The Redhunter

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October 31, 2009

Why I'm not Posting Much...

The reason for my lack of posting recently is that I've been working very hard in a volunteer capacity to elect conservative Republicans here in Virginia. As the election draws neared it's taken up more and more of my time, and it's at the point now where I spend several hours a day on email alone.

There have been a few dozen posts I've wanted to to put up but just haven't had the time. I'll be back to business as usual on the 4th.

Oh, and the Washington Post has once again confirmed that they're a complete disgrace. i think they're just mad because their candidates are so far down in the polls.

Posted by Tom at 10:24 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

October 22, 2009

A Comprehensive Strategy: Afghanistan Force Requirements
Part 1: The Legitimacy of the Afghan Government

I was originally going to do this in one post, but once I got into it I realized it would be too long and no one would read it all. As such, in this post we'll take up the issue of the legitimacy of the Afghan government. Counterinsurgency 101 says that in order to defeat an insurgency the government must get the people on it's side, and the only way to do that is if they perceive their government as being legitimate. As then-Lt Gen Petraeus' team wrote in the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 (pub Dec 2006)

1-113 LEGITIMACY IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

5-1 ...Successful counterinsurgents support or develop local institutions with legitimacy and the ability to provide basic services, economic opportunity, public order, and security.

The case for fighting and winning in Afghanistan is pretty simple; preventing more 9-11's. Large, well funded, terrorist groups can wreck enough havoc when they have regions such as Waziristan, or parts of Lebanon, Ireland or Spain to themselves. But when they have an entire country, even one that is backward by third world standards, the results are devastating even by "normal" terrorist-attack standards.

In other posts I have explored the details of counterinsurgency strategy, and why other options than a full surge of troops into Afghanistan will fail. It is time to lay out exactly what troops are required to win.

I do not have the ability to do that myself, but I know who does; Frederick and Kimberly Kagan. Frederick was the "intellectual architect" of the successful surge in Iraq, and his wife Kimberly has been a professor at West Point and is president of her own think tank, the Institute for the Study of War. On September 21 they laid out the force requirements for victory in Afghanistan and although I've touched on it before it's high time I went into more detail on it here. The full study is called A Comprehensive Strategy: Afghanistan Force Requirements. You can download the entire thing as either a pdf file or as Powerpoint slides, take your pick.

Their bottom line first:

To inform the national discussion, therefore, we have produced a report that argues for an addition of 40,000-45,000 US troops in 2010 to the 68,000 American forces that will be there by the end of this year. The report illustrates where US, NATO, and Afghan forces are now and where additional forces are needed to accomplish the mission. It links the US force requirements to the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces on an accelerated timeline. It explains the methodology for assessing the adequacy of a proposed force-level. This product, and our recommendations and assessments, are entirely our own--they do not necessarily reflect the views of General McChrystal or anyone else." - Fred and Kim Kagan

Now for the report:

Objectives

• Create conditions in Afghanistan to prevent the re‐establishment of safe havens for al
Qaeda and other trans‐national terrorist groups
• Establish sufficient stability to ensure that these conditions can be sustained over time with foreign financial assistance but with very limited foreign military presence

COIN (counterinsurgency) Strategic Framework

• Security
- Defeat the insurgency together with the ANSF
- Expand and improve the ANSF as rapidly as possible
- Make the lines cross
• Governance
- Remediate damage that corruption and abuse of power have done to the legitimacy of the Afghan Government
- Help and cajole GIRoA to emplace systems and procedures to improve legitimacy over the next few years
- Improve the capacity of GIRoA at all levels to provide essential services to the Afghan people, especially security, justice, dispute resolution, and basic agricultural and transportation infrastructure
• Development
- Focus development efforts on building Afghan capacity to develop their own country rather than on developing it for them
- Ensure that development empowers the government, not the enemy
- Address corruption and the perception of corruption within the international development effort
• Security and governance have priority over development

Me - that last line is vital; securing the population must come before economic development, and indeed even before political progress. For years we had it backward in Iraq, and with the surge in 2007 we finally got it right. As such, we succeeded.

Afghan Government Legitimacy

• Establishing the legitimacy of the Afghan government is a requirement for successful counter‐insurgency
• Elections are one way of establishing legitimacy, but they are neither sufficient nor necessarily determinative
• US must redouble its efforts to help Afghanistan establish the legitimacy of the institutions of its government
• A key part of these efforts must be dramatically increasing transparency in Afghan budgetary procedures (building on models already in place in some ministries)
• The US must also work to encourage the Afghan government to establish procedures for electing provincial and district governors and sub‐governors who are currently appointed by the president
• The US and the international community together control virtually all of Afghanistan's budget; they have enormous leverage if they choose to use it (much more than the leverage the US had on oil‐rich Iraq)
• The presence of large numbers of American and international forces and the irreplaceable role they currently play in providing security for the Afghan government and its officials also offer enormous leverage

Sources of Legitimacy

• Elections are one source of legitimacy, but only one
• Legitimacy is also defined by the performance of the government, both in its ability to provide desired services and in its adherence to social norms
• Karzai would likely have won fair elections, although possibly not in the first round, and he would almost certainly have carried the Pashtun areas heavily--so the problem is not the imposition of an unacceptable leader but rather the manipulations that led to this particular outcome
• The fraud is unquestionably damaging to Karzai's legitimacy and therefore harmful to the ISAF effort
• But in the mid‐ and long‐term, legitimacy will be defined much more by the actions Karzai and the international community take now than by the fraudulence of these elections
• We should not condone the fraud; on the contrary, we should deplore it
• But we should accept the outcome of the Afghan legal processes now underway to review the result and then develop and use all possible leverage with Karzai to shape the new government in ways the will repair the damage to its legitimacy and begin to improve the situation

Me - so we see that while elections are necessary, we should not focus too much on them. The reality is that most Afghans didn't even know there was an election, and many who voted didn't really understand what they were doing. What they want is a government that they believe is looking out for their interests, is reasonably free of corruption, and can provide basic services.

Legitimacy After the Election

• The US can also work to help the Afghan government reform itself using tools similar to those we employed in helping the Iraqi government rid itself of malign actors supporting sectarian cleansing and death‐squads in 2007:
- US forces can collect evidence of malfeasance by Afghan officials at all levels
- That evidence can be presented to those officials, to their superiors, to Karzai, to Afghan courts, to the public, or, in some cases, to international courts
- In some cases, criminal action should result; in some cases, the officials should be removed; in some cases, the aim is simply to pressure those officials to stop certain specific behaviors that threaten the success of the mission
- This is not a crusade against corruption--officials are only targeted when their actions seriously jeopardize our efforts
- This does not require the removal of Karzai or some of his key allies (including family members) from positions of power--as in Iraq, it should be possible to rechannel their behavior away from the activities that are most damaging
• The US has demonstrated that it can generate such precise and surgical
pressure on critical points in a political system in Iraq
• This approach requires significant numbers of American forces actively patrolling among the population--only in that way can our leaders develop the intelligence they need to determine which malign actors must be addressed and to gather the information needed to address them

Me - the good news is that unlike Iraq, we have a lot of leverage with the Afghan government.

