The Redhunter

June 12, 2010

Book Review - The Surge: A Military History

Kim Kagan's book is just what the title says it is; a military history of the Surge. It does not cover the political aspects in Washington DC, or the formation of the Surge plan. Nor does she discuss the politics in Iraq or Iraqi society. Most important to note for commenters, she does neither weighs in on whether it was a good idea to invade Iraq in 2003 or on whether the surge itself was a good idea. What she does is simply discuss the military aspects of what happened in Iraq.

Dr Kagan is very well qualified to write on military topics. After taking her Ph. D. in history from Harvard, she taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale University, Georgetown University, and American University. She is currently president of the Institute for Understanding War in Washington DC. She has traveled many times to Iraq, interviewing people from General Odierno himself down to lower ranking officers and soldiers. This is not to suggest that such qualifications make her right by definition in her analysis, rather that she has the background to write intelligently on the topic.

Kagan is married to Frederick Kagan, a military scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He has been described as one of the "intellectual authors" of the surge. His brother is foreign policy analyst Robert Kagan. Their father is Donald Kagan, who is a professor at Yale and a fellow at the Hudson Institute. A more distinguished family is hard to find.

Those who are opposed to our involvement in Iraq will be tempted to dismiss Kimberly Kagan's book because she and her husband did speak out in favor of the surge plan, and as mentioned earlier Frederick's work at the AEI was one of, if not the, impetus behind it (more on that below). But again, this book is not about whether the invasion or surge were good ideas, but is rather a history of what did happen.

Introduction: The Players

The Insurgents

• Al Qaeda in Iraq - AQI - Sunni - Commanded by Abu Ayyub al-Masri just before and during the years of the surge. Based in Falluhah.
• Mahdi Army, also knows as Jaysh (or Jaish) al Mahdi (JAM) - Shiite - created and led by the Iraqi Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in June 2003
• Special Groups - Shiite - Small, cell based groups created and sponsored by Iran
• JAM and Special Groups were primarily based in the northeast neighborhoods of of Baghdad, called Sadr City

The Sunni and Shiite insurgents fought each other as much as they did the Coalition. JAM and AQI fought each other for control of Baghdad and it's environs throughout 2005 and 2006 because if you controlled the capital you effectively controlled the government. There was in effect several insurgencies taking place at the same time: Sunni v Coalition, Shiite v Coalition, Sunni v Shiite, Awakening Movement v AQI, and insurgent group v insurgent group. Sometimes the insurgent groups cooperated and sometimes they didn't.

Key Events Leading to the Adoption of the Surge Strategy

• Mid-term Elections - November 7, 2006 - Democrats capture the House and Senate, having run partially on an "end the war" platform
• Iraq Study Group - December 6 2006 - Report released which recommended major changes in war strategy
• New Strategy - December 15, 2006- Team led by then-Lt. Gen. Petraeus releases U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24
• American Enterprise Institute report - December 14, 2006 - Report by Frederick Kagan, Gen Jack Keane (ret) "Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq" outlines many of the concepts that eventually make up the Surge plan
• Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno - December 2006 - The Corps commander told his boss, Gen. Casey, that his approach of fewer American troops and handing off responsibility to the Iraqis as soon as possible will not work and recommends to President Bush that he needs at least 5 addition U.S. brigades

Announcement of Surge - January 10, 2008 - The surge plan is announced by President Bush in a nationally televised address

U.S. Personnel Changes 2006-7

• Multi-National Corps - Iraq - December 14 - Lt. Gen. Pete Chiarelli. is replaced by Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno
  
• U.S. National Intelligence Director- January 5 - John Negroponte resigned and was replaced by retired Admiral John M. McConnell will take his place.
  
• CENTCOM commander- March 16 - Navy Admiral William Fallon replaced General John Abizaid as CENTCOM commander.
  
• Commander of Multinational Force Iraq - February 10 - Counter-insurgency expert General David Petraeus replaced General George Casey as Commander of Multinational Force Iraq.
  
• U.S. Ambassador to Iraq - March 26 - Bush U.S. diplomat Ryan C. Crocker replaced Zalmay Khalilzad, as the new ambassador to Iraq.

The Iraqi Leader

Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan al-Maliki or Nouri Kamil al-Maliki - Prime Minister of Iraq, Islamic Dawa Party. Elected PM May 20, 2006.

U.S. Military Unit Definitions

Division - typically commanded by a major general (two star) - 17,000 to 21,000 troops - a division typically consists of four brigades. A division is the smallest permanent unit in the United States military

Brigade (Regiment in the Marine Corps) - typically commanded by a Colonel - 2,500 to 4,000 troops - A brigade is important because it is the smallest unit that consists of all of the "parts" typically needed for a ground unit to fight a war; infantry, armor, artillery, medical, intelligence, helicopters, logistics, etc

Book Summary

The Background

The situation in Iraq was dire by the late summer of 2006. Coalition forces were not able to put down the insurgency that had started shortly after the invasion of March 2003. The death toll among Iraqi civilians and military personnel had been going up. The bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque (the "Golden Mosque"), a Shiite Muslim holy site, by al Qaeda in Iraq on February 22, 2006 and again on June 13, 2007 fueled the fire that was already raging. Some analysts that Iraq was in or headed towards a civil war, and whether that was correct or not from a technical aspect, it was starting to become clear that the insurgents were winning.

As insurgencies vary in nature, the center of gravity varies with each one. Sometimes control of the countryside is all-important, in others it's control of the capital, in still others a key industrial or crossroads. With the war in Iraq, the key to victory was controlling the capital city.

With violence was spiraling out of control in and around Baghdad, General Casey, along with his Iraqi counterparts, devised Operation Together Forward I in the summer of 2006. OTF I kicked off on July 13 and concluded on August 6. It was mostly reactive in nature, responding to insurgent attacks as they occurred.

Because sectarian violence continued to rise, Operation Together Forward II started immediately following OTF I. As with it's predecessor, it involved all elements of the Iraqi security forces as well as American troops.

The plan failed because although we could clear the neighborhoods we could not hold them. There were neither enough Iraqi or American troops. Further, many Iraqi units had been infiltrated by militia members who simply used the offensive to pursue the very violence it was supposed to stop.

Worse, the operation actually increased violence. Coalition troops would clear a Shiite neighborhood of JAM forces, but because they could not stay, AQI would move in and kill residents. Or, in Sunni neighborhoods, we would clear out AQI, only to have JAM move in as soon as we left. Commanders stopped the OTF II in mid-October precisely for this reason. Because coalition forces concentrated on clearing Sunni neighborhoods, they ended up suffering more than the Shiites.

American and Iraqi military leaders operated under fundamentally flawed concepts in 2006 and before. One was that their objective was not to secure the population, but to chase after the terrorists in a series of raids. They could not have made their primary objective to protect the people even if they had wanted to for two reasons. One, they simply didn't have enough troops, and two, the ones they had were based on large Forward Operating bases (FOBs) and thus were separated from the population.

General Casey thought that it was the presence of American troops that was fueling the insurgency, a concept that would turn out to be utterly mistaken. He wanted to get our troops out from responsibility for areas in Iraq and out of the country, thinking that if only we could train the Iraqis fast enough they could take over. This set up a race between the trainers and the insurgents; could we train Iraqis fast enough to defeat the insurgency before it won? The answer proved to be a resounding no.

As such, after we had secured an area, rather than keep our own troops there to make sure the insurgents didn't come back, we rushed to get the Iraqi Army and police in and us out. The Iraqis could not maintain control and before long the area was back in insurgent hands. The average time Iraqi forces could control a neighborhood before insurgents took it over again was 2 weeks, and this despite constant U.S. assistance.

Cart Before the Horse

From 2003 until Gen Petraeus took over, we operated under the premise that if we could get the Iraqi economy going again, and a legitimate government in place, security would follow. Readers will recall that it was primarily the Democrats in Congress who insisted on a series of political "benchmarks." The Iraqi government had to pass certain laws by certain dates or aid would be cut off and the troops brought home.

While there was a certain benefit to the benchmarks, by themselves they would have had no effect on ending the insurgency. Insisting on political progress before security had been established was putting the cart before the horse.

One of the main conclusions of Field Manual 3-24, mentioned above, was that political and economic progress can only occur after security is established. The authors of the work studied the history of insurgencies looking for trends, and it became clear that the path to victory lay in establishing security first.

The Genesis of the Surge

Commanders offered different plans to correct the situation. As mentioned above, Generals Casey and Abizaid believed that it was the presence of American troops that was fueling the insurgency, so favored plans that stressed recruiting and training more Iraqi troops. Lt. Gen. Odierno argued in favor of an increase of 5 to 10 brigades as a way of transforming the military situation. In response, Casey and Abizaid argued that an increase would only have a temporary effect because of the infighting among Iraqi politicians.

In Washington, the Iraq Study Group released a paper arguing for the plan Casey and Abizaid had put forth. The ISG was a ten person non-partisan appointed in 2006 by Congress, having first been suggested by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA-10).

Meanwhile, over at the American Enterprise Institute, scholar Frederick Kagan and retired Army Vice chief of Staff General Jack Keane presented a plan that involved sending 5 Army brigades and 2 Marine regiments to Iraq to support a new strategy of protecting the Iraqi population.

At the end of 2006 President George W. Bush adopted a new strategy for our war in Iraq, which was announced in a televised speech on January 10, 2007. As discussed above, there was a concurrent a change in commanders, the most important of which was the replacement of General George Casey with David Petraeus. The new strategy was explained by Lt Gen. Odierno as military operations designed:

...to create stability and security to protect the Iraqi people, first and foremost in Baghdad. The population and the government of Iraq are the center of gravity. Creating a stable environment in Baghdad should provide time and space for the Iraqi government to continue to mature as a government and continue to guild its capacity.

The team of Petraeus and Odierno considered two strategies to implement this new strategy of protecting the people of Baghdad. One was to attack the enemy in their safe havens outside of Baghdad, the other was to patrol the city's neighborhoods, clearing them of insurgents and then staying to ensure they didn't come back.

The answer came from Petraeus' new counterinsurgency doctrine, as ___ in the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. FM 3-24 had been written by a team led by then-Lt Gen Petraeus starting in October 2005, and was released on December
15, 2006.

As explained in FM 3-24, the path to victory lay in securing the population (or "populace," the term used in the book), not in chasing insurgents around the countryside. As such, as one element of the new strategy Odierno deployed his new surge brigades to Baghdad itself with the objective of clearing them of insurgents and keeping them from returning.

The other thing Odierno died was to assign other units to the belts around Baghdad to destroy AQI safe-havens, which extended 20 to 30 miles outside the city. OTF I & II only concentrated on security within the city, the new effort would secure the capital as well as its environs.

Surge Units

via Wikipedia, the 5 additional Army brigades sent to Iraq were:

1. 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division (Infantry): 3,447 troops. Deployed to Baghdad, January 2007
   
2. 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Infantry): 3,447 troops. Deployed to Baghdad, February 2007
   
3. 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Heavy): 3,784 troops. Deployed to southern Baghdad Belts, March 2007
   
4. 4th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker): 3,921 troops. Deployed to Diyala province, April 2007
   
5. 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Heavy): 3,784 troops. Deployed to the southeast of Baghdad, May 2007
   

This brought the number of brigades in Iraq from 15 to 20.

In addition, Marines in al Anbar province from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, the 1st Battalion 6th Marines and the 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines had their tours extended. All troops had their 12 month tours extended to 15 months.

From FOB to COP and JSS

p 32
Before the surge, most U.S. troops were stationed on one of five large well-protected Forward Operating Bases (FOBs), and only ventured out to patrol or take part in specific operations. They tended to be reactive rather than proactive, and reinforced Iraqi operations rather than leading the way themselves. Because the Iraqi forces were not able to conduct offensive operations effectively, they tended to rely on checkpoints. The strategy didn't work.

The first of the oft-cited Zen-like "Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency" in the first chapter of FM 3-24 was that "Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be." In other words, keeping our troops on well-protected bases most of the time made them less safe, not more so.

The reason for this was that by staying on their FOB most of the time the troops weren't as familiar their patrol area as they should have been, and because they obviously weren't sharing the same risks as the Iraqi people, the latter weren't going to take the risk of overtly helping our effort. As such, the troops were at a high level of risk from insurgent attack when on patrol or on an operation.

Odierno dispersed the troops from the FOBs into the neighborhoods, where they established Combat Outposts, or Joint Security Stations. The COPs were American only, the JSSs were set up in concert with the Iraqi security forces.

Whether stationed at a COP or a JSS, being in the neighborhood eliminated the problems they faced earlier. As has been reported many times, when the troops arrived in the neighborhoods, the Iraqis asked "are you staying this time?" When our answer was "yes," the Iraqis responded "then this time we will help you." In addition, our troops became intimately familiar with their assigned Area of Operations (AO). From FM 3-24:

7-7 ...Effective commanders know the people, topography, economy, history, and culture of their area of operations (AO). They know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance within it...

"Will you stay this time" was the question Iraqis asked American commanders when they saw our units coming into their areas. When the answer they got was "yes," the Iraqis decided they could safely support the Americans. With that support came timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence, not to mention more and more Iraqis signing up to serve in their own security forces.

Preparing the Battlefield

It is important to understand the difference between operations designed to prepare or "shape" the battlefield, and "prepare the conditions" for victory, from decisive operations themselves. The former three involve deploying forces to the area nearby or in the area where they willll eventually fight the decisive battle, and getting set up in their bases. This involved setting up the COPs and JSSs, getting supply lines set up, getting to know the neighborhoods, meeting the people, developing intelligence, etc. As part of establishing these neighborhood bases, our commanders became intimately familiar with their AO, and used that information to prepare for the fight ahead.

To be sure, preparing the battlefield involved much fighting. As most of these neighborhoods, towns, and cities were controlled by the insurgents we had to fight our way in. Insurgents then attacked our new bases. We sent out scouts to reconnoiter the area and they fought battles. But these were not decisive actions, but rather getting the troops in place and set for what would become the decisive action later.

So that the fight for Diyala province and eastern Anbar were preparatory operations. Indeed, even clearing operations in Baghdad as late as April and May were preparatory operations for the decisive battles that occurred in the second half of 2007.

Going After the Militias

The additional American troops gave Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki the strength and confidence to go after the militias. On January 11 he ordered them to disarm or face attack. Within a few days many Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) commanders had ordered their troops to stand down. Just as or even more importantly, Moqtda al Sadr issued a cease-fire, ordering his JAM forces not to fight American or government forces.

Not all JAM members complied. American and Iraqi forces went after them, arresting or killing rogue commanders and their troops. In addition, Moqtada al Sadr left the country for Iran, which left the organization leaderless and its commanders confused. As a result, JAM fractured and ceased to function as a coherent fighting force.

The result was that JAM was effectively neutralized, at least for the time being. This had am immediate and positive effect on the political scene, because without their militia Sadrist politicians ended their boycott of parliament, and became part of the political process.

The Baghdad Security Plan: Operation Fardh al Qanoon

The Baghdad Security Plan, or Operation Fardh al Qanoon ("Enforcing the Law") began on February 14, 2007. It was not the first true offensive operation, which would not come until June with Operation Phantom Thunder. Rather, it was part of what is called "preparing the ground" for the main battles that lie ahead.

Major General Joseph Fil, Commanding General of Multi-National Division-Baghdad and the First Cavalry Division, explained the operational concepts behind the plan:

This new plan involves three basic parts: clear, control and retain. The first objective within each of the security districts in the Iraqi capital is to clear out extremist elements neighborhood by neighborhood in an effort to protect the population. And after an area is cleared, we're moving to what we call the control operation. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, we'll maintain a full-time presence on the streets, and we'll do this by building and maintaining joint security stations throughout the city. This effort to re-establish the joint security stations is well under way. The number of stations in each district will be determined by the commanders on the ground who control that area. An area moves into the retain phase when the Iraqi security forces are fully responsible for the day-to-day security mission. At this point, coalition forces begin to move out of the neighborhood and into locations where they can respond to requests for assistance as needed. During these three phrases, efforts will be ongoing to stimulate local economies by creating employment opportunities, initiating reconstruction projects and improving the infrastructure. These efforts will be spearheaded by neighborhood advisory councils, district advisory councils and the government of Iraq.

In short, the main difference between the Fardh al Qanoon and OTF I & II was that this time we had more troops, and they would remain in the neighborhoods after they had cleared them of insurgents to ensure they didn't return.

The Anbar Awakening

Some people would have us believe that it was the Anbar Awakening alone that turned Iraq around, or that it was developed and was successful apart from the Surge. Neither assertion is true. Kagan

The truth is that (the Awakening) began emerging in 2006 thanks to the hard and skilful fighting and negotiating of Army colonel Sean MacFarland and a number of Marine officers and their subordinates. General Odierno met with Sheikh Sattar abu Risha in December 2006 and encouraged U.S. soldiers in Anbar to continue fighting and negotiating in support of Abu Risha's efforts.

She further explains that

"The presence of U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency missions to secure the population made the local rejection of al Qaeda possible and effective. The leadership and example of the sheikhs of Ramadi inspired sheikhs in neighboring cities to cooperate with U.S. and Iraqi forces. As a result of their efforts, especially in late 2006 and early 2007, al Qaeda no longer controlled Ramadi or Fallujah"

More,

The awakening started when in the summer of 2006 Sunni Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu al-Risha grew weary of al Qaeda brutality against is family and decided to fight back. He enlisted other sheiks in the fall of that year formed the Anbar Salvation Council. Sattar and the other sheikhs encouraged their men to join the Iraqi police, which in Anbar had been basically non-existent.

For U.S forces, securing Baghdad was the primary objective in 2007. We concentrated on what are called "shaping operations" in Anbar and Diyala that year. Shaping operations "create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation...they may occur before, concurrently with, or after the start of the decisive operation."

One objective of our operations in Anbar in 2007 was to integrate all levels of government; central, provincial, and local. De-Baathification had kept many Sunnis out of government, the insurgency frightened many into staying home, and Sunni leaders had boycotted the 2005 election. In 2007 the process of turning this around was started.

Concerned Local Citizens - Sons of Iraq

As in Anbar and elsewhere, Concerned Local Citizens groups were formed in Diyala. They complemented the Iraqi Security Forces, and protected villages when our forces were absent. Some of the CLC members were former insurgents. Having enemy troops join your side is better than killing them because it demoralizes and fractures the enemy. It also gives you another soldier.

Regular readers of this blog will be familiar with Concerned Local Citizens (CLC, later called Sons of Iraq), as they were discussed during many of the press briefings of this time. Essentially, the CLCs were an organization formed by the U.S. as a sort of "super-neighborhood watch." They were paid, but not armed (at least by us, everyone in Iraq seems to own an AK-47), by t he United States. The objectives were several. One, to give a job to unemployed young men who might otherwise fight a job planting IEDs. Another was to turn around former insurgents and bring them into the process. Because they worked in their own neighborhoods, CLC members provided the Coalition with valuable intelligence. Finally, it was a means of combating al Qaeda and other insurgent groups.

In order to be effective Iraqi police had to be recruited from the neighborhoods they would patrol, otherwise they'd be considered "outsiders" and not trusted by the people. Worse, "outsiders" would themselves engage in sectarian cleansing.

AQI Reacts to the Surge

"In war the will is directed at an animate object that reacts."

Carl von Clausewitz

AQI reacted to the surge by attempting to undermine the credibility of Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces by escalating its vehicle bomb campaign. They also hoped to spark the very sectarian violence we were trying to tamp down. Their car bomb campaign was well organized and thought out. The attacks were not at random but targeted specific locations and people. The campaign started in January of 2007 and persisted in intensity through March.

For a time it was act and react. Reacting to their campaign, Coalition and Iraqi forces took actions such as erecting barricades around populated areas such as markets. Denied these targets, AQI went after locations such as bridges. The Coalition, in turn, redoubled efforts to take out the AQI networks that made and distributed the vehicle bombs. Eventually, though the walls and Coalition attacks took their toll and AQI vehicle bombs slowed down.

Operation Phantom Thunder - The Decisive Battle Begins

Operation Phantom Thunder, the start of decisive operations, kicked off on June 15, 2007. It was a highly coordinated corps-wide offensive across all of Iraq that involved all commands and many sub-operations. It was followed by Phantom Strike on August 15, and finally, Phantom Phoenix on January 8, 2008.

Planning for Phantom Thunder had actually begun in December of 2006, even before President Bush announced the "surge" of troops. "Generals Petraeus and Odierno had determined...that securing Baghdad would require a major campaign to dislodge Qaeda from the belts around Baghdad."

By June, Baghdad was encircled by Coalition troops. Not literally, of course, but circled in the sense that we had control of all major road intersections and such.

Phantom Thunder was a corps-level offensive in that it was it was coordinated with all units in the country. Unlike previous operations, in which each division or brigade operated more or less without concern for the others, this time everyone would be working in concert.

The intent, again, was to protect the Iraqi population. Doing so would allow economic and political activity to start again, buying time for the government. Negotiations among political parties and factions only work when security has been established, not the other way around.

Phantom Thunder was the largest counterinsurgency operation in history. While previous operations had degenerated into a game of "whack-a-mole," this time the insurgents were separated from the population. We were also aggressive in avoiding civilian casualties and collateral damage, which built all-important trust among the people.

Phantom Thunder and Phantom Strike in Diyala Province

Kagan: "The overarching objective of Phantom Thunder was to stop insurgents in the provinces from supporting violence in Baghdad. Controlling Baqubah (the largest city in Diyala), advanced U.S. forces toward that objective."

Following Phantom Thunder was Phantom Strike. General Odierno explained the objectives of Phantom Strike:

"This week, we launched Operation Phantom Strike, a series of targeted operations designed to intensify pursuit of extremist elements across Iraq. With the elimination of safe havens and support zones due to Phantom Thunder, al Qaeda and Shi'a extremists have been forced into ever-shrinking areas, and it is my intent to pursue and disrupt their operations. ...Over the coming weeks, we plan to conduct quick strike raids against remaining extremist sanctuaries and staging areas, carry out precision targeting operations against extremist leadership and focus missions to counter the extremists' lethal accelerants of choice, the IED and the vehicle-borne IED. We will continue to hunt down their leadership, deny them safe haven, disrupt their supply lines and significantly reduce their capability to operate in Iraq" (DoD Press Briefing, August 17, 2007).

Diyala illustrated the benefits of the strategy of securing the population first. (p141) Our primary objective was to control territory, and killing or capturing the enemy was second. (p 116) After eliminating enemy safe-havens, we were able to convince some tribal leaders to join our side, or at least turn against the insurgents. Tribal reconciliation followed the establishment of security.

Although al Qaeda attempted to reconstitute itself, we were able to fragment them into small groups. They were not allowed safe havens, as this time the Coalition had enough troops to secure all critical areas of the country.

In 2006, the Iraqis were supposed to control territory through checkpoints after we had cleared an area. The problem with this approach is that it froze units in place where they could not respond to anything that happened save in their immediate area. More, operations in 2007 and 2008 were successful precisely because their primary objective was not immediate transition to Iraqi control, a control that was beyond their capability. Rather, their objective was simply that of establishing security.

To be clear, combat ("kinetic operations," in U.S. military parlance) operations were not second or subordinate to non-combat ("non-kinetic," i.e. nation building) operations, as has sometimes been charged. Rather, the purpose of combat operations was to allow non-combat operations to take place. Indeed, the two took place simultaneously. The goal of kinetic operations was to separate the insurgents from the population and defending those Iraqis willing to work with us and their new government. Only when they felt safe would Iraqis work with Americans and their new government. To facilitate this, the American strategy was a carrot-and-stick approach, with protection and financial benefits only going to tribal leaders who rejected violence.

Iran's Proxy War in Iraq

Iran began planning operations against American forces in Iraq in 2002, some months before the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom that started on March 20, 2003. While their overall strategy and goals are not completely clear, it is clear that they have supplied weapons, fighters, and advisers to the insurgency in Iraq. Iran has supported both Sunni and Shia groups throughout all of Iraq. Iran also supported Ansar al Islam, a Sunni terrorist group tied to al Qaeda, as well as AQI itself. Iranian support increased with time. At the start of the insurgency, Iranian influence was relatively low. By August of 2007 Iranian influence accounted for half of all attacks on Coalition forces.

As such, Coalition attention to the problems posed by Iran was relatively low at first, and only after achieving success against AQI and other insurgent groups did we turn our attention to Iran.

It didn't take any deep intelligence or decryption of encoded documents to detect the Iranian influence. It was stamped on weapon after weapon captured by the Coalition. Everything from the special copper disks on Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFP) to the tail fins of mortars told the tale.

The organizing force in Iran was the Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods(or "Quds") Force (IRGC-QF)(also known as "Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution" or "Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps"). The Qods Force is part of the Revolutionary Guards, and they report directly to the Supreme Leader, who as of this writing is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. From what I can tell, the IRGC is roughly equivalent to the Nazi SS (Schutzstaffel). The Qods Force is responsible for exporting the Iranian revolution. Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, is probably the most important group formed by the Qods Force.

Qods Force and Hezbollah personnel teamed to train Iraqis in groups of twenty to sixty in Iran so that they would function as a unit; hence the term "Special Group," a term given to them by the U.S. military. Hezbollah training of Iraqis in Iran began in 2005. Special Groups usually remained separate, but possibly teamed with JAM for some operations.

Special Groups functioned alongside and in cooperation with JAM and other militia groups. Some of them came from JAM and other militia groups, being their more extreme members. Perhaps the best description is that Special Groups are an "outgrowth" of JAM and other similar groups

It's possible that Iranian support for insurgent groups was simply to create a "quagmire" for U.S. forces so as to divert attention from their operations elsewhere, rather than militarily eject us from the country. It's also possible that they thought they could infiltrate the democratic Iraqi government and get people more sympathetic to their idea of a theocracy in place. Likely they also simply did not want a successful Western-style democracy on their doorstep. Or perhaps they simply had the more limited goal of ensuring that the Baghdad government could not control the southern portion of their country. Most likely of all is some combination of the above. Either way, it was clear that Iranian influence served to undermine the nascent democracy.

The U.S. countered Iranian influence with both a diplomatic and military response. Ambassador Ryan Crocker discussed the situation in direct talks with high ranking Iranian officials, including the Iranian ambassador to Iraq. The military response targeted JAM and Special Forces directly, capturing or killing leaders, breaking up networks, and intercepting arms shipments. These operations met with some success, but Iranian influence continues to be a problem.

Final Thoughts by Kagan

The last of the surge brigades left Iraq in the summer of 2008.

As can be seen by the following chart, the surge clearly worked

As the surge progressed, violence decreased. By late 2007 it was half that of mid-2005. Attack trends dropped 60 percent in Baghdad in 2007. Civilian deaths dropped 70 percent. Iraq dropped off the media's radar, itself a sign of success.

Three U.S. operations were responsible for the success. The first was Faradh al Qanoon (Baghdad Security Plan), in which Gen. Odierno placed surge units in and around the capital. Next came Phantom Thunder, which cleared AQI from the belts around Baghdad. That was followed by Phantom Strike, in which Coalition forces pursued AQI as they fled and attempted to reconstitute.

Iraqis ended up rejecting AQI and other extremist groups. The "Awakening" in Anbar and elsewhere was evidence of this. However, despite what some in the media insinuate, the"Awakening" was not independent of Coalition efforts and did not turn Iraq around by itself. The Awakening would have failed had U.S. leaders such as U.S. Army Col. Sean McFarland, some Marine officers, and Gen Odierno not seized the moment and encouraged and supported it.

Another criticism one hears is that American forces simply bribed insurgents into laying down their arms. While this is true in some cases, it overlooks the larger picture. Most of those insurgents who took money to change sides or go back to civilian life were also "encouraged" to do so by aggressive and successful American military operations.

Gen. Petraeus' U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 provided the overall theory on how to win, but it didn't get into specifics of what units should be deployed where or precisely how they were to be used. That task was left to Lt. Gen. Odierno, who drew up and oversaw the execution of what was know as the Surge. As Kagan concludes

It was Odierno who creatively adapted sophisticated concepts from conventional fighting to the problems in Iraq, filling gaps in the counterinsurgency doctrine and making the overal effort a success. For all the sophistication of this integrated political-military and kinetic/non-kinetic approach to the conflict, Odierno is likely to be remembered in military history as the man who redefined the operational art of counterinsurgency with a series of offensives in 2007 and 2008.

My Take

One book, and one author, cannot and should not cover everything. Those who may complain because this book does not discuss the domestic or Iraqi politics, or whether it was a good idea to invade Iraq in 2003 or execute the surge miss the point. The fact is that the surge plan worked, and Kagan explains why in this book.

The strongest part of the book is simply that Kagan explains clearly why we failed before the surge, and how the change in strategy coupled with additional troops worked. Although she does not get into the details of counterinsurgency, she discusses it well enough from a higher level so that one gets the idea. If you want to know why we once failed and then succeeded, this is the book for you.

Kagan also does a good job at outlining the various insurgent groups, and how they fought both one another and Coalition troops. Al Qaeda in Iraq, Jaysh al Mahdi, Special Groups, they are more are all there.

This is not to say the work is not without its flaws. There is not much on the commanders, and their decision making process, whether at the division or brigade levels. Discussing units without their commanders seems an omission to me. As someone who watched and blogged on every briefing by a combat commander in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2007 on, I was hoping for more names to appear.

There is also not enough about small-unit counterinsurgency strategy, but perhaps Kagan just decided to concentrate on the "big picture." There are also some grammatical and I think a few errors in word use, no doubt the result of a work rushed into print without enough editing.

All in all, this is a must-read if you want to understand the war in Iraq, especially the surge and why it was successful.

Posted by Tom at 9:30 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

May 26, 2010

General Petraeus Explains the Intellectual Origins of the Surge

Iraq is not much in the news these days, which must mean we're winning. Afghanistan is sometimes in the news, and there the going is decidedly tough.

On this blog I have examined in some detail the situation in Iraq before and during the surge of forces in Iraq. From 2007 on I covered every press briefing by a combat commander in Iraq and Afghanistan. I reviewed the all important U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, which was written by a team led by then-Lt Gen David Petraeus and released in December of 2006. It became the "bible" of the new strategy that made the surge of troops possible.

In October of 2008 Gen Petraus gave what I called a "how we did it" speech before the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting and Exposition in Washington, DC.

All this, however, mostly covered the surge of troops itself, and not the situation predating the surge. It was this time period, specifically ate 2005 through 2006, the General Petraeus covered in a speech on May 6 at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC. Excerpts follow:

One recent AEI effort, of course, stands out in particular. In the fall of 2006, AEI scholars helped develop the concept for what came to be known as "the surge." Fred and Kim Kagan and their team, which included retired General Jack Keane, prepared a report that made the case for additional troops in Iraq. As all here know, it became one of those rare think tank products that had a truly strategic impact. ...

At about the same time Team Kagan was authoring its study, President Bush's senior assistant on Iraq, Meghan O'Sullivan, called me at Fort Leavenworth. "What do you think is needed in Iraq?" she asked. "Everything you can get your hands on," I said. On reflection, it would have been a bit more impressive for me to say that, based on complex analysis, precisely five more brigades were required. It might have made my subsequent Senate confirmation hearings a bit easier, too!
...

