The Redhunter

Scenario 1 (Withdrawal)Summary

• Taliban takes control of the region from Farah to the gates of Kabul in 2010; Kabul likely falls in 2010 or early 2011
• Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) and Haqqani Network (HQN) likely conduct determined attacks on critical Lines of Communication (LOC) to cause significant casualties during the withdrawal of Coalition combat forces
• Al Qaeda senior leadership and training centers likely re‐emerge in Taliban‐held areas
• Ethnic civil war likely develops between Taliban‐led Pashtuns and Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras
• Conflict likely generates new waves of refugees into Iran and Pakistan
• Malign elements within Pakistan prevail in their efforts to support the Taliban and to stop the Pakistani government from fighting Islamist extremists within Pakistan
• NATO withdraws in defeat, possibly with significant resentment of the US for abandoning the alliance
• Al Qaeda will portray the US withdrawal as a stunning victory over the infidels, greater than the defeat of the Soviet Union
• Humanitarian crises in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and possibly Central Asia
• Reimposition of Taliban interpretation of shari'a law, including violent reaction to efforts to emancipate women over the last decade

Scenario 2 (Special Operations Forces Only) Summary

• Taliban takes control of the region from Farah to the gates of Kabul in 2010; Kabul likely falls in 2010 or early 2011
• QST and HQN likely conduct determined attacks on critical Lines of Communication (LOC) to cause significant casualties during the withdrawal of Coalition combat forces
• Al Qaeda senior leadership and training centers likely re‐emerge in Taliban‐held areas cautiously and covertly
• Ethnic civil war likely develops between Taliban‐led Pashtuns and Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras
• Conflict likely generates new waves of refugees into Iran and Pakistan
• Malign elements within Pakistan prevail in their efforts to support the Taliban and to stop the Pakistani government from fighting Islamist extremists within Pakistan
• NATO withdraws in defeat, possibly with significant resentment of the US for abandoning the alliance
• Al Qaeda will portray the US withdrawal as a stunning victory over the infidels, greater than the defeat of the Soviet Union
• Humanitarian crises in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and possibly Central Asia
• Reimposition of Taliban interpretation of shari'a law, including violent reaction to efforts to emancipate women over the last decade

Scenario 3 (SOF and Training Only) Summary

• QST operations:

launches major effort to capture and kill embedded trainers

conducts large‐scale targeted assassination campaign against Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) leaders

redoubles efforts to acquire advanced Man‐portable air‐defense system (MANPADs)

seeks to establish firing positions from which to rocket/mortar airfields

• HQN pursues similar tactics in attempt to regain control of Greater Paktia
• HQN also expands reach of radicalizing madrassas in Greater Paktia
• Both groups likely conduct determined attacks on critical Lines of Communication (LOC) to cause significant casualties during the withdrawal of Coalition combat forces
• Al Qaeda senior leadership and training centers may start to re‐emerge in Taliban‐held areas cautiously and covertly
• Ethnic civil war likely develops between Taliban‐led Pashtuns and Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras
• Increasing conflict and loss of confidence likely generates new waves of refugees into Iran and Pakistan
• Malign elements within Pakistan prevail in their efforts to support the Taliban and to stop the Pakistani government from fighting Islamist extremists within Pakistan
• NATO withdraws, with possible exception of some UK trainers, support elements
• Al Qaeda will portray the US withdrawal as a stunning victory over the infidels, greater than the defeat of the Soviet Union

When the Soviets withdrew, they also left behind a "puppet government" of Najibullah

Al Qaeda and the Taliban will portray the US transition to a pure SOF/Training mission as a repetition of the 1989 Soviet withdrawal

Scenario 4 (Steady‐State with Increased Training) Summary

• QST continues ongoing efforts

consolidate control of areas lacking ANSF and Coalition forces, especially: Farah, Oruzgan

outside TK, Kandahar, Now Zad and Nad Ali in Helmand, northern Ghazni, most of Zabol

contest coalition operations in the Helmand River Valley (HRV), working to inflict maximum casualties on British forces

vigorously contests US operations in Arghandab and Canadian operations in Zharay‐Panjwayi

• districts of Kandahar, working to inflict maximum casualties on Canadian forces

continues to infiltrate Kandahar City and solidify shadow governance throughout the south

emphasizes Afghan nationalism to build anti‐occupation sentiment

• QST may

attempt to spark inter‐ethnic fighting through mass‐casualty attacks, information operations, or other means

launch a concerted campaign of Suicide vehicle‐borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED), rocket, and mortar attacks on coalition bases

• HQN continues ongoing efforts to

disrupt construction of the Khowst‐Gardez Pass (K‐G Pass) road

gain influence and, where possible, control over the Khowst Bowl

conduct spectacular attacks in Kabul and elsewhere to raise funds and international support

expand its presence in Wardak and Lowgar Provinces and to interdict Highway One

• Pakistan will very likely view the rejection of GEN McChrystal's request for
• additional forces as an indication of waning US commitment to Afghanistan
• Islamabad will become more likely to increase support to HQN and QST in the expectation of a complete US withdrawal
• The death of Beitullah Mehsud and the perception of waning American commitment in Afghanistan may also persuade Islamabad to reduce American operations of all varieties within Pakistan

Scenario 5 (Fully‐Resourced Counterinsurgency (COIN)) Summary

• QST will likely

contest important areas in Helmand and Kandahar (esp. Arghandab, Zharay‐Panjwayi, Sangin, Nad

Ali) coalition forces achieve until overmatch in those areas, whereupon QST withdraws leaders and strategic assets to surrounding safe havens; local fighters either reconcile or go to ground

attempt to consolidate control, maintain Freedom of movement (FOM), support contested areas, and prepare to defend sanctuaries

prominently seize isolated district centers and attempt to retake areas "cleared" by coalition forces

increase attacks against more vulnerable coalition partners

QST highlights illegitimacy of GIRoA

QST emphasizes Afghan nationalism to build anti‐occupation sentiment

• Pakistan

will most likely view the deployment of more US forces to Afghanistan as an indication of US commitment, although that perception depends on the way the deployment is described (i.e., if the president emphasizes a time‐limit or hints at the likelihood of a changed strategy within a year, the perception of US commitment may be undermined even despite the increased deployment)

will not take action against the QST or HQN in any likely scenario, regardless of US decisions

is more likely to continue the fight against its own internal enemies if it believes that the US will prevail in Afghanistan

is very unlikely to increase support to the QST and HQN if the US deploys additional forces

if and when Islamabad becomes persuaded that the QST and HQN will NOT likely prevail in Afghanistan, it becomes more likely to reduce support to those groups

Next - A Comprehensive Strategy: Afghanistan Force Requirements