Legitimacy and the ANSF

• What is the ANSF fighting for if the US makes it clear that it regards the Afghan Government as illegitimate?
• The ANSF leadership is well aware that it cannot manage the violence in Afghanistan on its own
• Announcing that no US reinforcements are on the way is likely to damage ANSF morale seriously, particularly coupled with US interactions with the Afghan government that suggest the US does not accept its legitimacy
• The ANSF does not exist or fight in a vacuum--its quality and performance depends heavily on its belief that the international community supports it and will continue to support it adequately, and on its belief that its cause is just Legitimacy and Force Levels
• The flaws of the August 20 election increase the requirement for additional forces rather than decreasing it
• If the US declares that it will not send additional forces because of those flaws, it is de facto declaring that it regards the election as illegitimate, the Karzai government as illegitimate, and the Afghan enterprise as unworthy of additional effort, all of which will seriously exacerbate damage to the legitimacy of the government within Afghanistan as well as to the will of the international community to continue the struggle
• Failing to send additional forces, moreover, deprives the US of the ability to take advantage of the opportunities offered by this flawed election, particularly the opportunities to leverage Karzai's insecurity and growing recognition that he must take real steps to re‐establish the legitimacy of his government
• This is not a symbolic question--undertaking any of the steps outlined in this document to address systemic problems that undermine the legitimacy of the Afghan government require additional American military forces operating in a COIN mission on the ground

Me - let 's not cut off our nose to spite our face by not sending troops because of a fraudulent election. This is Afghanistan, folks, not Idaho. Let's concentrate on basic government services, which is all the people there really care about, anyway. What we don't want to do is create a situation that undermines the Afghan security forces, because if they lose confidence in us it will be very difficult if not impossible to regain their trust.

Next: The current size and state of the Allied and Afghan security forces

Posted by Tom at 9:00 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack

October 19, 2009

The Demographics of Islam and the West

This is a short must-watch video

The demographic numbers are spot on as near as I can tell. More Muslims are a problem because by and large they are not assimilating and adopting Western ideas. My only problem with the video is at the end when the solution presented is that we should try and convert them to Christianity. As a Christian I want everyone to accept Christ, but as a practical matter it's not going to happen.

Posted by Tom at 9:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

October 16, 2009

Red Teaming Afghanistan: Strategic Options and Enemy Responses

The Obama Administration is currently debating several options with regard to Afghanistan. Frederick and Kimberly Kagan have helpfully summarized them, and "red teamed" each for likely enemy responses. The results are posted at Kim Kagan's Institute for the Study of War.

As President Obama has finally gotten around to holding informational meetings on Afghanistan and started the decision making progress, it is important for us to know the options under consideration. Looking at the situation at the strategic level, the options are quite finite and thus easy to categorize.

In this post I am only going to quote the highlights of their report. Interested readers will want to follow the link above and read the entire report (or you can download it EnemyReactionstoUSStrategyinAfghanistan.pdf) Following are excerpts from their analysis.

The five strategic options are:

1. Scenario 1: The President orders all US forces out of Afghanistan, including Special Operations Forces (SOF) and classified forces.
2. Scenario 2: The President orders US combat forces out of Afghanistan, including all trainers and forces supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), but not including SOF and classified forces.
3. Scenario 3: The President orders US combat forces out of Afghanistan, but trainers, SOF, classified forces, and forces assisting the ANSF remain.
4. Scenario 4: US combat forces remain as currently deployed, with additional emphasis on expansion of the ANS.
5. Scenario 5: US combat forces are augmented as proposed by General McChrystal and the expansion of the ANSF is accelerated.

Analysis of each with most likely enemy response follows:

Scenario 1 (Withdrawal)Summary

• Taliban takes control of the region from Farah to the gates of Kabul in 2010; Kabul likely falls in 2010 or early 2011
• Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) and Haqqani Network (HQN) likely conduct determined attacks on critical Lines of Communication (LOC) to cause significant casualties during the withdrawal of Coalition combat forces
• Al Qaeda senior leadership and training centers likely re‐emerge in Taliban‐held areas
• Ethnic civil war likely develops between Taliban‐led Pashtuns and Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras
• Conflict likely generates new waves of refugees into Iran and Pakistan
• Malign elements within Pakistan prevail in their efforts to support the Taliban and to stop the Pakistani government from fighting Islamist extremists within Pakistan
• NATO withdraws in defeat, possibly with significant resentment of the US for abandoning the alliance
• Al Qaeda will portray the US withdrawal as a stunning victory over the infidels, greater than the defeat of the Soviet Union
• Humanitarian crises in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and possibly Central Asia
• Reimposition of Taliban interpretation of shari'a law, including violent reaction to efforts to emancipate women over the last decade

Scenario 2 (Special Operations Forces Only) Summary

• Taliban takes control of the region from Farah to the gates of Kabul in 2010; Kabul likely falls in 2010 or early 2011
• QST and HQN likely conduct determined attacks on critical Lines of Communication (LOC) to cause significant casualties during the withdrawal of Coalition combat forces
• Al Qaeda senior leadership and training centers likely re‐emerge in Taliban‐held areas cautiously and covertly
• Ethnic civil war likely develops between Taliban‐led Pashtuns and Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras
• Conflict likely generates new waves of refugees into Iran and Pakistan
• Malign elements within Pakistan prevail in their efforts to support the Taliban and to stop the Pakistani government from fighting Islamist extremists within Pakistan
• NATO withdraws in defeat, possibly with significant resentment of the US for abandoning the alliance
• Al Qaeda will portray the US withdrawal as a stunning victory over the infidels, greater than the defeat of the Soviet Union
• Humanitarian crises in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and possibly Central Asia
• Reimposition of Taliban interpretation of shari'a law, including violent reaction to efforts to emancipate women over the last decade

Scenario 3 (SOF and Training Only) Summary

• QST operations:

launches major effort to capture and kill embedded trainers

conducts large‐scale targeted assassination campaign against Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) leaders

redoubles efforts to acquire advanced Man‐portable air‐defense system (MANPADs)

seeks to establish firing positions from which to rocket/mortar airfields

• HQN pursues similar tactics in attempt to regain control of Greater Paktia
• HQN also expands reach of radicalizing madrassas in Greater Paktia
• Both groups likely conduct determined attacks on critical Lines of Communication (LOC) to cause significant casualties during the withdrawal of Coalition combat forces
• Al Qaeda senior leadership and training centers may start to re‐emerge in Taliban‐held areas cautiously and covertly
• Ethnic civil war likely develops between Taliban‐led Pashtuns and Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras
• Increasing conflict and loss of confidence likely generates new waves of refugees into Iran and Pakistan
• Malign elements within Pakistan prevail in their efforts to support the Taliban and to stop the Pakistani government from fighting Islamist extremists within Pakistan
• NATO withdraws, with possible exception of some UK trainers, support elements
• Al Qaeda will portray the US withdrawal as a stunning victory over the infidels, greater than the defeat of the Soviet Union

When the Soviets withdrew, they also left behind a "puppet government" of Najibullah

Al Qaeda and the Taliban will portray the US transition to a pure SOF/Training mission as a repetition of the 1989 Soviet withdrawal

Scenario 4 (Steady‐State with Increased Training) Summary

• QST continues ongoing efforts

consolidate control of areas lacking ANSF and Coalition forces, especially: Farah, Oruzgan

outside TK, Kandahar, Now Zad and Nad Ali in Helmand, northern Ghazni, most of Zabol

contest coalition operations in the Helmand River Valley (HRV), working to inflict maximum casualties on British forces

vigorously contests US operations in Arghandab and Canadian operations in Zharay‐Panjwayi

• districts of Kandahar, working to inflict maximum casualties on Canadian forces

continues to infiltrate Kandahar City and solidify shadow governance throughout the south

emphasizes Afghan nationalism to build anti‐occupation sentiment

• QST may

attempt to spark inter‐ethnic fighting through mass‐casualty attacks, information operations, or other means

launch a concerted campaign of Suicide vehicle‐borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED), rocket, and mortar attacks on coalition bases

• HQN continues ongoing efforts to

disrupt construction of the Khowst‐Gardez Pass (K‐G Pass) road

gain influence and, where possible, control over the Khowst Bowl

conduct spectacular attacks in Kabul and elsewhere to raise funds and international support

expand its presence in Wardak and Lowgar Provinces and to interdict Highway One

• Pakistan will very likely view the rejection of GEN McChrystal's request for
• additional forces as an indication of waning US commitment to Afghanistan
• Islamabad will become more likely to increase support to HQN and QST in the expectation of a complete US withdrawal
• The death of Beitullah Mehsud and the perception of waning American commitment in Afghanistan may also persuade Islamabad to reduce American operations of all varieties within Pakistan