Change starts, again, with getting the big ideas right. Developing the proper constructs is essential to having the right intellectual foundation for all that follows. And doing so typically requires an ability to think creatively and critically about complex challenges, constantly testing one's assumptions and often embracing new concepts.

In my experience, big ideas don't fall out of a tree and hit you on the head like Newton's apple. Rather, they start as seeds of little ideas that take root and grow. The growth takes place primarily in discussion--spirited, freewheeling, challenging discussion of the kind that Irving Kristol would have enjoyed.
...

Now, while getting the big ideas right is critical, simply developing them is not enough. The big ideas must also be communicated effectively throughout the organization. And this is the second step in the four-step process I described earlier.

Communication should flow in multiple directions to be effective. In the military, it involves communicating downward through leaders and units, upward through the chain of command, and outward through coalition partners, interagency elements, and the press. The most important of these directions is downward--communicating the big ideas throughout the breadth and depth of the organization, and then ensuring they're understood, operationalized, and, ideally, embraced by leaders at all levels.
...

Well, having gotten the big ideas right and having communicated them throughout the organization, the next responsibility of leaders in the process of change is to oversee their implementation. This meant spending time with those turning the big ideas into reality on the ground. And, in 2006 in the United States, it meant, in particular, overhauling the process of how we prepared our units for deployment.

Now, careful oversight should not be taken to imply micromanagement.
...

The final step of the change process is to capture and share lessons and best practices, to use them to refine the big ideas, and to then begin the process all over again.

Enabling this in 2006 was the fact that all of us in uniform had worked hard over the years to ensure that our services were "learning organizations." For example, we'd established lessons learned centers in our organizational structures, routinely conducted after action reviews in the wake of exercises and operations, and developed formal processes to capture and share best practices. These initiatives had long been hugely important to the long term effectiveness of our organizations. And they were--and continue to be--especially important in Iraq and Afghanistan. After all, war requires constant learning and adaptation, and that is particularly true in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. As the COIN Manual observed, the side that learns and adapts the fastest often prevails.
...

I can remember a time when members of our military did not always receive the support they deserved. Two generations ago, we were engaged in war in Southeast Asia. American men and women in uniform fought with skill and valor for the sake of the country they loved and took an oath to defend. Many of them bled, and more than 58,000 of them died. With every one of those casualties, a family and a community were heartbroken, mourning a loss that could never be recovered, whose grief could never fully be assuaged.

But those returning from Vietnam often were not treated as the heroes they were. Recalling that, those of us in the military today are thankful beyond words that the American people seem to have such high regard and affection for their men and women in uniform.

Working with those men and women every day, seeing them perform missions in the toughest of circumstances imaginable, I can tell you that the regard and affection accorded our troopers are fully merited.

Posted by Tom at 8:44 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

December 16, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 15 December 2008 - "Coach, Teach, Mentor"

This briefing is by Colonel Mark Dewhurst, commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division. With him is Mr. Conrad Tribble, who is his Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader. On Monday they spoke via satellite from Camp Liberty in Iraq with reporters at the Pentagon, providing an update on ongoing security operations.

As mentioned, the 4th Brigade is part of the 10th Mountain Division, also known as Task Force Mountain, currently headquartering Multi-National Division Center. However, the 4th Brigade is currently part of Multi-National Division-Baghdad. MND-Baghdad, also known as Task Force Baghdad, is headquartered by the 4th Infantry Division under Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Hammond.

The area they are responsible for includes the "three political districts of Karrada, Rusafa and Tisa Nissan, also referred to as New Baghdad. This is a heavily urbanized area with 80 percent of the ministries. We have the Baghdad city government here. We have the -- a lot of the government leaders live in the Karrada Peninsula that we have responsibility for the security." It is mostly a Shia area, with pockets of Sunnis and Christians.

Col. Dewhurst, I believe, reports to Maj. Gen. Hammond, who in turn reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin reports to General Odierno, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who on September 16 replaced his one-time boss Gen. David Petraeus in this position. Odierno reports to Gen. Petraeus, now commander of CENTCOM. Petreaus reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

There is an awful lot of importance in this briefing, so watch the video and follow the transcript. However, for purposes of brevity we'll only concentrate on a few areas.

From their opening comments

COL. DEWHURST:... This area's comprised of a lot of Shi'a Muslims. I do have pockets of Sunni and Christians that also live in this area. And I am partnered with four Iraqi security force brigades that are composed of 11 Iraqi security force battalions. Three of those brigades are national police brigades, and one of those brigades is Iraqi army brigade. They're commanded by highly competent Iraqi brigadier generals. They are very patriotic. They're very aggressive. And they've been working very hard to deliver security and reconciliation and reconstruction to the population over here.

In our area I operate from two forward operating bases. I have three combat outposts, known as COPs, and nine joint security stations, JSSs. And those are where we work with and live with Iraqi security force partners, and we -- we're -- we eat with them, sleep with them, prepare for missions together, go on missions together and train together.

This partnership with the Iraqi security forces has enabled us to increase their capabilities and has led to them receiving many more tips from the Iraqi people that has led to the successful detention of many unaligned extremists and criminals being taken off the streets, which has increased the security here in east Baghdad. The combined effects of these partnered operation has been the cornerstone in our fight against extremists and other criminals.

"...we eat with them, sleep with them..." This is straight out of Petraeus' U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 and is the major strategy change from pre-surge days. Previously, our forces more or less stayed on one of 5 major bases in Iraq, going out on raids when we got usable intel. It didn't work for several reasons. One, as soon as we left the insurgents came back. The Iraqi security forces were not able to maintain control. Second, because the populace knew the insurgents would return, they were hesitant to provide quality intelligence.

The 5 additional surge brigades (up from 15) provided U.S. commanders with the numerical safety to take the risk of leaving our bases to live among the people. This time, when we went to the communities, the leaders would ask "are you staying this time?" When the answer they got was "yes," they provided all the information and help we needed. The Iraqi security forces knew that this time they would be backed up in a fight.

See as examples

Iraq Briefing - 04 Feb 2008 - "We do not drive or commute to work"
Iraq Briefing - 22 February 2008 - "We are Living with the Population"
October 12, 2008 - Gen Petraeus' Speech on Iraq - How We Did It

COL. DEWHURST:...I like to say that our Iraqi partners are doing a superb job in the transitioning of the Sons of Iraq. In my area I have about 1,200 Sons of Iraq, of which already 400 of them have now transitioned into the Iraqi security forces, mainly to the Iraqi police. I have about 300 more that are getting ready to start into the Iraqi police academy, starting in the next month.

The Sons of Iraq program (originally called Concerned Local Citizens) has been instrumental in getting Iraqis to take ownership of their own security. The SOI program is a sort of "super neighborhood watch" of Iraqi citizens who patrol their neighborhoods and report suspicious activity to the authorities. Many of the SOI were armed, but with their own private weapons, as we did not provide them any. Because no one knows a neighborhood like the people who live there, the intelligence they provided was invaluable. More importantly, it got Iraqis "off the fence" and into our camp, taking responsibility for their own security. It also provided jobs and a paycheck; initially courtesy of the U.S. taxpayer.

Ultimately, the program was temporary in nature. Now that we've largely wrapped up the insurgency, the program is being disbanded. The idea is to move the SOI participants to jobs in government, the Iraqi security forces, or private enterprise. The problem with the latter is lack of jobs, with the first two suspicion by the Maliki government. Most or many of the SOI are Sunnis, and Maliki is a Shiite. This has caused many to worry that Maliki just wants to disband the SOI without making sure as many as possible get jobs; a recipe for disaster. The U.S. command understands this full well, with Lt. Gen. Austin sending Maliki a not-so-veiled warning on the matter last September.

From Mr Tribble's opening remarks:

MR. TRIBBLE:...My team is nine people. It's a mix of State, USAID and civil affairs Army Reservists. We are -- they're experts in governance and business and industry and in agriculture, primarily, and we work directly with the brigade both at the brigade level down to the battalion and company levels, even....

The five main areas that we're working on are everything on the other side of the spectrum from the security issues that Mark was talking about. Governance -- primarily, it's helping the Iraqi institutions develop better and more effective ways of delivering essential services -- sewer, water, trash and so forth.

We do a lot of political development, focusing primarily now on elections and support for parties and candidates, and just in general the electoral process that's starting in this -- in January of 2009.

We have a lot of programs focusing on business and economic growth in our area. Again, at the sort of local level, we do -- we're working with a lot of NGOs, trying to develop a civil society, the whole network of NGOs and professional associations that makes up a society, that makes things happen outside of government, government intervention and government control.

And finally, we're doing some programming in support of reconciliation among these communities that we mentioned earlier: Christian and Sunni and Shi'a, the mix that's in our neighborhood....

I would say -- I would go so far as to say that in a lot of our areas we're beyond counterinsurgency. We're really into a development phase. And that means that our mission has changed a little bit. We're focusing not so much on individual symptoms or specific neighborhoods, but it's really about the system that is or is not in place to address the issue, whether it's sewer or water or economic development. We're trying to get away from a focus on small projects, and look at the processes that have to be in place on the Iraqi side.

Really, what it comes down to is trying to help the Iraqis develop Iraqi solutions to their problems, not impose or deliver our solutions. This means fewer projects on our side. It means less U.S. money spent. And gradually, the trajectory over the next six to eight months, I suspect, is going to be in that direction, and that's a good thing.

Although the PRTs are small in number they are big in effect. However, unless used properly, economic and political development will have little effect on ending an insurgency.

One reason for our failure in the early years is that we put the economic and political cart before the security horse. That is to say, we though that economic and political progress would make up for or even end the security problem. This was incorrect, and at odds with history. What Petreus' team found out while writing Field Manual 3-24 in 2005-6 was that history conclusively showed that unless you secure the populace economic and political progress will achieve nothing.

Therefore, now that security has been achieved can the PRTs play a useful role. We also have much political progress taking place, as for example the recent passage in the Iraqi parliament of the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement). Of course, there is much yet to do.

On to the Q & A

Q Dawn Casey, Talk Radio News Service. My question is actually for Mr. Tribble.

You said some of the areas you were assisting in, with governance, and you would give some specific examples of helping with the essential services there. I am really curious what sort of help you are helping them with and, you know, what the programs are.

MR. TRIBBLE: The big picture is, the mantra that we use is pretty much the same one that the military uses on the security force side -- coach, teach, mentor.

We have a small team of governance advisers: I myself along with some in the brigade as well as a couple of my EPRT team members. Essentially what we're doing is getting out to the municipal city, the city municipal works department, its various offices and affiliates in the city, in our district.

We're just helping them identify their priorities. It's just a constant engagement with them.

We're training them or helping them to train them on things like planning, budgeting, resource management; how they link their needs to resource requests to their higher headquarters, to the city government; things as mundane as how do they track service requests from customers or from the neighborhood councils that identify neighborhoods where the sewer is backed up. A lot of it is very mundane and it's just daily, weekly, talking to them, working with them, and sort of showing them ways to do things.

And at the same time as we work at the -- really at the sub- municipal level, then there's the -- a Baghdad PRT above us that's engaging with the mayor and the sort of leadership of the city, trying to push down resources to the local -- to the local government.
So if you came out and saw it, you'd see us going to the municipal works departments; looking at their equipment; talking to them about how they manage their equipment, how they deploy it; helping them develop plans for trash pickup and that sort of thing. It's all very -- very, very nuts and bolts and not particularly glamorous, but it is in fact, I think, having some effect.

As he mentions later in the interview, it is indeed as if we are starting from scratch. One occasionally wonders, "didn't they have an army and local governments before we came in?" The answer is yes, but they were dysfunctional to the point of being barely recognizable. Among our many bad assumptions in pre-invasion thinking was to understimate the damage a totalitarian system can do to a country. The Germans were lucky to have only been under the Nazis for 12 years.

Q Colonel, it's Mike Mount with CNN. Going back on the security situation -- as we've been talking about the SOFA, you know, pulls you back out of the main parts of the cities by June, what's your confidence level -- and you've been working with them for some time now -- what's your confidence level with the Iraqi forces and the police in your region? And do you have a high level of confidence that they're going to be able to kind of take control of the area as you start backing off and maybe further down the road, too, as troops are eventually pulled out?

COL. DEWHURST: Yeah, I can tell you from day one -- this is actually my second tour over here -- and the difference from my first tour to the second tour is the -- one is the confidence and competence of the Iraqi security forces and, two, their logistics, their supplies and equipment is much better than it was two years ago when I was over here. And what I have seen in my year of working with them, they have greatly increased their capabilities to -- a lot of the operations now are Iraqi-led, Iraqi-planned, and we are supporting their operations. And that's very encouraging for me as we look forward.

Over the past two years I have covered several briefings in which commanders have expressed concerns about the logistical capabilities of the Iraqi Army.

The saying about how "amateurs discuss strategy, pros talk logistics" may be overstated, but it has a lot of relevance. Be wary, for example, about anyone who rattles on about how we need "more troops in Afghanistan" but says nothing about how we'll keep them supplied (hint; google for the "Khyber Pass").

Continuing with his answer:

COL. DEWHURST:...However that's now created lots more challenges for us to work through. It's now, okay, we have this agreement; now we've got to work through, how are we going to start withdrawing, pulling back? And how are we going to shape that? Because we want to do that in a very methodical manner because we don't want to lose the security gains that we have made.

Hello Barack Obama, are you listening? Democrats and Republicans in Congress? Any liberals reading this post, did you catch that? Any of you types who like to say things like what Kevin O'Meara* says about bloggers like me:

Redhunter also tells us the "War is over". Ok, then let's immediately stop spending $10bl per month, bring the troops home, downsize the Pentagon and get on with life. Oh, maybe they liked the war when it was raging.

Are you paying attention? Stop with the Movon.org talking points and learn what's really going on.

Regarding the violence; what I hear time and again is that we can reduce the overall level of violence, but stopping the isolated "spectacular attack" is hard. One time I heard Gen Odierno (I believe) say that that the way they judge progress is by a 90 day rolling average.

Col Dewhurst speaks about the "spectacular attack" later in the briefing:

COL. DEWHURST:....Probably the -- you asked about the most negative thing. I don't know if it's negative or it's just -- my concern is that there -- what keeps me up at night is that -- is that extremists that still trying to do that spectacular attack. And that is my concern, of trying to find out, get the information, who that is, to prevent that attack from happening in the first place. And that's probably the only thing that still bothers me, is those spectacular attacks are -- still have the potential of happening.

The lesson is; don't let the occasional spectacular attack convince you that things have not changed dramatically since the terrible days of 2006.

The journalists challenged and questioned some of Col Dewhurst and Mr. Tribble had to say, but I think mostly on non-vital issues. Time will tell if we can translate the security, economic, and political gains into a viable state at peace with itself and it's neighbors, but you'd have to be blind or in complete denial to think that the trends are not strongly in our favor.

A defeated insurgency, and an at least somewhat pluralistic Iraq would be a major blow to the worldwide jihadist movement, and an enhancement to U.S. prestige. Just the recent signing of the SOFA alone was a blow to Iran and a sign of an ever more confident and capable Iraqi leadership.

All in all, a very interesting and useful briefing, which contributed to our understanding of the situation in Iraq.

* Update - Kevin has now decided to hide his website behind a password. I'd challenged a few of his posts in comments there, and saw that at least one other conservative had too. Apparently this was too much for him.

Update II - January 3 2009 - Kevin has come out to play again, removing the password restriction from his website.

Posted by Tom at 9:45 PM | Comments (4) | TrackBack

December 11, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 08 December 2008 - "A New Hope in the Eyes of the Iraqi People"

This briefing is by Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling. Hertling is commander of the the 1st Armored Division, also known as Task Force Iron.. Until this past Tuesday, December 9, Gen. Hertling commanded, and the 1st Armored headquartered, Multi-National Division-North. This ended a 15 month deployment in Iraq.

MND-North is now headquartered by the 25th Infantry Division from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. It is now known as Task Force Lightning. MND-North and the 25th ID are commanded by Maj. Gen. Robert L. Caslen Jr.

Before his rotation back to their home base in Germany, Maj. Gen. Hertling reported to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin reports to General Odierno, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who on September 16 replaced his one-time boss Gen. David Petraeus in this position. Odierno reports to Gen. Petraeus, now commander of CENTCOM. Petreaus reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

Maj. Gen. Hertling spoke from Iraq via satellite Monday to reporters at the Pentagon. Here's the video:

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

As journalist Al Pessin notes in his first question, Maj Gen. Hertling and the troops of his 1st Armored Division arrived at a critical time. Violence was escalating out of control and the Iraqi government was at best chaotic. With the help of various volunteers from the State Department, the troopers of 1st Armored applied the counterinsurgency doctrine spelled out in Petraeus' Field Manual 3-24 and were able to achieve stunning successes in northern Iraq.

Readers should note that no, I don't just believe whatever military commanders say. I gather my information from a variety of sources that I have found to be trustworthy. Further, these briefings are two-way affairs; the journalists get to ask whatever tough and hard-hitting questions they want. I listen to their questions, and try and determine which part of the briefers stories they believe and which parts they challenge.

With this in mind, let's turn to Hertling's opening statement. Following is an exerpt:

GEN. HERTLING: ... When we arrived, there were nearly 1,800 attacks per month. Last week we had our lowest number of attacks in the north, with 108. When we arrived, there were four Iraqi army divisions in the north struggling to conduct operations above the company level, and there were about 55,000 Iraqi police. Nearly 75 percent of those were untrained. Today there are five Iraqi army divisions. They are conducting offensive operations at the brigade level, usually partnering with us. And they are beginning to build confident enablers, like engineers, explosive ordnance teams, intelligence and aviation. And there are 76,000 Iraqi policemen, and 70 percent of them are trained. And there's about a hundred women as well.

When we arrived, there were distrust of the central government, and the unemployment rate was staggering. For every two steps forward, we assessed, they were making one step back. Now there is improved coordination and communication between the government of Iraq and the provinces. And they are slowly executing provincial budgets, they are rebuilding infrastructure with their own dinars, and they are taking three to four steps forward for every one step back.

These actions were brought about not only by the desire of the Iraqi people but, frankly, by the performance of the U.S. military and a very small band of committed and selfless volunteers from the Department of State. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Provincial Reconstruction Teams that I have had the honor of serving with have been phenomenal. And I have been amazed as I -- as I've watched them make miracle happen.

We have had 104 of our comrades pay the ultimate price while we've been here, and 891 of our own have been wounded, some very seriously. Many more of our Iraqi brothers have experienced the same at the hands of an evil and committed enemy. At every memorial we rededicate ourselves to our motto, "Make these sacrifices matter." We try to do that, but our prayers are with the family members of our fallen as we complete this tour.

There are still enemies that need to be destroyed. The Iraqi government is still very fragile. And there is a need to polish the representative process and methods of infrastructure repair.

But despite the statistics and the assessments, the most dramatic change is one that only we get to see over here, and that's now a new hope in the eyes of the Iraqi people.

Hertling gives several reasons here for success

1. An improved Iraqi government. Trust, coordination, and execution of budgets have improved
2. The performance of the US military
3. The performance of the PRTs (Provisional Reconstruction Teams, the "volunteers from the Department of State")

The result has been a change in the attitude of the Iraqi people.

We have discussed the role of the PRTs previously on this blog. In a previous briefing a PRT leader described their function:

The chief role of the PRT is to teach, mentor and partner with provincial and local governments, civil society organizations and other provincial actors, increase their abilities, efficiencies, technical expertise and transparency.

A January 2007 story in the Washington Post tells us that the idea behind the PRTs was to move from massive construction projects to microfinancing of Iraqi entrepreneurs.

On to the Q & A.

Q Hi, General. It's Al Pessin from Voice of America. You've been there during a very key period when things went from spiraling downward to a much better situation. What would you say was the key, or the few keys, the most important factors in the turnaround in your area?

GEN. HERTLING: Well, I think a couple things, Al. I think, first of all, as I said in the opening comments, it's been the military that's been here as well as the work of the members of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

That's certainly been a factor.

I think in some parts of the north -- and you know how big the northern area is; it's about the size of the combined states of Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland and Vermont -- I think the -- in some of those areas, the rising up of the Sahwa, the awakening movements, in areas where they could rise up, was extremely helpful.

I think the Iraqi people themselves have really, as I've mentioned several times in these formats -- they're just sick of violence and they want to push the violence away from their society and get started again after 30 to 40 years of trauma at the hands of dictators.

But I think probably one of the more important facets of the improvements has also got to be placed right in the hands of the Iraqi security forces; the improvement in the army and the Iraqi police that have stood up over the last couple of years. That's always been the strategy, to get them to stand up to take responsibility for their own work, but today that's a reality. They're getting better and better every day.

And I think a combination of those factors -- the people wanting it, the U.S. military and our State Department friends assisting, and the standup of the Iraqi security forces have been the three keys to all of this.

I'm not sure if Pessin missed what Hertling said in his opening comments or was expecting more, but Hertling pretty much said the same thing, that the reasons for success in northern Iraq were:

1. The people wanting to end the insurgency
2. The assistance of the State Department Provisional Reconstruction Teams
3. The re-emergence of the Iraqi security forces as a potent force

Note that I said "keys for success in northern Iraq." There are or were several wars in Iraq, and because the problem was different in each one we used different techniques in each one.

While our military gets most of the attention, much credit must go to the PRTs and the Iraqis. In another part of the interview, Hertling says about the leaders of Iraq, civilian and military. At another point in the interview Hertling says a but more about how the Iraqis have stepped up:

GEN. HERTLING:... I'm confident that what we have allowed them to do is take on the security of their country. And what I'm seeing in the Iraqi army is some true patriotic leaders. They are in fact leading the way in terms of bringing this society into a representative government and a representative society. And they are fighting in very nationalistic terms for the future of Iraq. And it's heartwarming to see that.

In Pessin's next question we hear the word we've heard so often in these briefings; fragile. In briefing after briefing we hear the same thing; that we've pretty much got the insurgency beat but that it's too soon to just declare everything fine and solved. There are problems that require our presence, albeit at a much reduced level.

Q If I could just follow up, General: We almost always hear the word "fragile" along with declarations of progress in Iraq. How fragile or not fragile is it in your area?

GEN. HERTLING: Yeah, that's a great question.

What we've seen over this last -- these last 15 months is a coming together of the provincial governments -- the four provincial governments in the north with the government of Iraq. It's fragile because, frankly, they don't have the democratic processes and the bureaucracies that are needed in something like this. I mean, everything they do is starting from scratch.

Rule-of-law procedures -- I mean, you say, "Hey, you arrest criminals on the street; let's put them in jail." Well, the jails are bad. "And let's try them." Well, we don't have enough lawyers or judges. "Let's work the warrant process." Well, that doesn't exist in the rule of law, for example.

The budget execution problem -- I mean, we literally have budget offices in the four provinces that -- whereas we look at our state budgets as being executed with Excel spreadsheets, you walk into a budget office in Nineveh province, as an example, and these guys are there with big ledgers, opening up and literally writing billions of dinars worth of notes and contracts. There isn't the capability right now to hold people accountable for contract execution. Those are just some examples of the kinds of things we're talking about.

And then you throw into that, you've got an enemy that's affecting this, and in the north for the past several years, and it got extremely bad this year, there was a -- even a disaster of the drought, which affect the -- affected the agricultural area of the north.

So it's been interesting to watch everything, potentially, as a negative effect, but the Iraqi people have continued to fight this. They've fought the enemy. They fought the crisis of the drought. They've tried to put bureaucratic processes in place.

There is -- when we got here, and I think this is true throughout Iraq, nothing works right.

The infrastructure system, repair, the economy, all of the things were really in a very bad state. And that's why I would say it's fragile. And that's why you keep hearing many of the military and the civilian leaders say that it is fragile.

Maj. Gen. Hertling speaks to two things we didn't take into account before we invaded. One is cultural. The Iraqis have no tradition of pluralism or democracy.

The other is technical. We tend to forget, I think, just how backwards so many non-Western countries are.

Neither of these mean that we cannot succeed in Iraq. Our efforts to instill democracies in Germany and Japan at the end of WWII were criticized because it was pointed out that neither had a tradition of democracy, Japan less than Germany.

This said, it has been much commented on that we underestimated the cultural and infrastructure challenges in Iraq before we invaded. Once again we see that these criticisms were mostly correct.

Next, we'll look at upcoming elections, something that is crucial to building confidence in the government.

Q General, this is Joe Tabet with Al Hurra. When you say nothing is working right and when you say the situation is fragile, how long do you think the situation needs to be resolved? How long -- what the Iraqi government needs to do to help to fix this situation? And I don't know if you could give us, like, in terms of time, how long do you need to start drawing down in your area?

GEN. HERTLING: Well, again, I'm not going to address the drawing down issue. I'll let my senior commanders address that. But in terms of some of the things that the Iraqi government has to do, they're already doing them.

They are increasing -- as an example, they're increasing the visits of Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi to all of the provinces. Within the last month, he has been to three of our four provinces. He's been to Diyala, to Nineveh and last week he was in Salahaddin, where he was making a connection with the government of Iraq to the provincial governments, and seeing what they needed, in terms of infrastructure repair. He's been tasked by the prime minister with synchronizing the various ministries to go after the things that the central government needs to do to support the provinces. That's number one.

I think the big thing that will occur is the provincial elections, which are now scheduled for, as you know, the late January, the January 31st time frame. That, in and of itself, will be huge in order to get elected officials into power that are answering directly to the people.

Right now, all of the governors of Iraq, to include our four governors in the northern provinces, had not been elected. They had been appointed. The governors are increasing the amount of time they're spending with their people.

But I think the provincial elections, what we will see in terms of more of a representative government, the election of a true elected official as the governor and the deputy governor and the provincial counsels, that will be critical in terms of representing all the people within each one of the provinces.

So those are really two examples of things that could happen. I think a third one is, what we have seen over the last three years is a -- fits and starts in terms of execution of provincial budgets. Within the last several months, there has been great gains by the fielding of some technological equipment to the various provinces, which will allow them to increase their capability of executing their budgets to better serve their people.

At the end of the day the people have to believe that their government represents them and has their interests at heart. We've heard this time and again from American military commanders in these briefings. Petraeus (his team, anyway) wrote about it in the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24.

Next we'll do a human interest story.

Yes I know, anecdotal stories can be used to prove just about anything. And I'm not trying to argue from the specific to the general here, just relating a story that needs to be told. With this in mind I think it good though to step back from the geeky high-level analysis a bit and look at how close the partnership is between us and the Iraqis on a human level:

GEN. HERTLING:...The third one occurred about two weeks ago. That individual has confessed to the crime. But what was interesting about that particular incident is, the same day that made the news, the partnership with the American -- between the American army and the Iraqi army is so incredibly strong, the division commander called me, called -- the Iraqi division commander called me, called the regimental commander, called the battalion commander, offered his apologies. I happened to be up there that day. The Iraqi division commander literally was crying about the fact that someone within his ranks would have committed this act.

But that same day, we lost another soldier who -- and this is the part -- the kinds of things that don't get reported. And I'd just say this: The exact same day that many things were being reported about how there was infiltration within the Iraqi ranks, there was another soldier who slipped off a river bank in the Tigris River south of Mosul; another soldier jumped in to try and grab him, and drowned saving his life. Sergeant First Class Wilson drowned.

But when that body was lost, there were several Iraqis -- who didn't know Sergeant Wilson -- who entered that freezing water with that rapid current and searched for four hours for that body. This is the other side of the partnering, that sometime isn't recorded.

Finally, what can we look forward to in the future?

GEN. HERTLING:...I think when -- when you walk the streets of Mosul -- and I'd invite any of you to come over and -- well, not walk with me, because I'm leaving tomorrow, but walking with General Caslen -- what you will hear is the people not talking about security anymore. What they are now talking about is government and the economy.

And as soon as those two things are taken care of -- and I think they will be with the provincial elections -- we'll see a much stronger Mosul, and it will be the final destruction of al Qaeda in that particular city.

Previous Briefings by Maj. Gen. Hertling
Iraq Briefing - 06 October 2008 - Three Steps Forward, One Step Back
Iraq Briefing - 11 August 2008 - Going after al Qaeda with a Vengance
Iraq Briefing - 09 June 2008 - Job Creation to Defeat the Insurgency
Iraq Briefing - 11 Feb 2008 - AQI Is On the Run
Iraq Briefing - 22 Jan 2008 - Operation Iron Harvest
Iraq Briefings 15/19 November 2007

Posted by Tom at 6:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

December 2, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 01 December 2008 - From a Brigade to a Battalion

This briefing is by Col Tom James, commander of the 4th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, and and Mr. Howard Van Vranken, the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team leader with the brigade. On Monday they spoke from Camp Victory via satellite to reporters at the Pentagon.

The 4th Brigade took over their area of responsibility from 4-25 Infantry on December 1, 2007. Their AOR "encompasses North Babil province and stretches from the Euphrates River Valley in the West to the Tigris River Valley in the East." it is "just over 40,000 square kilometers, an area roughly the size of Switzerland, and contains approximately 625,000 Iraqis."

The 4th Brigade is part of Multi-National Division - Center, also known as Task Force Mountain. MNF-C is headquartered by the 10th Mountain Division (Light) from Fort Drum, New York.

Col. James reports to Maj. Gen. Michael Oates, commanding general of the 10th Mountain Divison and MND-C. Oates, in turn, reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin reports to General Odierno, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who on September 16 replaced his one-time boss Gen. David Petraeus in this position. Odierno reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of CENTCOM, who in turn reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink website.

Although there was much of interest in this briefing, what we'll concentrate on are

• The reasons for our success in Babil province
• The role of the PRTs
• The drawdown in U.S. forces from brigade to battalion size
• The status of the Sons of Iraq program

From their opening statements

COL JAMES: ...There are five key points I'd like to make about the current situation in our area of responsibility.

First, the population feels secure, and the quality of life is improving.

Attacks are down from eight a day last year to less than two per week. When we arrived, the population could not move in 30 percent of our area of responsibility. They now enjoy freedom of movement throughout both provinces. The population believes in the Iraqi army and police, and no longer allows sanctuary to extremists.

The capabilities of the Iraqi security forces have improved dramatically over the last year, enhancing security and enabling positive and real growth in local economies and governments.

The second point: The Iraqi security forces are capable and competent. The Iraqi army and police have made great strides in terms of manning, equipping, basing and training. The Iraqi army is capable of conducting precise offensive operations, based on intelligence that they have personally generated. The army and the police work extremely well together, and the population believes in both organizations.

We continue to assist with training and provide reconnaissance and -- correction -- aviation assets as required.

The third point: Governance and economics continue to flourish in both provinces. The security situation allows the governors, provincial council leaders and directors general to routinely travel to north Babil and throughout Karbala, feats that were inconceivable only a year ago.

This -- (audio break) -- provincial leadership resulted in initiation of more than 100 government-sponsored projects in north Babil alone. Another 50 projects were facilitated by coalition forces but funded by ICERP, Iraqi money, applied at the local level.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams mentor the provincial leadership, encouraging development and investment in areas outside the provincial seats of government. We continue to enable reconstruction team operations in both provinces.

