The Redhunter

GEN. ODIERNO: ... Although security continues to improve in Iraq, it is not yet enduring. There still remains underlying, unresolved sources of potential conflict that have to be addressed, which include regional and factional division, insufficient government of Iraq capacity, violent extremist groups and continued interference from external state and non-state actors.

An area of particular concern is the unresolved Arab-Kurd issues between the government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government. We fully support the United Nations efforts as they work with the political parties to resolve key issues, including legislation for hydrocarbon laws and revenue sharing and the disputed internal boundaries.

Over the years, the environment and threat have changed, and we have constantly adapted our strategy from focusing on protecting the people in a counterinsurgency fight to concentrating on developing Iraqi capacity. Today, given the hard-forged security gains, we are transitioning to stability operations slowly across the country. And we will continue to responsibly transfer responsibilities to the government of Iraq, the Iraqi security forces and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

Though the focus of our forces is shifting from security to capacity building, our strategic goal remains to foster a long-term partnership with a sovereign, stable, self-reliant Iraq. We have a good plan that we are executing, and I'm confident in our way ahead.

Iraq is a state and a society under construction, struggling to define its identity and its place in the world after decades of oppression and violence. The way in which we draw down our forces will impact not only the relationship between the United States and Iraq in the future, but also the nature of the new Iraq....

We must have strategic patience. ...

The Iraqi security forces have made steady progress, and our efforts over the next two-and-a-half years will help solidify the foundation of a professional and competent Iraqi security force. We must leave Iraq with security forces capable of defending the Iraqi people and protecting their institutions.

The things that stand out to me are

1) Iraq is relatively secure, but continued security is not assured.
2) Arab-Kurd issues are still a problem and remain unresolved.
3) We have moved from counterinsurgency to building Iraqi force capacity
4) We are succeeding but must be patient so that we do not backslide.

On to the Q & A part of the briefing.

One thing we heard a lot of in late 2007 and 2008 was that the insurgency had been tamped down, and things were stable, but that the situation was "fragile." We stopped hearing that from briefers in 2009, but it was certainly a question worth raising again.

Search for "fragile" in the search box at right and you'll see what I mean.

Q Al Pessin with VOA. Yesterday and today both, you painted a picture of progress but remaining challenges. Are you still describing the situation in Iraq as fragile? Or can we put that to rest now? Is it irreversible? And you also talked yesterday about Iraq needing U.S. help beyond 2011. What sort of help do you mean? And do you think it will require some military presence, if only for training or air support or whatever it might be?

GEN. ODIERNO: Let me answer the first part first. I think the help I'm describing is that within the context of the strategic framework agreement, that it covers many different areas, from educational, technological, security. And so it has to -- about providing long-term assistance for developing systems, for example, from the military side; also developing economic capacity, developing educational capacity, medical capacity, all of those things. And I think, as we do that, that helps to build their institutions. So that's what I see happening beyond 2011.

Whether that will require trainers or anything else beyond 2011, we have not determined that yet, and that's something that will have to be discussed some time in the future as we get closer.

Q And on the fragility issue?

GEN. ODIERNO: Yeah. Yeah, I would say the government of Iraq continues to make progress and move forward. So it becomes less and less fragile and moves closer towards stability. So I guess what I'm telling you, it's a work in progress. I believe, every day that goes by, it becomes less and less likely that it -- you know, some event will cause the -- some sequel to events would cause the government to fail. You know, I think every time we move forward, every day, it becomes less and less likely.

That's why I think the elections are important, because they will go through what we hope to be peaceful elections, the seating of a new government peacefully. And these elections will be entirely run by the government of Iraq.

And I think that will help to really stabilize the institutions as derived from their own constitution. I think that's really important as we move forward.

There then was much discussion about our current plan to draw down to 120,000 troops by the end of October, and somewhere between 110(,000), 120,000 by the end of the year. Watch the video and read the transcript for details, but the essential point is that we are slowly, and responsibly, withdrawing troops as circumstances permit.

Sometimes people ask "how long until we win?" It's an understandable question, because the American people understandably don't want an open ended commitment. Unfortunately, a precise answer is not possible.

Q General, what do you see the chances are that you'll be able to declare victory in Iraq before you leave personally? Do you see that happening before you go?

GEN. ODIERNO: I'm not sure we ever will see anyone declare victory in Iraq because first off, I'm not sure we'll know for 10 years or five years.

What we've done here is, we're giving Iraq an opportunity in the long term, to be a strategic partner of the United States but more importantly be a partner in providing regional stability inside of the Middle East.