Scenario 5 (Fully‐Resourced Counterinsurgency (COIN)) Summary

• QST will likely

contest important areas in Helmand and Kandahar (esp. Arghandab, Zharay‐Panjwayi, Sangin, Nad

Ali) coalition forces achieve until overmatch in those areas, whereupon QST withdraws leaders and strategic assets to surrounding safe havens; local fighters either reconcile or go to ground

attempt to consolidate control, maintain Freedom of movement (FOM), support contested areas, and prepare to defend sanctuaries

prominently seize isolated district centers and attempt to retake areas "cleared" by coalition forces

increase attacks against more vulnerable coalition partners

QST highlights illegitimacy of GIRoA

QST emphasizes Afghan nationalism to build anti‐occupation sentiment

• Pakistan

will most likely view the deployment of more US forces to Afghanistan as an indication of US commitment, although that perception depends on the way the deployment is described (i.e., if the president emphasizes a time‐limit or hints at the likelihood of a changed strategy within a year, the perception of US commitment may be undermined even despite the increased deployment)

will not take action against the QST or HQN in any likely scenario, regardless of US decisions

is more likely to continue the fight against its own internal enemies if it believes that the US will prevail in Afghanistan

is very unlikely to increase support to the QST and HQN if the US deploys additional forces

if and when Islamabad becomes persuaded that the QST and HQN will NOT likely prevail in Afghanistan, it becomes more likely to reduce support to those groups

Next - A Comprehensive Strategy: Afghanistan Force Requirements

Posted by Tom at 9:45 PM | Comments (8) | TrackBack

October 12, 2009

How to Win in Afghanistan: Kimberly Kagan and Jeffrey Dressler

A bit longer than the interview with Lara Logan below, but well worth your time

Click To Play

Make sure you also read Dr. Kagan's Key Facts on Afghanistan for background.l

Following are my notes from the briefing:

• The enemy in Helmund has the initiative
• What the coalition has been doing has not worked
• The 4,000 Marines sent to southern Helmund earlier this year have done some good but are not enough
• Civil projects will not work since the population is unsecured
• We need more troops in order to implement a proper counterinsurgency strategy
• A population-centric counterinsurgency is what is needed for us to succeed
• The key is protecting the population, or at least major population centers
• The main enemy insurgent group is the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) does not call itself the "Quetta Shura Taliban," but the "Islamic Emerate of Afghanistan" it sees itself as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. It is in Pakistan now.
• The other enemy insurgent group is the The Haqqani network, named after its leader Jalaluhuddin Haqqani, is an insurgent group operates in eastern Afghanistan
• These Taliban are imposing taxes on some population areas in southern Afghanistan as a way to fund their activities. They are the government in some areas. They have their own court system
• Both of these groups have historical and current links to other terrorist groups such as but not limited to al Qaeda.
• The insurgents are succeeding through a campaign of intimidation, not just of the population at large but they target local leaders. Assassination is a key tool. They have a platform and agenda
• The enemy is not a group of ragtag fighters. They are determined and well organized.
• Currently, when our forces go into a town in Helmund, they're asked "are you staying?" When our forces answer no, the people say "then we won't help you because if we do the Taliban will come back and punish us." (me - parallel to Iraq pre-surge!)
• If we withdraw or go to a counterterror strategy the Taliban will form a shadow government in southern Afghanistan.
• The Taliban are Afghans, not Pakistanis.
• We cannot impose a government on the people in Afghanistan, but must do what we are doing very well in Iraq: hold the government accountable to the people. If the government is predatory and does not provide services we must help the people hold them accountable. We cannot indiscriminately support the government officials. We are there to serve the people and make sure the government is accountable to them and that they serve you. So we must strengthen the institutions of local government. We must also leverage the international community to strengthen the national government, or at least the parts of it that work.
• Although opium and the drug trade is a source of income for the Taliban, they also make money by taxing legal crops. So even if we got rid of poppy production they'd still make money by taxing other crops. So an eradication campaign may not do much good. Further, it alienates the farmers. In fact, the Taliban does not conduct operations during harvest time (of all crops) so as not to disturb the farmers.
• Chasing the insurgents around Afghanistan will not work.

Posted by Tom at 9:45 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

How to Win in Afghanistan: Lara Logan

This is a must-watch.

CBS News Chief Foreign Affairs Correspondent Lara Logan speaks with Bob Orr about what will work in Afghanistan and what will not work. She absolutely eviscerates advisers such as Vice-President Biden who think that we can succeed with special forces and airpower. She also takes down those who say that the Taliban aren't a threat to the U.S. or that there are "moderate" Taliban with whom we can negotiate.

The lady knows what she's talking about.

Watch CBS News Videos Online

Principles of Counterinsurgency: What Does and What Does Not Work

I sent this as an email to a friend the other day, but it will serve our purpose here. It represents everything I have learned and posted on this blog over the past two and a half years about how to defeat an insurgency. I cleaned it up a bit but otherwise not much has changed. I'm posting it here because it serves as a nice backdrop to Ms. Logan's comments.

• The key is to protect the population. Unless the people feel secure nothing else is possible.
• You cannot protect the people with a few special forces and certainly not with airpower. It requires regular troops on the ground.
• Once an insurgency has reached a certain point, simply training the indigenous army to do the job won't work.
• Political and economic advancement can only occur after the population is secure.
• The fastest way to lose against an insurgency is the overuse of force. Killing civilians and destroying things turns the people against you, so the counterinsurgents must go out of their way to avoid civilian casualties.
• Relying on airstrikes and raids by special forces does not work.

• The insurgents must not be allowed to have a sanctuary.
• Not all insurgents are equal. Some are hard-core and must be killed or captured, but some are opportunists in it for a few bucks, because they are unemployed and need money to feed their families, or even because their family was threatened if they didn't plant a bomb or two. It is imperative that these individuals be "peeled off" the insurgency and brought into the government - even if they have killed Americans.
• In the beginning, some of the population will be on the side of the insurgents, and some on the side of the government, but most will want to "sit on the fence." The insurgency will succeed if the mass of people continue to sit on the fence. For the counterinsurgents to be successful, they must convince the people that A) the counterinsurgents will win, and B) it is in their interests for the counterinsurgents to win.
• Commanders must become expert in all aspects of the area that they are assigned to. This includes local customs, religions observances, economics, social links between families. They must know every village, road, field, business, and ancient grievance.
• It is vital for the indigenous government to be seen as legitimate by the people. If this is not achieved, the counterinsurgents will not be successful.
• In the end, the people must take charge of their own future.
• In the end, the indigenous army must take over the role of counterinsurgents
• In the end, only political reform can completely end an insurgency.
• No insurgency in modern times has been defeated in less than ten years, so patience is of the essence.
• It may be many years until you can be sure you've won. Insurgencies end with a whimper, not a bang. They aren't like World War II, which ended in dramatic fashion (low-intensity v high-intensity war).

Posted by Tom at 8:45 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

October 11, 2009

Obama's Evolving Promises on Afghanistan

Jim Geraghty traces the evolution of Obama's promises about what he'd do about Afghanistan, from his candidacy to this past week:

Then-candidate Barack Obama, July 15, 2008:

Our troops and our NATO allies are performing heroically in Afghanistan, but I have argued for years that we lack the resources to finish the job because of our commitment to Iraq. That's what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said earlier this month. And that's why, as President, I will make the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban the top priority that it should be. This is a war that we have to win.

And then in August, before the VFW:

This is the central front in the war on terrorism. This is where the Taliban is gaining strength and launching new attacks, including one that just took the life of ten French soldiers. This is where Osama bin Laden and the same terrorists who killed nearly 3,000 Americans on our own soil are hiding and plotting seven years after 9/11. This is a war that we have to win.

And then in his convention address:

I will end this war in Iraq responsibly, and finish the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

And then on October 22:

Abroad, we need a new direction that ends the war in Iraq, focuses on the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban, and restores strong alliances and tough American diplomacy.