The fourth point: We're focused on several key tasks for the future.

Number one, the successful execution of free and fair elections in January.

Number two, the transfer of the Sons of Iraq program to the Iraqi army and government Iraq for management, payment and eventual transition to other forms of productive employment.

Number three, continue to work professionalization of the Iraqi security forces.

And number four, further basing adjustments -- (audio break) -- forces in accordance with the pending SOFA agreement.

Finally, our soldiers and families are the greatest in the world. None of these -- correction -- none of these successes would be possible without the dedication and sacrifice of our soldiers and their wonderful families.

Their ability to rapidly adapt to the complex and dangerous situations never ceases to amaze me. I am honored to command such a dedicated group of warriors.
...

MR. VAN VRANKEN: Good morning. I'm Howard Van Vranken. For the last 11 months I've been the team leader of the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team attached to Colonel James' 4th Brigade Combat Team, 3rd ID, working in -- primarily in north Babil....

The population's looking forward to the Iraqi High Electoral Commission's education campaign. That's going to kick off later this month, with the support of the EPRT and the PRT. In general, we're beginning to see vigorous campaigns by candidates. It's -- a significant importance in this election is the full participation of the Sunni population, who boycotted, in large part, the 2005 provincial elections. They recognize that the boycott was a mistake, a serious blunder on their part, and they're committed to maximizing their participation in -- (audio break). That's a big change and a big improvement, quite frankly.

There's still a lot of work to do. The progress that we've seen is not irreversible. But budget execution, the provision of essential services and improving the rule of law stand out as areas that still need to be improved.

I've said and explained why a million times here on Redhunter but it bears repeating again; security for the populace must come first, and only then can political and economic progress take place. This is why Col. James' first point above is so important.

Don't take it from me, listen to Col. James himself explain the details himself in his Feb 22 2008 briefing, which I covered here on Redhunter.

Pay close attention also to his second point, that "the Iraqi security forces are capable and competent." You don't need to be a military strategist to know that we can't be there forever and that the Iraqis must take over. The point here is that Col. James has been talking about the progress of the Iraqis for some time now, see for example his July 22 briefing which he co-hosted with Brigadier General Abdul Amir, commanding general of the 31st Iraqi Army Brigade.

Also of note is status of the Sons of Iraq. Originally called Concerned Local Citizens, the SOI program is a sort of "super neighborhood watch" of Iraqi citizens who patrol their neighborhoods and report suspicious activity to the authorities. Many of the SOI were armed, but with their own private weapons, as we did not provide them any. Because no one knows a neighborhood like the people who live there, the intelligence they provided was invaluable. More importantly, it got Iraqis "off the fence" and into our camp, taking responsibility for their own security. It also provided jobs and a paycheck; initially courtesy of the U.S. taxpayer.

Ultimately, the program was temporary in nature. Now that we've largely wrapped up the insurgency, the program is being disbanded. The idea is to move the SOI participants into civilian jobs or the Iraqi security forces. The problem with the former is lack of jobs, with the latter suspicion by the Maliki government. Most or many of the SOI are Sunnis, and Maliki is a Shiite. This has caused many to worry that Maliki just wants to disband the SOI without making sure as many as possible get jobs; a recipe for disaster. The U.S. command understands this full well, with Lt. Gen. Austin sending Maliki a not-so-veiled warning on the matter last September. More on the SOI later in this briefing.

Lastly, we heard Mr. Van Vranken, leader of the Provisional Reconstruction Team attached to the 4th Brigade. The PRT's don't get the attention they deserve, and many people seem not to know they even exist. The fact though, is that they're vitally important. Providing basic services pulls the rug out from under the insurgency and denies them important propaganda points. The program has also been very successful, more so in Iraq than Afghanistan.

It also shows that people who say things like "all the Bush Administration has done is use military force, so it's time to try something different," simply do not know what they are talking about.

A Washington Post story from January 2007, when the surge and PRT program in Iraq was just getting started, is useful in explaining what it is all about.

(Provisional Reconstruction Teams provide) the U.S. military with funds for local, quick-fix reconstruction projects; and a separate quick-response fund.

All of those preexisting efforts will be expanded, along with a Pentagon-led jobs program to revitalize dormant state-owned industries and new "microfinancing" for Iraqi entrepreneurs. Having largely abandoned the huge, unsuccessful construction projects that marked its early years in Iraq, the United States will now emphasize putting Iraqis back to work to dissuade them from joining Shiite militias and the Sunni insurgency.

"It's not a bad choice under the circumstances," said one veteran of the administration's initial reconstruction effort. "Everybody who had half a brain cell knew this is what we should have done four years ago" instead of paying private U.S. contractors to rebuild and modernize infrastructure and trying to turn Iraq's highly centralized, government-owned economy into free-market capitalism overnight.

In summary, not only did our military strategy change, our reconstruction one did too. We moved from large-scale projects to financing small Iraqi entrepreneurs. Big surprise; capitalism works.

On to the Q & A with the assembled reporters:

Q This is David Morgan from Reuters. Colonel James, given the improvements that have taken place, as you say, and the optimism about the SOFA, the lack of tension over the approaching elections, how do you see the role of the U.S. military changing over the next several months? And from a practical point of view, really, how much longer would it be necessary to have a U.S. military presence in your area?

COL. JAMES: Yeah, absolutely. The progress has been enormous over the past year. The successes we have had in reducing the attacks, as I mentioned in my statement, it's -- the Iraqi security forces have improved to a point now where they can handle the security situation with minimal support from coalition forces.

We envision -- and Babil Province alone, I'll take that as an example -- that we can reduce our footprint from a brigade combat team of roughly 3,800 soldiers down to about a battalion's worth of about 1,000 soldiers to be able to handle the security situation, and that is changing because on 22 November -- correction, October -- when we did a provincial Iraqi control of the province, they took the lead. And so now we're in a support role as opposed to leading the security fight.

So we're now much less of a footprint providing resources as required and training as required, but the Iraqi security forces have been in the lead for the majority of the time we've been here and will continue in the future.

So I see us being able to reduce our footprint in Babil Province while the Iraqi security forces take this over. And we're seeing that now and we're prepared to do so.

Now, we're going to rip out -- we're going to transition with another brigade that's coming here over the next month, and when they take over, they will fall in on us about with a like-size organization, but that's just to draw equipment and pieces -- to set them up for success to be redistributed in other places with a multinational division center -- expanding as it covers more provinces. But for the most part, we can reduce almost two-thirds as far as the coalition footprint goes, but still providing the support to the Iraqi security forces, really continuing to build up their confidence that they continue to build on daily.

Q Hey, this is Courtney from NBC again. What's the timeline that you expect you can reduce from a brigade down to a battalion? What's the estimated date you think you might be able to be down to a battalion in Babil?

COL. JAMES: You know, I don't have specific timelines. I could just tell you that the conditions exist on the ground right now operationally with the Iraqi security force capability and the government's ability to control those security forces in Babil Province, that we could reduce down to about a battalion's worth now, I mean, the operational set is available now to do that. And we will see that eventually happen, but it will be in the near-term; I don't have specific timelines associated with that because it has to do with some repositioning of forces throughout the theater.

Got that? We're going from a brigade of 3,800 soldiers in Babil Province to a battalion of 1,000.

Next, Courtney Kube asked for details about about the Sons of Iraq program

Q Can I also ask about the Sons of Iraq program in your area? Can you give us sort of an update on that, how many you have, if any have been transferred over to Iraqi security forces?

COL. JAMES: Absolutely. The Sons of Iraq program has been a great program for securing the population and thickening the security lines where we don't have Iraqi army and Iraqi police. Right now, we have 5,115 Sons of Iraq in Babil Province and that's what we manage as a brigade combat team. I am optimistic about this program in the future. It's going to really require the government of Iraq and the Iraqi security forces to take it over from us and be able to transition it.

You know, I look at it in two ways, transition -- correction, transfer -- which is transferring the Sons of Iraq program over to the Iraqi army and the government of Iraq managed by the Iraqi army and that is going really well. We started that months ago. The Iraqi army is paying our Sons of Iraq forces -- (audio break) -- and they've been doing that for a period of time now. So that system is in place, but we're still paying them with coalition money. Around the turn of the year, January, February time frame, the GOI is going to take over that payment and the system will already be in place and plugged in and be able to work the transfer. So I'm very positive about the transfer of Sons of Iraq to Iraqi army control and the GOI.

Then the next step is transition to other forms of employment, be it the Iraqi security forces or any other employment like farming or industrial-type jobs, those kinds of things. Right now, we're looking at 20 (percent) to 30 percent transitioning of the Iraqi army and police and then further transitioning to other jobs potentially related to security -- FPS or facility protection services, those kinds of things. But it's going to really require the government of Iraq to get involved, working through the reconciliation cell and processing the Sons of Iraq into these other forms of employment, productive off-ramps.

At this point in time, its been slow-go with us trying to get Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi forces. We've prepped all of the packets and we've handed them over to the reconciliation cell and that's working right now, it's just -- it's slow, but I believe when the GOI takes this over, it will gain momentum.

MR. VAN VRANKEN: I'll just highlight. I think it's been an essential program over the course of the past year and I've got full faith that the Iraqi government is going to do as they've pledged to do and that is to maintain it and to work to find suitable employment for those current Sons of Iraq. So I think it was a good program and it's headed in the right direction the way it is now.

"...slow-go with us trying to get Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi forces...." The words of Clausewitz come to mind: "

Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen war.

Yes I know, if we had done this or that differently Iraq would be a lot easier. But it's all very easy in hindsight, isn't it? In the midst of a problem, you're getting a hundred different opinions, and only in retrospect is it "obvious" which one was correct. I'm just glad we have finally got the place right. Now lets just hope our new president listens to his Secretary of Defense and military commanders like Col. Tom James on just how fast we should draw down. The situation is still fragile in Iraq, and if we don't do it right we lose all that we've gained.

Previous Briefings by Col. James

Iraq Briefing - 24 July 2008 - Confident and Capable Iraqi Leadership
Iraq Briefing - 22 February 2008 - "We are Living with the Population"

Posted by Tom at 10:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

November 28, 2008

Gen. Barry McCaffrey Report - November 2008 - Iraq

General Barry McCaffrey (ret.) is back from another fact-finding tour of Kuwait and Iraq. He was there from Oct 31 to Nov 6 and met with dozens of American and Iraqi military and civilian leaders, including Gen. Ray Odierno, Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. This, his latest After Action Report, can be found on the website of MCaffrey Associates. Readers are encouraged to download the entire report and read it in its entirety.

I find McCaffrey's reports valuable as a check on other sources by someone who can usually be counted on to provide a non-partisan no-holds-barred assessment. McCaffrey lays out the good, the bad, and the ugly. He does not seem driven by an agenda. He does not see the situation through rose-colored glasses, but by the same token is not knee-jerk "all is lost."

From his bio, McCaffrey served for 32 years in the U.S. Army, retiring in I think 2001 with the rank of four star general. He then notably served as "Drug Czar" until 2005, when he took a position as the Bradley Distinguished Professor of International Security Studies at West Point. He is currently an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs there. This most recent report was undertaken as part of his professorship.

None of this makes him the end-all-to-be-all, but he does have some credibility.

Here's his bottom line on the current situation in Iraq:

3. THE BOTTOM LINE:

a. The United States is now clearly in the end game in Iraq to successfully achieve what should be our principle objectives:

• The withdrawal of the majority of our US ground combat forces in Iraq in the coming 36 months.
• Leaving behind an operative civil state and effective Iraqi security forces.
• An Iraqi state which is not in open civil war among the Shia, the Sunnis, and the Kurds.
• And an Iraqi nation which is not at war with its six neighboring states.

b. The security situation is clearly still subject to sudden outrage at any moment by Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or to degradation because of provocative behavior by the Maliki government. However, the bottom line is a dramatic and growing momentum for economic and security stability which is unlikely to be reversible. I would not characterize the situation as fragile. It is just beyond the tipping point.

• Daily attacks hit a high of 180+ in July of 2007--- they are now down to 20+ per day.
• Civilian deaths dropped from 3700 per month in Dec 2006 --- to 400 + in October 2008.
• US military deaths dropped from 110 in May of 2007---to 10 in October 2008.
• Iraqi Security Forces KIA dropped from 310 in June 2007--- to 50 in October 2008.)

c. The genius of the leadership team of Ambassador Ryan Crocker, General Dave Petraeus, and Secretary of Defense Bob Gates has turned around the situation from a bloody disaster under the leadership of Secretary Rumsfeld to a growing situation of security. Ambassador Crocker will be very, very difficult to replace in February 2009. We are fortunate that General Ray Odierno has stepped in to take Joint command of MNF-I. He is very experienced, knows all the players and has sophisticated situational awareness. The Iraqis trust him enormously--- they refer to him as the "big man with the quiet voice."

All this is very good. We have come a long ways and should be thankful for it. President Bush belatedly recognized that things were going wrong, and appointed the new team of Gates, Fallon, and Petraeus to fix things. They did. Later in his report McCaffrey details some of the errors that we made early in the war, remarking that "It is hard to not be bitter about the misjudgments and denial of the DOD leadership during the first years of the war. It did not have to turn out this way with $750 billion of our treasure spent and 36,000 US killed and injured."

True enough, and I do not doubt that his assessment of what we did wrong is incorrect. I won't list it all here, though, because my purpose is what we should do going forward, not what we should have done.

McCaffrey's report is only 9 pages long, and every paragraph a gem, so it's tempting just to reprint the entire thing. Here, though, are a few key statements from his "Context" section

It is unarguable that the past 18 months have witnessed a dramatic, positive change in the Iraqi internal security situation. Iraqi and Coalition Security Force casualties in a comparative sense are now at rock bottom. Ethnic strife between the Shia and the Sunnis has all but stopped. The Shia militias have in general been neutralized--- and the Sunni insurgents bought out by the Sons of Iraq Program....

The lawless disintegration of the state at province and municipal level which was apparent on my earlier visits has now largely abated....

Iranian intervention is relentless, lethal, and implacably hostile to US interests--- but has to a great extent alienated the southern Iraqi Shia and been largely ineffective.

The Maliki government remains largely dysfunctional in its ability to deliver services to the population (jobs, electricity, clean water, infrastructure repair, oil production, budget expenditure, etc)... (but) Mr. Maliki clearly has matured and gained stature as a political leader....

We should have a sense of empathy for these Iraqi politicians. They have survived a poisonous Saddam regime and a culture of intrigue and murder from every side.....

Indeed what has always struck me is the lack of respect Iraqis in general get from people in the U.S. on both sides of the political isle. Conservatives tend to ignore them, crediting everything to the U.S. military, usually even ignoring Amb. Crocker himself. Liberals tend to use them in casualty counts to "prove" how brutal the U.S. led war has been to the Iraqi people. Both sides tend to denigrate Iraqi politicians, caricaturing all of them as corrupt and incompetent.

No doubt the Iraqi government has a long ways to go. We're all familiar with the infighting based on sect, factional, tribe, and clan loyalties. Many have used the security services to murder not just opponents but numbers of ordinary civilians. Corruption is not just rife, but a way of life there, as it is in most of the Third World.

Because the surge has been so successful, we now hear from some on the left "let's immediately stop spending $10bl per month, bring the troops home, downsize the Pentagon and get on with life."

This message comes from those who either never wanted Iraq to succeed in the first place or gave up on it completely sometime after the insurgency started. They opposed the surge, saying that only political progress could save Iraq. Long after it was obvious that the surge was working they continued to deny the obvious progress. Now that the lack of violence is undeniable, and there is a relative stability, they don't even care enough to want to make sure the country does not backslide. All we hear is the same tired mantra; "troops out now!"

Despite our progress, regular readers of this blog know that most commanders, including Petraeus, still say the situation in Iraq is "fragile." Just click on "Iraq II 2007 - 2008" and search for "fragile" and you'll see what I mean.

Knowing this, McCaffrey lays out four scenarios where "success in Iraq could turn to collapse." Download the report and read all four yourself, but here's one:

Precipitous US military withdrawal before the Iraqis have developed a fully functional security presence among all eighteen provinces would also imperil the enterprise. The Iraqis do not have a functional Air Force (lift, gunships, transportation, and close air support). They do not have a Navy and Marine Corps yet capable of protecting their Gulf transportation and petroleum infrastructure. Their Border Security Forces are still anemic. The Iraqi Armed Forces in general lack adequate armor, artillery, maintenance, logistics, medical, and communications to function in counter-insurgency operations or border defense without US support. Their military officer corps is immensely better than a year ago--- but the bench is thin. The young officers at company and battalion level show great promise and courage. The legacy of the Saddam nightmare weighs heavily on the culture of the more senior officers. Finally, the confidence of the Iraqi combat force is still dependant on US mentoring and backup. Their officers are very explicit on this point---THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES DO NOT WANT THE US COMBAT UNITS TO LEAVE---YET.

So much for blanket statements like "the Iraqis want us to leave." Indeed, USMC Maj. Gen. Martin Post offered a more nuanced statement in a press briefing that I covered Nov 11 when he said, in response to a question on the subject;

Candidly, it depends upon who you talk to. In some cases, if you talk to the local man on the street, they'll look at us and say, "Hey, I think we're ready for you to go."

If you talk to the -- the leadership -- you know, the IP leadership or the Iraqi army leadership or the provincial leadership, they would probably tell you, "Hey, we need you here for some period of time longer." Not really ever saying, "We need you here for one year or two years," but I think we're still, if you would, that security blanket for them, in the -- standing behind them....

This makes sense. If I was an Iraqi I'd say that I want the Americans gone too. No one wants foreign troops in their country. We're lucky we got the Germans to accept such large numbers for so long, Soviet threat or no.

Further, although it has been a maddeningly slow journey to get the Iraqi security forces as far as they are, Gen. Petraeus warned about this in the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. Take the time to read it if you want to understand where we've been and where we're going.

Driving home the point, at the end of his report McCaffrey says that

...It is essential for both US and Mid East security that we pull out of Iraq in a deliberate and responsible manner--- and leave a stable and functioning state. This is clearly within our capabilities.

Again; "pull out of Iraq in a deliberate and responsible manner," not in the helter-skelter manner advocated by anti-war types.

Two more excerpts from the report and they I'll wrap it up. He has this to say about the senior military leadership:

Finally of note--- the senior leadership at general officer and brigade command is remarkable. They are visible to their troops and share the personal risk of the battlefield. (This is in marked contrast to the stacked helicopters of the Vietnam War commanders.) General Odierno has personally been under direct small arms fire and IED attack during his three combat tours at Division, Corps, and now theater command. LTG Lloyd Austin nearly got nailed by direct machine gun fire while directing forward operations during the recent battle to control SADR City in Baghdad. LTG Frank Helmick and BG Tony Thomas both recently survived an IED attack of an 800 lb suicide vehicle bomb which totally destroyed their MRAP vehicle. (The survivability of the MRAP vehicles has drastically reduced casualties among our forces.)

I've heard our generals talk about how they go out with the troops, and read stories on this too, but didn't know about the attacks they'd survived. We are lucky to have such able and brave leaders.

Lastly, a note to the future:

The likely strategic outcome will be a more rapid forced drawdown than desirable in Iraq in order to enhance combat power for Afghanistan. It will be a tricky balance--- but in my judgment we will pull this off successfully. Iraq will stabilize with the rapidly increasing power of the Iraqi Security Forces ---while we reinforce the inadequate NATO combat power in Afghanistan.

I'd already figured that my own coverage would see a shift to Afghanistan in coming months and years. I've noticed that I've posted more "Afghanistan Briefings" of late.

Previous McCaffrey Reports on Iraq
The December 2007 General Barry McCaffrey Report on Iraq
Barry McCaffrey on Iraq II, March 29, 2007
"The Most Brilliantly Led Military We Have Ever Fielded" May 14, 2006

Posted by Tom at 2:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

November 20, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 17 November 2008 - Impact of the SOFA in Sadr City

This briefing is by Colonel John Hort and Dr. Theodore Andrews. Col. Hort is Commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. Dr. Andrews is the leader of the Baghdad Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team 3. They spoke via satellite from Forward Operating Base (War) Eagle with reporters at the Pentagon on Tuesday.

The 4th ID headquarters Multi-National Division-Baghdad. it's area of responsibility is Baghdad and the surrounding cities and towns. The 4th ID, and Colonel Hort, deployed to Iraq in December of 2007. Dr. Andrews took up his responsibilities in March of 2008.

Col. Hort reports to Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Hammond, commanding general of the 4th ID and MNF-Baghdad. Hammond, in turn, reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin reports to General Odierno, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who on September 16 replaced his one-time boss Gen. David Petraeus in this position. Odierno reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of CENTCOM, who in turn reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

Although much was discussed, there were three main topics covered during the course of this briefing. One was the dramatic reduction in violence caused by the neutralization of the "special groups" criminals, and the Jaish al-Madhi (or Jaish al-Mahdi) militia (which was created by Muqtada al-Sadr). Second was the transitioning of the Sons of Iraq from an independent force into the security services, and third was the impact of the recently signed SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement). Although all are important, after reviewing the Colonel's opening remarks we'll concentrate on the SOFA.

From Col Hort's opening remarks

COL. HORT: Thank you, Bryan, and good morning, everybody. Colonel John Hort, as Bryan said, commander of the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

But first of all, we've got the Adhamiya District on the east side of the river on the northeast side of Baghdad as well as Sadr City. So they're two very large districts -- Fort Baghdad, about 4 million strong, in terms of the population density. About 40 percent of the Baghdad population kind of resides in our area of responsibility, as well as one Iraqi army division, the 11th Iraqi Army Division, which comprises the 42nd Iraqi Brigade as well as the 44th Iraqi Brigade that partners with us in the security component of our responsibilities over here.

Significant amount of progress, as I'm sure that you all know, has been made in the last year in terms of security, as well as the local governance and economic and essential services progress that we're seeing here on the ground.

To start off with Adhamiya briefly, we've -- when I got here, we were averaging roughly around six to seven attacks a day, which was actually down from the 14 attacks they were -- they were seeing prior to the surge. Since I've been here, in about a year now, we're down to less than one attack a day in the Adhamiya District, which is primarily a Sunni area, just on the river. And then it kind of transcends over to the Shi'a side as you move farther to the east. So a significant reduction in violence in that part of our area of responsibility. And I attribute that largely to what the Iraqi security forces have been able to do over the last year as we partner with them in defeating al Qaeda, which tends to be our biggest threat over here, as well as some special groups of criminals that do, in fact, operate in the Adhamiya district.

What I would call our main effort -- Ted and I's main effort -- is Sadr City, comprised of about 2.5 million people, as most of you might be familiar with; a large population density -- probably the largest density of Iraqis living in one area in Baghdad and probably all of Iraq; prior to the March time frame a very very kinetic area to operate in, not only for coalition forces but for Iraqi security forces.

But through the March-April-May time frame, a significant amount of combat operations were conducted in this area against the special- groups criminals, and some Jaish al-Madhi militia, that resulted in the cease-fire that you probably heard about in May that has really turned the corner, in our estimate, in terms of the special groups being significantly disrupted over here and, some would argue, actually defeated in some cases.

But they're certainly on the run inside and outside of Sadr City....

Most of the key leaders fled around the middle of May, went to various countries or south of Baghdad, and today we're seeing some of those individuals try to make it back, but what's different -- what's different today that they did not see before is that they are, in fact, fugitives now. The Iraqi army is in pursuit of them, attacking them, capturing them and bringing them to justice. And I think that's one of the most significant changes that I have seen in my 12 months, is the Iraqi security forces' willingness and capability to actually go after some of the special-groups criminals that really did not have that to worry about, about seven months ago....

We've been able affect health clinics, schools, parks, to some extent, the electricity in this part of Sadr City as well as trash and sewage, which has been a major focus. And that has worked extremely well, not only in the security component but also giving the people a sense of normalcy and bringing this part of the city back to life.

And it's also had an impact on the government of Iraq, as they have watched kind of our support to the local government down here, in the south part of Sadr City, also start to see some progress up in the northern parts or the parts beyond the gold wall, as we call it.

So once again we see the success of the surge. Not only did it quell the violence, but it has led to political progress. The Iraqi security forces are picking up the pace, and local Iraqi governments are stepping up. As Col Hort noted at the end, there's a cascading effect whereby the central government is affected by success at the local level. Some have said that it progress could only happen from the top down, but this has been disproven by facts on the ground.

Next was the Q & A between Hort, Williams, and the assembled reporters. As mentioned above, we'll concentrate on those questions that touched on the SOFA.

A Status of Forces Agreement is a legal document that provides the legal basis for one country to keep military forces in another. It also covers all manner of legal issues that pertain to individuals and property, both those of regular military personnel and civilian contractors. For example, it covers whose court system tries a soldier or civilian if they are accused of A or B crime. It covers damages that might be made to civilian property by military vehicles in the course of exercises or warfighting. The United States has a SOFA with every country where we have troops.

As everyone knows, a long-awaited SOFA was signed between the governments of the United States and Iraq over the weekend. I have neither the time, the inclination, nor the expertise to analyze the details and all that they mean. That said, The Washington Post has a useful backgrounder(and see this Post story. The Iraq Oil Report claims to have a leaked copy of the agreement itself, though I'll let readers judge the reliability of it for themselves.

So far, Maliki's cabinet has unanimously approved the SOFA, which is good news. Now it must go before the Parliament, and like in any democracy there will be at least some disagreement.

Let's go to the Q & A:

Q Colonel, this is David Morgan from Reuters... The question is this: Given the Sadrist opposition to the SOFA agreement, how do you assess the threat of violence on that count? And is it possible that the May cease-fire could be vulnerable to violence coming from opposition to the SOFA?

COL. HORT: What -- my assessment right now of that particular part of the insurgency is that it is -- it is severely disrupted. As I mentioned, a lot of the leaders left, and they -- we've seen some return of the leadership, either from different countries like Iran or Syria or wherever they fled to, or in parts from the south that they've come back. But they have not all come back. And so that part of the leadership -- at least 50 percent, in my estimation -- is still missing that we saw prior to the May cease-fire. So the leadership itself is not completely intact yet to really affect a large-scale uprising or anything that we have seen before. We still watch that very closely.
...

Q Ken Fireman from Bloomberg News. A question for both Colonel Hort and Dr. Andrews. It now looks like there's a good chance that the SOFA will take effect, given what happened in the cabinet yesterday. If it does take effect, how will that affect the environment -- the political and the security environment in which both of you and your people operate? And how will it affect your day- to-day operations?

COL. HORT: Did you want to --

DR. ANDREWS: Let me just -- excuse me, let me just take an initial swing at that. I don't see any immediate effect on our operations. Our -- (audio break) -- in promoting governance, promoting economic development, promoting essential services for the people.

On this day-to-day level, the SOFA is not a big issue, not with the local-level politicians with whom we're working most closely. It's obviously a piece of the background news and people, I think, will be a little bit apprehensive in the day or so after it, but there's no great apprehension of major problems.

The election is coming up. A lot of the leaders down at the provincial level are really concerned about that. A lot of them are going to be running for the election. And they're also really worried about how are they going to get services in their area. And that's the focus of things, not the SOFA.

COL. HORT: I would just say from the -- taking the security standpoint as we look at SOFA -- (audio break) -- obviously been able to read, kind of, exactly what all of the points and pieces of it are, but as I understand it, it will probably look something like a transition period for coalition to move more to a perimeter type of, you know, support to the Iraqi security forces inside of Baghdad.
...

And so, I think there will be some transition that we have to work through if that's, in fact, where's going. But in general right now, with the exception of Sadr City, we're kind of already moving in that direction, even prior to the SOFA with the Iraqi army taking more and more responsibility, more and more of the lead, particularly the targeting of the bad people -- and I talked about, the special groups, but also the al Qaeda that is not -- is still somewhat out there within certain parts of our area. So I don't -- I don't see a significant change.

We do have some joint security stations and combat outposts that are inside the city that we would probably have to push more out towards the perimeter of the city, but I think that we can work through all of that. And I just will say that the Iraqi army today, more so than when I was an adviser, has got a tremendous amount of confidence in themselves and is doing more and more each and every day that we work with them.

Q For Dr. Andrews, you said that some people in your area may feel a little bit of apprehension about the SOFA. Could you specify what the source of their apprehension would be? What will they be concerned about?

DR. ANDREWS: No, I think -- I'll backtrack a little bit from that, but the issue's that they hear the news stories and just wonder whether things might happen. A few days ago we met with some leaders and they said: Oh, did you hear, the -- you know, that the cabinet had made this decision? Do you think anything is going to happen? And we could say we don't think anything serious will happen.

So it's an issue in the news. People here have been through a lot over the last few years, and they've got very -- you know, they have paid, almost all of them, some sort of personal price. So they've got an obvious concern, but I don't think there's anything specific that they know that we don't know about, of any great danger, that's going to arise simply by the signing of this.

I'll take these two at their word because it makes sense that the signing of the SOFA would cause little immediate effect in Sadr City. It will be interesting to see what happens in future briefings, especially by senior commanders such as Lt. Gen. Austin or Gen. Odierno.

As for the larger picture, an article in yesterday's Washington Times says that the Iraqi PM sees the pact in terms of restoring sovereignty. Iraq is an "honor society," and as such image and perception are all-important. All people want to run their own affairs, and the Iraqis are no different. What is different between them and post-WWII Germany and Japan is that we beat the latter two into oblivion before occupying their countries. Their people were so war-weary they were in no mood to resist whatever treaty or constitution we foisted on them. Our experience in Iraq has been dramatically different, to the point where the Iraqis are asserting themselves sooner.

From our perspective, there certainly are problems with the SOFA. First, although our troops will be tried in our military courts for any alleged crimes they commit while in Iraq, our contractors will have no such protection. Second, we cannot use Iraq as a base for operations against other countries. Third, all U.S. troops must be out by 2011.

Even with these I'm not as worried as some. All this is renegotiable and it won't be for a year or so before we know where things are really headed.

The editors at National Review see mostly good in the pact, saying that it's successful conclusion is "a blow to the schemers in Iran -- and to their cat's-paw, Moqtada al-Sadr -- who did all they could to torpedo the pact." True enough.

On the other side, Andrew McCarthy, also writing at National Review, sees cause for worry. He says that "behind the smiles" lies the inconvenient fact that "the Iraqis don't like us," and he cites polls to support his thesis. To McCarthy, winning is not about establishing a democracy, it is about defeating radical Islam. Because of the terms of the SOFA and leaks as to how the negotiations went, he concludes that the "Iraqis are more concerned about prosecuting Americans than embracing them."

Readers of this blog know that I have a lot of respect for McCarthy, and time will tell whether he's right or not. For now I think he's being a bit too pessimistic. Recall the Nov 10 briefing by Maj. Gen. Martin Post (USMC) in which addressed the issue of whether "the Iraqis" want us to leave or not and said that

Candidly, it depends upon who you talk to. In some cases, if you talk to the local man on the street, they'll look at us and say, "Hey, I think we're ready for you to go."

