The Redhunter

COL. KIEVENAAR: Good morning. My name is Butch Kievanaar -- (audio break) -- talk to you today about the operations over the last year in the southern provinces of Iraq.

Our brigade and battalions have moved multiple times over the last year, based off the fast and ever-changing security environment here in Iraq. (Audio break) -- provinces of Qadisiyah, otherwise known as Diwaniyah, Najaf and southern Babil, while providing a combat arms battalion to Multinational Division North in Kirkuk, eventually moving to Mosul, and a battalion in Wasit that eventually moved to Babil.

As background, the Brigade arrived in Iraq in September of 2008 where we replaced a Polish contingent in what was formerly known as Multinational Division Center South.

With our assumption -- (audio break) -- transition to the control of the Multinational Division Center, which was under the command of the 10th Mountain Division.

In April of 2009 we moved a portion of the Brigade to Basra and assumed responsibility for the province from the 20th U.K. Brigade on the 1st of May.

During this transition, Multinational Division Center became Multinational Division South, and the 10th Mountain transferred authority to the 34th Infantry Division.

Next month we're scheduled to redeploy back to Fort Carson, Colorado, having completed a 12-month deployment.

I'd like to take a moment to tell you about the Brigade. The Warhorse Brigade is about 4,000 soldiers strong. It comprises two combined arms battalions, a cavalry squadron, one field artillery battalion, a special troops battalion, and a brigade support battalion.

So as you can see the situation in Iraq is fluid. Now that we have beaten back the insurgency (hopefully permanently), we are reducing our footprint. Unlike Afghanistan, the Iraqi insurgency was mostly in urban areas. As part of the surge we moved our troops out of their large bases and onto smaller bases that were among the population they were to protect. Part of what is going on now is a process of U.S. forces moving out of these urban areas and handing the bases over to the Iraqis.

Because we are reducing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq we are also reorganizing their corps structure. Following is a high-level overview.

From the Multi-National Force-Iraq website, the current organization structure for logistic and combat units is:

Joint Base Balad Joint Base Balad is home to the headquarters of the 332nd Air Expeditionary Wing and what was formerly Logistics Support Area Anaconda, the largest Army supply center in Iraq. The U.S. Army's 3rd Expeditionary Sustainment Command is responsible for providing logistics support throughout theater. Balad is located approximately 40 miles north of Baghdad.

Multi-National Corps - Iraq
This is the Tactical Unit responsible for command and control of Operations in Iraq. Currently MNC-I is headquartered by I Corps, forward deployed to Camp Victory, Baghdad. The following units report to MNC-Iraq:

Iraq is divided into four major areas of responsibility maintained by forces from four countries. Below are the units that cover these areas. When available a link has been provided to the unit's homepage on the Internet.

* Multi-National Division - Baghdad
MND-Baghdad is also known as Task Force Baghdad. Its major area of responsibility is the city of Baghdad. MND-Baghdad is headquartered by the 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Hood, Texas.

* Multi-National Division - North
MND-North is also known as Task Force Lightning. Responsible for an area including the cities of Balad, Kirkuk, Tikrit, Mosul, and Samarra, MND-N is headquartered by the 25th Infantry Division from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

* Multi-National Force - West
MNF-W is headquartered by the U.S. II Marine Expeditionary Force. Their area of operations include the cities of Ar Ramadi and Fallujah.

* Multi-National Division - South
MND-S, also known as the Rud Bull Division, assists Iraqi Security Forces with security and stability missions in the area south of Baghdad ranging from Najaf to Wasit provinces extending to Basrah. MND-S is headquartered by the 34th Infantry Division from Rosemount, Minnesota.

Prior to this reorganization the org chart went something like this:

* Multi-National Corps - Iraq
* Logistics Support Area Anaconda
* Multi-National Division - Baghdad
* Multi-National Division - North
* Multi-National Division Center
* Multi-National Force - West
* Multinational Division Central-South
* Multi-National Division (South-East)

MNF-Baghdad, North, and Center were each headquartered by a U.S. Army Division. MNF-West was headquartered by a U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). Central South and South-East by Polish and British troops respectively.

Each U.S. Army division consists of 3-4 brigades. Each MEF consists of 3-4 Regimental Combat Teams. Divisions and MEF are commanded by major generals, and the brigades and regimental combat teams by colonels. Each brigade consists of 3-7 battalions, which are commanded by a lieutenant colonel. A brigade may consist of 3-5,000 troops, a battalion maybe 1,200. Anyone correct me if I am wrong, however.