The New York Times, today:

President Obama's national security team is moving to reframe its war strategy by emphasizing the campaign against Al Qaeda in Pakistan while arguing that the Taliban in Afghanistan do not pose a direct threat to the United States, officials said Wednesday.

I think we know where this is headed.

In the post just previous to this one I showed how the Administration has been laying the groundwork for withdrawal by telling us that

1) "the Taliban is not...a homogenous group."
2) They could bring elements of the Taliban into the government
3) This different Taliban would not harbor al Qaeda
4) Therefore we could draw down troops as we have no fight with the Taliban.

I sincerely hope this does not come to pass. I hope he adopts Gen. McChrystal's recommendations but I fear he will not.

Posted by Tom at 9:00 PM | Comments (4) | TrackBack

The Coming Obama Excuse for Withdrawing from Afghanistan?

Ever since the invasion of Iraq turned unpopular in maybe 2005, liberals assured us that while that was the wrong war, Afghanistan was the right one where we had to fight. Yessiree, they were raring to go "get bin Laden."

During the campaign, then-Senator Obama seemed on board too. On October 22, 2008 he said

In 2002, I said we should focus on finishing the fight against Osama bin Laden. Throughout this campaign, I have argued that we need more troops and more resources to win the war in Afghanistan, and to confront the growing threat from al Qaeda along the Pakistani border. ...

Make no mistake: we are confronting an urgent crisis in Afghanistan, and we have to act. It's time to heed the call from General McKiernan and others for more troops. That's why I'd send at least two or three additional combat brigades to Afghanistan. ...Only a comprehensive strategy that prioritizes Afghanistan and the fight against al Qaeda will succeed.

And indeed, last March, Obama seemed to keep his promise when he announced that we were sending another 17,000 troops to Afghanistan.

At the time I congratulated the president, but harbored some doubts as to whether he'd really see it through.

Please Note - President Obama may well do the right thing and order the surge of troops that General McChrystal wants. If he does I will congratulate him.

Right now though I am seeing signs that this is not what they will do. They seem to be floating a justification for scaling back troops, and moving to a counterterror strategy of special forces and airpower.

The Excuse

What they will tell us is that the Taliban are not a threat to the United States, and al Qaeda does not operate in force in Afghanistan, so bringing elements of the Taliban (Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), actually, and they call themselves the "Islamic Emerate of Afghanistan") into the Afghan government. The Obama Administration will tell us that they've struck a deal with the QST by which the latter has agreed not to harbor al Qaeda. As such, we have no beef with QST, the country is safe from al Qaeda, and we can withdraw troops.

On Thursday White House Spokesman Robert Gibbs equivocated when asked if "the administration believe it's possible to defeat the Taliban?"

Transcript:

Q Thanks, Robert. Coming out of the Situation Room meeting yesterday on Afghanistan and Pakistan, obviously, what significance should we attach to the fact that the President's public words lately, a lot of people have been noting that he continues to talk about dismantling al Qaeda but seems to be talking less and less about Taliban. And people are reading that, that's sort of a significant shift and a signal of where the mission is headed. What do you say about that?

MR. GIBBS: I would tell folks to go back and read what the President said -- has said virtually every month leading up to -- and I would -- including the review and the speech coming out of the review from last March.

The President has always evaluated our policy, as I said here yesterday, based on those that pose a direct threat to attack our homeland or to attack our allies. Included in that group are any that would provide safe haven for those activities.

Though, as I said yesterday, we're not talking about the same type of -- they're not the same type of group. Al Qaeda is a global transnational jihadist movement that has conducted attacks on the United States homeland; conducted attacks on our allies; continues to plan, and has the intent and will to do so again. Again, some in the Taliban have similar agendas that have helped al Qaeda with safe havens. There's also a significant number of Taliban that are local warlords that have far different agendas. I think to look at them as separate entities, it's certainly not backed up by any of the intelligence.

What Gibbs does throughout the briefing is stress that "the Taliban is not...a homogenous group." What the Administration is going to do is bring elements of the Taliban into the government that claim that they have an agenda that does not threaten the United States.

This next exchange is the worst:

Q Thanks, Robert. You had the March review on Afghanistan/Pakistan policy. You have General McChrystal's report. You've had hours of discussions over the past couple weeks. Does the administration believe it's possible to defeat the Taliban?

MR. GIBBS: I think -- let me get a better sense of -- let me say this. I think as we get into Friday's discussion, there will be a larger discussion about Afghanistan, particularly, and the threats we face there.

No direct answer, so the answer is "no." Sounds like preparation for a withdrawal to me.

Richard Haas, president of the liberal Council on Foreign Relations, said much the same thing in today's Washington Post:

Al-Qaeda does not require Afghan real estate to constitute a regional or global threat. Terrorists gravitate to areas of least resistance; if they cannot use Afghanistan, they will use countries such as Yemen or Somalia, as in fact they already are. No doubt, the human rights situation would grow worse under Taliban rule, but helping Afghan girls get an education, no matter how laudable, is not a goal that justifies an enormous U.S. military commitment....

All of this argues that U.S. interests in Afghanistan are less than fundamental, rendering the conflict not a war of necessity but a war of choice.

Reading the entire piece, the summary of his argument is that al Qaeda will not be a force in Afghanistan, it does not depend on that country anyway, so it's not so important for us to be there in force. Indeed, he says, "if they cannot use Afghanistan, they will use countries such as Yemen or Somalia, as in fact they already are."

There are two problems with this. One, as Thomas Joscelyn points out, "why not allow al Qaeda and its allies to take over whatever geographic territory they desire?"

The second is that it's all contradicted by history. Have we forgotten that the Taliban harbored al Quaeda prior to our invasion? If given the chance, surely they will do so again.

Indeed, as By Thomas Joscelyn & Bill Roggio conclude

You have undoubtedly heard that Osama bin Laden was the Taliban's "guest" in Afghanistan prior to September 11. That is a vast understatement. The reality is that bin Laden integrated al Qaeda's operations with the Taliban's in a variety of important ways. Al Qaeda and the Taliban have been fighting side-by-side for more than a decade. Long before September 11, al Qaeda successfully integrated itself into the Taliban's infrastructure...

The bottom line is that al Qaeda and the Taliban fight side-by-side today, just as they have for more than a decade.

It is remarkable that anyone would argue that a Taliban safe haven in Afghanistan would not necessarily lead to an al Qaeda safe haven there given that the two currently enjoy the same safe havens in Northern Pakistan. After the two jointly established the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan in 2006, for example, it should have become painfully obvious that they had not given up on their combined territorial ambitions.

If yo udon't believe them maybe you'll believe Al Jazeera:

Another Excuse

The other excuse the Obama Administration may try is that the war is too expensive. Bill Kristol said last Tuesday us that

At today's White House meeting, President Obama, I'm told, reminded the congressional leaders that every thousand troops sent to Afghanistan would cost about a billion dollars a year, and asked whether the lawmakers would really support $40 to $50 billion a year of additional spending for the war.

This from the administration that thought nothing of a trillion dollar "stimulus," no less. $40 - $50 billion is pocket change to Democrats.

Conclusion

All these past several years when I heard liberals say that Iraq was the wrong war but they wanted to fight in Afghanistan, I openly doubted them on this blog. I said that once they got into power they'd say the war was too expensive, because the money was needed at home for "badly needed school lunch program."

I sincerely hope Obama does the right thing, but if not I think I'll be halfway right as to his excuse if he doesn't.

Posted by Tom at 8:45 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

October 9, 2009

Obama's Ridiculous Nobel Peace Prize

So President Barack Obama has won the Nobel Peace Prize. We're supposed to be happy for him and for our country. Sorry, but I'm not.

If you can stand to watch it, here are his remarks this morning upon learning of the award

From his remarks

I am both surprised and deeply humbled by the decision of the Nobel Committee. Let me be clear: I do not view it as a recognition of my own accomplishments, but rather as an affirmation of American leadership on behalf of aspirations held by people in all nations.