If you talk to the -- the leadership -- you know, the IP leadership or the Iraqi army leadership or the provincial leadership, they would probably tell you, "Hey, we need you here for some period of time longer." Not really ever saying, "We need you here for one year or two years," but I think we're still, if you would, that security blanket for them, in the -- standing behind them....

This makes sense. Things could go either way in Iraq but right now I'm cautiously optimistic.

More than that, though, I've always taken the long view with regard to Iraq. I know this sounds terribly Wilsonian (not to mention neoconservative!) but I do think that a pluralistic society in Iraq will serve American and indeed Western interests. It's not so much about this or that policy, or whether they allow us to have bases on their soil, but whether it changes their attitude towards the relationship of government to the individual and the role of religion. Sure, Islam is enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution, and I'm less than pleased about it. This may well though prove to have been a temporary measure to satisfy entrenched interests. The enemy of radical Islam or jihadism is pluralistic societies more than it is military bases or particular policies. I think McCarthy is wrong in that there is a link between democracy (or liberty or a pluralistic society, choose your term) and defeating jihadism.

Further, although in the long run having the Iraqis "like us" would be nice, in the short term it's not the point. Much of counterinsurgency revolves around winning the "hearts and minds" of the populace, and note that this is probably the most misunderstood term in all of warfare. From the book that then Lt. Gen Petraeus wrote (ok he led the team that wrote it), the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24

"Hearts" means persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN success. "Minds" means convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless. Note that neither concerns whether people like Soldiers and Marines. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, successful trusted networks grow like roots into the populace. They displace enemy networks, which forces enemies into the open, letting military forces seize the initiative and destroy the insurgents.

Of course, I could be wrong.

Before we end, let's look at two other exchanges that highlight issues of importance. In this first one, in response to a question Dr. Andrews discusses something that goes to the heart of counterinsurgency warfare:

DR. ANDREWS: I would just add to that that the biggest problem that we would face is not the -- the biggest problem we would face is that people sometimes feel a little bit hopeless after all the years of fighting that they've had. And the thing we're trying to push them for is not to feel that, not to feel helpless, to let them know they've got institutions that can work to represent their interests, to push their interests. And we're trying to show that there's benefits of working in a democratic way, and I think the vast majority of people in our area get that. So there are services, there is pressure to get more services and that's -- (audio break).

Read this post at Small Wars Journal for the complete explanation.

Beating insurgents is about a lot more than what the military calls "kinetic operations." That's important, to be sure, but in the long run you can't shoot your way out of an insurgency. Sure, violent military operations are important, and no one is saying otherwise. But in the end you have to give the people a reason to side with the government other than that you'll kill them if they don't. This is where the "hearts" part of the phrase comes into play.l

See then-Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno's "exit interview" of February 2008. Odierno said of the Iraqi people that

As long as they (the Iraqi people) feel safe... they will continue to support us... if they feel rejected by their government.. that will be a turning point on what decision they make.

Dr. Andrews and his team are trying to make sure the Iraqi people believe that the government has their best interests at heart. Only if they do will final victory and a stable Iraq be assured.

And speaking of how the people see their situation, this last exchange is important:

Q Okay. This is Joe Tabet with Al Hurra. Quick question. Based on your assessment, how do you see the current status of Jaish al-Mahdi, and how do you see its future?

COL. HORT: ...talking with the Iraqi military that operates a lot inside the parts of Sadr City that I don't go to, they are not seeing the militia that we used to see before, which was brandishing weapons, controlling neighborhoods, extorting money.

And one of the true signs that we see in change is the Jamila market. This market is inside Sadr City. It's the largest market in Baghdad, and I think in Iraq, if I'm not mistaken. It basically distributes out to all different parts of the city, as well as receives the goods in.

So it's a large, large market that supports, you know, millions of people in the city of Baghdad. That market used to be the primary funding -- financing of the Jaish al Mahdi militia, as well as parts of the special groups. Today, that's a free market, controlled by the market owners, the businessmen, as well as those that lease the stalls in that area, and we're not seeing any extortion at all. So that's a sign of progress that the Jaish al Mahdi militia are trying to step away from that type of nefarious activity that they were doing before.

Free markets, owned and operated by Iraqis, largely free of corruption, and where people feel safe, will save Iraq as much as any round from an M-4.

Posted by Tom at 9:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

November 16, 2008

See, I Told You We Were Winning

Reporting from Iraq, Michael Yon tells Glenn Reynolds that

"The was is over and we won"

Lucky for the Democrats Iraq wasn't an issue in the election.

"There's nothing going on. I'm with the 10th Mountain Division, and about half of the guys I'm with haven't fired their weapons on this tour and they've been here eight months. And the place we're at, South Baghdad, used to be one of the worst places in Iraq. And now there's nothing going on. I've been walking my feet off and haven't seen anything. I've been asking Iraqis, 'do you think the violence will kick up again,' but even the Iraqi journalists are sounding optimistic now and they're usually dour." There's a little bit of violence here and there, but nothing that's a threat to the general situation. Plus, not only the Iraqi Army, but even the National Police are well thought of by the populace. Training from U.S. toops has paid off, he says, in building a rapport.

It turns out that it's even better than that. Reynolds one bit wrong, and Yon emailed in this correction:

"Actually, NONE of them have fired their weapons in combat during this tour, and about half of them are combat veterans from Afghanistan and/or Iraq."

With news like this it's no wonder that my liberal commenters have nothing to say about my Iraq posts.

After all, after Bush announced the surge in December of 2006, rather than support it the Democrats turned into Civil-war era Copperheads, squawking that the war was lost and there was nothing we could do.

But as I reported at the time, those who promoted the surge (General David Petraeus, Sen. John McCain, Dr. Fred Kagan, Gen. Jack Keane (ret), Australian Lt. Col. (Dr) David Kilcullen, Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, and many others) said that no, we can do it.

Then, as the surge was implemented, throughout 2007 and into 2008 I reported on our progress through many "Iraq Briefings" and more. It became clear in late 2007 that we were winning, and since then we've done nothing but consolidate our gains.

Let us now review a little history.

First up is an excellent video documenting Senator Obama's pronouncements opposing the surge. Listen to him announce his "Iraq War De-Escallation Act of 2007" on January 30 of that year in which he demands an immediate withdrawal before the surge can take effect. Note also when he says that he believes that sending 20,000 additional troops would be counterproductive:

As late as last January, the Obama campaign was insisting that the surge was not working

Sorry, but although much still remained to be done, by January of 2007 it was clear that the surge was working.

I know, I'm "piling on." After all, Obama has been elected president and we on the right should just learn to deal with it.

Not to worry, I'll cut him a break when he takes office.

But the reason for this post is that I see a President Obama claiming credit for all this. Call me cynical, but I can just see him making big announcements everytime a unit comes home from Iraq, and all the leftie bloggers proclaiming too that it was all due to the wisdom of The One.

We'll know the truth, though, which is that Obama, Biden, and virtually all other Democrats wanted to quit the war back in 2006 if not earlier, and opposed the surge and all that it entailed. Then, months after it was apparent to everyone else that the surge was working and we were winning they denied it and continued to denigrate our effort.

Anyone who has followed the "Iraq Briefings" I've posted on this blog know that we have been so successful that troop withdrawals have in fact been going on for months.

Interestingly, our commanders on the ground tend to be more cautious than reporters like Yon. Last October, Col. Philip Battaglia said what we were "not yet at the tipping point" whereby success could be assured. Battaglia is commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, which is part of Multi-National Division - Center, which in turn is headquartered by the 10th Mountain Division, which is the area where Yon reported from.

Still, that we have been winning is evident. Maj. Gen. Michael Oates, Commander of Multi-National Division-Center, and the 10th Mountain Division, reported last July on the incredible changes he'd seen since his last deployment, saying that "it's indisputable that the level of attacks are phenomenally low."

In that same month Col Tom James, commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 3rd Infantry Division, part of f Multi-National Division - Center, headquartered by the 10th Mountain Division, told us about the confident and capable Iraqi leadership that he'd seen.

As for troop withdrawals, we've seen a lot of that too. Just last week Maj. Gen. Martin Post, Deputy Commanding General, Multi-National Force-West, headquartered by the I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), spoke of how the Marines had reduced their forces by 50% and had turned over all of al-Anbar to Iraqi control. They're closing bases down (including Camp Fallujah!) and the remaining units are in oversight mode only.

Part of Multinational Division-Center, Col. Dominic Caraccilo, commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), said that his 4,000 man unit will be replaced by two battalions that total 1,800 troops.

To be sure, some commanders are reporting that although their areas are stable now, things could take a turn for the worse if we're not careful.

Col. William Hickman, Commander of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), which is part of Multinational Division-Baghdad and headquartered by the 4th Infantry Divison, said in October that although there has been much progress, "the situation's certainly fragile."

As always, Steve Schippert provides some of the best analysis of Yon's report and what's going on over at The Tank. Don't miss it.

In the end, though, if Obama wants to claim that the drawdown is all due to him, I'll just have to sit back and watch. I just hope that he listens to our commanders and follows their advice on just how fast we should bring them out.

Update

Here are two excellent articles by Peter Wehner in Commentary that are worth your reading

From April of 2008, "Obama's War," in which Wehner traces Obama's evolving position on the war. He's held several. Basically he went from total opposition before it, wondering whether he was wrong after seeing the statue of Saddam toppled, to wanting to send more troops to Iraq, to opposing the surge and finally denying that it was working. In other words,he's been anything but the model of consistency that he's claimed himself to be.

Second is "Liberals and the Surge." In this piece Wehner describes how no matter what the news about how successful the surge was, leading liberals continued their mantra that all was lost and that nothing was or could work. Finally, when it could no longer be denied that violence was way down, they claimed that it was not because of anything our military did or due to any Administration policy.

Posted by Tom at 8:45 PM | Comments (6) | TrackBack

November 11, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 10 November 2008 - Anbar: "We don't think it's fragile out here"

This briefing is by Major General Martin Post, Deputy Commanding General, Multi-National Force-West, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), speaks via satellite with reporters at the Pentagonyesterday.

The I Marine Expeditionary Force took command from the previous MEF (Maj. Gen. Walter Gaskin, commanding) in February of this year. Gen. Post spoke Monday from Fallujah.

Gen. Post reports to Maj. Gen. John Kelly, the commander of I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) and MNF-West. Kelly, in turn, reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin reports to General Odierno, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who on September 16 replaced his one-time boss Gen. David Petraeus in this position. Odierno reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of CENTCOM, who in turn reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

The initial set of questions was about infiltration from Syria in the wake of the October U.S. raid into that country. Post replied that there has been little cross-border activity, and no fallout from the raid. All good news.

Since Obama won the election, I suppose we're going to get a lot of questions like this next one;

Q Sir, it's Mike Mount with CNN. The new president-elect has a kind of rapid timetable to start moving troops out of Iraq. You've just kind of given us a pretty positive look at the Iraqi security forces there. Do you have any concerns, if the U.S. troops are pulled out early, what effect that might have on advances that the Iraqi security forces have made?

GEN. POST: Well, obviously, I can't or won't comment necessarily on decisions being made in Washington or in Baghdad.

I know those discussions are going -- are being had and will be had here in the future. And obviously Multinational Force-West is providing recommendations to our higher headquarters, as far as how we believe our stance is.

I think, as you all know, since we arrived here last February, we've reduced over 50 percent of our ground forces, our actual maneuver battalions, if you would, with the coming down from the surge and then from the Army BCT that left, the two Marine battalions that left. And then just recently here as a matter of fact, this week, another Marine battalion is headed back home, without a replacement....

One of our big efforts has been to start to close some of the bases down, i.e., closing Camp Fallujah, as we -- General Kelly talked to you about here a couple weeks ago. And we've also -- there's been a big effort to move all the Marine forces out of the cities. And so as you go throughout, from Fallujah all the way up the Euphrates River Valley, up to Al Qaim, where we used to have Marines actually living in the cities, we've pulled them all out.

And so where we have our tactical locations, where the Marines are living, they're all in expeditionary facilities right now, outside the urban centers, if you will. And of course, that's one piece of the discussion here, as we wait to see what will happen with SOFA, if SOFA is in fact signed, and what the final agreement will be.

SOFA refers to the Status of Forces Agreement, an agreement between on country and another for keeping troops from one country in another. In this case, it refers to U.S. forces in Iraq. The idea is to reach a long-term agreement, and it would cover a range of issues, among them who gets to prosecute U.S. troops accused of various crimes against Iraqi civilians, and vice versa. Theoretically, if we cannot reach an agreement we'll have to immediately withdraw.

Lest you become alarmed, I think Steve Schippert has it right when he says that it's all just jockeying for position by the Iraqi government. The Iraqis are 1) trying to get the best deal they can so see no reason to sign before the deadline, and 2) have to look tough to their own people, this being what they call an "honor society."

A theme of recent briefings is the drawdown of U.S. forces. The Iraqis are now able to handle security on their own with the U.S. in a support role, and anyway violence is way down as AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq) and other insurgent forces near defeat.

Q Hi, General. This is Courtney Kube from NBC News. Just a couple of quick questions. Can you talk a little bit more about the move, the headquarters move to Al Asad next week? How many Marines does that involve?....

GEN. POST: Yeah, I can. I'll first answer the comment here about the Camp Fallujah, I mean the basing. You know, we had -- when Camp Fallujah was full up with all the units, we had probably over 8,000 Marines and sailors and soldiers and contractors here on Camp Fallujah.....

So it's a -- really, numbers-wise, I mean, you can go from where we're going -- from 8,000 in here earlier this summer to zero. So we're just reposturing those forces. In some cases, some of those forces -- (audio break) -- you know, would be transitioned home....

Percentage-wise, obviously, you could probably look at -- you know, we were -- when we arrived here in Anbar Province, MNF-West was about 34,000 strong. That's between Marine forces, Army forces and our support from the -- from the Navy. We're probably going to be at the end of this month here, early December, down about 26,000. So you can see it's almost 8,000, approaching 9,000 service member -- men and women -- reduction.

Gen. Post also discussed upcoming elections that will seat new provincial governments. They'd hoped to hold them in October but they've been delayed. He stressed that unlike in 2005, when the Sunni's mostly sat them out, this time their polls showed they could expect a 70-80% turnout.

Several U.S. Army commanders have said in recent briefings that while there is much progress in their AORs (Area of Responsibility) it is "fragile" and we must be careful how fast we draw down. Not so for the Marines;

Q General, if you don't want to give figures for the coming six to 12 months, can you give us some idea -- we hear this word "fragile," that there's good progress, but it's fragile. How fragile -- or is it fragile in Anbar Province?

GEN. POST: No, I don't believe it's fragile at all. You know -- (audio break) -- for Anbar Province. The -- you know, as we say it, the AQI is marginalized here. The people of Anbar don't want that back. Surely we have -- we have incidents out here where we believe AQ is still trying to inject themselves when they and where they can and where we stay very heavily engaged on that, as you would expect....

Candidly, it depends upon who you talk to. In some cases, if you talk to the local man on the street, they'll look at us and say, "Hey, I think we're ready for you to go."

If you talk to the -- the leadership -- you know, the IP leadership or the Iraqi army leadership or the provincial leadership, they would probably tell you, "Hey, we need you here for some period of time longer." Not really ever saying, "We need you here for one year or two years," but I think we're still, if you would, that security blanket for them, in the -- standing behind them....

But what we're seeing is that -- they're comfortable in their role, and I would probably see -- as decisions would come out at CENTCOM and MNFI here, and later this year or early -- early 2009, there would probably be potential continued reductions out here. I think we would be able to probably handle that quite nicely.

Often I hear the anti-war crowd seize on one or another statement by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki or a survey which purports to show that "the Iraqis don't want us there." As the statements by Gen. Post illustrate, this is simplistic thinking and the reality is a bit more complicated. I don't want to go through the whole issue with Maliki now but let's just say that he often seems motivated by factors other than what's best for Iraq.

No one wants foreign troops on their soil. The Germans got tired of us by the late 1970s, and we saw large protests over the placement of Pershing II and GLCMs in the 80s. Truth be told, I am halfway surprised we were able to keep such large numbers of troops and weaponry in Western Europe for so long.

So of course they want us out. The Iraqis are a proud people (when asked about Iraqi achievements, one response you hear is "we invented the wheel" - made only half in jest). And with violence so far down, everything I see (including from this briefing; watch the whole thing) the Iraqis are more concerned now with social services.

Mid-level Iraqis, however, know that for now they need U.S. support. The good news and bottom line lesson from this briefing is that the surge was a tremendous success (Obama and the left are wrong on the reasons for our success in Anbar), the Iraqis are able to handle the situation with less and less U.S. support, and that we can slowly draw down.

Posted by Tom at 8:45 PM | Comments (2) | TrackBack

October 30, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 28 October 2008 - No More The "Triangle of Death"

This briefing is by Colonel Dominic Caraccilo, commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), also known as the Rakkasans. They are also known as the Strike Brigade Combat Team. Col. Hickman spoke via satellite with reporters at the Pentagon last Wednesday.

Caraccilo's 3nd Brigade Combat Team is part of Multinational Division-Center, otherwise known as Task Force Mountain. The 3rd Brigade has been operating in a rural area to the south of Baghdad, and are scheduled to return home next month, after which they will have served 15 months in Iraq. They are the last unit on a 15 month tour, all current and future unit deployments will revert to the 12 month standard.

Caraccilo reports to Maj. Gen. Michael Oates, the commander of MND-Baghdad. Hammond, in turn, reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin reports to General Odierno, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who on September 16 replaced his one-time boss Gen. David Petraeus in this position. Petraeus, in turn, has been appointed the next commander of CENTCOM.

Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is acting commander of CENTCOM until Gen. Petraeus assumes command there on October 31. The commander of CENTCOM reports directly to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

Remember the "Triangle of Death" which in 2006 was considered lost to the insurgents? No more.

COL. CARACCILO: ... the Rakkasan's area of focus has been in the Mahmudiyah Qadha, and this qadha's part of the Baghdad Province, but it's primarily a rural area situated south of the city and its focus is on agriculture. The region's approximately the size of Rhode Island, and it has four main cities named Yusufiya, Lutifiyah, Al Rashid and Mahmudiyah. The qadha's population is 75 percent Sunni and 25 percent Shi'a, with the concentration of Shi'a residing in the towns of Mahmudiyah and Lutifiyah and along the road that connects the two cities.

Now, you're probably most familiar with this region by the name given it -- given it over two years ago, and it was called the Triangle of Death. From 2004 to 2007 the area bound by Yusufiya, Mahmudiyah and a town called Iskandariyah to the south was a nexus for enemy activity, which included Sunni insurgency in the countryside, Shi'a death squads and extrajudicial killings along the -- (inaudible) -- corridor and a virtual highway for both Shi'a and Sunni insurgency resources coming in from western and southern Iraq.

In the past, the Triangle of Death was the site of brutal attacks against coalition forces. It was riddled with IEDs and it was considered no-man's-land for both coalition forces and non-combatant Iraqis.

It's important to highlight the atrocities of the Triangle of Death in order to appreciate how far this region has come. One year ago, in November 2007, coalition forces encountered 73 IEDs. In September, 2008, that number was 15 and most of those were found before they -- before they were detonated. One year ago, the average number of attacks per week was 28. That number today is less than two.

A year ago, our preceding unit lost 50 American soldiers and 277 others were wounded in action. We have only felt the hardship of a fallen soldier once during our deployment, and have sustained only 22 combat-related casualties in the last 14 months.

These traditional statistics of combat, however, do not capture other significant changes in the landscape. In May 2008, Iraq Sons in the 4th Brigade and the 6th Iraqi Army Division launched a wide- sweeping offensive, which focused on security enhancements as well as infrastructure improvement. Our embedded provincial reconstruction team played a significant role in the operation as well....

The Rakkasans are clearly approaching the end of deployment to Iraq, as was stated. When General Oates first addressed the brigade commanders of Multi-Division Center, he asked two questions. First, what do we need to do to leave Iraq, and then what does the plan for transition to Iraq look like?

From my vantage point, it looks like the Iraqis (are) in the lead on a host of issues and strong support for coalition partners....

The improvement all over Iraq is amazing. The "Triangle of Death" is no more.

On to the Q & A. From the first exchange, the dramatic improvement is evidenced by the fact that we will not need to replace Caracillo's brigade with another unit of equal size. Instead, his 4,000 man unit will be replaced by two battalions that total 1,800 troops. The reason is that security is much improved and the Iraqis are capable of managing on their own with only U.S. assistance.

Q Hi, Colonel. This is Courtney Kube from NBC News. I'm just a little bit confused about the very end of your statement there.

So when you leave, when your BCT leaves in a few weeks, you'll be -- you will not be backfilled by U.S. forces. And instead you'll have Iraqi security forces there. Is that what you're saying? Or can you talk a little bit more about that?...

COL. CARACCILO: There is not a BCT that's going to backfill us. So that's the short answer. A brigade combat team will not replace the 3rd Brigade Combat Team from the 101st.

To give a little more background on this, in July or June and July of this past year, there were three brigade combat teams operating in the southern belt -- the Madain qadha, Arab Jabour just to the east and then in this portion of the Mahmudiyah qadha. Now there are two brigade combat teams. When I leave with our brigade combat team, there will be one brigade combat team....

The -- this brigade consists of 4,000 soldiers, the 3rd Brigade of the 101st. When it leaves, it'll be two battalions, approximately 1,800 soldiers at the -- at the very most, U.S. forces. The Iraqi security forces we define as the Iraqi army plus the Iraqi police plus the Sons of Iraq. That's up of -- close to 30,000 Iraqi security forces that operate in this area.

So while the coalition force is drawing down exponentially the security forces have increased greatly. And so there are 30,000 Iraqi security forces standing guard at over almost 1,000 checkpoints and 23 patrol bases throughout our battle space....

Presently 12 of 18 provinces in Iraq are under Iraqi control. Tomorrow that number moves to 13.

So has the violence increased in areas where the U.S. has withdrawn our forces? This is an important question, because it goes to the heart of the "surge" strategy. The surge, if your not familiar, was to temporarily increase our presence in Iraq from 15 to 20 brigades. It was temporary because the Army and Marine Corps cannot sustain 20 brigades there. The idea was to use the extra forces to implement a true counterinsurgency stragegy, which we couldn't really do at 15 brigades (at 2006 levels of violence, anyway). But if the violence went up after we went back down to 15 brigades then they whole thing would be a failure. As a matter of note we have been back down to 15 brigades for several month, the surge having ended mid-2008.

Therefore, this next exchange is important:

Q Colonel, this is Jim Mannion from Agence France-Presse. As you begin to shrink your presence in that area, what do you see are the risks of a revival of violence? And what are the, you know, possible things that could lead to that, things that have to be avoided that could result in a return of violence in your area?

COL. CARACCILO: Yeah, any time we turn over part of the battle space to the indigenous force, the force that lives here, the local population, there's always been a concern that the void that the -- that is perceived will be filled by something other than security.

There is such a large footprint of Iraqi security forces in this area that we don't see and we haven't experienced any return of violence in any form. We've already turned over 17 patrol bases, and tomorrow will be the 18th. And as of yet we have not seen any return of al Qaeda's stronghold, any kind of insurgency -- insurgent activity, because quite frankly the population controls that, and the population has decided that they're not going to have that in their neighborhood. So the Shi'a extremists that were once in Mahmudiyah or along the Jackson Corridor are no longer in this part of the country. Al Qaeda has all but been nullified and neutralized.

As always, you will benefit if you watch the entire briefing. However, there is one more thing that Caraccilo said that I want to discuss:

Q So would it be fair to say that even if there is a flare-up of violence, essentially you're going to be leaving that to the Iraqis to handle at this point?

COL. CARACCILO: I don't want to make it sound like the coalition is not involved in continuing to professionalize the Iraqi army. We have MiTT teams in place, Military Transition Teams, at the division, at the brigade level. They maintain their presence with the Iraqis. They continue to coach, teach and mentor. When an Iraqi division commander or brigade commander wants to have coalition forces with him to continue to train or continue to learn how to conduct operations, we're there.

And we lead from behind at this point, and we enable the Iraqis to be able to conduct their operations. We're not trying to make them look like a U.S. Army force. We're allowing them to work through their processes and to ensure that they can sustain themselves, because that's what's going to matter once, in fact, the coalition actually leaves.

This is straight out of the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24 is the guide for everything we've been doing in Iraq since early 2007. It was written in 2005-6 by a team led by then-Lt. Gen. David Petraeus. Essentially, he was then sent to Iraq to implement the strategy outlined in his book). A few quotes from FM 3-24 will make the point:

1-154 THE HOST NATION DOING SOMETHING TOLERABLY IS NORMALLY BETTER THAN US DOING IT WELL. It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where the United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant US support....

6-11. Perhaps the biggest hurdle for U.S. forces is accepting that the host nation can ensure security using practices that differ from U.S. practices. Commanders must recognize and continuously address that this "The American way is best" bias is unhelpful

6-29 Training HN (host nation) security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a "quick fix".

A-43. By mid-tour, U.S. forces should be working closely with local forces, training or supporting them and building an indigenous security capability. The natural tendency is to create forces in a U.S. image. This is a mistake. Instead, local HN forces need to mirror the enemy's capabilities and seek to supplant the insurgent's role.

So although this briefing did not lend itself to any big lesson or message to our presidential candidates it does help us understand what is going on in Iraq.

Posted by Tom at 10:00 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

October 28, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 22 October 2008 - Much Progress, but "the situation's certainly fragile"

This briefing is by Col. William Hickman, Commander of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). They are also known as the Strike Brigade Combat Team. Col. Hickman spoke via satellite with reporters at the Pentagon last Wednesday.

Hickman's 2nd Brigade Combat Team is part of Multinational Division-Baghdad, and have been operating in Northwest Baghdad for the past 11 months.

Hickman reports to Maj. Gen. Jeff Hammond, the commander of MND-Baghdad. Hammond, in turn, reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin reports to General Odierno, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who on September 16 replaced his one-time boss Gen. David Petraeus in this position. Petraeus, in turn, has been appointed the next commander of CENTCOM.

Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is acting commander of CENTCOM until Gen. Petraeus assumes command there soon. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

As with so many other briefings, there is a message here for our presidential candidates, most particularly Barack Obama.

From his opening comments:

COL. HICKMAN: Okay, thank you.

Good morning. It's a pleasure to spend some time with you today to discuss our operations in Northwest Baghdad. As mentioned, I'm Colonel Bill Hickman. I command the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), also known as the Strike Brigade Combat Team.

We're out of Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and currently attached to Multinational Division-Baghdad. Our brigade has been operating in Northwest Baghdad for the past 11 months. And I feel it's important to update you on some of the changes, since our arrival, and entertain any questions that you have.

First, I'd like to comment that the trends you see, on the reduction of violence, across Iraq, are certainly present here in Baghdad and especially visible in our area.

Across the Multinational Division-Baghdad area, there's been an 83 percent decrease in overall attacks from a year ago. Enemy attacks in our area are down more than 62 percent, since our arrival, and over 92 percent since January 2007.
...

With our Iraqi partners, we are fully engaged and committed to the security of the Iraqi people and the reconstruction of northwest Baghdad. It has been a solid year that we -- we think we made a difference in Baghdad. The situation's certainly fragile. We have a critical mission here in the heart of Baghdad.
...

Q Colonel, it's Andrew Gray from Reuters here. You had some pretty dramatic statistics on the decline of violence there. Can you explain why, given that dramatic reduction, you still describe the situation as fragile? What are the factors that mean that you still require substantial presence there? What are the areas that you're concerned about that could reverse those trends?

COL. HICKMAN: Well, I still think there are small very disrupted cells that do not want to -- this to progress forward. And those cells right now we continue to target with the Iraqi army, Iraqi police.

I would tell you what I think, if I could get into it, is -- take that, is the reconciliation that's occurring in northwest Baghdad -- I think that's the key. And I think the key is going to be -- and there are really four areas. I think it goes back to what you asked. It's the resettlement, and I'd like to go into more detail, if you'd like to, in a few minutes on that. It's the election piece. It's integration of the SOIs, the volunteers, into the Iraqi security forces and other ministries. And it's the release of the detainees that the coalition force have. I think those are the four key areas that we have to work in northwest Baghdad. And as we progress down the road and are successful in those areas, I think security then will become more evident as we go forward.

I have heard this in every briefing since Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil (Commanding General of Multi-National Division-Baghdad and First Cavalry Division) gave his final briefing before leaving Iraq in December of 2007. During the briefing Fil said

Now, I want to be absolutely clear that while we have seen significant progress during our tour here, we are very mindful that it is fragile and that there is very tough work ahead. Al Qaeda is down, but it is by no means out.

I have heard a similar theme in almost every briefing since then: "We're making tremendous progress but it could all fall apart if we don't stick with it." This is no doubt a warning and message to the American people and our political leaders that we must not declare victory and withdraw troops too soon.

We made the mistake at the beginning of the war of declaring victory too soon and not sending more troops into Iraq to stabilize the situation. At the time we thought that because we'd defeated the regular Iraqi army the country would be like post-war Germany or Japan and we could get on with rebuilding with minimal attention to security. We were wrong then, so let's not make the same mistake twice.

I've posted dozens of briefings on this website. Go through them and you'll hear time and again our commanders making this point. During these briefings I pay attention to assertions the reporters challenge and what they don't. Mind you the journalists who cover these briefings are knowledgable in military affairs. They're not the big-name stars who talk about everything and anything whether they know anything about it or not. I've come to respect the journalists who cover these briefings. And they seem to accept both that we've made great progress but that it's fragile.

It's not just military leaders making this point, either. Jay Nordlinger of National Review recently returned from Iraq, and posted a five part series on his visit (see the October 2008 listings in his archive). However, he sums it up best in his summary article in the November 3, 2008, print edition of the magazine. It's behind a firewall so you can't get it on-line unless you pay, but here's the beginning:

You hear certain things over and over, as you spend some time in Iraq. You hear them from Iraqis, Americans, and others. What you hear is: We've made great progress in 2008. Al-Qaeda, the militias, and the rest of those lovelies are on the run. But our progress is fragile and reversible. If the coalition leaves too soon -- before Iraq can defend itself -- there will be hell to pay. If we leave too soon, our work will be for nought.

You also hear, Iraqis don't want Americans and other foreigners in their country. (That includes foreign terrorists too, of course.) No one likes to be occupied. At the same time, Iraqis are very, very worried about the American departure: a departure that precedes stabilization. It's "Yankee, go home -- but don't leave us at the mercy of the wolves. Go home at the right time."

What did I tell you?

At the very end of the piece he tells of their interview with General Ray Odierno, commanding general of all coalition forces in Iraq. Odierno was commander of Multi-National Corps-Iraq during the critical days of the surge, and he was the one who implemented Petraeus' vision (Odierno was to Petraeus what Patton was to Eisenhower).