Here's a map showing 2004 deployments, just so you get some idea of where these MND structures were:

Next some maps from the New York Times showing deployments around the country, pre-surge, surge, and post-surge.

Iraq Battalions Jan 2007

Before the Surge - After months of escalating sectarian violence, President Bush announces a plan to add more than 20,000 soldiers and Marines to the United States military presence in Iraq. Insurgents are using the rural belt around Baghdad to stage attacks, but there are not enough American forces to fight them outside the city.

Iraq Battalions Sept 2007

At the Height Of the Surge - The last of the surge forces arrive in June. In August and September, American forces clear much of the insurgent activity out of the rural belt around Baghdad. With violence coming under control, American troops establish numerous outposts throughout the city, from which they make daily patrols.

Iraq Battalions Oct 2008

A Year Later - The last of the surge units leave Iraq in the summer of 2008. American forces have already started pulling out of cities around the country, particularly in Anbar Province, where troop levels are drastically reduced. There is still active fighting in Mosul, Baghdad and Diyala Province.

Iraq Battalions June 2009

The Withdrawal and Changing Roles - Battalions that were living in outposts among the population move to bases at the outskirts of neighborhoods. In Baghdad and other cities, American troops are switching to an advisory role, supporting Iraqi units as requested, following the process started in Anbar Province.

Back to Col Kievenaar's opening remarks:

COL. KIEVENAAR: June 30th marked a significant milestone for the citizens of Basra as the Iraqi Security Forces assumed responsibility for their city.

We have turned over a total of four patrol bases since our arrival to Basra. All four of those bases were handed back over to the Iraqi Security Forces. We are scheduled to close two more bases before we redeploy.

We have also significantly reduced the number of our soldiers inside the city of Basra. Upon my arrival, the Brigade had over 500 soldiers inside the city, and we now have less that 200 soldiers operating inside the city.These soldiers remain at the request of the Iraqi Security Forces and the provincial government to continue our partnership and training from these combined command and control centers.

These locations are predominantly with the Iraqi Army, and I want to emphasize we are only in the remaining locations because we've been asked to stay there, and are there to coordinate, conduct joint command and control training, and provide enablers to the Iraqi Security Forces.All vehicle movements and training events are coordinated daily with the Basra Operations Center, and our daytime vehicle movements inside the city are supported with the Iraqi Security Force escorts.

While my Brigade's primary focus is to train and enable the Iraqi Security Forces, we're also heavily involved in assisting the government by improving essential services for the citizens of Basra.

I don't have a whole lot of commentary this time, mostly because I've said it all before so many times and interested parties can go to the Iraq sections of "Categories" at right.

The key question, of course, is whether the Iraqis can hold on to their republic. In November of 2006 Washington Post columnist said Charles Krauthammer said, "We have given the Iraqis a republic and they do not appear able to keep it". That was pre-surge. If current trends hold, this time they will be able to keep it.

On to the Q & A. We'll only cover one exchange:

Q My name's David Morgan. I'm with Reuters.

Can you give us your assessment of the threat that Shi'ite militias potentially pose in Basra, and if they are mainly extorting money, does that suggest that Iran's influence has diminished?

COL. KIEVENAAR: Okay. Well, the answer to the first question is because I haven't seen them pursue a real militia agenda, I don't see a significant threat that they pose at this point.And I do not see anything in the foreseeable future that cannot be handled by the Iraqi Security Forces in Basra province.

In terms of whether or not they are receiving support from Iran, there are certain groups that still receive support. But by and large, most of the individuals that we see or deal with on a daily basis are no longer receiving that kind of -- the same support that they were receiving before from Iran.

They're not receiving the money, so they can't pay the people that used to work as part of their groups. They're not able to, as freely as they were before, able to get the resources with which to then be able to attack either the Security Forces or us.

And so the -- what we see now is more legacy-type of ammunition than we used to see before.

But there are things like Kataeb Hezbollah who still receive funding and resources from Iran, and those are the cells that we get most concerned about when you start talking about EFPs and IRAM-type capabilities that you've seen sporadically through the south here over the last two or three months.

In case anyone is wondring, Steve Schippert has demonstrated that these Iranian manufactured Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) are responsible for ten percent of our combat fatalities, and is responsible for many more U.S. casualties beyond that one device.

If President Obama meets with Ahmadinejad, as he seems so determined to do, he will hopefully put this on his agenda, but I'm not holding my breath.

Previous Briefing by Col. Kievenaar
Iraq Briefing - 05 January 2009 - Trying to Ensure Peaceful Transitions of Power