To be honest, I do not feel that I deserve to be in the company of so many of the transformative figures who've been honored by this prize -- men and women who've inspired me and inspired the entire world through their courageous pursuit of peace.

But I also know that this prize reflects the kind of world that those men and women, and all Americans, want to build -- a world that gives life to the promise of our founding documents. And I know that throughout history, the Nobel Peace Prize has not just been used to honor specific achievement; it's also been used as a means to give momentum to a set of causes. And that is why I will accept this award as a call to action -- a call for all nations to confront the common challenges of the 21st century.

He's actually right on some of these: The award is not about his accomplishments because he has none, he does not deserve to be in the company of most of the recipients, and

Where he's wrong is that he does deserve to be in the company of some of the more recent recipients, and the current Nobel prize does most certainly not reflect the promise of our founding documents.

Given that Obama has done absolutely nothing to advance peace, and in fact has made the war far more likely, you may be wondering why he got the prize. The Norwegian Nobel Committee clears that up:

Obama has as President created a new climate in international politics. Multilateral diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United Nations and other international institutions can play. Dialogue and negotiations are preferred as instruments for resolving even the most difficult international conflicts. The vision of a world free from nuclear arms has powerfully stimulated disarmament and arms control negotiations. Thanks to Obama's initiative, the USA is now playing a more constructive role in meeting the great climatic challenges the world is confronting. Democracy and human rights are to be strengthened.

Only very rarely has a person to the same extent as Obama captured the world's attention and given its people hope for a better future. His diplomacy is founded in the concept that those who are to lead the world must do so on the basis of values and attitudes that are shared by the majority of the world's population.

It's all bullcrap, of course, but the meaning is clear: we hate a strong United States that takes firm action against the dictators and troublemakers of the world and want one that give up it's sovereignty to international institutions and prefers endless meaningless talk to action.

More, they admit that Obama has done nothing of substance. They base their entire decision on the idea that he has "created a new climate" and "given its people hope."

If there was once any doubt, it should be clear by now that the Nobel Peace Prize is a complete and utter farce. It is nothing but a political statement by a bunch of leftists.

Once upon a time, the winners were at least deserving. Consider these examples:

1906 - Theodore Roosevelt

1919 - Woodrow Wilson

1944 - The International Committee of the Red Cross

195 - George Marshall

1962 - Linus Pauling

1978 - Anwar Al-Sadat and Menachem Begin

1979 - Mother Teresa

1983 - Lech Walesa

1986 - Elie Wiesel

All of these are men, and one woman and organization, of solid achievements. They and most of the others are deserving.

However, more recently the award has gone off the rails with these winners:

1990 - Mikhail Gorbachev

1992 - Rigoberta Menchú Tum

1994 - Yasser Arafat, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin

2001 - The United Nations ( U.N.) and Kofi Annan

2002 - Jimmy Carter

2004 - Wangari Maathai

2005 - International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Mohamed ElBaradei

2007 - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Albert Arnold (Al) Gore Jr.

Gorbachev is an unrepentant communist who would have kept the Soviet Union around if he had his way, Menchu invented most of her biography, Arafat was a terrorist, the UN is a harbor for human rights abusers, Annan refused to take action that would have prevented the Rwanda massacres and presided over the Oil-for-Food scam, Carter is an anti-Semite, Maathai thinks that AIDS was created in the West to kill black people, the IAEA useless and ElBaradei a moral idiot who thinks Israel the greatest threat to peace, the IPCC is a political outfit and Al Gore a nut who rants that "the earth has a fever."

No one in their right mind would want to be in the company of these losers.

If you look at the timeline on the Nobel Committee's website, you'll see that the deadline for submission of candidates is February, 1 (12 days after he took office), in that month and in March the committee shortens the list, in March and August advisers review it, and in October the winner is selected.

So if you think nine months in office is a rather short time to garner such an award, know that someone thought him worthy a week or two after his inauguration. This alone boggles the mind.

But in the intervening months the committee was no doubt impressed with Obama's world "apology tour." They must have salivated over how he bashed his own country, and George W Bush in particular (if only by implication).

They gave him the awared because they see him as standing above America, not as part of it. He is "post-American." Obama doesn't see himself so much as an American as a "citizen of the world," something he called himself last July in a speech he gave while in Germany.

The whole thing was meant as a repudiation of GWB, and to a lesser extent I think Reagan. After all, this is the org who gave the prize to Jimmy Carter but not RR.

It is an encouragement for him to continue his polices of appeasement : cutting our military, not using our military except in the most multilateral fashion and then only tepidly, signing all manner of international treaties and agreements, ignoring problems such as Islamic extremism

It was also meant as, or will certainly have the effect of, dissuading him from sending a significant number of troops to Afghanistan. Anti-war types in the Democrat party and media will no doubt use this to persuade him to scale back our effort there.

But what if he does send a significant number of troops, a "surge" along the lines recommended by General McChrystal? How will the Nobel committee view that?

Finally, as if to sum up the current administration's attitude, in a display of utter classlessness State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said today that

From our standpoint, you know, we think that this gives us a sense of momentum ... when the United States has accolades tossed its way, rather than shoes

Ha ha.

Better get your laughs in now, because where we're going with Obama in charge there won't be much to laugh about.

Update

In case there was any doubt, the Democrats have officially gone nuts.

We are all now required to sing the praises of Obama, says DNC communications director Brad Woodhouse

The Republican Party has thrown in its lot with the terrorists--the Taliban and Hamas this morning--in criticizing the President for receiving the Nobel Peace prize. Republicans cheered when America failed to land the Olympics and now they are criticizing the President of the United States for receiving the Nobel Peace prize--an award he did not seek but that is nonetheless an honor in which every American can take great pride--unless of course you are the Republican Party.

That "dissent is the highest form or patriotism" went out the window fast.

Posted by Tom at 9:40 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Iraq Briefing - 08 October 2009 - The Emphasis is Now on Stability Operations

This briefing is by Colonel Tobin Green, commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. On Thursday he spoke spoke via satellite from JSS (Joint Service Station) War Eagle to reporters at the Pentagon, providing an update on security operations in Iraq.

The 1st Brigade Combat Team is also known as the Iron Horse Brigade. The Iron Horse Brigade is assigned to Multi-National Division-Baghdad, which is also known as Task Force Baghdad. Its major area of responsibility is the city of Baghdad. MND-Baghdad is headquartered by the 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Hood, Texas.

Col. Green reports to Major General Daniel P. Bolger, commanding general of the 1st Cav. Bolger, in turn, reports to Lt. Gen. Charles H. Jacoby Jr., commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Jacoby reports to General Odierno, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq. Odierno reports to Gen. Petraeus, commanding general of CENTCOM. Petreaus reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

This is Col. Green's third tour in Iraq. His first was pre-surge and the second during the surge.

This and other videos can be seen at DODvClips. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is at DefenseLink.

Unique to this briefing, Col. Green refers to several charts on posters and has the camera pan over to them. He also holds up a paper with some charts and has the camera zoom in on them. In all of the briefings I have watched, I have never seen this before. Gen. Odierno has made use of charts, but they were electronically interjected (term?), the camera did not pan to a chart.

Three important topics were raised during this briefing that we'll examine:

1) The number of insurgent attacks and the trending
2) The "fragility" of Iraq
3) Iranian influence

From Col. Green's opening statement:

COL. GREEN: ...Our current mission is to provide support to our Iraqi security forces partners inside the city of Baghdad and to conduct combined counterinsurgency operations with the ISF to disrupt and to defeat the enemy outside of the city....

Security is still the first order of business for the units in this brigade, as well as our Iraqi partners in uniform. Overall, I think we've been making steady progress in this area.

It's been just over three months since the Iraqi security forces assumed control -- they assumed control of and also responsibility for the security situation inside the city.

...so how are we doing? At this point, overall attack numbers, and those include IEDs and the dangerous explosively formed projectiles or EFPs, those attack numbers remain pretty low and are actually at lower levels than those we experienced, in the springtime, leading up to the transition point on 30 June. In terms of attack lethality, casualties among U.S. forces have taken a significant downturn.

