The Redhunter

In the Middle East, the Arab Awakening presents both strategic opportunities and challenges. Regime changes, as well as tensions within and among states under pressure to reform, introduce uncertainty for the future. But they also may result in governments that, over the long term, are more responsive to the legitimate aspirations of their people, and are more stable and reliable partners of the United States.

They are smoking crack if they believe this.

Most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it. Combined with the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current conflicts toward a focus on future capabilities. In keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our posture in Europe must also evolve.

Yes we should draw down forces in Europe. But the Europeans are neither producers nor consumers of defense. Because of it's aircraft carrier the Charles de Gaulle (R91),France is the only one of them with the means of projecting power. But NATO couldn't even take care of Bosnia without the United States, so the idea that they are producers of defense is rather absurd.

Our planning envisages forces that are able to fully deny a capable state's aggressive objectives in one region by conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains - land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. This includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces. Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of - or imposing unacceptable costs on - an opportunistic aggressor in a second region.

Note that "victory" does not appear here or anywhere else in the document. "Defeat Aggression" is there, and maybe that counts. But the language of "denying the objectives" and "imposing unacceptable costs" is either bureaucratese or written by someone who doesn't see the objective as winning.

Also, have you noticed the amount that is in italics? I've read no small number of these type of documents from the government, and this is just about the only one that uses italics to emphasize at all, and they do it in almost every paragraph. My snarky side says they don't think we'll take them seriously.

States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities, while the proliferation of sophisticated weapons and technology will extend to non-state actors as well. Accordingly, the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments. This will include implementing the Joint Operational Access Concept, sustaining our undersea capabilities, developing a new stealth bomber, improving missile defenses, and continuing efforts to enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical space-based capabilities.

This is some good news. As mentioned in my previous pieces, the Navy and Air Force come off relatively unscathed, at least for now. The Army and Marine Corps are in for immediate cuts of between 10 - 15 percent, though. Wars against Iran and China will be naval and air conflicts.

It is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as their role in U.S. national security strategy.

They had better be right.

Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations. In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.

They had really better be right about this one. History tells me that predicting future wars is a fools errand in that the predictions are almost always wrong. I have a terrible feeling it's deja vu all over again. So many times after a war we have cut our military to the bone, only to have to surprised by a new enemy and have to quickly ramp back up again after taking serious losses.

...we have sought to differentiate between those investments that should be made today and those that can be deferred. This includes an accounting of our ability to make a course change that could be driven by many factors, including shocks or evolutions in the strategic, operational, economic, and technological spheres. Accordingly, the concept of "reversibility" - including the vectors on which we place our industrial base, our people, our active-reserve component balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis - is a key part of our decision calculus.

I have no idea what this jibberish means other than "hold on folks because we're going to cut some important weapons systems shortly," and they're just trying to get us ready for it.

Conclusion The United States faces profound challenges that require strong, agile, and capable military forces whose actions are harmonized with other elements of U.S. national power. Our global responsibilities are significant; we cannot afford to fail. The balance between available resources and our security needs has never been more delicate. Force and program decisions made by the Department of Defense will be made in accordance with the strategic approach described in this document, which is designed to ensure our Armed Forces can meet the demands of the U.S. National Security Strategy at acceptable risk.

It sounds like a lot of risk to me.

My Conclusion: The Cuts Are An Excuse for More Domestic Spending

As military theorists have said from time immemorial, there are two basic strategies: One is to calculate the minimum amount of force you will need to achieve your objective and go with that. The second is to calculate the minimum and then go with double, triple, or quadruple that.

Go with the first, and and your calculations are correct you will win but just barely. More importantly, you will sustain a large number of casualties in the process.

Go with the second and not only will you be assured of victory but you will suffer far less casualties in the process.

Yes I realize that there are budgetary limits which intrude on these nice formulas. And there are certainly situations where spending a lot can provoke an arms race in which you never achieve overwhelming force.

But our budgetary problems are not because of military spending, as I have demonstrated time and again. They are because of out-of-control entitlement programs such as Medicare and other Great Society programs. And Obamacare hasn't even gone into effect yet.

So as I and others have said these cuts in military spending have nothing to do with either reassessing defense priorities or an attention to fiscal discipline. They are being made so Obama and his liberal Democrat friends (aided by some unprincipled Republicans) can continue spending like there's no tomorrow on domestic programs. In short, they are sacrificing our standing in the world and our ability to influence world events for domestic programs which will in turn eventually bankrupt us. It's a Lose-Lose proposition if I ever saw one.