The Redhunter: A Comprehensive Strategy: Afghanistan Force Requirements<br>Part II: The Number of Troops Required

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November 10, 2009

A Comprehensive Strategy: Afghanistan Force Requirements
Part II: The Number of Troops Required

As President Obama nears a decision on Afghanistan, I will look at the force requirements for winning the war. Then, when he announces his decision, I will compare that to what is really needed, and grade him accordingly.

The case for fighting and winning in Afghanistan is pretty simple; preventing more 9-11's. Large, well funded, terrorist groups can wreck enough havoc when they have regions such as Waziristan, or parts of Lebanon, Ireland or Spain to themselves. But when they have an entire country, even one that is backward by third world standards, the results are devastating even by "normal" terrorist-attack standards.

In other posts I have explored the details of counterinsurgency strategy, and why other options than a full surge of troops into Afghanistan will fail. It is time to lay out exactly what troops are required to win.

I do not have the ability to do that myself, but I know who does; Frederick and Kimberly Kagan. Frederick was the "intellectual architect" of the successful surge in Iraq, and his wife Kimberly has been a professor at West Point and is president of her own think tank, the Institute for the Study of War. On September 21 they laid out the force requirements for victory in Afghanistan and although I've touched on it before it's high time I went into more detail on it here. The full study is called A Comprehensive Strategy: Afghanistan Force Requirements. You can download the entire thing as either a pdf file or as Powerpoint slides, take your pick.

Before we get to the details of what forces are required, their bottom line assessment:

To inform the national discussion, therefore, we have produced a report that argues for an addition of 40,000-45,000 US troops in 2010 to the 68,000 American forces that will be there by the end of this year. The report illustrates where US, NATO, and Afghan forces are now and where additional forces are needed to accomplish the mission. It links the US force requirements to the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces on an accelerated timeline. It explains the methodology for assessing the adequacy of a proposed force-level. This product, and our recommendations and assessments, are entirely our own--they do not necessarily reflect the views of General McChrystal or anyone else." - Fred and Kim Kagan

Now for the specifics:

• As of June 2009, the Afghan Ministry of Defense had 103,475 authorized
personnel, with 89,521 actually assigned. Of those, Afghan National Army
operational units had 66,406 soldiers authorized with 53,417 assigned in around
80 kandaks (battalions). The remaining MoD personnel were assigned to
headquarters, infrastructure, ministerial and general staff positions, and training
and transfer accounts. The AWOL rate is running at around 9%. The official
capability ratings of Afghan kandaks puts about 66% of them in operational status
(CM1 or CM2).

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Expansion

• Current plans call for expanding the Afghan National Army (ANA) to 134,000 by the end of 2011
• This expansion can be accelerated to meet that goal by October 2010
• Assuming the current ratio of combat forces to end strength of around 60%, the ANA can probably have around 80,000 troops in combat formations by October 2010, an addition of 30,000 over June 2009
• Adding that many troops requires recruiting and training even more to account for significant casualty rates among the combat forces

Bottom line: The ANA can add around 30,000 counter‐insurgents by October 2010, for total of 80 000--but 9/21/2009 Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan 14 a 80,000--only if decisions to accelerate ANSF expansion and resources necessary for it are made and committed at once

US Forces

• US Forces in Afghanistan currently number around 64,000
• Of those, roughly 34,000 are combat formations assigned to counter‐insurgency roles; the rest are support elements, trainers, and classified forces
• US COIN formations include roughly 17 maneuver battalions and as many as 12 combat support battalions remissioned to function as counter‐insurgents
• The US contingent therefore can put about 23,300 soldiers on the ground doing counter‐insurgency
- In Iraq, by contrast, the 15 US brigades before the surge could put around 72,000 counter‐insurgents on the ground; at the height of the surge, it was more like 105,000.

• ISAF and ANA forces are generally deployed in accord with the threat and theater priorities--there are no excess forces in any areas to be moved around

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF i.e. NATO) Forces

• 42 countries now contribute military forces to the NATO mission in Afghanistan
• 11 of them provide battalion‐sized maneuver formations that can participate in COIN operations

Available Counter‐Insurgents

• US: 23,200
• Non‐US ISAF: 16,000
• Afghan National Army: 50,000*
• TOTAL: 89,200
• ANA expansion can add 30,000 more by October 2010, bringing the total to 119,200

Bottom Line: Additional Requirements
• Helmand: 1.5 brigades
• Kandahar: 1‐4 brigades (depending on assumptions about Kandahar City)
• Greater Paktia: 1 brigade
• Total: 3.5‐6.5 brigades
• NB: The Dutch battalion in Oruzgan will not be replaced in 2010 and the two Canadian battalions in Kandahar will not be replaced in 2011
• Either the US or NATO will thus have to find an additional brigade to offset those departures within the next two years

Priority Areas

Priority Areas