The Redhunter

GEN. NASH: ... Our mission here in Iraq is to build civil capacity and transition security to the Iraqi security forces. We do this through partnerships with three subordinate brigades and their Iraqi Security Force counterparts.

It's been just over one month since all U.S. combat forces have been out of the cities. No combat forces in the cities has been the norm in the southern nine provinces here for quite some time. And the Iraqis are fully in the lead to secure their country and their population. My forces are in a supporting role.

Pretty straightforward, brief, and nothing unexpected there. On to the Q & A. Some excerpts:

Q Three members of the -- this is Eric Roper with the Minneapolis Star Tribune. Three members of the 34th were killed last month in a rocket attack. Is that emblematic of the environment out there, or is that sort of an anomaly for what you're seeing?

GEN. NASH: That's a -- that's a great question, because I spent time last week with our Family Readiness Group back -- communicating with them back in Minnesota, with the loss of our three specialists, Specialists Wertish, Wilcox and Drevnick -- and explained to them that we still live in an environment that we cannot totally control: indirect fire. And that's what killed these three great Americans.

Maybe I shouldn't be surprised, but I'm impressed that Gen. Nash knew their names off the top of his head.

Q General, this is Shin Shoji from NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation. Of all the extremists working within your region, how much of attacks can you attribute to al Qaeda or to Muqtada al-Sadr or some of those Shi'ite elements?

GEN. NASH: In the south, the AQI, unless it's up in the northern borders of northern -- northwest Babil, northwest Wasat province and the southern belts of Baghdad, that's where -- if there is an AK -- AQI cell working -- cells working, that's where they would predominately be, and not necessarily here in the south.

The violent extremist networks that we look at come from all walks of terrorism, if you will, that are still trying to disrupt the government of Iraq and the sovereignty of the government of Iraq and cause doubt in the minds of the Iraqi people about the Iraqi security forces.

But the atmospheric that we've taken here in the south is that the people feel very well secure with the Iraqi security forces, with the police and the army. And we're seeing tip lines being used to the Iraqi police for suspected extremists that are attempting to move back, especially back here into the Basra province. So we're seeing the locals really reinforcing, if you will, now the Iraqi security forces across the southern portion of Iraq here in our nine provinces.

My recollection is that that the last holdout of AQI is in the area of MND-North, so this isn't too surprising. What's interesting is that the general doesn't name any specific groups but indicates that they are fragmented.

Most of the questions in this briefing were softballs, which tells me the reporters can't find much to question in Gen. Nash' story. Hopefully that's the reason, anyway.

One more exchange

Q General, it's Luis Martinez with ABC News. You mentioned that Iraqi security forces didn't want you to abandon them, as you said, in the cities. What's the dynamic between the Iraqi security forces and political leadership with regard to maybe them trying to minimize these -- their level of reliance on U.S. forces? Are you seeing that down there in your area?

GEN. NASH: Well, I would have to answer that -- that is the case. Again, each province in different. Each one wants some degree of help. A lot of them have become independent, if you will, and we respect that. We do joint patrols with them when required. We'll respond to an event, an IED event, if you will, to do site exploitation of things that may be there left as residue that we can work together as a crime scene and be able to work out those networks -- so somewhat more of that, somewhat less of that.

And again, we're working with two ministries, the minister of defense, with the Iraqi army, and the minister of interior, with the Iraqi police, and then the minister of border enforcement, again with our border force. So we have to be able to work with each one of those ministers, what they're looking for. And again, they're in the lead, and we want to be sure that they're taking full credit for all the great things that we're doing, and if we can support them in any way, we'll do that.

We back off when they think that they want to do it on themselves -- by themselves. And they're certainly capable of doing unilateral operations, and we acknowledge that.

Gen Nash is not about to say anything that contradicts the official line from Washington, and for him to directly say "they want us to stay" or even "they don't want us to abandon him" would get him in trouble, so we have to filter his responses through that lens.

Some will say that commanders whitewash the problems in Iraq. Washington Post correspondent and fellow Tom Ricks says that Iraq is unraveling. Journalist/blogger Bill Roggio demurs, saying that Ricks cherry picks incidents. Both are knowledgeable, and both pretty honest, I think. I tend to think that Roggio has it more right this time, but we shall see. My guess is that violence will increase as we withdraw, but that it will be manageable. Either way, as Roggio says, it's too soon to say.