In the Faw Palace, we sit down with Gen. Ray Odierno, who is "CG" -- commanding general -- of coalition forces in Iraq. He gives us an overview. And we question him hard. He has a knack for putting things plain. For example, "In 2006 Iraq was a failed state. Now it is a fragile state." We have not yet reached the point of Iraq's being a "stable state." But that is what we're driving toward. Gradually, we are turning matters over to the Iraqis, alone. "I want our forces to reduce their visibility yet maintain their effectiveness. I tell them I want everything." We have invested so much, over these five and a half years: "I hope we'll be able to finish this and do it right."

I fear that Sen. Obama might win the election and become our next president. He has pledged to immediately withdraw our forces from Iraq. This would be a terrible thing to do and risks losing all that we have gained.

The left talks about our losses in Iraq being in vain. They are wrong now, but it might become a self-fulfilling prophesy if Obama carries through on his promise.

Odierno and the other generals would argue mightily with Obama if he was to give such an order, but of course in the end would either carry out his wishes or resign. This would all be supremely ironic, for in the early days of the way the anti-war liberals castigated Bush for "not listening to his generals." I hope and pray that if Obama wins he listens to our generals and sticks it out until victory is assured. I hope for the best but fear for the worst.

Posted by Tom at 8:45 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

October 25, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 23 October 2008 - Shifting to an Iraqi Operation

If you don't watch the video or read any other part of this post, please skip to the bottom of this post and read Gen. Kelly's final remarks. You won't want to miss them.

This briefing is by Major General John Kelly, Commanding General, Multi-National Force-West, I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward). He spoke via satellite Thursday to reporters at the Pentagon.

Maj. Gen. Kelly reports to reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin reports to General Odierno, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who on September 16 replaced his one-time boss Gen. David Petraeus in this position. Petraeus, in turn, has been appointed the next commander of CENTCOM.

Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is acting commander of CENTCOM until Gen. Petraeus assumes command later this month. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

The good news from this briefing is that in Anbar the Iraqis are absolutely in control and can handle their own security. That said, we still need stay for a bit longer, but the situation is looking very good.

From Maj. Gen. Kelly's opening remarks:

GEN. KELLY: ...We started a share-the-road program where no longer would Iraqi traffic have to do anything particularly different when they came upon military convoys. That was a big change. Moved most of our convoys -- I think something on the order of 95 percent of all military movements, administrative, logistics movements, and that includes the contract convoys -- they all move late at night, certainly after 21:00 or 9:00 at night and they're off the roads by 5:00 a.m. The average Iraqi, of course, is home in bed in at that particular point in time, so they don't even see much traffic, much military activity in the province anymore.

We started to tear down literally hundreds of checkpoints, particularly the ones that had -- certainly were once very necessary as defensive positions all over the province but no longer serve the purpose. And it was kind of an operation Rudy Giuliani that we did to clean up the cities and to, as I say, take down these unsightly defensive positions, roll up the barbed wire in this attempt to convince the average Iraqi that the good news of reduced -- significantly reduced security over the last couple years -- correction, violence -- was real and even the Marines, even the coalition forces felt confident enough to allow them to travel on their own roads around us without having to stop, pull over, be under the threat of any type of gunfire and, at the same time, to break down these defensive positions.

We did PIC on the first of September. That has gone very well. We're still very much engaged but in overwatch with the Iraqi security forces. We are outside the cities, for all intents and purposes -- not to say that we don't go in frequently, to meet with them, to bring training to them.

We still have Marines and some U.S. Army soldiers as police advisers that still live inside police stations, but down to a very small number in comparison. We were up over 115; now we're down below 30. And that's -- the good news is, we are backing out. They're on their own and all we're doing is providing them training.

Even in the area of funding, we have probably in April started to shift away from the U.S. -- the use of U.S. money; as much as we could, started to rely on government of Iraq funding. It's a little harder or more frustrating because the U.S. CERP money, as I think you all know, is -- you know, we can use that in a relative sense, in a lightning quick way, but that doesn't teach the Iraqis how to budget and how to execute a budget, so we really started backing off on the use of money that I have, U.S. money, and forcing -- not forcing them, but teaching them, working with them, to use their own money. And that's turned out very well.

I turned back a fairly significant amount of money of CERP money this year, U.S. CERP money, and I recommended about a 64 percent reduction next year, to only $50 million. But the thrust, the theme will still be to use Iraqi money, not U.S. money, just as in the security LOO, it's to use Iraqi police, Iraqi army, with Marines and soldiers, U.S. personnel, in overwatch.

So as you can see we are well along in the process of handing Anbar back to the Iraqis. Our forces are now in "overwatch" and are not doing the front-line work. We are reducing our footprint as much as possible, by doing everything from running our convoys at night and taking down checkpoints. And because it's such a big issue back here at home, it's also very good news that the Iraqis are paying more of their own way.

A bit more on the money; I've read too many short-sighted people say that the Iraqis should pay us back. One, if we did this it would seem to confirm the left's argument that "it's all about the money and oil." Two, and more importantly, we are not doing this out of the goodness of our hearts (though that is a factor) but because it is in our self-interest to have a stable, pluralistic Iraq. I am convinced that the money we are spending their now will pay dividends in the future, if we stick it out and do not withdraw too early.

Recall that in 2005 and most of 2006 Anbar was considered "lost" to the insurgents. The Anbar Awakening changed all that.

There has been much nonsense written by leftist revisionists on this subject, in which they claim that the turn around in Anbar had nothing to do with the U.S. military and happened on its own. Senator Obama has even adopted this line. They are wrong, as I wrote here in Obama Wrong on Anbar.

The issue in Anbar was that initially after the invasion the Sunnis there thew their support to AUI (al-Qaeda in Iraq) and turned against U.S. forces. U.S. Marines, who were responsible for Anbar, were unable to quell the insurgency, which consisted of indiginous Sunnis and foreign AQI fighters.

AQI wore out its welcome by 2005, however and the Anbaris grew to resent them. They resisted, but so many were brutally killed by AQI that their resistance was pretty much in vain. In 2006, one Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha led the effort to "reach out" to the Marines, who took advantage of the situation movement, teamed with the Anbaris and have been able to defeat AQI. Sheikh Sattar, now known as the founder of the Anbar Awakening, was murdered, probably by AQI, in September of 2007.

I've explained our new counterinsurgency tactics in detail elsewhere, but essentially it involved moving out of our large bases and living among the population, and from there defeating the insurgency village by village. See Iraq Briefing - 04 Feb 2008 - "We do not drive or commute to work" and Iraq Briefing - 22 Feb 2008 - "We are Living with the Population"

Moving on, Maj. Gen. Kelly touches on an aspect of our counterinsurgency strategy that was absolutely key to our success; living with the Iraqis.

Prior to the arrival of Gen. Petraeus, our strategy was twofold: One,we mostly kept our troops at five large bases and send them out on raids based on available intel. Second, we concentrated on building an Iraqi army that could take on the insurgents. Neither worked

The problem with the first was that unless you are living among the populace you don't get good intel, and the people don't respect you because you are not sharing in their danger and their lives. The problem with the second was that the insurgents were building up their forces faster than we could build up the Iraqi Army. We were, in short, losing the race.

In the Q & A session, Andrew Gray of Reuters asked for some statistics. The part of Kelly's response, though, that I find most interesting is about the counterinsurgency:

GEN. KELLY:...And I would tell you, when we first started working with the police, three, four years ago, the relationship was very different. The relationship was we lived in their police stations with them, and took them out on patrol, a very dangerous time, where police were killed in very, very large numbers. So that was the relationship then.

Now the relationship is -- actually when I arrived here it was much more they went on patrol -- that is, the police -- and the Marines went with them but they were in the lead. And at that point, we started to reduce even the numbers that were in the cities with them, because clearly -- the numbers of U.S. personnel, because they were clearly doing well, and it's that whole image of, you know, we took the training wheels off, they were more than ready to leave the driveway and get out on the street. And they've done quite well, actually.

Again, we see that it is the Iraqis who are in the lead.

Another thing of importance that Kelly discussed in this exchange was how far violence had declined:

GEN. KELLY: When I got here -- when I left here, let me put it that way, in '04, we had several hundred incidents a month on a pretty routine basis. When I got here, the incidents were down to the level of about 35 a week. And an incident -- you have to understand in todays' world an incident might be an IED we find, doesn't go off. Another incident would be an IED that goes off but doesn't hurt anyone. It could be a single shot of gunfire. If there's five people shooting at you, that's five incidents. So, frankly, the way we account for it's almost meaningless now.

Because of this decline in violence, Iraqis have been able to redeploy their forces to a more population-friendly manner

GEN. KELLY:...the police now are in the cities. The Iraqi army are outside the cities, but around the cities, but out beyond the suburbs, if you will. And then the Marines are in various places doing various things for the most part outside that -- those areas that even the Iraqi army are responsible for.

Let's be honest, no one wants military units in their neighborhood

The Sons of Iraq program is an important reason for our success in quelling the insurgency I've written about them in previous briefings,so I wont' go through it all again here, but suffice it to say that they are a sort of "super neighborhood-watch" program. Funded by the U.S. we did NOT arm them, though everyone in Iraq seems to have an AK-47. Originally called Concerned Local Citizens, the Iraqis gave them the much more Iraqi sounding name Sons of Iraq.

The SOI program is at an end, as with the near-defeat of the insurgency they just aren't needed anymore. They need to to be disbanded as no society needs a paramilitary force separate from the regular army. The issue is how to do it, because you simply cannot release thousands of young men into an economy with poor job prospects and expect that there won't be trouble. The idea is to move them into other occupations.

There has been some controversy over ending the program, and whether the national government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. See Lt. Gen. Austin's "warning" to al-Maliki in Iraq Briefing - 22 September 2008 - A Warning from Gen. Austin

It is interesting that Kelly reports that he isn't having any trouble with ending the program.

Q General, this is Joe Tabet with Al Hurra. I would like to know what's your assessment of the current status of the Sons of Iraq. How do you see the process to make them join the Iraqi forces?

GEN. KELLY: Yeah, the Sons of Iraq -- we're -- you know this -- depending on where you are in Iraq and where -- what province you're in, the Sons of Iraq are a different issue in each place.

In our case, we have right at about 4,000 of them. They work directly -- don't operate with, but they work directly for the American -- and in today's world, the post-PIC environment, for the local Iraqi army commander. They're given tasks. They're organized in small units....

(What) we asked them about was what they might want to do for an occupation after, what would -- what life would be like after the Sons of Iraq. Interestingly enough, most of them would prefer to go back to being farmers. Anbar used to be a very productive rural province. A lot of things happened in the old days: food for oil -- you know, the impact of the sanctions did a lot to hurt the economy of Anbar, particularly putting its agricultural industry in collapse.

But these young guys would prefer to go back to being farmers. Those that didn't look towards farming very much would like to be police officers and even join the Iraqi army. So I'm hoping that we'll be able to expand a little bit on the police numbers. But they have pretty quality guys. They -- again, they read and write.

So we don't have the same kind of challenges, by any means, that some of the other provinces are having.

One more exchange which gives a flavor of daily life, and how Iraqi concerns have moved beyond security

Q Those cells as refugees, if the Marines start really pulling out, will they just die, in your assessment, or is there still the potential that they could come back?

GEN. KELLY: Well, you know, I walked through the city of Kharma this afternoon with the provincial police chief. No helmet, no flak. And now, it's not -- you know, you do certain things for certain reasons, but we walked down through there today and met with the Kharma city council and the mayor and all, did the same thing yesterday -- two days ago, rather, in Ramadi with the police chief.

And their security concerns -- or a better way to put it, when they talk to me about the things that they need from me, they'll talk about electricity, which is absolutely number one. In the last several months, we have solved -- for all intents and purposes -- we have solved, with the government of Iraq, the fuel problem in Anbar province. We went from 8 percent of what they needed here, gasoline and diesel and that kind of thing, 8 percent, and we've solved that now and they're -- and they're getting at least 90 percent of their allocation every month. So that's off the table. But they talk about health care and schools and all of this.

When I first got here, they'd hit security at the three or the four mark. Now, when we talk, they'll talk about five, six, seven things that they need -- they need help from me; they need help from the government of Iraq -- and then I'll have to say, well, what about security? So we'll remind of them security and then they'll say, "Well, yeah. Okay, security, too." But then I'll look at the police chief and say there's nothing right now that I can conceive of that could come back here that the police, in partnership with the Iraqi army, couldn't handle. And that is my message to them. They can handle it.

But before you lefties say "this proves Obama is right about withdrawing!" read what Kelly says next

GEN. KELLY:...they're not quick to have us leave -- not that they want us to do their fighting for them. They just want us to reestablish something that we decided to disestablish. And when we do that, they're very confident that we can -- we can, you know -- you know, be friends with Iraq forever and not be here forever. That's the key point.

So if we stick it out we can make this thing work. I know that lefties roll their eyes at this, but yes I believe that Gen Kelly is right; if we do this right we can have the Iraqis as friends for a long time. And having an ally - even an imperfect one - in the heart of the Middle East is priceless.

Are you listeniing, Senator Obama?

Previous briefings by Maj. Gen Kelly
Iraq Briefing - 09 March 2008 - "Levels of violence -- stunning to me how low they are"

Posted by Tom at 4:30 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

October 12, 2008

Gen Petraeus' Speech on Iraq - How We Did It

Gen David Petraeus spoke at the 2008 Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting and Exposition in Washington, DC, October 7. To be sure, his speech wasn't really called "How We Did It", as I just made that up. But it might as well have been. It's just listed as a "Special Presentation" on the schedule. No matter.

I realize it's long, at 90 minutes, but if you have time it's well worth watching. Gen. Petraeus goes through the horrific situation in Iraq at the end of 2006 and what he and Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno did to change the situation from one that was rapidly deteriorating to the near-victory that we have today.

This speech, as well as other briefings and military videos, can be seen at DODvClips

However, if you don't have time to watch the video, you're in luck, because I did, and my notes follow.

Teaser; if you read on, you'll discover Gen Ray Odierno's nickname.

Regular readers will recognize almost everything here, because these are themes that have been the subject of many posts since the "surge" started. Interspersed with my comments are some of the press briefings in which our commanders have spoken of the strategy and tactics that Petraeus discussed in his speech (note that I have covered many more briefings than appear here. See sidebar, categories, Iraq II 2007 - 2008

• Surge - focus on securing the population


• Before the surge, 55 dead bodies every morning in Baghdad


• The only way to secure a population is to live with the population, to share the risk. You cannot "commute to the fight." See Iraq Briefing - 04 Feb 2008 - "We do not drive or commute to work" and Iraq Briefing - 22 Feb 2008 - "We are Living with the Population"


• Gradually get the population to tell you who the bad guys are


• You must use all the tools in your kitbag. Military force, yes and necessary. But you can't win with that alone. Yes before you can have legislation you must have security. But by the same token once military force has done it's part you then move into economics and building projects.


• The idea is to "spiral upward" - kind of the opposite of a "vicious cycle" downward.


• The political line of operation (Ambassador Crocker) often or sometimes trumped the military


• Petraeus and Crocker worked very closely together. The presented a united front, usually meeting together with Maliki or visiting congressional delegations.


• Cannot allow the enemy to have any sanctuaries, at least within Iraq. See Iraq Briefing - 02 June 2008 - "Attack, Attack, Attack"


• Before you start to clear, you must have a plan to hold and build. Clearing then leaving does not work. See Iraq Briefing - 14 April 2008 - "From Clear to Hold and Build".


• Promote reconciliation; reach out to those who are willing to be part of the new Iraq


• Col. Sean McFarland meeting with Sheik(s) to recognize the Anbar Awakening and reach out to them. See Iraq Briefing 10 December 2007 - Maj Gen Walter Gaskin (the subject is Anbar) and Iraq Briefing - 13 March 2008 - Tremendous Turnaround in Al Anbar


• We could not hand off responsibility to Iraqi security forces until at the very least they ceased to become part of the problem. One of the first things Petraeus had to do was arrest some top level Iraqis - sometimes at the behest of Makiki himself. Although Petraeus doesn't say so, this is another reason why the Rumsfeld/Abizaid/Casey strategy of reducing American forces while counting on the new Iraqi Army to take over was failing. See Iraq Briefing - 04 March 2008 - State of the Iraqi Army, and Iraq Briefing - 24 July 2008 - Confident and Capable Iraqi Leadership


• Be upfront with the press. "Don't put lipstick on a pig" Just tell it as it is. No spin


• Ray Odierno's nickname is "The Big O"


• Me: General Odierno is now the commander of MNF-Iraq, having assumed command earlier this month. During the vital period of 2007-08, he was number two in Iraq, a Lieutenant General in command of Multi-National Corps Iraq. I covered many of his briefings, but his "exit interview" is perhaps the most incisive (and brief, so it won't take much of your time).


• Correct interrogation techniques. We must uphold our values even when the enemy is barbaric


• Several times he mentions Field Manual 3-24 (Petraeus lead the team that wrote it in 2006, while he was a Lieutenant General, and it provided the strategy for what became known as the "surge"). See Book Review - U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24


• You can never stop learning and adapting. The enemy may be barbaric but they are thinking. It is an enemy to be respected in that it is a thinking enemy. What works one day may not work another. What works in one area of the country might not work in another. What works in Iraq might not work in Afghanistan.


• Mentioned the Sons of Iraq (SOI, originally called Concerned Local Citizens) as important to success. They were important to sustain the progress. Me: The SOI were the subject of most briefings, which shows their importance).


• Get the irreconcilables out of society, detain them, and take the pressure off the population. Eventually you might be able to reconcile some of them though and release some.


• Education, social services job opportunities important to long term success. See Iraq Briefing - 09 June 2008 - Job Creation to Defeat the Insurgency and Iraq Briefing - 04 August 2008 - Achieving Durable Security


• They call the strategy "Anaconda" because the idea is to squeeze the insurgents from all directions at once. For example, money is the oxygen for the insurgency, more important over time than ideology


• - The February 2006 bombing of theal-Askari Mosque (the "Golden Mosque") which set off a tit for tat cycle of violence that was spiraling out of control


• Aug 2007 was the turnaround, when the militia lost the support of the populace. Eventually they declared a ceasefire.


• The violence went back up when PM Maliki sent the Army into Basra, but it was a temporary increase.


• The sectarian ethnic cleansing didn't stop because all the people had left/been "cleansed", but because of our troops.


• Violence has of course come down but is still too high. See Iraq Briefing - 09 March 2008 - "Levels of violence -- stunning to me how low they are"


• We found more and more weapons caches as we began to live with the populace. It's starting to fall off because we think we've found most of them


• Mentioned many of the divisional commanders, Major Generals such as Lynch, Fil, Hammond, Oates, as he went around the map of Iraq. All of them were key to our success. There is more work to be done, though.


• Total 200 Iraqi combat battalions today. See Iraq Briefing - 24 July 2008 - Confident and Capable Iraqi Leadership


• Iraq is only producing half of the electricity of what they need. Progress is never as fast or as easy as you'd like.


• Oil production has hit a record for recent years (not sure about way back).


• Many countries have sent ambassadors back to Iraq


• Debt relief is moving forward


• Iraq is open for business


• There are potential storm clouds:


• The SOI need to be reintegrated. 50,000 have, but there is a long way to go


• Can we meet the rising expectations of the population?


• AQI will try to reignite the violence


• Other Sunni and Shiite extremists will try and return


• Iranian special groups


• Violence during elections


• Political disagreements


• Return of displaced families


• Various ethnic disputes


• So progress is real but fragile. Me: This has been echoed in briefing after briefing. See for example Iraq Briefing 17 December 2007 - Maj Gen Joseph Fil


• Our military is vastly better than at any point in our history. We have never fought a war this long with a professional military. See Gen Barry McCaffrey (ret) report "The Most Brilliantly Led Military We Have Ever Fielded"


• We have and need leaders who can do it all; major combat operations to stability, reconstruction, humanitarian operations.


• How we train our leaders is different now.


• Counterinsurgency is the "graduate level" of warfare. Still, our leaders can do all types of operations.


• Video goes out at 65 min, resumes at 68:13


• The way our soldiers have responded to the challenges should be an inspiration to us all


• Our soldiers reenlist knowing they'll be sent back to a combat zone. No bonus can make you do that. They do it because they believe in what we are doing.


• Tom Brokaw said that what he saw in Iraq that day (big reenlistment) led him to say that he had seen the new greatest generation


• We are deadly serious about being first with the truth


• I stand by my bottom-line assessments. See The Gen Petraeus - Amb Crocker Hearings Day 1 and The Gen Petraeus - Amb Crocker Hearings Day 2


• - All units must work as an integrated whole. "Fusion Cells" that broke down barriers between intel centers and government departments. Everyone must work together.

Posted by Tom at 8:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

October 11, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 09 October 2008 - Not Yet at the Tipping Point

This briefing is by COL Philip Battaglia, Commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division. He spoke via satellite Thursday to reporters at the Pentagon.

I believe that the 4th Brigade Combat Team is part of Multi-National Division - Center, which is headquartered by the 10th Mountain Division. Major General Michael Oate is the commanding general.

Maj. Gen. Oates reports to reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin reporst to General Odierno, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who on September 16 replaced his one-time boss Gen. David Petraeus in this position. Petraeus, in turn, has been appointed the next commander of CENTCOM.

Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is acting commander of CENTCOM until Gen. Petraeus assumes command later this month,. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

There was quite a bit of interest in this briefing. If there was any one theme, or question that got asked more than any other, is was about Iranian influence. Since they're relatively close to the border, this is to be expected. But political influence is bad enough, arms and insurgency unacceptable.

From their opening statements

COL. BATTAGLIA:... My mission is to partner with the Iraqi security forces to secure the population, defeat terrorists, interdict the flow of munitions into Iraq and enable the reconstruction efforts of the PRT.

We work very closely with the 10th Iraqi Army Division, the Iraqi border enforcement units and Iraqi police every single day on a wide variety of security tasks. We live where they live, amongst the population and at various outposts and smaller bases throughout our area of operation. We're having tremendous success because we've combined our technological advantages with Iraqi firsthand knowledge of the terrain, the culture and those intangibles that only come from being an Iraqi.

We've seen the security in this area improve significantly since our arrival in July. The provinces are overall very stable, with occasional attacks by special groups and other criminal elements. Our combined offensive operations represent only a small part of what we do. We are very focused on improving the effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces and enabling Dan and his PRT to conduct their reconstruction efforts.
...

MR. FOOTE:... As Phil mentioned, there had been no American presence or coalition forces presence in Maysan province for well over a year before Iraqi military operations commenced in mid-June. This is a province that has historically faced a lot of empty promises from outsiders and has seen significant militia influence and illegal arms smuggling from Iran

Let me touch briefly on what we're talking about when we mention capacity-building. The chief role of the PRT is to teach, mentor and partner with provincial and local governments, civil society organizations and other provincial actors, increase their abilities, efficiencies, technical expertise and transparency.

So the Maysan province has been neglected, which is a challenge but also creates an opportunity. If we can provide security and then boost the economy in a place like this, we'll have gone a long ways towards defeating the insurgency and stabilizing the country. Hopefully this will also create goodwill that we can leverage.

On to the Q & A

Q Colonel, this is David Morgan from Reuters.

Can you tell us about your border security operations and what you've been able to interdict, what you've been seeing in terms of weapons flowing in from Iran?

COL. BATTAGLIA: Yeah. Thank you very much for that question, David.

As -- in terms of our border interdiction efforts, the improved security throughout Iraq has allowed us -- has allowed coalition forces to focus more in Dan's province, in Maysan. And since my arrival here, I have moved two battalions in the Maysan province, approximately about 1,800 soldiers. And we are partnered with the 38th Brigade of the 10th Army in that province, along with the Department of Border Enforcement forces right along the border and of course the Iraqi police.

In the past three months, our operations, in coordination with Iraqi security forces, have seized well over 8,000 -- I believe you have a sheet here that kind of talks about what we have interdicted -- a lot of the improvised explosive devices, IEDs, the EFPs, the explosively formed penetrators, about 600 of those deadly devices that we have taken off the streets, along with rockets -- 107, 122- millimeter.

What we have found is -- in the rockets in particular, we find that the manufacturer and lot numbers are Iranian-made.

So I hope that answers your question.

Q Give us some idea of whether the volume of weapons has been increasing or decreasing, and who the intended recipients are.

COL. BATTAGLIA: Yeah. Our intelligence indicates that -- we know that we have had an effect and we have disrupted the flow of weapons. After the first two months, primarily in July, August time frame, we have found that our discovery of caches of these weapons systems has decreased. So we believe that and we know that we have interrupted the flow of these explosives. What the normal -- our intelligence indicates that Amarah, in the province of Maysan, was an area -- since there was no previous coalition forces there, for a while, it was an area where these devices were assembled and them from there shipped to other parts of the country, into Baghdad and other places.

The bad news is that Iran is still smuggling weapons into Iraq, the good news is that we are doing a better job of interdicting them.

Kimberly Kagan's Institute for the Study of War has an excellent paper (published Oct 6) on the subject of whether recent attacks were carried out by AQI (al Qaeda in Iraq) or Iranian Special Groups. The authors, Claire Russo and Marisa Cochrane, examine the publicly available evidence and believe that it is most likely Iranian elements that are responsible

In any event, they say, i's important to get it right, because "Giving AQI credit for attacks of which they are not capable has serious consequences. This benefits Special Groups, AQI, and Shi'a sectarian political agendas, and is problematic for Coalition Forces and the SoI(Sons of Iraq)."

Continuing on the same theme of Iranian influence:

Q Colonel, this is Joe Tabet with Al Hurra. Do you think there is any Iranian influence through political -- Shi'a political parties in your area?

MR. FOOTE:...There's no question that there is a certain level of Iranian influence. The four main parties in Maysan province are a Sadrist umbrella party, ISCI, Da'wa and Fadhila. ISCI and Da'wa have ties to Iran, long and fairly strong. Ironically, the Sadrists are probably the most nationalistic of those parties.

Have we seen a ton of malign political Iranian influence to date? Not that I'm aware of. With provincial elections on the horizon, I think we're going to be looking at an interesting time. Iranian influence in Maysan province is to be expected. It's a neighboring country. The tribes along the border have people on both sides. There's going to be some of that that happens, and we expect and accept some of that to happen.

It's the smuggling, the malign influence, the Iranian accelerants that Colonel Battaglia and his folks are very focused on taking care of.

COL. BATTAGLIA: Yeah, exactly, and Dan's absolutely right on that.

We are -- what we experience and what we hear, what I hear from the, from the Iraqi security forces, some of the leaders of the 10th Iraqi Army Division, the police and so forth, same thing.

There is some Iranian influence, you know, not very overt at this time. And, but everyone is kind of bracing a little bit to see what happens during the upcoming provincial elections, I think.

So if I'm reading this right most of the Iranian involvement is military and not political.

One more exchange on a theme that we've heard time and again in these briefings; that although the fighting ability of the Iraqi forces have improved considerably, they still have big problems with logistics.

Q Gentlemen, Bill McMichael, Military Times papers. General Petraeus has repeatedly warned that this might be -- the positive trends in Iraq and the gains that have been made, that the situation is very fragile and things could easily reverse. I wonder if you would discuss what you see in the province you're working in.

COL. BATTAGLIA: I can, you know, lead off on that a little bit and talk about, you know, the Iraqi army and the Iraqi security forces. I have -- I have mentioned here to you about how capable they are. They're able to plan and to execute operations. But of course, we're there and we supply a lot of those enablers -- some, you know, additional intelligence -- intelligence air assets, intelligence platforms to kind of narrow their focus of their operations. All those types of enablers, the Iraqi army has yet to build.

The Achilles' heel of the Iraqi security forces, in my opinion and what I see here in these provinces is their logistical system. And you know, that's well-acknowledged, in terms of maintenance and availability of repair parts. So although the Iraqi security forces are capable and willing to go out there -- that's my experience -- at the same time there are other facets of these security forces that must continue to grow -- you know, logistics, like we talked about, their intelligence assets and other type enablers -- to make them a more capable force....

Logistics is an "unglamorous" aspect of warfare. It's much more fun, if you will, to discuss weaponry and tactics. Yet history shows time and again that wars are as often won or lost on the ability to supply an army or navy in the field. All the advanced weaponry in the world, and the best strategy and tactics, do you no good if you can't keep your troops fed, ammunition coming, and vehicles working.

I am not quite sure what the difficulties are but obviously it is something that needs to be resolved.

The final comment by Mr Foote presents both an opportunity and a warning:

MR. FOOTE: I think the population of Maysan is a very fickle one. Through history -- World War II and the British, earlier Iraqi regimes, Saddam Hussein, the British -- they've heard a lot of empty promises over the years.

We have an opportunity as coalition, American and with the new power of the Iraqi security forces in there, to take advantage of the opportunity to give them optimism and show them reason for a better life. It's not going to last forever. And we're certainly working hard and have had some quick wins with the population, some good press events and humanitarian assistance, some infrastructure things.

Are we at the tipping point, as General Petraeus likes to say, where Maysan has tipped and will be stable? Not yet. I think over the next six to 12 months what Phil and I do and our teams do and what the Iraqi security forces and the result of the provincial elections is going to be key to what happens there.

Are you listening, Barack Obama? If you win, don't pull them out precipitously just to satisfy your extremist anti-war base (and probably your own instincts). If you do, you risk losing everything we've gained so far. President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld were criticized in the early years of the war for not listening to their generals and colonels, some of whom were warning that the strategy was not working and that they needed more troops. Let's not make the same mistake again.

Posted by Tom at 2:13 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

October 9, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 06 October 2008 - Three Steps Forward, One Step Back

This briefing is by Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, Commander of Multi-National Division-North (also known as Task Force Iron) and the 1st Armored Division. He spoke via satellite Monday to reporters at the Pentagon.

Maj. Gen. Hertling reports to reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin reporst to General Odierno, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who on September 16 replaced his one-time boss Gen. David Petraeus in this position. Petraeus, in turn, has been appointed the next commander of CENTCOM.

Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is acting commander of CENTCOM until Gen. Petraeus assumes command later this month,. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

Unfortunately there were technical difficulties about halfway through the briefing and it had to be terminated, but we still have plenty of information that we can learn from.

From General Hertling's opening statement:

GEN. HERTLING: Well, good morning to all of you in Washington. Thanks for having me again. You know, we're right now in our 13th month of this deployment, and it's more and more apparent to me that we measure progress in Iraq not by wins and losses but by gains and regressions, steps forward and then steps backwards.

When we first arrived in the north last September, we saw progress, but it was usually two steps forward for every one step back. Now most days are marked by three steps forward, one step back, and on a good day, we sometimes even experience four steps forward. But there's always that one step back, to be sure. And that's usually pretty frustrating, but it's progress and, most importantly, it's their progress.

Since we talked a few months ago, we had begun Operation Iron Pursuit. We began that at the end of July. We had just started it when I talked to you. And we're doing it to go after al Qaeda fighters further out in their support zones as we had -- as we had chased them from the cities, a few key areas they had-- we had identified in each province.

Basha'er al-Kheir, the operation which means "glad tidings of benevolence" was going on in Diyala. We were seeing significant security gains during the month of August, but during the month of September, quite frankly, because of the Ramadan holidays and the holy period of Eid, the tempo of operations began to wane a little bit towards the end of the month. We'll continue to partner with the ISF as operational tempo increases in the next few weeks now that the holiday's over.