Now, we did see an increase in Iraqi security force casualties in the July time frame. And I think most of you are aware what the civilian casualties associated with the 19 August VBIED attack on the foreign ministry and the ministry of finance.

But casualty figures have steadily declined since that time, and I'm encouraged by initial returns. I'm also mindful of still lethal and capable enemy cells and networks that seek to inflict harm on security forces and innocent Iraqis every day.

We've found that the Iraqi security forces with whom we partner, especially the federal police and the Iraqi army, continue to stand up to extremist and insurgent groups like al Qaeda. And the Iraqi citizens continue to reject attempts by these groups to incite sectarian violence....

Moving on to civil capacity, in the post-30-June environment, we have been able to expand on an already-robust civil-capacity effort across the brigade by placing even more of our emphasis and our resources on stability operations. The improved security situation, gained from months and years past, means that the brigade combat team and its embedded provincial reconstruction teams can give increased weight to expanding the capability of Iraqi local government and to improving the quality of life for Iraqi people with greater access to essential services and employment. ...

...I believe we've been able to generate and sustain our momentum in helping the Iraqis build civil capacity because of how we have organized ourselves for this challenge. We can discuss these initiatives more later if you like, but the take-away here is that we've established a structure that closely tied our embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams directly to the brigade, fusing these organizations into one; thereby ensuring better synchronization and unity of effort.

Summarizing, we see the following

1) Security is still the number one concern, so counterinsurgency operations are still ongoing
2) Attacks of all sorts are down
3) Since the "spectacular" attack of Aug 19 civilian casualties are down
4) The Iraqi security forces can stand on their own
5) Since the security has improved so much they are moving to stability operations.

On to the Q & A. First off we get more detail on the security situation. As mentioned above, you'll want to watch the video so you actually see the charts he refers to.

Q Thank you. I'd like to begin. This is Courtney Kube from NBC News.

Colonel, you said that the overall attacks are pretty low. Can you quantify those for us, how many you were seeing back in March when you first moved into the area; how many you're seeing now?

And then, can you talk a little bit about who's behind the attacks in your area and who's the target? I assume it's -- it sounds as if it's Iraqi security forces, but just give us a better sense of what you're seeing in security incidents.

COL. GREEN: Courtney, I can. And if you could bear with me, I want to refer to some statistics to help me get the exact numbers. But if I understand you correctly, you really want some more specific details on the numbers of attacks that we've seen that show this decline, and then who I think might be behind those attacks.

So I'm looking at a chart right now that shows the number of attacks that we've experienced by type. And I'll hold it up in front of me, you know, just in case you're able to see it, and I'm not sure you are. ...

And you can see that, after our TOA, we did have a slight increase leading up to the 30 June time frame. And since that period, attacks have actually declined.

Now, this number shows higher in September, but I would just caution you and say that on the 31st of August, the terrain that we're responsible for, our battlespace, essentially doubled. So attacks really are down overall. And then again, if you look at lethality -- and lethality is depicted on the lower charts down here -- you can see that numbers did spike in the June and July time frames, June leading up to the security agreement, July just after. I think this was a high of 122 casualties involving Iraqi security forces. But those numbers have dropped substantially since. And coalition forces are down here at the bottom. They remain real low.

In terms of overall numbers of attacks, I think in the September time frame between our two areas, on the east side and the west side of the river, we had about 50 attacks overall. I want to caution you and tell you that we include every found IED, every found cache, as an attack, because we record those events based upon the enemy's intent. The actual successful lethal attacks are quite less than that.

Now, those are numbers, but who's behind the attacks? We have seen a drop-off in the targeting by Shi'a extremist groups following the 30 June accord. They still occur, but they occur in less frequent numbers than we saw in the spring time frame. On the other hand, we've seen some additional targeting that we attribute to al Qaeda or other types of insurgent or resistant groups.

Even after it was clear that the surge was successful, commanders often described the situation as "fragile," warning that while we had been successful if we weren't careful Iraq could backslide. It was stressed that a premature withdrawal of troops, for example, could leave a vacuum into which insurgent or criminal elements would reappear and perhaps reignite sectarian tension. We stopped hearing Iraq described by briefers that way in 2009, but remembering this description it is natural that reporters will ask if Iraq is still fragile.

In the 01 Oct briefing, Al Pessin asked Gen. Odierno whether Iraq was still fragile. He does so again today:

Q Colonel, it's Al Pessin from Voice of America. ...If I could just follow up briefly, over the years various officials and officers have used the word "fragile" to describe progress in Iraq. Do you think it's still fragile? Or how fragile is it? Or if not, what words would you use?

COL. GREEN: Yes, sir. I am familiar with that term. And you know, it is combat, so it's difficult when, you know, events like the 19th of August happen. ...

And so you'd look at an event like that, and you'd say: Okay, the enemy is still capable of conducting spectacular attacks and inflicting large amounts of casualties. And I think that remains the case.

However, I do believe that the Iraqi security forces grow stronger each and every day. I see the growth in governance and civil capacity, which is coming along. I think it's got some ways to go. I'm very encouraged by the progress, and I think that, you know, very critical for us right now is to have, you know, elections that go off successfully here in the coming months and then witness the seating of a new government.

And that transition, I think, will be really critical in cementing the gains that we've experienced thus far. ...what I see every week out there is forward momentum right now.

Although more was discussed in this briefing, the last topic we'll cover is that of Iranian influence. Obama campaigned as the candidate who would bring back diplomacy. Today the Nobel Peace Prize Committee gave him their award, mostly for things they hoped he would do in the future. One thing President Obama can do to bring peace to Iraq is to end the pernicious Iranian influence. Let's see him earn his prize by doing that.

Q Sir, it's Mike Mount with CNN.

You had made a brief reference about Iranian influence in your sector. How much are you seeing of fighters that may have gone into Iran, for training or -- and then come back in and set up in your sector? And how serious is the Iranian influence in your sector, compared to other parts in Baghdad?

COL. GREEN: Thanks, Mike.

We do see Iranian influence. We also see some influence of foreign fighters or insurgents, who have moved back and forth from other countries. I mean, I've seen some that have migrated in from Syria for example.

Many of our most important targets are individuals who have had some migration or spent some time outside of the country with one of these external actors.

We actually had a detention yesterday that involved a high-value target that had spent some time in Iran, in the not-too-distant past. So that does occur. Remember that my area of operations includes places like Sadr City.

So I don't think it's uncommon that we would have, you know, external influence, the migration of some weapons or materials that have their origin from abroad. You know, we have seen that. But we track it pretty effectively and we track it in conjunction with Iraqi forces.

They assist us as well in that effort. And then as those individuals appear, as those networks become activated, we action them when we have -- when we have the conditions set to do so. Over.

Overall this was an excellent briefing and we learned much of interest. As of now Iraq is on the right path.

Posted by Tom at 8:15 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

October 8, 2009

Key Facts on Afghanistan

Download the entire report here

If you want to understand what's really going on in Afghanistan, you can't do better than to read this. As way of short introduction, Frederick Kagan has been described as the "intellectual author" of the surge in Iraq. Both have been to Afghanistan and Iraq numerous times. Kimberly has been a professor at West Point. This doesn't make them right, but it gives them some credibility. Yes, they're married.

More from the Kagans and others on our strategic options and the likely outcome of each choice in a day or two. This post, then, is an introduction to what is coming next.

Key Facts on Afghanistan: A Joint Institute for the Study of War - American Enterprise Institute Report

By Dr. Kimberly Kagan and Dr. Frederick W. Kagan

The Enemy in Afghanistan

The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) and the Haqqani network pose the greatest threat to stability in Afghanistan.

* The QST is an insurgent group responsible for Taliban operations in Afghanistan. The group is led by Mullah Mohammed Omar. Following the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, Omar relocated the senior leadership council to Quetta, Pakistan. Though the QST is most active in southern Afghanistan, its operations have spread into areas of the north and west.

