The Redhunter

COL. VOLESKY: ...I'd like you all to know that this is the third time in the last five years this brigade's deployed as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In fact, many of my soldiers just left the Diyala province 15 months ago.

We assumed control of Nineveh province on the 19th of January. And as all you know, that's when we were really ramping up to start the elections series here in Nineveh.

And our focus was really at that point to build strong relationships with our Iraqi counterparts and really support them in the establishment of secure locations for the elections. And as you all know, the elections went very well and were a great success.

After the elections, we started to look at the problem set in Mosul and rest -- and the rest of Nineveh province. And our predecessors here did a great job, as you can tell, or as you know. The last six months attacks and violence have decreased significantly lower than they have been in a number of years.

But the insurgencies still were able to conduct operations in Mosul, and there are really three reasons why -- more than three, but three primary reasons.

The first was that there was an ineffective provincial government that didn't represent the majority of the population in Nineveh. And they did nothing, really, of any measure to improve the people's quality of life.

The ISF, all the Iraqi security forces, they were still developing, getting more and more capability, but they were unable really to handle the threat that AQI and the other insurgents were able to do while attacking Mosul. And then finally there were fewer coalition forces here in Mosul. When I was here 18 months ago, the focus was clearly on Baghdad, and we had to win in Baghdad. And so there was not as many forces as there are currently in Mosul to get at the problem with AQI and the other insurgents.

So what we've done is we've really done what I would call our own little surge up here in Mosul. We focused on Operation Nineveh Resolve, which is a subset of the division's Operation New Hope.

And I've got almost twice as many coalition forces in Mosul as my previous -- as the previous unit did. But it's not really how many forces we have; it's really the ability for us to partner with our Iraqi counterparts. And I don't really like using the word "partnering." I prefer "embedding," so that we embed with those Iraqi forces.

As you know, the security agreement changed how we operated here in Iraq in January. We are no longer in the lead. We support the Iraqi security forces, and that's what we're doing here.

The strategy for Nineveh Resolve really focuses on clearing neighborhoods that the enemy has had freedom of movement in and a large amount of influence. But what's different about this operation to past operations is the control and retain or the holding force that we're leaving in these neighborhoods as we clear them. That hasn't really been done before at the level that we're doing it now.

So as we go into a neighborhood to clear it, once that is cleared -- the insurgents are killed, captured or they move out, we leave a holding force there. And we really focus at that point on getting after those drivers of instability in those neighborhoods, which is really the quality of life and the unemployment in those neighborhoods.

So we'll hold it and start immediate projects in those neighborhoods, employing people that live there to do what we're calling "quick wins" in the brigade. And right now, for example, we're doing multiple trash projects, hiring, at times, a hundred people in one neighborhood to collect trash, to give them some employment and get that recruiting pool that the insurgents have reduced.

And how we tie this in to the local government is we brought them in and said, what are their priorities for Mosul? In the past, when I was here in 2004, we just developed the projects on our own and really did not take into account what the true needs of the population were. So we brought in the local officials as well as the director general from the province and had them help us develop these projects so that they get buy-in. And as we move these projects further and further, they take more and more responsibility for them so that we have a sustained system versus just a project that ends and then everyone's unemployed.

In these neighborhoods that we've cleared, we see very rare attacks in those areas, and the people are taking more and more ownership of their neighborhoods. The security forces that are in each of those neighborhoods -- and we've got Iraqi army as well as national police -- they're perceived as the force who's providing security, not the coalition. And that is really what we want to achieve.

To summarize, Col. Volesky first gave hree reasons why the insurgents were successful in Nineveh even after the surge had cleared them from most of the rest of Iraq

1. Ineffective local government that did not represent the people
2. Iraqi Security Forces were unable to handle the threat on their own
3. Too few coalition forces

To resolve those problems, what we did was

1. Assign twice as many U.S. troops to Nineveh
2. Clear and hold areas where the insurgents were strong - "oil spot" theory in action
3. "Quick wins" to win over the population; improvement of basic government services based on the true needs of the people.

Q Hi, Greywolf Six. This is Laura Jakes from the Associated Press. It's nice to see you again.

I was wondering if you could give us a general assessment of the ISF in the province, whether they'll be ready to -- when you all redeploy, and whether they'll really be capable to fight AQI on their own at some point.

COL. VOLESKY: The Iraqi security forces -- again, I was here in 2004 -- and they're 100 percent better than they were. In fact, there are over 25,000 members of the Iraqi security forces in Mosul. And they conduct independent operations every day.

And as I said earlier, these insurgents have focused their attacks on the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqis have not -- have not wavered at all. So we see continued improvement day by day. And as I said, they're conducting independent operations now.

What I really offer them is a lot of what we call enablers -- the aviation, that -- the military working dogs, those kinds of things that really augment their operations. But they're all in the lead right now. I don't own a base and I coordinate all my operations with them.

I'm not quite sure where the "six" comes from, since this is the 3rd Brigade, but if you watch the video Col. Volesky seemed to get it.

Commanders stressing that the "Iraqis are in the lead" has been a theme of briefings.

