The Redhunter

GEN. HELMICK: Dave, thank you very much. And good morning to all of you. I just want to say up front I'm very happy to be here today to talk to you about the situation in Iraq and the role of the Multinational Security Transition Command and NATO in Iraq. But first, I must address the horrific attacks that took place yesterday in Baghdad...

One attack in Iraq is one too many, but we must remember where we've been. The Iraqi security forces have demonstrated their increased capability, and the declining number of attacks over time is proof of that. Yes, we have much work to be done, and the U.S. forces will continue to work with the people of Iraq to improve the capabilities of their security forces.

What do I mean by institutional capacity? In short, I mean helping the government of Iraq develop the capacity to train, equip, employ and supervise their security forces. Iraq has come a long way in these last couple of years in being able to field tactically proficient soldiers and police.

But supporting these soldiers and police in the field remains a challenge. The government of Iraq still needs help in establishing fully functional maintenance and logistics systems, as well as help in things like effectively managing the personnel actions required in a nation-wide police system which employs today over 400,000 policemen.

Along with other improvements, the government of Iraq is also making positive strides in the professionalization of their security institutions. Iraq's security forces are visibly proud to serve their nation. Unlike the past, security forces are effectively resisting sectarian and other negative influences. This is in stark contrast from a few years ago when some units refused to follow lawful instructions, or simply melted away.

Here are the relevant Q & A exchanges:

Q Gordon Lubold, with the Christian Science Monitor. So what was the scope of what you provided on the ground to the Iraqis yesterday in the aftermath? But also, are you frustrated -- you've mentioned that -- by request, by request, and that's subject to the security agreement, but I mean, are you guys at all frustrated that the requests haven't been more forthcoming, more requests from the Iraqis?

GEN. HELMICK: No, I don't think we are frustrated because the requests are not forthcoming. If you look -- again, if you take this incident in isolation -- and again, I do not want to discount this, but if you look at the past 18 months, the security trends have been very, very good -- again, at an all-time low. And this clearly is a spike, and there was a breakdown in security.

So I don't think that we are -- or at least I am not frustrated with the lack of requests.

What I am personally frustrated with is that, again, we must continue to develop the capabilities inside the Iraqi military. And we are doing that as fast as we can. My frustration is we -- I am not doing it fast enough. And we want to continue to do that as we move to the timeline of 50,000 in August of 2010 and down to zero in December 2011.

Q Point of view, from that standpoint, what are some of the things that you want to work on with them from where you sit?

GEN. HELMICK: Right. You know, what we have done so far to date is the -- I don't want to say the easy things, but the less difficult things. It's easy to build an infantryman and an infantry unit; it's very, very difficult and it takes time to build an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance technician to build a platform for the Iraqis. In other words, airplanes with qualified crews, Iraqi crews that can fly them and analyze the data; for example, in the ISR platform.

In the police side of the house, it's easy to build a policeman; it's very, very difficult and it takes time to build forensics labs for the Iraqis, where they have scientists that are trained, where they can secure a site and exploit the evidence on that site to convict someone vice a confession to convict someone.

All of these things are very, very difficult to do, and it takes time. Another frustration, of course, is building a logistics system for the Iraqis. It is very, very difficult and very time-consuming to build a national logistics system, something that just doesn't happen overnight.

So those are the kinds of difficult things as we move forward into the rest of 2009 and '10 that we really have to focus on and accelerate. That is my personal frustration with where we are today.

As I have said before, I'm certain that our generals use these briefings to send messages; sometimes to the Iraqis, sometimes to the Iranians, mostly of course to the American people. This one was a loud and clear message to the Iraqi government: Get your act together because we are not going to be here forever.

And sure enough, the media picked up on this. Fox News had an article out the same day:

U.S. Training Commander 'Frustrated' By Pace of Progress in Iraq

Army Lt. Gen. Frank Helmick told a Pentagon news conference that he is not certain he can complete some of the high-tech training -- including for Iraq's Air Force -- by the time U.S. troops are scheduled to leave at the end of 2011.

"What I am personally frustrated with is that ... we must continue to develop the capability inside the Iraqi military," said Helmick. "We are doing that as fast as we can. My frustration is we, I, am not doing it fast enough."

For those who are interested in the details of what's going on in Iraq, and want an excellent primer on building security forces in difficult situations, see Building Security Forces and Ministerial Capacity: Iraq as a Primer, by ieutenant General James Dubik (ret.), who served as the commander of Multi-National Security and Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I) from mid-2007 to mid-2008, over at Kimberly Kagan's Institute for the Study of War.

Finally, for the naysayers, yes building an army in a third world country is hard. But it can be done. In the 1980s we retrained several Latin American armies so that they coulddefeat communist insurgencies, and recently our advisors have been helping countries around the world defeat various jihadist insurgencies. Gen. Helmick isn't saying we're losing in Iraq, or that the Iraqis aren't "stepping up to the plate" or whatever. He is simply stating the obvious; that it's hard and that we can do better.

This passage is approvingly quoted in Gen Petraeus' U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24

"It is a persistently methodical approach and steady pressure which will gradually wear the insurgent down. The government must not allow itself to be diverted either by counter-moves on the part of the insurgent or by the critics on its own side who will be seeking a simpler and quicker solution. There are no short-cuts and no gimmicks - Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, 1966

Previous by Maj. Gen. Nash

Iraq Briefing - 06 August 2009 - Stability in the South