* The Haqqani network, named after its leader Jalaluhuddin Haqqani, is an insurgent group operates in eastern Afghanistan--in Paktia, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni, Wardak and even Kabul provinces. It also retains a base in North Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the son of Jalaluhuddin, is reported to be in charge of the day-to-day operations of the movement given his father's ill health.

Historically, the Taliban and the Haqqani network have been strategic enablers for al Qaeda.1

* Prior to 2001, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda's success was dependent upon support from the Taliban and Haqqani network.

* In the 1980s, Jalaluhuddin Haqqani met bin Laden while fundraising together for the mujahedeen in Saudi Arabia.

* In the 1990s, Haqqani invited bin Laden to establish training bases in Paktia, Paktika, and Khost (known as Greater Paktia).

* During the rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s, Haqqani joined Mullah Omar as a minister in the Taliban regime. Together, they welcomed the continued presence of bin Laden and gave sanctuary to al Qaeda training camps.

* Despite the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the relationship between the Quetta Shura Taliban, the Haqqani network, and al Qaeda continues.

Given the integral links between the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and al Qaeda, it is necessary to pursue a counterinsurgency strategy that prevents these groups from expanding their control and influence in Afghanistan.

The Mission in Afghanistan

On March 27, 2009, President Obama said his goals were, "...to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future."

Currently, President Obama is conducting a review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Several options are being debated, such as a more limited counterterrorism strategy and the adoption of a robust counterinsurgency strategy (advocated by General Stanley McChrystal in his assessment).

Strategic Options

Counterterrorism in Afghanistan2

* The U.S. Department of Defense defines counterterrorism (CT) as, "Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism."

* Given the range of Predator UAVs and the requirements for Special Forces teams, the conduct of CT operations using either requires bases in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

* While an over-the-horizon CT approach is feasible using long-range, precision-guided munitions, this approach relies entirely on Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and CIA networks to locate targets.

* The enemy has become increasingly savvy with its operational security, making SIGINT targeting more difficult.

* Even now it is difficult for CIA networks to provide targetable intelligence on key enemy leaders.

* CT operations have been the primary cause of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. Outrage over civilian casualties has damaged the perception of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan3

* Counterinsurgency Strategy (COIN) has at its core the protection of the population from insurgents by military and political means.

* To achieve the President's stated objectives, one must fully resource and implement a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan.

* This will require additional forces, as there are currently not enough troops to execute a proper counterinsurgency.

* Even with additional forces, it is necessary to prioritize objectives within Afghanistan and then mass forces in critical areas to protect and positively influence the population. The insurgency is most dangerous in RC (South) and RC (East). Counterinsurgents must focus on the critical population centers in: the central Helmand River Valley; Kandahar City and its surrounding areas; Tarin Kowt in Uruzgan Province; and Khost, Paktia, and Paktika provinces (Greater Paktia).

* Coalition counterinsurgency operations must be coordinated and mutually-reinforcing to achieve decisive effects and prevent the enemy from fleeing during the operation, only to return to the area later.

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)4

"The role and responsibilities of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) must be clearly articulated. There has been an overreliance on the Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANP are simply not equipped for the combat-intensive initial phases of counterinsurgency. The appropriate role for the ANP should be maintaining order once the insurgency has been reduced to a manageable level and effective rule of law has been established."

"The Afghan National Army (ANA) are appropriate for the combat-intensive phases of counterinsurgency, though they are not present in sufficient numbers. Growing the size of the ANA and advancing its capacity to carry out mission-critical counterinsurgency operations in Helmand will help to relieve some of the burden that is currently shouldered by coalition forces."

"The best way to rapidly increase the size and capacity of indigenous forces is to partner coalition units with them together in combat"

"Dramatically expanding the size and capacity of the ANSF is only one part of a strategy. It must be paired with steps to defeat the insurgency and improve the legitimacy and capability of the Afghan government."

1 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, "How Not to Defeat al Qaeda," The Weekly Standard, October 5, 2009.

2 United States Department of Defense, "The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," Joint Publication 1-02, April 12, 2001 (as amended through August 19, 2009); Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, "Afghanistan Force Requirements," joint publication by the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War, September 19, 2009.

3 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, "Afghanistan Force Requirements," joint publication by the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War, September 19, 2009; Jeffrey A. Dressler, "Security Helmand: Understanding and Responding to the Enemy," Afghanistan Report 2, Institute for the Study of War, September 28, 2009.

4 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, "Afghanistan Force Requirements," joint publication by the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War, September 19, 2009; Jeffrey A. Dressler, "Security Helmand: Understanding and Responding to the Enemy," Afghanistan Report 2, Institute for the Study of War, September 28, 2009.

Posted by Tom at 9:30 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

The Moral Bankruptcy of the United Nations - Part 12,874,372

Watch this, if you can.

Warning: Put all throwable objects out of reach first.

Eye on the UN via TWS

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October 6, 2009

The Moral Bankruptcy of the International Atomic Energy Agency

Victor Davis Hanson over at NRO

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed ElBaradei is a living metaphor for all that is wrong with post-Western society. He now proclaims that Israel -- democratic and constitutional -- is the "number one threat" to the Middle East. That he made this comment from Tehran -- after his hosts have serially promised to wipe Israel off the map, and after his own agency missed an entire weapons facility run by an autocratic theocracy -- says it all.

ElBaradei, who was educated in the West, and much of whose family lives in the safety and prosperity of the West, has made a career of appeasing Iran, lecturing Westerners about their assorted sins, and saying nothing about the dictatorship in Egypt (for which he once worked). Indeed, beyond Egypt, he has said nothing about the Middle East's self-induced pathologies -- from tribalism, gender apartheid, and statism to dictatorship and religious intolerance -- which are a far more significant cause of the region's economic stagnation than is Western colonialism.

That ElBaradei has been showered with awards from Western governments and universities -- among them the Nobel Prize -- reveals how well he understands the West's timidity and lack of principle. He knows that he and his family are safer and freer outside Egypt than they are inside Egypt, and he knows that Israel is not going to nuke its neighbors or announce that it would like to wipe Syria or Egypt off the map. He also knows that elites in the West like to be chided by Westernized non-Westernizers about their assorted sins -- it allows those Western elites to alleviate their guilt at very little cost.

In short, if ElBaradei didn't exist, he would have to be invented.

Posted by Tom at 10:05 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Iraq Briefing - 01 October 2009 - Iraq is "Less and Less Fragile"

This briefing was by our top general in Iraq himself, General Ray Odierno, Commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq. Last Thursday he spoke with reporters at the Pentagon, providing an update on ongoing security operations in Iraq.

This and other videos can be seen at DODvClips. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is at DefenseLink.

Even after it was clear that the surge was successful, commanders described the situation as "fragile," warning that while we had been successful if we weren't careful Iraq could backslide. It was stressed that a premature withdrawal of troops, for example, could leave a vacuum into which insurgent or criminal elements would reappear and perhaps reignite sectarian tension.

Today General Odierno addresses this issue of "fragility" in response to a question by Al Pessin of VOA. Before we get to that exchange, though, let's look at part of Gen. Odierno's opening statement, where he discusses the security situation:

GEN. ODIERNO: ... Although security continues to improve in Iraq, it is not yet enduring. There still remains underlying, unresolved sources of potential conflict that have to be addressed, which include regional and factional division, insufficient government of Iraq capacity, violent extremist groups and continued interference from external state and non-state actors.

An area of particular concern is the unresolved Arab-Kurd issues between the government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government. We fully support the United Nations efforts as they work with the political parties to resolve key issues, including legislation for hydrocarbon laws and revenue sharing and the disputed internal boundaries.

Over the years, the environment and threat have changed, and we have constantly adapted our strategy from focusing on protecting the people in a counterinsurgency fight to concentrating on developing Iraqi capacity. Today, given the hard-forged security gains, we are transitioning to stability operations slowly across the country. And we will continue to responsibly transfer responsibilities to the government of Iraq, the Iraqi security forces and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

Though the focus of our forces is shifting from security to capacity building, our strategic goal remains to foster a long-term partnership with a sovereign, stable, self-reliant Iraq. We have a good plan that we are executing, and I'm confident in our way ahead.

