The Redhunter

COL. STAMMER: Thank you very much, Dave, for that kind introduction.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Colonel Mark Stammer, commander of the 1st Advise and Assist Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, and I'm speaking to you today from al Asad Air Base in Al Anbar province, Iraq. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today. Going to be a real pleasure.

I have the honor to lead almost 5,000 of the finest paratroopers and soldiers in the armed forces today in a unit that traces its lineage to World War II and the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment.

When I introduce the brigade to our Iraqi partners, I tell them that we offer all the features of a light infantry brigade capable of full-spectrum operations, combined stability operations, route clearance, intelligence, information operations, even civil affairs.

I tell them that what makes us an advise and assist brigade, or AAB, is a complement of specialized officers to help build civil capacity, specialized partnership training to help our troops increase Iraqi security force professionalization, and a whole new mindset that says everything we do is by, with and through our Iraqi counterparts.

Anbar is Iraq's largest province, roughly the size of North Carolina, with a primarily agrarian economy. Most of its 2 million predominantly Sunni residents live within the Euphrates River corridor as it travels from the Syrian border southeast to Baghdad. Our mission is to partner with Iraqi security forces and conduct combined stability operations. Our goals are to improve Iraqi security forces' capabilities and capacity, deny violent extremists opportunities for resurgence and support the growth of political -- I'm sorry, support the growth of provincial governance and economic capacity in order to achieve sustainable security. By accomplishing these tasks, we will enable effective governance, political reconciliation, political and economic development, and the advancement of the rule of law.

With the recent passage of the Iraqi election law, we appear to be only two months away from yet another historic election. The brigade will be there to assist the Iraqis, as they ask us to do so and in accordance with the security agreement.

Finally, during all of this activity, we do everything with an eye on leaving Iraq in a responsible manner. Every relationship I make here, I make with the big picture in mind, because ultimately advise and assist is not an entity so much as it is a mindset and process. That process is our mission and, by its execution, we will ensure an enduring strategic partnership and friendship with our Iraqi counterparts.

Unfortunately the introduction was the best part of the briefing. Col Stammer tended to give short, pro forma answers to the questions, didn't expound on basic points. The entire briefing was only 18:40, which is the shortest I can remember, most lasting just over a half hour. As such, this briefing was not as informative as most.

Nevertheless, we'll cover some of the Q & A, as it does touch on topics of interest.

With the transition from counterinsurgency to stability operations, American forces have been stepping back and assuming a more advisory role. As such, the U.S. Army has created the Advise and Assist Brigade (AAB). From a May 2009 story on the U.S. Army's website

The "advise and assist" brigades will assist Provincial Reconstruction Teams in their missions, will work directly with Military Transition Teams to train Iraqi Army units and with the teams that train the Iraqi Border Patrol and police. The brigades will also work closely with the State Department, U.S. Aid and other government agencies, as well as non-governmental organizations in their area....

BCT stands for Brigade Combat Team. A BCT is how Col. Stammer's brigade would normally operate.

Q Colonel, Luis Martinez again. The AABs, General Casey characterized them as being, in how they're different from the BCTs, in the sense that they have 50 additional officers. Is that -- is that an accurate assessment? And if so, what are those officers -- how do they -- how are they -- what jobs do they carry out that are separate from what a BCT would undertake?

COL. STAMMER: Well, there's -- there's a lot of goodness in being the first of anything, but the first AAB -- you know, we didn't get quite 50 additional officers; we, in fact, got 16. But we organized those 16 professionals in three stability transition teams, and we partnered them with the three most important nodes in Anbar: the Anbar ops command, the provincial government council and the Department of Border Enforcement.

And they serve as the eyes and ears and liaison officers for the commanding general, Multinational Force West, and the principal conduits for me to coordinate with those three entities as well. And to date this -- those 16 men and the techniques that we're using have proven very fruitful.

Q Do you anticipate the arrival of an additional 34 to get your full complement in the future?

COL. STAMMER: No, I do not.

Q Well, if the tasking is for 50, doesn't that complicate your efforts, then, for additional advising and assistance?

COL. STAMMER: Well, I think the future AABs will be filled to -- closer to the 48 or 50 number that's been promulgated in D.C. The 16 officer I -- the 16 officers I have right now I have complemented with additional capability from within my brigade combat team, and right now that is working just fine for us out here.

As you know, the AAB construct will have to be manipulated to the contextual environment it finds itself. So while we all may start from common ground, we'll all depart rather quickly once we get over here into Iraq, depending on where you operate from. The construct that we have is working quite well for our situation here in Anbar at the time.

Of course a big issue is whether the insurgency has ramped up again now that we're withdrawing. The point of the surge was to tamp it down and give the enough Iraqis breathing space to build their security forces and government. The big question was always whether the Iraqis would then be able to take over when we left. From what we've heard here and in other briefings, it so far so good.

This next exchange tells the tale:

Q Colonel, this is Joe Tabet, with Al Hurra. Could you... give us an update on the -- on the presence -- or if there is any presence of AQI in the Anbar province, any activities related to al Qaeda in that -- in that province?

COL. STAMMER: Could barely hear you, but I think your first question had something to do with the border with Syria. We partner with the Department of Border Enforcement, the Iraqi army -- and the Iraqi army along the border with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia throughout Al Anbar province. And my experience to date has been very professional with all those organizations.

With regards to your question with AQI, AQI in Al Anbar, again, in my first three months over here, can be best characterized as a group or a -- disparate groups coming together to achieve some short- term common interests, cellular in structure, but nothing that will pose significant challenges to the Iraqi security forces or the provincial government as they continue to mature in Al Anbar

This comports with what else we know, which is that the insurgency per se has been mostly defeated in the Anbar province. As with most all other insurgencies, elements remain around, often for years. The key is to whether they can cause serious disruption or not.

In a later exchange with Louis Martinez, Col Stammer explains the drawdown of American troops. When Col. Stammer's 1st Brigade arrived, they replaced two two Marine regimental combat teams. Marine combat units are now mostly out of Anbar, though their combat logistics regiment, the Marine aviation regiment, and the Multinational Force-West headquarters, remain in Anbar.

After the election, the Multinational Force-West HQ unit will leave. Although the 1st 1st Advise & Assist Brigadewill remain in Al Anbar, they will be assigned to U.S. Division- Central.

The 1st 1st Advise & Assist Brigade is assigned to stay in Iraq until August 2010.

AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq) and other insurgents are for the most part defeated and reduced to small gangs, but what about the all-important threat of sectarian violence?

Q Colonel, it's Luis Martinez again. Do you see any incidence of sectarian violence, any uptick, or any significant actions involving securing groups that rise to your level of concern? COL. STAMMER: To date, with my time in Al Anbar, I have not experienced any sectarian violence. While there has been some violence, it has been criminal in nature, and not necessarily sectarian. Q Any violence resulting from -- within Sunni separate -- Sunni factions in Anbar? As there's obviously the political debate going on towards the -- and the ramp-up towards the elections, there are rival groups. Are you seeing any of those groups actually taking violence for their ideas?

COL. STAMMER: No, I would -- I would like to characterize the violence that I have witnessed to date in Al Anbar as predominantly criminal in nature.