Umm Al-Rabiain, Operation Mother of Two Springs, in Mosul and Nineveh Province, continues. We've executed some extremely successful operations in the north in the last few weeks and some even this weekend. And those have resulted in reduced violence in the key city of Mosul. There's also been an interruption in the foreign fighter flow from Syria, although it's critical to note that al Qaeda is desperately trying to hold on to that city of 2 million Iraqis. Our assessment is that the insurgents have become fractured -- certainly still capable and lethal -- and they are increasingly relying on intimidation to garner support from the local populace.

If you talk to the Iraqi citizens in any of our four provinces, which I do quite a bit, they will tell you that security has improved.

And that's true because across the board in our north, we have seen almost a 60 percent reduction of attacks since we arrived last year.

The Iraqis will also tell you that the economy and the government functions are also improving, but each province is proceeding at a different rate. While we've seen improvements in infrastructure repair and employment figures rising, there are still anywhere between 40 and 50 percent unemployed or underemployed, as we sometimes call it, in every one of the provinces. And much is yet to be done in the area of schools, hospitals, electricity, water and industry in the four northern provinces.

What's different today than when we arrived here over a year ago is the contributions of both the provincial government and the central government.

First, a summary of the operations mentioned above

• Operation Iron Pursuit - I can't find much about this other than a few private Youtube videos.
• Umm Al-Rabiain/Operation Mother of Two Springs - See the excellent analysis over at Understanding War.
• Basha'er al-Kheir/ "glad tidings of benevolence" - The best I could find is a short article in the Los Angeles Times.

Other things to note are:

• The importance of economics in ensuring long term stability
• While much of the focus in the press is on the Iraqi national government, just as important is how well local government functions.
• Our troops are combination warfighters, mayors, city managers, sociologists. They have to get to know their areas like the back of their hand (see Petraeus' Field Manual 3-24).

On to the Q & A

Q This is David Morgan from Reuters. You said that the insurgents have become fractured. Can you talk a little bit about the nature of the threat as it stands now and how it has changed in recent months? What is it that has led to this fracturing, as you describe it? ...

GEN. HERTLING:...There are contributions from both the Iraqi security forces, the people of Iraq, who are tired of the insurgency. This -- both those things have been recurring themes that I've talked about before and that I think all the other commanders have talked about. But also in the north what you're seeing is a combination of the increase in the capability of the Iraqi government, both at the provincial level and at the central governmental level, reaching out for the -- reaching out to the provinces in the north.

So I think there is a feeling, first of all, that the Iraqi citizens are certainly sick of the insurgencies. Over the last year we have killed or captured several hundred -- and, in fact, in the thousands -- of insurgents of different insurgency groups, not only al Qaeda but also Jaish al-Islami, Ansar al-Sunna, Jaish al-Mujahideen, several of the insurgent networks in the northern provinces.

So I think it's a combination of continuing to pursue the enemy, making the cities more secure, allowing the people to get back to work and the governmental outreach to help the people feel like they're being secured by a newly evolving government of Iraq. So I think all of those things continue to fracture the insurgencies more and more.

But having said that, there is still a desire by al Qaeda and other extremist groups to hold on to key areas. We have seen that most of all in Mosul. As they have lost Baghdad, for all practical purposes, there have been other areas which they've tried to hold on to. Mosul is one of those. And because of the proximity to the Syrian border, the proximity to the port of Rabiya, the ability to gain safe havens in the desert around that city of 2 million people, the fact that they can blend in very easily in that very cosmopolitan city, which has quite a few different populations within the city -- Sunnis, Arabs, Kurds, Yazidis, Christians, Assyrians -- they continue to try and control that city.

There was a bit more, but not much. As mentioned above the audio part of the transmission stopped working and the briefing had to be terminated.

Nevertheless, we hear again that AQI (al Qaeda in Iraq) is down but not out. This has been a theme of briefings and is not challenged by the journalists.

The obvious conclusion is that we are winning but have not won. We need to keep the troops there as long as they are succeeding, rotating them in and out as necessary. Contrary to what Maliki spouts off about occasionally (and some in the US parrot), "the Iraqis" do not want us out before they are secure.

Here are a few points that Bing West made in the Sept 15 print edition of National Review

• If we leave before the job is finished and Iraq flys apart, they will hate us because our action precipitated a disaster.
• If we leave before the job is done, and Iraq stays together, the Iraqis will still resent us for not finishing the job that we started and making them do what they will say we should have done ourselves, "since you started it."

So we are where we are whether anyone likes it or not.

We're winning, so let's finish the job.

Posted by Tom at 8:30 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

September 29, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 22 September 2008 - A Warning from Gen. Austin

Yes I know, the big issue today is the fiscal crisis and the bill that got voted down in the house, and why am I not writing about that? The truth is that I don't understand the economics of the matter and don't like writing about things I don't really understand. I'm no expert on Iraq or military matters but I do have a clue. So here goes:

This briefing is by the commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq, Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin III. Austin replaced Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno in February 2008, who at the time had been appointed Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army. On September 16 Odierno assumed command of Multi-National Corps - Iraq, replacing his one-time boss Gen. David Petraeus. Petraeus, in turn, has been appointed the next commander of CENTCOM.

As the second-highest commander in Iraq, Austin reports directly to Gen. Odierno. Odierno reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last month. Until Petraeus assumes command of CENTCOM later this month, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey will remain as acting commander. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

The divisional commanders report to the corps commander. The overall commander in Iraq sets strategy and the corps commander executes it. He carries out the day to day operations.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

Unlike in his last briefing on Aug 18, in which I said that he "tends to skirt questions, is less conversational, and isn't as decisive in his answers" this time we get some real insight into the situation in Iraq.

Read out to find out about his stern warning...

Before we get to that, though, a progress report from his opening statement:

GEN. AUSTIN: ...We've had a productive month since my last Pentagon press conference. We've experienced continued low levels of violence, with 15 of the last 16 weeks remaining below the 200-attacks-per-week mark. In Baghdad, which as you know is a city of roughly 6 million people, we've averaged less than 4 attacks per day for the last 13 weeks. And this is truly remarkable and it would've been hard to imagine this just six months ago.

In another sign of progress, Anbar province, which was at one time the home of the Sunni insurgency, transitioned to Iraqi control just three weeks ago. This milestone would not have been thought possible a year ago, but because of the hard work of our men and women and our Iraqi partners, Anbar continues to maintain a very low level of violence, even after the transfer....

Combined coalition and Iraqi security force operations in the north, in the west and in Baghdad have put al Qaeda in disarray, and these operations have significantly reduced the number of foreign fighters coming across the border.

And while al Qaeda has a complex network that is good at reseeding these fighters, our actions to stem the flow of foreign fighters and our ability to take extremist leaders off the battlefield are having positive effects on the security conditions.

We've also had success against special groups criminals in the south. We've isolated them from the population and we've dealt considerable blows to their network of lethal accelerants.

Once again our efforts have put "al Qaeda in disarray". It has been a long time since I've heard any journalist challenge this assessment, so you know it must be true.

Then it's on to the Sons of Iraq (SOI). Note how the general uses his platform to issue a stern public warning to the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki:

GEN. AUSTIN:....One of our primary focus areas as we move forward is transitioning the Sons of Iraq program to the Iraqi government. The volunteer movement that started in Anbar and spread across the rest of the country significantly contributed to the security successes that we are now taking advantage of.

The sons of Iraq have paid a heavy price fighting al Qaeda and other insurgent groups, and it's important that the government of Iraq responsibly transition them into meaningful employment. Prime Minister Maliki has assured me that the government will help those who help the people of Iraq. And so next week in Baghdad the government will accept responsibility for approximately 54,000 Sons of Iraq, and we will be there to assist in the transfer.

We spent the last few weeks working hand in hand with our Iraqi partners on this transition, and I'm confident that this will go well. And you should know that we will not abandon the Sons of Iraq. We'll continue to follow up in the future to ensure that they get paid and that they do in fact transition to meaningful employment.

This is a significant opportunity for the government to demonstrate to the Iraqi people and to the rest of the world that it is serious about reconciliation and about honoring its promises -- promise to the Sons of Iraq. And so with increased security comes different challenges, challenges that I am confident that we will continue to overcome with our Iraqi partners. As a result, I remain optimistic about the future of this country.

Wow. There's a lot here. Maybe I'm misreading this, but I don't think so. The SOI are mostly Sunni, an it is well known that the Shiite government of al-Maliki is suspicious of the SOI and sees them as a threat. There has been much recently about how Maliki was going to disband the SOI and basically just tell all of them to go home.

We, on the other hand, want to transition as many SOI as we can to paying civilian jobs or to positions in the Iraqi Police or Army.

The point is that the SOI should remain around forever. Once the insurgency is gone they've served their purpose. And it is not entirely unfair for Maliki to want them gone. The problem is that we have to do it the right way. If we just turn them lose when they've been expecting jobs, there will be trouble

The SOI (originally Concerned Local Citizens) were and are a sort of "super neighborhood watch." They have been paid out of the U.S. Treasury, and no we do not give them weapons, it's just that everyone in Iraq seems to have an AK-47.

Anyway, the point of the SOI was to get the Iraqis involved in their own defense, take ownership of their situation, and all that. If they have a stake in their future they'll fight for it and if they fight for it we win.

So it might not have sounded very tough when Austin said that Maliki had a "significant opportunity for the government to demonstrate to the Iraqi people", but I think it was "diplomese" for "you screw this up pal and you risk reigniting the insurgency."

Austin publicly mentioned Maliki's promise and is now publicly holding him to it.

Austin, as commander of MNC-Iraq, is in a position where he works directly with the top levels of the Iraqi Government. It is part of his job.

In his closing statement Austin came back to this again when he said that "And I'd like to close by saying that the government of Iraq will have a great opportunity over the next several months to make some significant progress and the Multinational Corps will stand side-by- side with them each step of the way." In other words, we'll help you but you had better come through.

Then Lt. Gen. Odierno explained the stakes last February in his "exit interview" when he left as corps commander:

What I worry about is, there's a window. And we need is some political progress in order to maintain this window. And if we don't maintain the window, the populate will feel that they have no where to turn and I don't know what will happen then, and so this is what makes this somewhat of a tentative security gain right now. Because unless you have the populace behind you you will not maintain security.

So if the Sunnis in the SOI get the impression that the government doesn't care about them then risk reigniting the insurgency. Odierno got it. Austin gets it. Let's hope that Maliki gets it. .

Two reporters followed up on this during the Q & A part of the briefing:

Q General, Bill McMichael, Military Times newspapers. You mentioned that next week the government of Iraq will accept responsibility for 54,000 Sons of Iraq. Could you give us some detail on what sorts of jobs they'll be put into? Are they all going to be accepted into the Iraqi security forces for training and integration into the ISF?

GEN. AUSTIN: Well, as you no doubt know, the total number of Sons of Iraq throughout the country is about 99,000. And 54,000 of that number reside in the Baghdad province.

And so we will start with the Baghdad province next month and transition that element first, and then we will begin to move to other parts of the country and transition those elements.

We set aside -- we said up front that about 20 percent of the total number of Sons of Iraq would go into the security forces, and so we're looking to get about 20 percent of the total population hired as policemen. There will be others that join the army, but the rest of that population will go into other types of jobs. We're working with the Iraqi government to help provide job skills and training for those that are interested. And we've made some progress there, but that will be -- that will take time.

But we should know or we should recognize that the government is committed to taking care of the Sons of Iraq. And I talked with Prime Minister Maliki and others that are senior leaders in the government, and they assure me that they will stick with the folks that have helped us or helped the country of Iraq over time, and they will ensure that these folks who have helped us are properly transitioned into civilian employment.

Q General, the 54,000 that are going to be transitioned out of the 99,000, that's in addition to the roughly 15,000 to 20,000 that have already started to be transitioned over into the ISF or into security forces jobs?

GEN. AUSTIN: Well, we've got about 9,000 that have gone into police forces, and so there will be a number of others that will transition into police forces. And so again, the total number of people that go into security forces will be about 20 percent.

And later:

Q Hi, General. JJ Sutherland with NPR.

I just wanted to follow up quickly on the SOI program. You're saying 54,000 of them will be transitioning to the government of Iraq. Does that mean they're coming off of the American payroll and going onto the Iraqi government payroll?

GEN. AUSTIN: Yeah, that's a great question. That's exactly what it means. That means, for that 54,000 in October, the Iraqi government for the month of October will begin paying their salaries.

Now, this is a deliberate process that we'll go through to hand off responsibility from us to the Iraqi government.

We'll work through, you know, all of the details to make sure that every individual's accounted for and they are paid, and most importantly that they, at some point in time, get meaningful jobs. But that's exactly what it means. It means beginning the month of October for that 54,000, the government of Iraq will pay their salaries.
...

Q ...what happens in October? I understand eventually you want to have them be plumbers of electricians, but in October, there are a lot of checkpoints that have been manned by the Sons of Iraq. Are those checkpoints all going to go away? Are they only going to be staffed by Iraqi police now? That's my question. It's not eventually, it's next month.

GEN. AUSTIN: Yeah, next month the Iraqi government will begin to work their way through this. And there's no question that some of them, some of the checkpoints, many of the checkpoints will be -- will be manned by Iraqi security forces. In some cases, there may be SOI that will be tasked to help with that work. But in most cases, I think the Iraqi government will be looking to transition people into different types of jobs.

So Austin implicitly acknowledges that transition is going to be a problem, and refused to be nailed down on a time line.

I'll follow the issue of transitioning the SOI and will report back as developments arise.

As always, there was much more of value in the briefing, so watch the whole thing

And ok, maybe it's not as big a deal as the financial mess but I thought it was important.

Tuesday Update

What timing, a Yahoo News/Time story appeared today about just this issue. Money quote:

The last time the U.S. was involved in disbanding large Iraqi military units, things didn't go well - the fateful 2003 decision to dissolve the Iraqi army proved to be a key strategic blunder that gave a massive boost to the insurgency. This week the U.S. will try again, transferring control of 54,000 of the 100,000-strong largely Sunni citizen patrols known as the Sons of Iraq (SOI) to a Shi'ite-led government many of them view with suspicion. The rest will remain on the U.S payroll, as part of a phased transfer.

Some 20% of these anti-al-Qaeda groups - many of whom had been insurgents paid by the U.S to switch sides - will be incorporated into the Iraqi security forces. The rest will be given civilian jobs or training in a bid to help reintegrate them into the general population. But it won't be that simple: after years of vicious sectarian violence, many Sunni Arab patrol members fear retribution from the government; and indeed, some government officials consider the SOIs as little more than thugs and murderers. And as is so often the case in Iraq, the U.S is being blamed - this time by Sunni allies, such as tribal leader Sheikh Saleh al-A'ghayde, who accuse the Americans of abandoning them.

There's some dispute over whether we really disbanded Saddam's army or whether it dissolved itself in the aftermath of the invasion, but I'm not worried about that right now. The important thing is that the Iraqi and American governments handle transfer of SOI personnel correctly.

Posted by Tom at 10:00 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

September 16, 2008

A New Commander in Iraq

Earlier today Gen. Ray Odierno took command of Multi-National Forces-Iraq. It was a well-deserved promotion, and Iraq and our country is the better for it.

Gen Petraeus, who turned over his command to Odierno, is a man who needs no introduction. He is well known as the man who saved Iraq, and our country's reputation, from our near-debacle in that country.

Ray Odierno is perhaps less well known. From November 2006 to February 2008 he was commander of Multi-National Corps Iraq, which oversaw the day to day operations. It is the job of the corps commander to carry out the strategy devised by the country commander (MNF-Iraq). Odierno was the man who implemented Petraeus' counterinsurgency strategy and made it work. Because he was to Petraeus what Patton was to Eisenhower, Frederick and Kimberly Kagan called him The Patton of Counterinsurgency.

The promotion, which was approved by Congress, also meant a rise from three-star Lieutenant General to four-star full General for Odierno.

Gen. Petraeus, meanwhile, will assume command of CENTCOM in late October, which oversees the entire region, including Iraq and Afghanistan. Once more, then, Odierno will report to Petraeus. Petraeus, in turn, reports directly to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

Here's a brief news report from The Pentagon Channel of the change of command ceremony

Here's the entire ceremony

From the press release on the MNF-Iraq website:

The change of command occurs after incredible progress in the country, said Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who traveled to Baghdad to participate in the ceremony.

"When General Petraeus took charge 19 months ago, darkness had descended on this land," the secretary said. "Merchants of chaos were gaining strength. Death was commonplace. Around the world, questions mounted about whether a new strategy - or any strategy, for that matter - could make a real difference."

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that a national intelligence estimate in January 2007 doubted whether Iraq could reconcile over 18 months.

"Here we are, 18 months later, and Iraq is a vastly different place," Mullen said during the ceremony. "Attacks are at their lowest point in four years, 11 of 18 provinces have been turned over - including the once-written-off Anbar province - to Iraqi security forces, who are increasingly capable and taking more of a lead in operations."

The Iraqi government is providing for its people, the legislature is passing laws and the courts are enforcing justice, the chairman said. "In more places and on more faces we are seeing hope; we see progress," the admiral said.

Odierno's bio is on his MNF-Iraq page.

Retired Army Chief-of-Staff Jack Keane, and scholars Frederick W. Kagan & Kimberly Kagan (all of whom were among the intellectual architects of the "surge"), have more in The Weekly Standard. There message is that although we have achieved much, it would be premature to simply declare victory now and pull out the troops:

On September 16, General Raymond Odierno will succeed General David Petraeus as commander of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq. The surge strategy Petraeus and Odierno developed and executed in 2007 achieved its objectives: reducing violence in Iraq enough to allow political processes to restart, economic development to move forward, and reconciliation to begin. Violence has remained at historic lows even after the withdrawal of all surge forces and the handover of many areas to Iraqi control. Accordingly, President Bush has approved the withdrawal of 8,000 additional troops by February 2009.

With Barack Obama's recent declaration that the surge in Iraq has succeeded, it should now be possible to move beyond that debate and squarely address the current situation in Iraq and the future. Reductions in violence permitting political change were the goal of the surge, but they are not the sole measure of success in Iraq.
...

Reducing our troop strength solely on the basis of trends in violence also misses the critical point that the mission of American forces in Iraq is shifting rapidly from counterinsurgency to peace enforcement. The counter-insurgency fight that characterized 2007 continues mainly in areas of northern Iraq. The ability of organized enemy groups, either Sunni or Shia, to conduct large-scale military or terrorist operations and to threaten the existence of the Iraqi government is gone for now. No area of Iraq today requires the massive, violent, and dangerous military operations that American and Iraqi forces had to conduct over the last 18 months in order to pacify various places or restore them to government control. Although enemy networks and organizations have survived and are regrouping, they will likely need considerable time to rebuild their capabilities to levels that pose more than a local challenge--and intelligent political, economic, military, and police efforts can prevent them from rebuilding at all.

I'm sure this is just what Gen. Odierno will tell whoever is elected in November. If, heaven forbid, it is Senator Obama, I just hope he listens. Sadly, I doubt he will.

Posted by Tom at 10:15 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

September 6, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 04 September 2008 - The Meaning of Pink

Col. Scott McBride, Commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), spoke via satellite with reporters at the Pentagon on Thursday. His current tour dates from October 2007.

McBride's 1st Brigade Combat Team is part of Multi-National Division North, also known as Task Force Iron. Responsible for an area including the cities of Balad, Kirkuk, Tikrit, Mosul, and Samarra. MND-North is headquartered by the U.S. Army's 1st Armored Division.

I'm not sure, but I do not think that the entire 101st is in Iraq. As such, my guess is that Col. McBride reports to Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, Commander of Multi-National Division-North. Hammond reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Forces - Iraq (Gen Ray Odierno will assume command of MNF-Iraq sometime later this year). Petraeus reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until April. Until Petraeus assumes command of CENTCOM sometime later this year, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

There was much of interest in this briefing, but if you want to find out what I meant by "The Meaning of Pink" you'll have to read the excerpts below.

COL. MCBRIDE: ...As was pointed out, we're going on our 12th month being gone from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and our brigade combat team of 4,000 soldiers continues to perform, in my opinion, exceptionally well.

I will tell you up front that the situation here continues to improve from a security standpoint. And having said that, we still have work to do.

There's still an active enemy out there that we are pursuing and going after every day. And all indicators across the board -- economic, governance and development of our Iraqi security forces -- is getting better. And it's significantly better than it was in January, February of this year, which -- when, in my opinion, was probably the low point of our tour.

So having said that, I'm happy to take any questions that you've got.

Although I did not include all of it, it was a very short intro. On to the Q & A

Q Colonel, this is Dave Wood from The Baltimore Sun. I know that you've been doing a pretty intensive job in terms of trying to penetrate the IED networks and that's sort of a multifaceted, multidimensional kind of -- part of the fight. How much of that are the Iraqis able to take over now? And do you see them taking over that fight, including the -- all the ISI hook-ups and everything else that goes into it, the battlefield forensics, any time in the near future?

COL. MCBRIDE: ...Okay. I'm going to answer that in two parts. One, the amount and volume of improvised explosive devices continues to decline in the province. The way that we've approached IED and -- combating IEDs is, we look at how they affect the population and their ability to move. If you look at MSR Tampa -- and MSR Tampa is a main highway that runs from Baghdad, runs through the length of this province and then runs all the way up to Mosul -- in November of 2007, probably 10 or 11 IEDs a day on MSR Tampa; today, an average of maybe one or two a day.

The important part of that is that those IEDs are largely ineffective. And for that reason, the population is able to travel those roadways. And my concern with IEDs, quite frankly, is not how they affect our forces -- and we have not had one soldier who's been seriously wounded on that main highway -- but how it affects the population and their ability to move. So that's how we've approached combating the IED network, because frankly, we've always seen it as a tactic the enemy uses to force use to lock down those highways and restrict the way the population moves.

And we've taken kind of counterintuitive approach, and now the population is moving on those highways. Economic commerce is moving. I think it's helped the economy, and the people believe they're safe on those highways.
...

The second point is, if you look at all the major -- the major supply routes or movement routes and then the auxiliary movement routes in our province, those are manned largely and secured largely by the Iraqi security forces. Our soldiers really aren't doing that. They are doing that on a day-to-day basis. So what the people see out there is the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police and the Sons of Iraq securing those roadways.

We've heard in other recent briefings that while the IED threat is still present, there are not only fewer of them but that they are less effective. Col Ted Martin, commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, said that "we're seeing homemade explosives, low quality, and many that have improper initiation systems" in his briefing on August 4. Col. Tom James, commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 3rd Infantry Division said in his July 24 briefing of al Qaeda that "we see that the recent attacks are IEDs of a primitive nature." So we seem to have a trend.

Q Hi, Colonel. This is Jeff Schogol with Stars and Stripes. The Army is going to be holding a roundtable later today on suicide prevention. Can you talk about what trends you have noticed with suicides in your unit?

COL. MCBRIDE: Thankfully, we have not had any suicides in our outfit since we deployed. Back in back in May, it was about our halfway point, and I was doing some serious thinking about what we wanted to accomplish as a team our last six months. And one of those things was, as a goal, to go home without a soldier having committed suicide.

And really the key there is our junior leaders communicating and then listening to our junior soldiers, and then leaders talking to other leaders. That's -- one of the things I see is that many times, leaders at the rank of staff sergeant, sergeant first class, captain, who have been here two or three times and are leaders, are reluctant to share the struggles they have with other leaders. I encourage them to do that. I share the struggles I have, because I'm on my third deployment. ...

This is a serious issue that needs to be addressed continually.

Suicides are a favorite topic on the leftist blogs. One wonders, what was the suicide rate in previous wars? I hate to sound smart-alecy, but if you just listen to the left you'd think that suicide and post-traumatic stress syndrome were never problems before the war in Iraq.

Q Colonel, this is Andrew Gray from Reuters.... At what point do you think your area will be ready to have a smaller U.S force there? At what point will the Iraqis be able to take up more of the responsibility?

COL. MCBRIDE: I will tell you that having been here in 2006 and worked -- and having worked specifically in that job with the Iraqi security forces and then being here for a year now, they have improved dramatically. I was not encouraged in 2006 when I left here in September. And we got back here in October last year, and over that period of time, this Iraqi army and these Iraqi -- and these Iraqi police -- Iraqi national police that work with us have made dramatic improvements....

And the other thing I see is the quality of leadership is significantly better at the company and battalion level than what I saw two years ago, and that makes all the difference in the world.

Col. McBride went on but would not commit to a time frame. This is the standard answer all commanders give. It's all "conditions based" and they refuse to be locked to a date.

The other important point is that the Colonel sees dramatic improvement in Iraqi forces from his time in 2006 and today. I've also heard this from most other commanders, most of whom have also served multiple tours.

The next question is about the all important issue of political reconciliation. Remember that Col. McBride can only answer for his area of responsibility.

Q Colonel, it's Luis Martinez of ABC News. How would you rank the challenges that you face right now? Which is the greatest challenge? Is it still the security challenge or is it more the infrastructure or getting funds, let's say, from the central government into the provincial government?

COL. MCBRIDE: Five months ago, hands-down, I would have told you security was our greatest challenge. Security is still a challenge, but if I had to rate them now, it's governance, security, economics all kind of neck-and-neck here. Because of the increased security we've got here we're able to get on with some development and then governance.

So I am working very hard while paying attention to our security operations and tying the provincial government with the equivalent of the county governments and then the county governments with our equivalent of the city governments, because in this province there's an inherent distrust, at all levels, of each other. And it's mainly because they don't talk.

That's improved pretty dramatically in the past three months. I'll give you an example. We have the city of Ad Dawr. If you'll remember, just north of Ad Dawr, that's where Saddam Hussein was captured when he was captured. The people of Ad Dawr in 2005 did not vote in the elections, therefore they had no representation on the city council.

Ad Dawr lies about six or seven miles from the provincial capital of Tikrit. For the last two years, no one from the provincial government had been to Ad Dawr and visited their people or their government.

At my urging, working with my partner, the governor and the deputy governor and the provincial leadership, I encouraged them to go to Ad Dawr and listen to the people, go talk to the people. And we've done that twice and it's made a tremendous impact on that city.

About two -- about three weeks after that, things started to happen in that city, and then the population began to have a little bit of trust in their government. And then business owners came together and over a stretch of about one mile, as you run through the center of the city of Ad Dawr, which is about probably 65,000 people, they had painted every shop pink, which was quite amazing to see.

But I asked them, why did you paint everything pink? They said this is the color of peace and reconciliation.

But I think that effort by the provincial government to tie itself to that district made a huge difference. So that's taken up a large amount of our -- of my personal effort and efforts of junior leaders at their respective levels, to tie and to develop the trust so these different levels of government can work together and achieve something for the population.

Wow. What could Code Pink think of this?

Al Pessin, known by me for asking some of the more tough questions, followed up on Andrew Gray' earlier question about drawing down U.S. forces.

Q Colonel, it's Al Pessin from Voice of America. I want to follow up on two of the earlier questions. You said that Iraqi security forces have made dramatic improvements, and yet your unit will be replaced by a unit of similar size and capability. When do you see that changing? When will the Iraqis, with these dramatic improvements, be able to stand more on their own in that province? ...

COL. MCBRIDE: Okay. Okay. The first question, I guess back in 2006 I saw how -- I saw how ineffective they were, because they, in many cases, were at their infancy. So that's what I mean when I say a dramatic improvement. I would hope that in, you know, the next several months to the next year, we could look at -- if everything stays progressing at the way -- at the rate it is now, some reduction of forces here. And that's going to be -- and on a -- and I would say a repeated phrase, but that's going to be contingent upon conditions on the ground....

The Iraqi police are not progressing as quickly as the Iraqi army is. Their performance is uneven across the board. That's largely dependent on leadership. Most of these forces have their equipment. They have their cars. They have their weapons. It's dependent on leadership....

...I wouldn't advocate any drawdown yet, plus we have a huge geographical area where now I can push or we can push both our forces and Iraqi security forces out into deserts, both east and west, which -- frankly, six months ago, al Qaeda had their way in these deserts. They moved from north to south in the deserts, both east and west.

So a little while longer -- we don't -- we haven't held enough to do -- to -- to talk about a drawdown, in my opinion, in the province. And oh, by the way, if you talk to the provincial leadership here, they'll tell you, "We are not ready for you to leave. You need to stay. We're making progress. It's not time."

Two steps forward, one step back. In other words, a typical war. The friction is all around, yet we move forward, if slowly. The key is to fight smart and never get complacent. What works today might not work tomorrow.

"I wouldn't advocate any drawdown yet." I hope whoever is elected in November listens to the troops who are fighting this war.

Posted by Tom at 5:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

August 30, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 28 Aug 2008 - "The progress...since my last visit is absolutely phenominal"

This briefing is by Pat White, Commander of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, who provided an update on ongoing security operations in Iraq on August 28. In Iraq, he spoke via satellite to reporters at the Pentagon.

White reports to Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, commander of Multi-National Division-North (also known as Task Force Iron), which is headquartered by the 1st Armored Division.

Hertling reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Forces - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until April. Until Petraeus assumes comman of CENTCOM later this year, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The PentagonChannel website also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink website.

As is always the case, there was much of interest in this briefing. Perhaps most important though was the differences Col White saw in Iraq during his last deployment and what he encounters today:

COL. WHITE: ...And before I begin, I'd like to say this is my second tour in Iraq. My first was as a commander of the Iron Dukes -- 2nd Battalion, 37th Tank Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division -- from May 2003 to July of 2004, where I served in Baghdad. First Armored Division, as you all know, was extended for three months during Muqtada al-Sadr's first uprising and my battalion fought for five weeks in An Najaf.

Honestly, the progress here in Iraq since my last visit is absolutely phenomenal. I can state this because a portion of my current brigade sector was also a portion of my battalion sector five years ago. Five years ago, as a battalion commander, I never worked with an Iraqi army unit. The combined security cooperation effort depended almost solely on an Iraqi police force heavily infiltrated by the Jaish al-Mahdi. At that time, we supported the recruitment and training of a nation organization named the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps.

Today, I'm partnered with an Iraqi army division and the qadha has six fully functioning Iraqi police stations with a district headquarters, highway patrol and an emergency response unit. Now Iraqi security forces routinely plan, prepare and execute offensive operations and the population clearly respects and trusts them.

Our mission, in partnership with the Iraqi security forces is to secure the population and interdict accelerants -- accelerants being described as enemy forces and munitions -- from entering Baghdad.

Clearly, there is a measurable improvement in the security of the Madain. And this improvement is primarily a function of the hard work done by our predecessor unit, the 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, known as the Hammer Brigade, which is one of the surge brigades that operated out here in the Madain prior to our arrival.

When Colonel Wayne Grigsby's brigade assumed responsibility for the Madain in 2007, attacks averaged two and a half a day. In April, as we began transitioning with the Hammer Brigade, attacks were down to one per day. And today, as I sit here and speak to you, attacks are less than one per day, with over half of those directed at Iraqi security forces.

