The Redhunter

GEN. NICHOLSON: Okay. Thanks, Dave. Yeah, I've really just got two quick issues I'd like to hit. And first of all, I appreciate the opportunity to talk to the men and women of the media there today.

We certainly have had no shortage of media here over the last week or so. And frankly I think it's been a pretty good news story. And we certainly appreciate their being here.

Let me start with the start. And that is seven days ago tonight, we inserted -- at 01:00 local, we inserted about 4,000 Marines and sailors into the Helmand River Valley, over a period of about seven hours.

The intention was to go in big, strong, fast; overwhelm any opposition and frankly save lives on all sides but most specifically save civilian lives. And I think what we have found here is that in some areas, there's still some fighting going on. But in large part, the enemy has not resisted too strongly.

Now, we have essentially come into their areas. Every area we went into were areas that were considered Taliban heartland areas, where they had strongholds in there. And these are areas that have been visited before by coalition forces and Special Operations forces. But they never stayed. It was always just passing through.

The number-one question we're getting across the board right now is, how long are you staying? And one of my requirements, to every one of our company commanders, was that within 24 hours of hitting the deck, you will have a shura with the local elders. And that has occurred. I've attended several of those myself.

Let me just start with, what makes this so different? And first of all, I think, it was the size of the force going in and the speed in which it inserted. We almost looked at this like an amphibious operation, back to our Marine roots.

We really had the force sort of contained on Camp Leatherneck and Camp Dwyer. And when the word go ashore was launched, when we hit execute at 01:00, when the weather was right, when the conditions were right, we moved very quickly and decisively, almost the way we would for an amphibious op.

And again those first couple hours ashore are very vulnerable. And we understood that there was some risk but also high gain. It was a high-risk/high-gain type of operation.

When I heard Nicholson say "the number-one question we're getting across the board right now is, how long are you staying?" it immediately reminded me of the Iraq briefings in 2007. The commanders said that they heard the same thing from Iraqis. Previously, they'd had to answer that they were not going to be able to stay, and as such the Iraqis were reluctant to help, knowing that they'd be punished by the insurgents for doing so.

With the surge forces, however, they were able to answer "we're staying," and the Iraqis responded to this by helping us as never before. All of this and more is outlined by Gen. Petraeus' team in their 2006 U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24

On to the Q & A. We'll only quote one exchange, since it highlights a point made several times during the briefing:

Q General, could you tell us -- are you satisfied with the number of Afghan forces and the number of U.S. government and other civilians you have helping you in the operation? Do you have enough to hold and build?

GEN. NICHOLSON: Yeah, well, you know, what we've said is what makes this all so very different as an operation is where we go, we stay; and where we stay, we hold; and where we hold, we build; and where we build, we work with an eye towards transition.

I mean, I'm not going to sugarcoat it. The fact of the matter is, I -- we don't have enough Afghan forces, and I'd like more. You know, imagine right now I've got 4,000 Marines in Helmand with about 600...650 Afghan forces. Imagine if I had 4,000 Marines with 4,000 Afghan forces. I mean, it would not even be comparable to this -- even the success that we -- the relative success that we've had over these first seven days.

So no, I have -- but I have told, from General Petraeus to General McChrystal, everyone who's come through here, even General Jones, the national security adviser -- I mean, the fact of the matter is, there is a plan to source more. I'd have liked to have had more. They're just not available right now...

But the bottom-line answer is, I'd like more, I need more.

So we need to increase the number of Afghan forces by a factor of 10. Wow.

Following this were at least three more questions asking when additional Afghan forces would be available. Each time the general would not be specific, but spoke in generalities. The most he would say was that the Afghans "ave a ministry of defense, and they have leadership in Kabul and will decide, you know, where and when these forces will be applied."

Iraq was easy compared to Afghanistan. Lest you immediately conclude that this *must* be due to U.S. (read Bush Administration) incompetence, let's do a brief comparison of Iraq v Afghanistan with the U.S. as a "base" using the CIA Factbook:

Infant mortality rate: Iraq - total: 43.82 deaths/1,000 live births Afghanistan - total: 151.95 deaths/1,000 live births USA - total: 6.26 deaths/1,000 live births

Life expectancy at birth:
Iraq - total population: 69.94 years
Afghanistan - total population: 44.64 years
USA - total population: 78.11 years

School life expectancy (primary to tertiary education):
Iraq - total: 10 years
Afghanistan - total: 8 years
total: 16 years

GDP - per capita (PPP):
Iraq - $4,000 (2008 est.)
Afghanistan - $800 (2008 est.)
USA - $47,000 (2008 est.)

Both Iraq and Afghanistan are in bad shape, but Afghanistan is backward compared to Iraq. Michael Yon was right - Afghanistan isn't the 10 year war, it's the 100.