They have an opportunity to build an open economy. They have an opportunity to continue to move forward with their nascent democracy. That's not going to happen next year or the year after or the year after that.

It's going to be several years before we know. But the positive piece is, we've given them the opportunity to do that. And I think that's what our goals were, is they now have an opportunity to do this. And that's why I tell that the engagement after 2011 is as important as our continued engagements prior to 2011.

This next exchange is a bit geeky, and probably only of interest to those like myself why have gotten into the nitty gritty of counterinsurgency and counterterror oprerations. Nevertheless it is worth taking a look at because you hear these terms with regard to what we should do in Iraq. Because of that it is important to understand the differences between counterinsurgency and counterterror.

Lt. Col (Dr) David Kilcullen (Australian Army - Ret) was Gen. Petraeus' senior adviser for counterinsurgency during 2007, the first year of the surge. In 2004 he authored Countering Global Insurgency, one of the most important works on the subject of al Qaeda.

Kilcullen defines an insurgency as "'a popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict and
terrorism. By definition, insurgent movements are grass roots uprisings that seek
to overthrow established governments or societal structures" Terrorism, defined as "'politically motivated violence against civilians, conducted with the intention to coerce through fear," is a tactic used by insurgents.

Although all insurgents use terrorism, not all terrorists are insurgents. An insurgency is a more broad based movement, and their issues represent deeper issues in the society. Pure terrorists have agendas that are inherent to their own selves. As Kilcullen puts it, "Terrorists are psychologically and morally flawed, with personal (psychopathic) tendencies toward violence," while "Insurgents use violence within an integrated politico-military strategy - violence is instrumental (but) not central to their approach."

Terrorism by itself is a law-enforcement problem, while an insurgency must be met with a holistic approach, involving the resources of the entire government.

Q Ann Tyson, Washington Post. Sir, many years you've been involved in the Iraq operation, and specifically that was aimed primarily at the al Qaeda in Iraq group, which had ties to the broader al Qaeda. And I'm just wondering if you could reflect on the difficulties of going after a group like that, as a narrow counterinsurgency -- I mean, counterterrorist action, as opposed -- without the broader counterinsurgency effort to support it, and why it is necessary to have both combined.

GEN. ODIERNO: Well, first, you have to have -- and your last comment was the most important. You have to have both combined. In order to effectively go after these elements, you have to have counterinsurgency operating by your conventional forces that then can be supplemented by counterterrorism operations by your higher-end counterterrorism forces. It takes a combination of both of these things. You're going to have to -- and the reason you need those forces is because of the connections that go on not only in Iraq but outside of Iraq. And so we want to make sure that you have to understand that.

Now, what we've been able to do in Iraq is sever al Qaeda-Iraq from mainstream al Qaeda. They have -- you know, we -- that's been done for the last year or so, where they have a lot of difficulty communicating to get -- they don't get any support, external support, for their effort any more in Iraq. So what they've had to do is they've degenerated into an organization that has to try to fund themselves inside of Iraq, with a population that is rejecting their presence inside of the country, which has made it difficult for them to raise funds. So that's critical.

And it takes a combination of a counterinsurgency in order to allow the population to feel secure so they can help you against this counterterrorism threat, and you still need the precision of our counterterrorism forces to go after these sometimes high-end, complex, enemy forces that are there.

Much has been made recently of the revelation late last month by our commander in Afghanistan, General McChrystal, that he had only spoken with President Obama only once. The president has been much criticized for not seeking a briefing or the advice of our commanding general in a war very important to the future of our country. As such, it was perhaps predictable that the question would come up in this briefing:

Q Sir, I'm just wondering, as you see Iraq sort of slip from the front pages and the attention of the administration turn to Afghanistan, do you worry that that is a danger? And also just as a follow-up to that, how often do you speak with the president?

GEN. ODIERNO: Well, actually I send a report to the president every single week that I know he reads, because he comments on it all the time.

Q When was the last time you talked to him?

GEN. ODIERNO: A month ago or so. As a matter of fact, I think I'm going to go talk to him this afternoon. So today will be -- if you ask me tomorrow, I'll tell you today. So but I also talk to the vice president quite often. The vice president has been out several times. So I feel very comfortable with that.

Once again Gen. Odierno gave an excellent account of the situation in Iraq, and as is most often the case the Pentagon press corps asked tough and intelligent questions. Gen. Odierno is not the household name that David Petraeus is, but among our military leaders is one of the finest.