I believe the significant reduction and the fact that attacks remain low can be attributed to two things: first and obviously, the astounding efforts of the Hammer Brigade over 14 months and now our 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, in an area that really saw very little U.S. presence prior to 2007. Now the populace is absolutely assured of our commitment and the commitment of the Iraqi security forces. The second contributor to the decrease in attacks is the ever-increasing professionalism of the Iraqi security forces. Coupled with the security contributions of the Sons of Iraq, we have achieved a point here in the Madain where operations are by, with and through Iraqi security forces.

All these efforts combined deny anti-Iraqi forces sanctuary and provide a solid foundation of hope for the free citizens of the Madain.

So as you can see progress has been tremendous. I've seen this in briefing after briefing by commanders who have had previous tours in Iraq. Go over to the sidebar of this blog under "Categories,", select "Iraq II 2007 - 2008", scroll though the briefings and you'll see what I mean. More importantly, the reporters never challenge this assertion. The key new is moving forward to economic and political progress.

Fortunately, both seem to be happening. The Iraqi government has met most of the benchmarks set by Congress, and oil revenues are helping spur the economy. It is vital that we Americans not get stupid and short sighted by demanding the Iraqis "pay us back" before this thing is settled. Sadly, I've seen this call for "pay back" come from some on the right as well as the usual suspects on the left.

On to the Q & A. The camera shows that this briefing was pretty sparsely attended. Odd that this would be so. Given that these are military/Pentagon reporters, I wouldn't think that that they're all off covering the conventions. Maybe it's just an acknowledgment that the war is winding down. No bad news is no news.

The first major topic was the Sons of Iraq (SOI), formerly called Concerned Local Citizens, which have been discussed extensively in numerous briefings. They function as a sort of super-neighborhood watch. Many are armed, but not by us or the Iraqi government. The point is to get the Iraqis involved in their own security.

Many of the SOI are Sunni, and are thus regarded with suspicion with the mostly Shiite government in Baghdad. Reports are that the Iraqi government wants to disband them....but that may only be in certain areas, I'm not totally sure.

Our objective is to integrate members of the SOI into the police, army, or government, but this is easier said than done.

Q Colonel, Jeff Schogol with Stars and Stripes. I've seen reports that the government of Iraq is actually arresting members of the Sons of Iraq. Are you having to deal with any of that in your area?

COL. WHITE: Well, here in the Madain, as I mentioned, we've got 6,000 Sons of Iraq. ...We have not experienced any warrants or any arrests at this point in time for any of our Sons of Iraq, and I think that really goes back to a question of who reconciled with the government of Iraq and who -- and who did not.
...

Q Could you talk about how the -- what progress you're making in either integrating these Sons of Iraq into the security forces or training them for other jobs?

COL. WHITE: Absolutely. And I think this is a common theme across Iraq, but let me talk about specifically in the Madain. Again, I have a pretty low number of Sons of Iraq, and it's -- and it's based on the security situation here and the need for them. We have a number of programs that we transition. The first and most important for us and for the government of Iraq is that transition from Sons of Iraq into either the Iraqi police, the Iraqi army or the Iraqi National Police.

We currently have over 400 packets in with Ministry of Interior to transition Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi police force. Next month we'll begin a recruiting drive again for another 1,000 Iraqi police shurta. Now not all of those will be Sons of Iraq, but it's another opportunity for us to engage the Sons of Iraq. They consistently look at how they can backfill into the Iraqi army with Sons of Iraq after they are recruited and trained.

But that is just one area where we transition Sons of Iraq. Here in Madain we have nine civil service corps projects that are solely employing Sons of Iraq. Most of them are down in the Salman Pak area. I do have two that are in the Jisr Diyala area, and then we have three more that we're looking at for the Nahrawan area, to assist us in providing them the training that is required to seek and gain a sustainable job over time.

There are a number of Iraqi initiatives that will also begin, as we are familiar with it, on the new fiscal year. And as we study and look at those programs, I'll be able to pass along what we think from a percentage-wise that we be able to transition.

But truly we remain committed to the Sons of Iraq. The government of Iraq has also recently said they're very committed to maintaining the Sons of Iraq here in the Madain -- can't speak for the rest of Iraq.

So we'll see. The SOI are not so important as an institution, but as an idea or attitude. It is vital that the Iraqis believe that their government cares about them and that it has their best interests at heart. Further, they must believe that they can take part in that government, that they have a say in their future. I'll be watching these briefings and other news sources carefully for future developments.

Posted by Tom at 8:10 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Iraq Briefing - 18 August 2008 - "al Qaeda is in disarray"

This briefing is by the commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq, Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin III. Austin replaced Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno in February 2008, who at the time had been appointed Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army. This Wednesday Odierno was appointed commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq, the position now held by Gen. David Petraeus. Petraeus, in turn, has been appointed the next commander of CENTCOM. Both of these changes require Senate confirmation and so even if approved they will not take their new jobs until later this summer.

As the second-highest commander in Iraq, Austin reports directly to Gen. Petraeus. Petraeus reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last month. Until Petraeus assumes command of CENTCOM later this year, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey will remain as acting commander. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The PentagonChannel website also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink website.

Truth be told, this wasn't a terribly exciting interview. Austin doesn't come across as well as his predecessor, or most of his subordinates, for that matter. But I'm pretty well determined to cover all of these briefings as we can learn something from each of them.

GEN. AUSTIN: ...Let me say up front that our mission in Iraq has not changed. Our number one task remains protecting the Iraqi population. We're also focused on developing a capable and professional Iraqi security force and helping to build civil capacity.

And we're making progress in each of these areas every day. And while these efforts are progressing at a different pace, they're all moving forward in a positive and tangible manner.

Today, the Multinational Corps Iraq is operating in more areas of the country with fewer troops, and our security gains continue to trend in a positive direction even after the redeployment of five brigade combat teams, and most recently the Georgian brigade. We've been able to achieve this success because of an increasingly effective Iraqi security force, one that is growing in capability and in confidence. And as a result, we have seen signs of hope and prosperity return to many parts of the country that were once previously threatened by criminals and terrorists and others who don't want Iraq to achieve its full potential.

For 10 of the last 11 weeks, we've sustained less than 200 attacks per week nationwide. It is undeniable that Iraq is in a much better place than it was several months ago. And we're very encouraged by these positive trends, but we realize that there remain threats to the population and there is still much work to be done.

In the north, al Qaeda is in disarray, and its capability to conduct well-planned and coordinated attacks is limited, but they still pose a real threat to the population. And a couple of weeks ago, I walked through an open market in Mosul that was several kilometers long, and it was overflowing with Iraqis. Now that's something that would not have been possible just a couple of months ago, and this is a clear sign that we are making progress indeed.

We must, however, keep sight of the fact that al Qaeda retains the capability to perform high-profile attacks on the population. Suicide vests, which are a trademark of al Qaeda, account for less than 3 percent of the total number all of all attacks, but they account for 65 percent of all casualties. And most of those casualties are innocent civilians. So you can see that while al Qaeda is in disarray, they are still capable of ruthless attacks.

In short, we've scored a decisive victory but dangers remain.

"Our number one task remains protecting the Iraqi population." This is straight out of U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. Today such a strategy sounds obvious, but as unbelievable as it sounds this isn't what we focused on until the adoption of classic counterinsurgency tactics under Gen Petraeus.

Our focus from 2003-06 was on raiding from large, secure bases. As we learned, this simply doesn't work. To win, counterinsurgent forces need to live among the populace.

GEN. AUSTIN:...The Iraqi security forces have gained valuable experience through their operations in Basra and Sadr City, Mosul, Amarah and now in Diyala. And the operations in Diyala are some of the best Iraqi-planned and executed operations to date. And this is impressive because the Iraqi security forces are growing and training all while fighting an insurgency.

Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, commander of MNC-North, spoke about this on Aug 11 in his press briefing. Kimberly Kagan's Institute for the Study of War also has an excellent report on the situation in Diyala.

Troop levels are a concern back home and it's only natural that the American people want to know when we can bring more troops home. Al Pessin from the VOA asks about just this:

Q General, it's Al Pessin from Voice of America. I know that you and General Petraeus are now in the period of assessment. I wonder if you could share with us -- I see you smiling. You know -- you knew this was coming, I guess. Can you share with us your at least general feeling about how low you can go? You said security's been sustained with the withdrawals you've already had. What more do you think you can do, say, by the end of the year?

GEN. AUSTIN: Well, sir, as you know, we've always been clear that, you know, we'll make our recommendations based upon the conditions on the ground at the time when we have to provide those recommendations.
...

And so at the point that we make those recommendations, we'll take all of those things into consideration. And General Petraeus and I are in continual dialogue about these issues. And I'll make a recommendation to him. And at some point, he will make a recommendation to the leadership, at Central Command and in Washington.

But again it is a continual process of assessing the conditions on the ground, what we're faced with and our ability to provide the level of security necessary to continue to move forward. And we have seen some progress, some significant progress over the last several weeks, last several months.

Not getting the answer he quite wanted, Pessin tried again:

Q General, based on what you see today, do you feel like you could lose more combat brigades or battalions, between now and the end of the year, and still sustain security?

GEN. AUSTIN: Based upon what I see today, again, I'm always encouraged by what our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are causing to happen and the things that they're doing, working with the Iraqi security forces, to improve conditions on a daily basis.

If conditions continue to improve, absolutely, that presents some opportunities for us. But again we're not making that recommendation today. We'll make that recommendation at some point in the future. And that will be based upon what we're looking at at that point.

And once again Austin said that it depends on "conditions on the ground" at that moment. Our military leaders have been quite clear in that it is inappropriate to commit to numbers of troops ahead of time.

The Sons of Iraq program, originally Concerned Local Citizens, have been important to contributing to our success. It got the Iraqi people to take responsibility for their own security. For a variety of reasons the program is coming to an end, and the question is what will happen to its members.

Q General, David Wood from the Baltimore Sun. Could you give us a status report on the Sons of Iraq program; how many you've got nationwide, how many you envision being absorbed into the Iraqi security forces by the end of the year? And what are you going to do with the rest of them? GEN. AUSTIN: Well, a couple of weeks ago, we had about 101,000. Today, we're down to a little over 99,000. And the reason that that number has reduced is because some of those Sons of Iraq we've helped to find jobs. Others have been either wounded and some have lost their lives in the process of helping us to provide security for the country; helping us to help the Iraqis provide security for the country. ...

What we will look to do with the Sons of Iraq is to place about 20 percent of them into security force positions with the police or the army. And then the remainder of those Sons of Iraq's -- Sons of Iraq we hope to help find jobs, meaningful jobs that can help them provide for their families.
...

Q Hi, general. This is Courtney Kube from NBC News. When you answered Tom Bowman's question earlier, about transitioning Anbar to provincial Iraqi control, you said that the agreement wasn't yet finalized; there were still details to work out. Several weeks ago, we were told that it was a dust storm that was the delay in this PIC transition.

What's the reality here? Was the agreement never really finalized?

GEN. AUSTIN: At that point, it was, I think. But since then, they've gone in to work out some more details that they would have liked to have seen worked out. And that was, in fact, what delayed the ceremony at that point in time. It was a dust storm. And so again as the provincial government and the government of Iraq work things out, they will announce the scheduling of the ceremony. And I'll leave that to them to announce.

Q (Off mike.) changed since then? What's still not agreed upon?

GEN. AUSTIN: Well, you know, I'm not involved in that dialogue, between the provincial government and the Iraqi government. And so I'm really not the best person to outline, for you, the details that they may be finalizing.

Try as she might, she couldn't get much of an answer.

Overall Lt Gen Austin is less impressive than his predecessor, Ray Odierno. He tends to skirt questions, is less conversational, and isn't as decisive in his answers. He may well be a good corps commander and just doesn't come across well in press briefings. I've gotten more from the briefings given by his divisional and brigade commanders.

Previous
Iraq Briefing - 23 April 2008 - Meet the New Commander of MNC-Iraq

Posted by Tom at 8:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

August 12, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 11 August 2008 - Going after al Qaeda with a Vengance

Yes I know, I suppose I should be writing about the Russia-Georgia war. The truth is I want to but don't have the time to put together a proper post on it. I had some discussion on it with a commenter in my previous post, and if you want to talk about it in the comments to this post instead of the briefing that is fine.

Maj. Gen. Mark Hertling, Commander of Multi-National Division-North (also known as Task Force Iron) and the 1st Armored Division, spoke via satellite Monday to reporters at the Pentagon.

Maj. Gen. Hertling reports to reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Forces - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until April. Until Petraeus is confirmed by Congress for this position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The PentagonChannel website also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink website.

There were several items of interest in this briefing, but perhaps most interesting was Gen Hertling's description of how they have chased most of the insurgents from the cities into the countryside.

GEN. HERTLING:...Since Operation Umm al-Rabiain or Mother of Two Springs started on the 15th of May, we've seen a sharp decline, not only in attacks but in foreign fighters traversing the western Ninewa deserts. And we have captured or killed dozens of mid- and high-level AQI operatives in the province and in the city of Mosul itself. With the Iraqi army, we've also disrupted the flow of foreign terrorists from Syria, as I said, through that western Jazirah Desert.

I visited Mosul yesterday and walked the streets of that city with my good friend Lieutenant General Riyadh, who is the Ninewa Operations Command commander, real good friend of mine, as well as Governor Kashmula. It is still a city recovering from years of harsh combat, but the population is feeling more secure every day. We talked to many of the people on the streets on both sides of the city, and they are becoming increasingly concerned not so much about security but about infrastructure repair and their number one topic of jobs.

This pretty much mirrors what we've heard in the last two briefings, whereby operations have gone from kinetic to economics and jobs.

And, just as with all the other briefings I've watched recently, Hertling warns that it's still not over yet. Continuing with his opening statement:

GEN. HERTLING:...While security is improved, we are still involved in a tough fight against hardcore al Qaeda and other extremists in this city and this province. They've resorted to using car bombs. In fact, al Qaeda has called it -- the fight for Mosul -- the battle of the car bomb. And they have been seen to randomly kill innocent -- (inaudible). They are also using murder and intimidation to an increasing degree in Mosul, because those are crimes that can be done quite simply without being detected. So with our Iraqi friends, we are going after the cells that conduct all three of those types of operations with a vengeance.

The cities of Diyala and the large cities throughout the northern provinces are increasingly more secure because of Iraqis turning against al Qaeda and other extremists. The Iraqi police and army are becoming more capable. The extremists are being pushed into the rural areas because of this. They're active, so -- AQI is active, that is, so to secure the people of Iraq, we must continue to pursue the enemy -- and that's, in fact, the name of our operation, Iron Pursuit -- and we must capture or kill the hard-core terrorists that are residing now out in the hinterlands.

Keeping up the pressure against AQI (al Qaeda in Iraq) and the other insurgent groups is obviously key. We don't want them running around in the countryside either, but when they were in the city they could wreck much more havoc.

The first exchange goes to the heart of counterinsurgency strategy:

Q Hi, Major General Hertling. You had mentioned that the strategy in Diyala is to pursue the enemy. AP is reporting that the Iraqi government is giving insurgents a week -- has called a week-long cease-fire in Diyala in order to give insurgents a chance to turn themselves in. How does that fit into the strategy of continuing to pursue the enemy

GEN. HERTLING: Yeah. Well, we will continue to pursue with coalition force operations. We have heard of that tactical pause. And I think quite frankly, Jeff, that was a result of a session that was occurring on Saturday, which I attended, with the new deputy prime minister, Mr. al-Aswari (sp). He, in fact, got the governor of Diyala together, as well as the senior military leaders, as well as many of the sheikhs and provincial council members in that particular province, pulled them all together. And as we were conducting operation, he was looking not only to continue to go after the hard- core extremists and terrorists, but also to give those who are perhaps just along for the money or because they are gang members an opportunity to change their mind and perhaps not get killed or captured but instead turn themselves in.

We've seen the success of that particular strategy in other provinces. In fact, in Salahuddin, I can tell you that we've had over 2,000 former insurgents turn themselves in. Some of them have been tried in court, and in fact several of them are serving sentences now. But they came to us and said: Hey, we don't want to run, and we don't want to be killed anymore. We see the power of the vote overcoming the power of the gun, so we're turning ourselves in.

So I think -- I hope this answers your question -- I think what the Iraqi government is doing in this particular case with this cease- fire is as a result of the visit on Saturday of the deputy prime minister, to give those who don't want to fight anymore, the less hard-core, a chance to become a part of the society.

Some, primarily on the right, will object that we're pardoning insurgents who have attacked and maybe killed U.S. troops. And indeed they may have.

The answer is "do you want to win or are you just interested in making a moral point?" The fact is that history shows that successful counterinsurgencies win through a combination of militarily defeating the irreconcilables and moving into our camp those who can be reasoned with.

Although I don't have time to look up the exact quote the strategy outlined in the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24.

Yes it is painful to realize that we've got to accept and forgive some insurgents who were involved in attacks on U.S. troops. I'm not minimizing that. Yes also that if we want to win it's something we've got to live with. Divide and conquer is part of every successful counterinsurgency.

Next, as with all insurgencies it is complicated, and we're not just facing one "al Qaeda in Iraq." Hertling explains:

Q It's Kimberly with CBS. Can you walk us through the makeup, as near as you can figure, of AQI, any other insurgents you're facing right now, foreign fighters versus domestic? Are you facing any militia activity as well, and what kind of -- you said car bombs; do you also have EFPs?

GEN. HERTLING: ...We have not seen very many EFPs. We have over the last several months. We have not over the last several weeks...

Yes, in fact, Kimberly, what I'll tell you is, we think, as we've looked at the enemy in the foreign northern provinces, we've -- we have about seven different enemies, seven different fights. Many of them are calling themselves al Qaeda. I would almost tell you that in the north, we have more foreign fighters associated with al Qaeda in Ninewa province, in Mosul itself. We are seeing reflections of several different foreign fighters coming in through the Syrian desert, and those are the ones we've been targeting very hard, the Shari'a cells, the emirs of Mosul, some of the areas in the western desert.

When you go to Diyala, they will call themselves AQI, or the Islamic State of Iraq. But they're more the homegrown extremists, and in fact many of the parts of ISI or AQI are truly gang members. And that's why I say this reconciliation -- or the Iraqis use the word "musalaha" -- is going after them to try and win them over, maybe show them the error of their ways.

In the areas in the central provinces, we've got really a mixed bag of Jaish al-Islami, Ansar al-Sunna, Naqshbandi, some new groups that are forming because the old groups are either breaking down or being literally sought and pursued, and they are trying to combine to keep viable. So we really have several organizations that are affecting the Iraqi people.

But the good news is, the Iraqis see them all as terrorists. They will call them all al Qaeda, although there are some differentiation between the different groups. But I've told my bosses that I think I've got about seven different organizations that I'm fighting in the north, and it depends on where you want to go to talk about which one is the most prevalent. That's -- (audio break) -- I know, and I'm sorry for that.

The Sons of Iraq (SOI) program, originally Concerned Local Citizens, has been a major factor in beating the insurgency. As with everything,though, there is controversy.

The purpose of the SOI is to get the Iraqi people to take ownership of their own security. In the battle of "hearts and minds" (please follow the link) it is essential to get them "off the fence" and into our camp. If they remain on the fence (or obviously if they support the insurgents), the insurgents win.

There are a few controversies over the SOI. One is that most or all of them are paid for by the U.S. and not the government of Iraq. This is a legitimate thing to bring up, but only to a point. There are some, on the right as well as the left, who seem willing to cut off our nose to spite our face. Their main objective seems to be getting money from the Iraqis rather than winning the war.

Two, the government of Iraq is wary of them because they're perceived as an alternate power structure. Many are Sunni, and of course Maliki is Shiite. Apparently the government is determined to disband the SOI program in the near future.

Q General, it's David Wood from the Baltimore Sun. Could you bring us up to date on the Sons of Iraq in your sector -- how many you've got on your payroll; how successful you've been in helping them move into the ISF? And are you telling them that this program is going to come to an end pretty soon and they ought to look for jobs as they can find them?

GEN. HERTLING: Yeah, I can, David. Thanks. That's a -- I can tell you to the number how many we have, but I'll just give you generalities. We started a few months ago with about 32,000 Sons of Iraq. We're down just under 29,000 today because we have been very active either in -- to getting them into the Iraqi security forces, primarily the police, but some into the army. And there's an interesting differentiation there. Most of them want to go into the police force because they can stay close to home. Some of them want to join the army.

There have been other programs established. In fact, the opening ceremony I was at this morning saw about 500 Sons of Iraq in Kirkuk province -- (audio break) -- into the civil service corps, which will train young men to be carpenters, electricians, farmers and things like that, all being paid for by the Iraqi government. So we're gradually transferring the responsibility to the Iraqi government, both from a security standpoint but also of getting them jobs and in some cases even giving them education.

We have an internal task force goal in the north of cutting that by about 40 percent by October. So we hope to be down somewhere around 16(,000) or 18,000 by October that are still on U.S. payroll, with a continual effort to get those into other jobs and other commitments. And it's working relatively well to get them down that way.

There was another question I was going to answer. It is -- oh, have we told them that this is happening? Yes, we have. In some cases, they choose not to believe it. They're putting this off, because some of these young men have done a very good, patriotic job of defending their country and would like to enter the security forces or other jobs, but right now the jobs just aren't available in those numbers. But we hope to have them available and have these individuals either trained or educated to join the security forces or get after jobs.

During his closing remarks, Gen Hertling reminds us as to why he is so optimistic regarding the future:

GEN. HERTLING: ...But what I'll tell you today is, I have never been as confident or as hopeful for Iraq as I am right now. It is -- today it was 127 degrees when I was out with some both Iraqi army forces and U.S. Army forces, and they were continuing to take the fight to the enemy. And then immediately I switched to a session with some politicians. I was with the governor of Diyalah on Sunday -- correction, Saturday. I was with the governor of Ninewa on Sunday. I was with the governor of Kirkuk today. And all of them are trying to get jobs for their people and make the system work.

Previous briefings by MG Hertling

• Iraq Briefing - 09 June 2008 - Job Creation to Defeat the Insurgency


• 19 November 2007


• 09 January 2008 - Operations Phantom Phoenix and Iron Harvest


• 22 Jan 2008 - Operation Iron Harvest

Posted by Tom at 10:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

August 5, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 04 August 2008 - Achieving Durable Security

This briefing is by Col. Ted Martin, Commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division. The 4th ID relieved the First Cavalry Division in December of 2007. This is Col Martin's first press briefing.

The 4th ID is part of Multi-National Division Baghdad, also known as Task Force Baghdad. Its major area of responsibility is the city of Baghdad. MND-Baghdad is headquartered by the 4th Infantry Division from Fort Hood, Texas.

Col. Martin reports to Maj. Gen. Hammond, commanding general of the 4th ID, and thus of Multi-National Division-Baghdad. Hammond reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Forces - Iraq (Gen Ray Odierno will assume command of MNF-Iraq sometime later this year). Petraeus reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until April. Until Petraeus assumes command of CENTCOM sometime later this year, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

his and other videos can be seen at the DODvClips website. The Pentagon Channel also has videos and news stories, so visit it as well.

The transcript is on the DefenseLink site.

There's quite a bit of interest in this brlefing, but perhaps most important was the issue of whether our security gains are permanent. From the Colonel's opening statement:

COL. MARTIN:...The mission of my brigade is to protect the population. We accomplish this by standing shoulder-to-shoulder with our Iraqi security force brothers defending the people of Rashid. Together, we conduct relentless offensive operations designed to kill, capture or drive from Rashid anyone who threatens the safety and security of the people we have sworn to protect. This is a straightforward mission and it translates into hours of backbreaking work in miserable conditions, patrolling alongside our Iraqi counterparts to defeat anti-government forces.

Our hard work and sacrifices have paid off. There's been a measurable improvement in the security in the Rashid district since our arrival here in March. When we arrived, we averaged five attacks per day in the Rashid district. By July, we'd reduced that average to 1.5 attacks per day. As a reference point, in the same security district there were 824 attacks in July of 2007 with a daily average of 27 attacks, making Rashid one of the most dangerous places in Iraq.

I believe this reduction in violence is a direct result of the conditions set by the success of the surge in forces and combat power. We built on this success and have seen a dramatic reduction in violence in the past four months. For example, we have reduced the number of attacks from 122 in April to 48 in July. This represents a 61 percent reduction. The daily attack average was four in April and has been reduced to 1.5 in July. Additionally, there were 18 rocket and mortar attacks in April and only three in July of 2008. This represents an 83 percent decrease. Regarding the IED (Improvised Explosive Device), there were 69 attacks in April and 37 in July, and this is a 46 percent decrease. When we look at direct-fire attacks, we saw 30 in April and five in July. This represents an 83 percent decrease.

"The mission of my brigade is to protect the population." This is the strategy laid out in U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, which has been the bible for our troops in Iraq since its release in December of 2006.

The key to success in counterinsurgency is making protecting the population your first priority. Without that nothing else is possible. Political and economic progress can only occur after security has been achieved. Our mistake in the early years was in thinking that if we could put a stable, representative government in place, coupled with public works programs, we could win over the populace. This strategy failed.

Now that the populace has been secured, it is time to get on with the political and economic progress that is vital to ensuring that our gains take hold and are permanent.

Continuing with the Colonel's opening statement:

COL. MARTIN:(continued) What this reduction in violence in Rashid district has allowed me to do is to shift my focus from kinetic operations to enabling the improvement of essential services and to continue to improve the capabilities of our Iraqi security force partners. It is my firm belief that the decisive defeat of the special group criminals and militias in May and June of this year has opened a window of opportunity for us to make substantial and lasting improvements in the Rashid district...

Seizing on the improved security conditions, we are pursuing reconstruction progress -- projects to improve the quality of life for the Iraqi people. To date, we have completed 22 projects valued at more than $5 million. Currently, we are managing 78 active projects valued at more than $45 million. We've also proposed an additional 117 projects valued at more than $26 million. Each product -- project is coordinated with the Rashid district council leadership to ensure that we are meeting the needs of the people. I'm very proud of the work my soldiers have done working hand-in-hand with the Rashid district council.

In closing, I'd like to thank the American public for their support. We receive care packages from family, friends and caring and patriotic people that we've never met from all across America, from an elementary classroom in Frankfort, Kentucky; Cub Scout Pack 773 in Houston, Texas; volunteers from Operation Gratitude from Encino, California and many others.

If like me you are sending packages to Iraq, do not think that your efforts are unrecognized.

As for the switch from "kinetic" to " enabling the improvement of essential services", this is a fundamental part of counterinsurgency. From FM 3-24:

1-4. Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible. This can include eliminating those extremists whose beliefs prevent them from ever reconciling with the government. Over time, counterinsurgents aim to enable a country or regime to provide the security and rule of law that allow establishment of social services and growth of economic activity. COIN thus involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone.

Before we go on, though, some clarification was needed about the number of attacks:

Q Hi, Colonel. Jeff with Stars and Stripes. Just a really quick housekeeping question.

I think you said initially attacks had dropped from an average of 5 in April, 5 per day, to 1.5 per day in July. But later I thought I heard you say it had dropped from 4 per day to 1.5 per day. Can you kind of clarify that?

COL. MARTIN: Yeah. If I confused you there, it should be -- it's averaging right at 5 attacks per day when we arrived. It's down -- (off mike) -- a day now.

The issue of Iranian involvement in Iraq is much in the news and is important for many reasons. One, if it makes defeating the insurgency that much harder. Two, if they are supplying the insurgency, as I'm sure they are, it shows the true nature of the Iranian leadership.

Q Colonel, it's Al Pessin from Voice of America. You mentioned that some of the folks you've captured have gotten support from Iran. Can you tell us what the time frame of that support was? Is that still going on? And what sort of support are they getting?

COL. MARTIN: Well, I can only speak for the Rashid district. But I can guarantee you that we have found Iranian-made munitions inside of the Rashid district. Upon arriving into the battlespace in March of this year, pretty much we coincided with the uprising of the Special Group criminals. We started uncovering caches.

Some of these, we uncovered through reconnaissance operations, through active patrolling. But many of them were -- actually the people of Rashid district called in on our tip lines. And just as an example, within the last two weeks, we found a cache of munitions hidden inside of a water tank. That was a combined operation between the national police and my forces in the vicinity of the town known as Abu T'shir. Inside of that water tank, we found 107-millimeter rockets that were clearly Iranian made.

Now, I am not an expert on munitions. I rely on the experts, in the explosive ordnance disposal company and the other assets we have in Baghdad that can determine the origin of these weapons. So in this case, we found rockets which had obviously been used or been planned to be used against the people of Iraq; Iranian-made, I believe, February 2008.

Despite this, you don't have to go far on the Internet to see the left furiously denying Iranian involvement in Iraq. Their claim is that it's all falsified evidence and part of yet another plot by the evil neocons to invade another country.

The MRAP (link) has been a politically hot issue (also link to your post on Humvee armor). The Administration has been criticized for not getting more armor into the field faster.

MRAP stands for Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, and refers to not one but a whole family of vehicles. They were developed specifically in response to the IED threat in Iraq.

This is all a bit ironic since during the 90s the call was for "faster and lighter" fighting forces. Heavy armor was said to be "Cold War", and thus the product of old thinking. At the time The Enlightened Ones were severely critical of anyone who thought that we might just need armor on the battlefield.

However, as soon as it became apparent that we needed more armor in Iraq to protect our soldiers, the Administration came under attack for having too light of a force. When Rumsfeld made the common-sense statement that "you go to war with the army you have" (verify) he was chastised by those who apparently think you can field new equipment overnight.

Q Yeah. This is Kernan Chaisson with Forecast International. The GAO has talked about the MRAP program, saying that in order to get the vehicles to the field, multiple manufacturers were used, and as a result, there's the potential for problems with maintenance, sustainability, training and that sort of thing. Has your unit received its full complement of MRAPs? Are they all from the same company? And have you experienced any problems as a result of them being so new?

COL. MARTIN: Sure. I'm in a heavy brigade combat team. My primary mode of transportation on the battlefield are tanks, Bradleys and howitzers.

We do have our fair share of MRAPs. I think they're fantastic pieces of equipment. I currently have 136 MRAPs. There are, I think, three or four different varieties. Just like there's different varieties of humvees, there's different varieties of MRAPs. We have some of the larger troop-carrying ones and some of the smaller versions. My operational readiness rate is -- maintained over 90 percent since I arrived in country, and I don't see that falling off. There's not a reliability problem with the MRAPs.

I'm very pleased with the -- both the MRAPs and the maintenance support I've received at Forward Operating Base Falcon. It's a good piece of equipment.

The question on everyone's mind, though, is whether the success of the surge will be permanent:

Q This is Jim Mannion from Agence France-Presse. I was wondering if you could talk about how durable you think this decline in violence is in your sector and how you would go about judging that.

COL. MARTIN: Sure. That's interesting you use the word "durable," because our commanding general had challenged us to achieve sustainable security in Baghdad, and I thought, as I arrived in the country, that was a pretty lofty goal, a tough mission. And we went after that.