The journalists do not passively accept whatever they're told, but will challenge briefers if they don't think they're getting the straight scoop. To be sure, it's all done politely, as all involved are professionals. Having watched and reported on dozens of these briefings since early 2007, I've come to respect the Pentagon journalists. They're not like the pretty talking heads (men or women, I stress), who as often as not don't have a clue as to what they're talking about.

Indeed, Laura Jakes does just that in her follow up:

Q If I could just follow up, when I was doing some of the market walks with your guys, there would be a platoon of 20 coalition forces or actually your battalion and then it would be four or five Iraqi security force officers, whether it was IA or whether it was Iraqi police. It was very clear that it was the American forces that were -- even if you were in a support role, that you were doing most of the security. Do you think that the ISF is going to be ready by the time you-all leave, less than a year from now?

COL. VOLESKY: I don't know who you walked around with. I know that if you were walking with a patrol that was with Iraqi police, that is a challenge, because as I think you heard when you were here, they're about 5,000 Iraqi police short. But if you went up to the northern part and saw 7 Nissan, you'd see an Iraqi battalion there. In fact, that's one of the areas we're calling our model neighborhoods and that we want to transition to the Iraqis, because the security there is really good. Attacks there are very rare, and the Iraqi security forces are doing that patrolling pretty much independently of us.

So my assessment is I am optimistic in the progress that the Iraqis are making, and we'll continue to support them. But again, I see great indications that they are well on their way ahead to take over security when we eventually leave.

Q Thank you.

Here Jeff Schogol of Stars and Stripes isn't happy with Col. Volesky's initial comments about their ability to clear and hold areas:

Q And I have a quick follow-up question. My understanding is, Mosul has been cleared several times. If you have to clear someplace more than once, that implies that you're not really holding it. Am I not seeing something?

COL. VOLESKY: Well, that's exactly right. And that's what's different about Nineveh Resolve, is that we've got -- once we clear it, we're leaving, you know, a formation in there to hold that. We are doing night patrolling with our Iraqi counterparts. And as I mentioned, 7 Nissan, you know, that Iraqi army battalion's up there, working with our Steel Dragons that own that or have responsibility to work that partnership with them. And they're -- they are holding that neighborhood.

And again, in the neighborhoods that we have cleared and are holding and have projects ongoing, the attacks are very rare. The enemy has shifted now into going to areas that we have not yet cleared or are going on the main avenues between those because they can't -- they don't have access into those neighborhoods right now.

The problem may be due to a shortage of Iraqi Police, as we heard the Colonel admit to in a later exchange

COL. VOLESKY: ...the Iraqi police are about 5,300 short of what the provincial director of police believes he needs to take over primacy in Mosul. About 4,000 of those are policemen that have died or have gone AWOL. And, you know, about 1,300 are new hires that he needs. So those -- you know, 4,000 was currently on the rolls; 1,300 are more -- additional police that he needs. So there's really a 5,300-police deficiency in Mosul right now....

...the issue becomes the hiring and vetting. I mean, as you know, we want to make sure that the police that come in are ready to be policemen and they have all the qualifications required of them. There has been a vetting program so that we're getting good policemen and rooting out all the bad police. That's the first piece and that takes a while.

The second piece ... is the oil prices have gone down and so there have been some budget issues.

As the Prussian general and military theorist Karl von Clausewitz said, "Everything in war is very simple. But the simplest thing is difficult."

Once again classic wisdom has proved prescient.

Then Lt. Gen. David Petraeus knew this when he led the team that wrote U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, published in December of 1996. From the Field Manual comes this reminder:

6-29 Training HN (host nation) security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a "quick fix".

No kidding.

FM-3-24 formed the theoretical basis for the change in strategy that accompanied the surge in troops to Iraq in 2007.

The question is not as important in this exchange as is part of the answer that I want to highlight.

Q Yeah, this is Daphne Benoit again, with the Agence France- Presse. Are you expecting any extra U.S. troops in your province any time soon to help you clear and hold the area, in Mosul particularly?

COL. VOLESKY: Yeah, again, it's not important to focus on how many soldiers I have. What's important is our partnership and embedding with our Iraqi counterparts. I mean, again, we're not in the lead of these operations. We want to make sure we're partners and support what their operations are. Again, then it will resolve as an Iraqi-led operation. We're just supporting it.

So to say how many more, or do I think more coalition forces will come in, frankly, I've got my brigade here and we're going to partner with as many Iraqi counterparts as we have to get at the solution. And, you know, as I walk through neighborhoods, the people are very happy to see their Iraqi forces in the streets.

And that's what we want to continue to reinforce: getting them more -- out there more in the cities with the people and talk to the people and be recognized as the ones that are in charge of security for their area.

Of the many sections of FM 3-24 that I could cite to back up what Col Volesky says here at the end I'll use this one, from the famous "zen-like" section

1-154 THE HOST NATION DOING SOMETHING TOLERABLY IS NORMALLY BETTER THAN US DOING IT WELL. It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where the United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant US support....

The Iraqis will never be as good as we are, but they don't have to be. All they have to do is convince the people that they are for real and can protect them.

We should remember these lessons now that the focus is in Afghanistan. Although the insurgency there is different from Iraq, the overall principles of how to win remain the same.