Iraq is a state and a society under construction, struggling to define its identity and its place in the world after decades of oppression and violence. The way in which we draw down our forces will impact not only the relationship between the United States and Iraq in the future, but also the nature of the new Iraq....

We must have strategic patience. ...

The Iraqi security forces have made steady progress, and our efforts over the next two-and-a-half years will help solidify the foundation of a professional and competent Iraqi security force. We must leave Iraq with security forces capable of defending the Iraqi people and protecting their institutions.

The things that stand out to me are

1) Iraq is relatively secure, but continued security is not assured.
2) Arab-Kurd issues are still a problem and remain unresolved.
3) We have moved from counterinsurgency to building Iraqi force capacity
4) We are succeeding but must be patient so that we do not backslide.

On to the Q & A part of the briefing.

One thing we heard a lot of in late 2007 and 2008 was that the insurgency had been tamped down, and things were stable, but that the situation was "fragile." We stopped hearing that from briefers in 2009, but it was certainly a question worth raising again.

Search for "fragile" in the search box at right and you'll see what I mean.

Q Al Pessin with VOA. Yesterday and today both, you painted a picture of progress but remaining challenges. Are you still describing the situation in Iraq as fragile? Or can we put that to rest now? Is it irreversible? And you also talked yesterday about Iraq needing U.S. help beyond 2011. What sort of help do you mean? And do you think it will require some military presence, if only for training or air support or whatever it might be?

GEN. ODIERNO: Let me answer the first part first. I think the help I'm describing is that within the context of the strategic framework agreement, that it covers many different areas, from educational, technological, security. And so it has to -- about providing long-term assistance for developing systems, for example, from the military side; also developing economic capacity, developing educational capacity, medical capacity, all of those things. And I think, as we do that, that helps to build their institutions. So that's what I see happening beyond 2011.

Whether that will require trainers or anything else beyond 2011, we have not determined that yet, and that's something that will have to be discussed some time in the future as we get closer.

Q And on the fragility issue?

GEN. ODIERNO: Yeah. Yeah, I would say the government of Iraq continues to make progress and move forward. So it becomes less and less fragile and moves closer towards stability. So I guess what I'm telling you, it's a work in progress. I believe, every day that goes by, it becomes less and less likely that it -- you know, some event will cause the -- some sequel to events would cause the government to fail. You know, I think every time we move forward, every day, it becomes less and less likely.

That's why I think the elections are important, because they will go through what we hope to be peaceful elections, the seating of a new government peacefully. And these elections will be entirely run by the government of Iraq.

And I think that will help to really stabilize the institutions as derived from their own constitution. I think that's really important as we move forward.

There then was much discussion about our current plan to draw down to 120,000 troops by the end of October, and somewhere between 110(,000), 120,000 by the end of the year. Watch the video and read the transcript for details, but the essential point is that we are slowly, and responsibly, withdrawing troops as circumstances permit.

Sometimes people ask "how long until we win?" It's an understandable question, because the American people understandably don't want an open ended commitment. Unfortunately, a precise answer is not possible.

Q General, what do you see the chances are that you'll be able to declare victory in Iraq before you leave personally? Do you see that happening before you go?

GEN. ODIERNO: I'm not sure we ever will see anyone declare victory in Iraq because first off, I'm not sure we'll know for 10 years or five years.

What we've done here is, we're giving Iraq an opportunity in the long term, to be a strategic partner of the United States but more importantly be a partner in providing regional stability inside of the Middle East.

They have an opportunity to build an open economy. They have an opportunity to continue to move forward with their nascent democracy. That's not going to happen next year or the year after or the year after that.

It's going to be several years before we know. But the positive piece is, we've given them the opportunity to do that. And I think that's what our goals were, is they now have an opportunity to do this. And that's why I tell that the engagement after 2011 is as important as our continued engagements prior to 2011.

This next exchange is a bit geeky, and probably only of interest to those like myself why have gotten into the nitty gritty of counterinsurgency and counterterror oprerations. Nevertheless it is worth taking a look at because you hear these terms with regard to what we should do in Iraq. Because of that it is important to understand the differences between counterinsurgency and counterterror.

Lt. Col (Dr) David Kilcullen (Australian Army - Ret) was Gen. Petraeus' senior adviser for counterinsurgency during 2007, the first year of the surge. In 2004 he authored Countering Global Insurgency, one of the most important works on the subject of al Qaeda.

Kilcullen defines an insurgency as "'a popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict and
terrorism. By definition, insurgent movements are grass roots uprisings that seek
to overthrow established governments or societal structures" Terrorism, defined as "'politically motivated violence against civilians, conducted with the intention to coerce through fear," is a tactic used by insurgents.

Although all insurgents use terrorism, not all terrorists are insurgents. An insurgency is a more broad based movement, and their issues represent deeper issues in the society. Pure terrorists have agendas that are inherent to their own selves. As Kilcullen puts it, "Terrorists are psychologically and morally flawed, with personal (psychopathic) tendencies toward violence," while "Insurgents use violence within an integrated politico-military strategy - violence is instrumental (but) not central to their approach."

Terrorism by itself is a law-enforcement problem, while an insurgency must be met with a holistic approach, involving the resources of the entire government.

Q Ann Tyson, Washington Post. Sir, many years you've been involved in the Iraq operation, and specifically that was aimed primarily at the al Qaeda in Iraq group, which had ties to the broader al Qaeda. And I'm just wondering if you could reflect on the difficulties of going after a group like that, as a narrow counterinsurgency -- I mean, counterterrorist action, as opposed -- without the broader counterinsurgency effort to support it, and why it is necessary to have both combined.

GEN. ODIERNO: Well, first, you have to have -- and your last comment was the most important. You have to have both combined. In order to effectively go after these elements, you have to have counterinsurgency operating by your conventional forces that then can be supplemented by counterterrorism operations by your higher-end counterterrorism forces. It takes a combination of both of these things. You're going to have to -- and the reason you need those forces is because of the connections that go on not only in Iraq but outside of Iraq. And so we want to make sure that you have to understand that.

Now, what we've been able to do in Iraq is sever al Qaeda-Iraq from mainstream al Qaeda. They have -- you know, we -- that's been done for the last year or so, where they have a lot of difficulty communicating to get -- they don't get any support, external support, for their effort any more in Iraq. So what they've had to do is they've degenerated into an organization that has to try to fund themselves inside of Iraq, with a population that is rejecting their presence inside of the country, which has made it difficult for them to raise funds. So that's critical.

And it takes a combination of a counterinsurgency in order to allow the population to feel secure so they can help you against this counterterrorism threat, and you still need the precision of our counterterrorism forces to go after these sometimes high-end, complex, enemy forces that are there.

Much has been made recently of the revelation late last month by our commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal, that he had only spoken with President Obama only once. The president has been much criticized for not seeking a briefing or the advice of our commanding general in a war very important to the future of our country. As such, it was perhaps predictable that the question would come up in this briefing:

Q Sir, I'm just wondering, as you see Iraq sort of slip from the front pages and the attention of the administration turn to Afghanistan, do you worry that that is a danger? And also just as a follow-up to that, how often do you speak with the president?

GEN. ODIERNO: Well, actually I send a report to the president every single week that I know he reads, because he comments on it all the time.

Q When was the last time you talked to him?

GEN. ODIERNO: A month ago or so. As a matter of fact, I think I'm going to go talk to him this afternoon. So today will be -- if you ask me tomorrow, I'll tell you today. So but I also talk to the vice president quite often. The vice president has been out several times. So I feel very comfortable with that.

Once again Gen. Odierno gave an excellent account of the situation in Iraq, and as is most often the case the Pentagon press corps asked tough and intelligent questions. Gen. Odierno is not the household name that David Petraeus is, but among our military leaders is one of the finest.

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