter.

This final exchange is off topic, but I can't resist. A big name reporter asks a very dumb question:

Q General, Jim Miklaszewski with NBC. Do you think it's realistic to expect that all U.S. forces will be withdrawn from Iraq by the end of 2011, or will that SOFA agreement have to be renegotiated?

GEN. AUSTIN: Well, hey, Jim, I'll leave that to our senior leadership to -- to address that question there. I think that where we stand right now is that we have a security agreement with the Iraqi -- with the government of Iraq, excuse me -- that says that our forces will leave by 2011. And so from my perspective, you know, we are focused on that. And if there is something that is addressed in the future or is negotiated in the future, that will be really addressed by our civilian leadership.

Did Miklaszewski actually expect the general to say something like "yes, we can't get the troops out on time so we have to renegotiate the treaty?" This proves an aphorism I've thought true for several years; the bigger the name in journalism, the dumber the question.

As always, Gen. Austin comes across as calm, authoritative, confident, and knowledgeable. Between him, his boss General Odierno, and Odierno's boss General Petraeus, our troops are well led.