Just before -- I guess just about a week ago, I was talking to the commanding general, and I told him I think we're on the cusp of achieving durable security. So we share the same word. I think that what I'm seeing right now in Rashid -- and again, I'm -- my view goes back to 2003, when I first arrived, through 2004 and again in 2005, and I've been studying this area since October of last year. There's been a phenomenal change in the security situation in Rashid district. And I don't want to speak to all of Baghdad, because that's not my area of operation. But in the southern quadrant, what I've seen is, I've seen the people come forward now and not accept militias.

This really broke in the May-June time frame. There seemed to be a wedge that was placed between the people and the insurgents and we tried to exploit that. And we've exploited that by continuing to improve the effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces. We also went all-out on our clearance operations to take away the base of support, and by that I mean he can't fight unless he has access to munitions.

A signal that I see in the Rashid district is the quality of the improvised explosive device. When we see the Iranian-made explosively-formed projectile, we know that the pipeline has not been cut off. Less and less do we see these specific anti-armor improvised explosive devices. We're seeing homemade explosives, low quality, and many that have improper initiation systems. So not only are they -- have they not been very effective in the past 45 days, that -- we've actually been able to discover more. That means that the quality foot soldiers of the enemy have either been killed, captured or driven away and now the amateurs are at work in our area.

A less-effective IED was exactly what Col Tom James, commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 3rd Infantry Division, was saying just last week in another briefing. Seems like we have a trend - a good one.

Continuing with Col Martin;

COL. MARTIN:(continued) Now, that is not to say that there's no threat to our soldiers, because frankly it's -- the improvised explosive device is very deadly. And complacency, when it sets in, is a big danger to our soldiers. So I would say that we're aggressively pursuing the IED threat. And what I'm seeing on the battlefield right now is telling me that there has been a fundamental shift in the security situation in Iraq and we are moving out fast to exploit that.

Q What would you have to see to go beyond it being on the cusp of durable security to being durable security? What more are you looking for?

COL. MARTIN: Well, as a military man, I'm pretty conservative. I'm going to look at the battlefield and I'm going to have to feel it in my gut. And I've got quite a bit of time here in Iraq and I've had different feelings in my gut. But right now, my gut is telling me that if we're not there, we're close.

And I think to actually say that the security is durable in my district, I need a little bit more time to convince myself. Again, I said I'm very conservative here. I don't want to -- I don't want to make a rash judgment on what I'm seeing, because, you know, it's easy to get disappointed in a combat zone. But I think, with the attitude of the people -- and that's what's different, the attitude of the people. These people are reaching out. They're opening their stores back up. They're participating more in the government. And the Rashid district council's one of the best in Baghdad.

I have a great relationship with District Council Chairman Mr. Yaqoub. I see that Mr. Yaqoub and the Iraqi security force brigade commanders, of which there are three in this area -- he's got a great relationship with them. So the voice of the people is shared between both the security forces and the governing forces in Rashid. And I've never -- frankly, I've never seen anything like that. And that is enabled by the blanket of security, the hard-fought and hard-won blanket of security that's been provided in the Rashid district. And I'll be honest; a lot of that success is because of the quality of the Iraqi security forces that we're seeing.

Field Manual 3-24:

A-60 ...Whatever else is done, the focus must remain on gaining and maintaining the support of the population. With their support, victory is assured; without it, COIN efforts cannot succeed.

A few more comments by Col Martin that are illustrative:

COL. MARTIN:...So more than 60 percent of my brigade is forward-deployed to a small company-sized outpost. And really, that's what makes us so successful, our connection with the people....

Field Manual 3-24:

A-24 The first rule of COIN operations is to establish the force's presence in the AO (area of operations).... This requires living in the AO close to the populace. Raiding from remote, secure bases does not work.

COL. MARTIN:...But they're (his soldiers) confident and they're confident in themselves and their leaders and their equipment. And that confidence also, I think, inspires the people of Rashid. At least that's what I've seen. And that -- it's kind of hard to put my finger on what I'm seeing. Maybe I'm not articulating it well enough. But what I'm seeing is a level of confidence that I've never seen before and a willingness to take a risk, you know, to open the store, to transit the area, to drive around to, you know, spend a little money on better clothes.

I'll tell you, that's one thing I've noticed. When the security situation is better, people dress better. And I'm seeing a lot of that in the area; a lot of little intangible things that you really can't put your finger on. But I think the biggest thing I've seen is, you know, the people of Rashid, they trust the Iraqi security forces. And that is a big leap.

Notice that Col Martin is intimately familiar with is AO (Area of Operations). Again, straight out of 3-24:

7-7 ...Effective commanders know the people, topography, economy, history, and culture of their area of operations (AO). They know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance within it...

7-8 Another part of analyzing a COIN (counterinsurgency) mission involves assuming responsibility for everyone in the AO. This means that leaders feel the pulse of the local populace, understand their motivations and care about what they want and need. Genuine compassion and empathy for the population provide an effective weapon against insurgents.

So as you can see, Col Martin knows exactly what he is doing. Let's not satisfy some political promise made during the heat of the primaries and ruin it all with a precipitous pullout.

Because if current trends continue, we're on the way to victory. And the United States, Iraq, and the Muslim world in general will be the better for it.

Posted by Tom at 10:15 PM | Comments (3) | TrackBack

August 4, 2008

"The New Reality in Iraq"

Time to post some of the more important articles on Iraq that I've seen in the past few months.

First up is one in the Wall Street Journal of a piece by Frederick Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, and Jack Keane. The Kagan's are married, and both are scholars with all sorts of degrees and whatnot. Jack Keane is retired chief of staff of the army. In December of 2006 Frederick Kagan, Jack Keane, and some others developed a plan to save Iraq that they presented to President Bush in December of 2006. Bush was impressed, and long story short their ideas helped lead to what we call "The Surge" (though they were hardly the only ones involved.

All of the most important objectives of the surge have been accomplished in Iraq. The sectarian civil war is ended; al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has been dealt a devastating blow; and the Sadrist militia and other Iranian-backed militant groups have been disrupted.

Meanwhile, the Iraqi government has accomplished almost all of the legislative benchmarks set by the U.S. Congress and the Bush administration. More important, it is gaining wider legitimacy among the population. The attention of Iraqis across the country is focused on the upcoming provincial elections, which will be a pivotal moment in Iraq's development.

The result is that we have an extraordinary - but fleeting - opportunity to advance America's security and the stability of a vital region of the world.

If you don't want to believe the Kagan's and Jack Keane because they were influential in promoting the plan that eventually became the Surge (are we to capitalize this or not?) maybe you'll believe the Associated Press. From an AP news analysis piece that has been quoted widely:

Despite the occasional bursts of violence, Iraq has reached the point where the insurgents, who once controlled whole cities, no longer have the clout to threaten the viability of the central government.

That does not mean the war has ended or that U.S. troops have no role in Iraq. It means the combat phase finally is ending, years past the time when President Bush optimistically declared it had. The new phase focuses on training the Iraqi army and police, restraining the flow of illicit weaponry from Iran, supporting closer links between Baghdad and local governments, pushing the integration of former insurgents into legitimate government jobs and assisting in rebuilding the economy.

Scattered battles go on, especially against al-Qaida holdouts north of Baghdad. But organized resistance, with the steady drumbeat of bombings, kidnappings, assassinations and ambushes that once rocked the capital daily, has all but ceased.

This amounts to more than a lull in the violence. It reflects a fundamental shift in the outlook for the Sunni minority, which held power under Saddam Hussein. They launched the insurgency five years ago. They now are either sidelined or have switched sides to cooperate with the Americans in return for money and political support.

Insurgencies don't end all at once, World War II style. They tend to peter out over many years. Lt. Col. (Dr) David Kilcullen (Australian Army, ret), senior advisor to Gen Petraeus in 2007 for counterinsurgency, was asked about timeframes by Charlie Rose in an interview on October 5, 2007. What Kilcullen said astonished Rose:

DAVID KILCULLEN: . there's two issues. One is a territorial issue. The other one is time. Let me talk time. There has never been a successful counterinsurgency that took less than 10 years.

CHARLIE ROSE: Less than 10 years?

DAVID KILCULLEN: Successful.

You have to watch the interview to get the full force of Rose's surprise. He couldn't believe what he was hearing.

Kilcullen did not mean that in a successful counterinsurgency there would be ten years of heavy fighting. What he meant is that there would be ten years where there would be some insurgents somewhere who could at least theoretically pose a danger.

While on her fourth trip to Iraq since May of 2007, Kimberly Kagan, mentioned above, visited the headquarters of a small Iraqi political party in Baghdad. She wanted to find out more about their campaign plans for the upcoming elections. After a tour of their headquarters, she and her fellow visitors spoke for a few hours with about 30 political activists and aspiring politicians, some young, some older. Most were men, but there were several women. Her observations make for fascinating reading:

We sip our tea and discuss the upcoming provincial elections. The party leader proudly takes out a folder containing the results of last week's poll, which the party commissioned from an independent firm. He has very high name recognition, strong favorable ratings, and low unfavorable ratings. If these continue until Iraq's national elections in 2009, he thinks he will retain his seat in parliament, and the party may gain a few more.

We are guests, so we ask our questions first. We discuss the party and its campaign, national issues such as foreign investment in Iraq, and foreign affairs including the Iranian nuclear program. We ask what they tell people when they go door to door: Why should anyone join and vote for their party? One older woman answers, We are religious people, but we are not a religious party. Any Iraqi can join, regardless of sect. We stand for all Iraqis. She says this gravely, and it does not seem a platitude.

These party members are hardly naive, despite their optimism. They have experienced politically driven and sectarian violence. The headquarters is surrounded by low, concrete barriers to protect it from vehicle bombs. After the party signed a lease for its first headquarters in Baghdad in 2005, the homeowner reneged on the agreement for fear that his property would be bombed, so the party moved.

I ask the young people why they have joined the party, and whether they hope to have careers in politics. One young man, who has been to college, explains that many young Iraqis have not had a proper education. He has joined the party and its youth committee to help improve Iraqi education, recruit good teachers, and ensure that all young people can not only read and write, but also acquire the skills that they will need to pursue their careers in a high-tech world. This is important, he insists, not only for the young people themselves, but also for the future of Iraq's economy, which must be able to compete in the global market. Another young man will not pursue a career exclusively in politics, but believes that when he enters the business world his political connections will come in handy.

The young woman with highlighted hair is frankly ambitious. She intends to have a political career and hopes to be a high party official someday--so she can better help the people, she adds as an afterthought. The older woman seated next to the party leader smiles wryly at this comment and cleans her spectacles so no one will notice her expression. She is evidently the high official that the young woman aspires to replace.

This could be the future of Iraq. These people have a strong vision of what their country can become, and are working to bring it to fruition in their lifetimes. They are not alone.

Read the whole thing.

All this is possible because al Qaeda in Iraq is disintegrating. In a press briefing last week, Col. Tom James, commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 3rd Infantry Division, said that "we see that the recent attacks are IEDs of a primitive nature." He concluded from this that "the weakening (of al Qaeda) over time is obvious to us based on their ability to deliver an effective IED."

I've followed these press briefings pretty carefully for the past few years, and one thing I've noticed is that after our early and foolish over-optimism of the early years of OIF, we learned to be more circumspect and cautious in predicting the future. So when a MNF-Iraq release is titled "Al-Qaeda support structure dwindling" we need to pay attention.

If for some crazy reason you haven't been reading this blog (shameless self plug alert) and so don't know why we've been successful in 2007-8 where we failed earlier, Michael Yon explains what we did in an interview with Kathryn Jean Lopez this past April on NRO. Money quotes:

We are winning partly because in the most violent sections of the country this became a war of competing values, terrorist values vs. American values. But only when we got off our big bases, and out of our tanks and deeper into the neighborhoods, could we make that choice very clear. Few people with a choice choose al Qaeda. ...

...most of all I began to see the fruits. I saw it working, the Iraqi people beginning to align with us and for themselves. I saw it in big "kinetic" battles where we took a fraction of the casualties we expected because the citizens told us where almost every terrorist ambush and booby trap was hidden. And I saw it in neighborhoods in which the American military had become the most respected institution in Iraq, and it was our soldiers whom the people turned too for protection but also for justice.
...

You win a counterinsurgency by walking the neighborhood, not by flattening it.

Christopher Hitchens is always clear thinking on most issues of foreign policy. A leftist on most matters, he grants them no quarter on Iraq. In "Fighting good fight in Iraq" he goes after the notion that we should have concentrated on Afghanistan instead of invading Iraq:

Would we be bound to say, in public and in advance, that the Western alliance couldn't get around to confronting such a threat until it had Afghanistan well under control? This would be similar to the equivalent fallacy that nothing can be done in the region until there is a settlement of the Israel-Palestine dispute. Not only does this mean that every rogue in the region can reset his timeline until one of the world's oldest and most intractable quarrels is settled, it also means that every rogue has an incentive to make certain that no such settlement can occur. (Which is why Saddam supported, and now the Iranians support, the suicide-murderers.)

It would also be very nice to accept another soft-centred corollary of the Iraq v Afghanistan trade-off and to believe that the problem of Afghanistan is a problem only of the shortage of troops. Strangely, this is not the view of the Afghan Government or of any of the NATO forces on the ground.

The continued and indeed increasing insolence of the Taliban and its al-Qa'ida allies is the consequence of one thing and one thing only. These theocratic terrorists know that they have a reliable backer in the higher echelons of the Pakistani state and of its military-intelligence complex and that, while this relationship persists, they are assured of a hinterland across the border and a regular supply of arms and recruits.
...

If we had left Iraq according to the timetable of the anti-war movement, the situation would be the precise reverse; the Iraqi people would be excruciatingly tyrannised by the gloating sadists of al-Qa'ida, who could further boast of having inflicted a battlefield defeat on the US. I dare say word of that would have spread to Afghanistan fast enough and indeed to other places where the enemy operates.

The notion that fighting a low-intensity wars (another term for "counterinsurgency") in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously is too much for the United States is more than faintly ridiculous.

During World War II we fought two high-intensity wars simultaneously on opposite sides of the planet. During the Cold War we maintained plans to fight two and a half high-intensity wars simultaneously.

The idea that we cannot fight two counterinsurgencies that are geographically near each other at the same time is not sustainable.

Finally, let's give the Iraqis some credit, in particular Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Now, for the record, to put it mildly I'm not entirely happy with al-Maliki, but when he does come through it needs to be recognized. He came through a few months ago by defeating Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army in Basra. From the Wall Street Journal:

Mr. Maliki took a big risk when he decided to move against his fellow Shiites to reclaim Basra for the government. Iraqi troops were untested for such a complex, divisional-level operation and, in hindsight, their battle plans were too hastily drawn. The early setbacks might easily have emboldened Mr. Sadr, caused the Iraqi army to crumble and led to the end of Mr. Maliki's government.

Instead, Mr. Maliki and Iraqi forces persevered. And two months later, hundreds of Mahdi Army fighters have been arrested and weapons caches found. Following the model of the U.S. surge in Baghdad, Basra's streets are far safer thanks to the visible presence of 33,000 Iraqi troops. The Mahdi vice squads that terrorized the city's population are gone. The U.S. and Britain provided air support during the early stages of the operation, and continue to provide advisory support. But the Basra operation has clearly been an Iraqi success.

If you don't trust the WSJ, you can read largely the same story in The New York Times:

Three hundred miles south of Baghdad, the oil-saturated city of Basra has been transformed by its own surge, now seven weeks old.

In a rare success, forces loyal to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki have largely quieted the city, to the initial surprise and growing delight of many inhabitants who only a month ago shuddered under deadly clashes between Iraqi troops and Shiite militias.

More details on Maliki's Operation Knight's Charge in Basra can be found at Kimberly Kagan's Institute for the Study of War.

Despite all this, Iraq could still go south. A war with Iran will upset Iraqi Shiites, possibly to the point of reigniting the civil war. The government could degenerate into autocracy. And you or I could be killed in an auto accident tomorrow. But as Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson once said, "Never take council of your fears." His point was not that we should ignore or dismiss danger, but rather that it should not paralyze our thinking. Despite the dangers of what lies ahead, the future or Iraq has never been better.

Posted by Tom at 9:50 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 28, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 24 July 2008 - Confident and Capable Iraqi Leadership

In February Col. Tom James gave one of the most powerful presentations that I've seen as part of his Iraq briefing. It is worth following the link and watching it for yourself.

I was therefore pleased last Thursday to see him give another Iraq briefing. Col James commands the 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 3rd Infantry Division. James' brigade deployed to Iraq sometime around November of 2007. The rest of the 3rd ID deployed to Iraq in early 2007, and, having completed it's mission, deployed back home to Fort Stewart GA in May of this year. I am not sure why the deployment of the 4th Brigade Combat Team does not match the rest of the 3rd ID, and frankly do not have time to reach why this is so.

Briefing us with Col James is Brigadier General Abdul Amir, who commands the 31st Iraqi Army Brigade. Gen Amir is responsible for security in the Babil province, which is located 50 kilometers south of Baghdad. Both are connected via telecommunications link from Baghdad to the Pentagon briefing room.

I believe that they are part of Multi-National Division - Center, which is headquartered by the 10th Mountain Division.

This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. The transcript is at DefenseLink. More videos, briefings, and military news can be seen at The Pentagon Channel.

What is most interesting about this briefing, I think, is simply that it featured an Iraqi co-hosting with the American. I've noticed this happening more often in these briefings, and is hopefully a trend. It is important because Americans need to see and hear from the Iraqis, and because the Iraqis need to step up and brief the American people on what they are doing. Most importantly, the Iraqis in these recent briefings appear confident and capable.

GEN. AMIR: ...Another reason for security improvement is the people roles of supporting the Iraqi security forces and provide information to the Iraqi security forces and to the U.S. forces, and also this increases the trust between U.S. and the citizens. The Sons of Iraq program also played great roles in improving the security situation. Also, the U.S. forces provide enormous economical projects to support farmers, civilians, schools, roads and clean up canals for farmers. All this creates a good cooperation and a great environment with the Iraqi and the Iraqi citizens.

Sons of Iraq, previously Concerned Local Citizens, or simply CLCs. Vital to winning the "hearts and minds",it moves the Iraqi people from bystanders to participants, which is so vital getting them "off the fence" and into our camp.

Back to General Amir's opening statement:

In addition to the security improvement, there was a great improvement in the capability of the Iraqi army. Last year we were working with two battalions. This year we are working with four battalions. Next year we will have new equipment, such as artillery forces. At this moment, at this time, we also -- we have Lieutenant Colonel McDowell (sp)) training our -- one of our platoons on a route clearance method and such missions like that.

One reads this and thinks, ok, I'm happy this is happening, but didn't they have artillery before we showed up? How is it that it seems that we have to start from the ground up? Yes yes, we allowed the old Iraqi Army to melt away and maybe should have tried harder to keep it (easier said than done), but once we started their new army surely they had old stuff they could have reconstituted?

Following Gen Amir, Col James gave his opening statement. Following are excerpts:

COL. JAMES:...First, a quick orientation to our operating environment. Babil province is located 50 kilometers south of Baghdad, on the key avenues of approach into the capital city. The population is an estimated 1.2 million Iraqis, 70 percent Shi'a and 30 percent Sunni. The majority of the Sunni population resides in the northern portion of the province, in and around the towns of Jurf al-Sakhr, Iskandariyah, Jabella and and Diyara (ph). Currently the majority of our combat brigade is positioned in north Babil.

We maintain a Military Transition Team, as well, further in the provincial capital of Hillah, and we are partnered with the 31st Iraqi army brigade under General Abdul Amir's command and control. And we also work very closely with the Babil police throughout the province.

Our mission is, in partnership with the Iraqi security forces, to secure the population, defeat extremists and neutralize resistance groups, increase the professionalism of the Iraqi security forces, build the capacity of government institutions and economic programs, and transition security and local development tasks to the Iraqi security forces and government over time.

The essential point of what I want to make today is this: The population feels secure and the quality of life is improving. There are two main reasons for this current condition. First, the Iraqi security forces have improved significantly and in partnership with coalition forces have drastically improved the overall security situation in Babil province. Second, the improved security has enabled positive growth in governance and economic systems, creating tangible improvement in the daily lives of Babil citizens.
...

Security improvements are based on three key factors: first, a highly professional and greatly improved Iraqi security force; second, the Sons of Iraq program; and third, combined security forces. That is Iraqi security forces and coalition forces living with the population, on distributed patrol bases and joint security stations throughout our area of operations.
...

We are focused on several key tasks looking to the future -- first, successful execution of free, fair and safe elections; second, GOI-driven SOI or Sons of Iraq transition to other productive employment; and third, assisting with professionalization of the Iraqi security forces; fourth, assisting with local economic development to increase employment opportunity; and fifth, basing adjustments of the Iraqi army and police into key locations we see that's required for security -- all of these tasks while simultaneously conducting relentless pursuit of extremists with our Iraqi partners.

Iraq provincial elections are scheduled for October 1 2008 but might be delayed. They are key because ultimately the people have to believe that their government represents them and has their interests at heart.

On to the Q & A. First was a discussion of the remaining security threats:

Q This is David Morgan from Reuters. Can you please rank for us the security threats that you now face in Babil province in terms of their importance and give us an assessment of their numbers and capabilities?

COL. JAMES: We sure can. General Abdul Amir, I'd like to defer to you first for a comment on that. What do you see as the primary threats in our area of operation?

GEN. AMIR: Babil province area of operation and northern Babil -- as I mentioned in my brief, there were some areas used to live under the control completely of al Qaeda. Some areas used to be under the control of the sectarian violence, which Sunnis and Shi'a lived together in these areas. But because we conducted numerous amount of operations -- joint operation between U.S. forces and Iraqi army forces, we were able to disable all these cells and enemies. We detained most of al Qaeda leaders in all of the areas.

Recently, all the area is under our control. We are conducting basically daily patrolling in several areas -- such area that encounter some sectarian violence such as the Jabella area. We are working through the tribes and pushing them forward for the national reconciliation. And we are -- patronage and held all these conference and ceremony for these tribes and tribal leaders so we could create a real reconciliation between the fighting tribes.

I would love to say and I would like to say that all area of operation in northern Babil is under control 100 percent. There is no threat from al Qaeda. There is no threat from the extremist militia and the outlaw militias. Thank you.

COL. JAMES: And I'd like to add to what General Abdul Amir says. And he is tracking 100 percent. The key here, though, is that as we plan for a potential threat in Babil province, we see the number one threat being extremists that are influenced by al Qaeda, that could potentially attack us with suicide vests, bombs or IEDs, and as well vehicle-borne IEDs on concentrations of population that may be observing a religious festival or something like that. But for the most part we've seen that the Iraqi security forces have been able to take that under control and prevent that from happening in the recent past here.

So we continue to work with that. So that's the first one. And then as he mentioned as well, the militia. The militia threat -- they're much more capable with the EFP and potentially indirect fire systems, but we have not seen that in Babil province in the past month and a half to two months, based on an aggressive Iraqi security force campaign supported by coalition forces.

"There is no threat from al Qaeda. There is no threat from the extremist militia and the outlaw militias." Pretty confident. I hope he's right. Col James didn't go that far, saying that "The organization related to al Qaeda is severely disrupted, as described by General Abdul Amir, and as well the militia are as well in Babil province."

Interestingly, the reporters didn't really challenge this statement. Also, it is in keeping with what else I've been reading about Iraq from other sources.

Q I think you said that the pace of attacks has now fallen off to about one per week. What element is responsible for these attacks, by and large, would you say? And how would you describe the attacks themselves?

COL. JAMES: I would answer that and then pass off to General Abdul Amir. We see that the recent attacks are IEDs of a primitive nature. What we're seeing is IEDs that are affixed to vehicles, that are targeting SOIs. And these are typically influenced by al Qaeda. And what they want to do is discredit the Iraqi security forces. And they're going after mid- to lower-level leaders in that program. And so that's the primary threat that we've seen over the last couple of weeks, and that is what General Abdul Amir has oriented his focus in the operation he described earlier on. So we continue to focus on that, and that is our primary threat. But like I said, that is significantly decreased and we're seeing less than one a week.
...

And one other point is al Qaeda -- the weakening over time is obvious to us based on their ability to deliver an effective IED. Typically, we have seen in the past the suicide vest or the deep- buried IEDs. We're not seeing those anymore. We're seeing them to be much more primitive and much more less effective. And we see this as a very positive thing.

"recent attacks are IEDs of a primitive nature" This is significant, because from 2003-07 what we read was that IEDs got more sophisticated each year. If the insurgents are using "primitive" ones now, this can only mean that we've killed or captured their top bomb makers and now it's the second or third string trying to make do.

Back to the elections. As we'll recall, early in Iraq's post invasion history, the Sunnis held out and didn't vote in several of the elections.

Q This is Jim Mannion from Agence France-Presse. You mentioned that one of your missions was to prepare for upcoming elections, and I'm wondering what, if any, effect the prospect of elections is having on security -- the security situation in your area. And I was wondering if these attacks involving the SOI were interfactional, or is it Shi'a against SOI? ...

COL. JAMES: If I could just add a couple of points to that as well, I had the distinct pleasure of attending several planning sessions -- with General Abdul Amir and Major General Fadil, the police chief of Babil province -- related to election security.

They have just over 20 sites that are registration sites they're securing. And they have a very detailed plan. And they've allocated and distributed resources, to protect those sites, to allow both Shi'a and Sunni to participate in registration.

And that is a true good-news story that we're seeing in Babil province, that General Adbul Amir mentioned, was that the Sunni want to participate. They held out last time and they see the fruits of democracy and want to pursue them. So that is a very positive situation.

Going back to the tail end of your question, about factions and about the IED strikes that we've seen to this point over the last couple of weeks, we see that as al Qaeda, Sunni-based extremists trying to influence the Iraqi security forces, correction, not the Iraqi security forces -- Sons of Iraq program, which is predominantly Sunni.

So we're not seeing sectarian violence at all at the levels that were in the past; very minimal if at all in Babil province. So this is just a al Qaeda attempt to try to discredit the Sons of Iraq program.

Watch the entire briefing.

The security situation is, for now anyway, under control. It is important to seize the moment and push ahead politically and economically. All Iraqis need to feel that their government represents them and has their interests at heart. The economy needs to show visible signs of improvement so that Iraqis will believe that their interests are best served in pursuing legal employment and business opportunities.

It'll be interesting to see how the average Iraqi reacts if elections are in fact delayed. This hasn't been something I've followed much but will have to get more informed. Hopefully the assessment by our briefers that the Sunnis' will fully participate in upcoming elections will hold true.

Important to note for the future is how well General Amir's 31st Iraqi Army Brigade continues to perform, especially once Colonel James' brigade deploys back home. Right now, though, it's so far so good.

Posted by Tom at 7:30 AM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

July 23, 2008

Obama Wrong On Anbar

Senator Barack Obama wants us to believe that he would have been right about Iraq if only the Anbar Awakening had not occurred. Really.

I think that, I did not anticipate, and I think that this is a fair characterization, the convergence of not only the surge but the Sunni awakening in which a whole host of Sunni tribal leaders decided that they had had enough with Al Qaeda, in the Shii'a community the militias standing down to some degrees. So what you had is a combination of political factors inside of Iraq that then came right at the same time as terrific work by our troops. Had those political factors not occurred, I think that my assessment would have been correct.

Unfortunately for him, we have Steve Shippert of Threatswatch to explain what really happened. I had the pleasure once of meeting Steve, and have followed his work over at NRO's The Tank, and believe he knows what he's talking about. Here's Steve, (h/t The Corner):

Presidential Candidate Obama's statements in and about Iraq in the past 24 hours have been nothing less than shameless and disgraceful. While we strive to avoid political discussion at ThreatsWatch, criticism of his words transcends rank political partisanship if for no other reason than his claims are simply and flatly untrue, made in a war zone, during a time of war and while running to become the Commander in Chief of US Military Forces. This simply cannot stand unchallenged.

Not only does Senator Obama apparently think the Anbar Awakening and the Shi'a militia stand-downs that have occurred are somehow separate developments from the surge, which is a remarkable feat of logic in and of itself, but he is implying that they are part and parcel indigenous to what his 'plan' for 'political progress' would have afforded.
...

I would remind the candidate that the Anbar Salvation Council (which later grew exponentially and developed into al-Sahwa al-Iraq - the Iraq Awakening) started with one man, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu al-Risha, and seventy men fighting al-Qaeda in defense of their families, not in pursuit of a 'political' anything. They simply wanted to live and end al-Qaeda's assassination and murdering spree against their families and tribe. Sheikh Abdul Sattar, later assassinated by al-Qaeda in Iraq, had seen 10 family members, including 4 brothers, killed by al-Qaeda for their cooperation with US forces. He had had enough.

Obama's plan - unoriginal and pieced together like a quilt from others against the Iraq war - was entirely Baghdad-centric, about laws and revenue sharing and conferences. The Anbar Awakening had nothing to do with Baghdad when they began and when they turned the neighborhood tides in Ramadi and elsewhere in Anbar province. It was about killing the terrorists before the terrorists killed them. One must, after all, live to ultimately see progress on any scale beyond one's neighborhoods.

Obama wanted laws written, press conferences, and an immediate pull back of US troops. As Senator Chuck Schumer so brilliantly said at the time about 'the plan,' US forces were to withdraw post-haste to the periphery "in more of a counterterrorism role." This would have abandoned the Anbar Salvation Council - and Anbar Sunnis and Shi'a alike - entirely. It would have been feeding them to the bloodthirsty wolves of al-Qaeda so that domestic American political figures could champion themselves as 'ending a war' and conducting business "in more of a counterterrorism role."

This is precisely what I tried to scream when I wrote "This Is Counterterrorism, Senator" over a year ago for National Review Online. And winning the counterinsurgency is about aligning a population with us. Neither of these, counterterrorism nor counterinsurgency, could have been successfully addressed by 'The Plan' put forth by Obama and others in opposition to The Surge. The Surge was all about protecting the population within their own neighborhoods, while 'The Plan' was about abandoning said population to complete animals unassisted. Yet Obama - and surely others - would oppose it all over again.

The Iraqis have done what they have done for themselves in spite of the likes of Obama, Schumer, Pelosi and all the rest. What's more, now that The Surge has accomplished much of what it set out to do to help the Iraqis - again in spite of Obama, Schumer, Pelosi and the rest - a presidential candidate who opposed the surge, would still oppose The Surge and had absolutely no clue about the Anbar Salvation Council when it was pleading and begging for US support (since at least September of 2006) wants to champion their success as somehow his brainchild and a sign of the political development he envisioned?

One is left to suppose that he overlooks the fact that so many in Anbar and throughout Iraq are alive in spite of attempts to push such a sacrificial 'Plan.' There's no other way to describe it. Dead people - crucified, baked and beheaded - do not live to contribute to 'political progress.' Sheikh Abdul Sattar - and today, his brother Sheikh Ahmed al-Rishawi - understood this. Too many Americans seem flip to dismiss this comfortably from afar.

The Anbar Salvation Council didn't have a damn thing to do with political resolution. It needed to simply survive first; family by family, town by town, tribe by tribe. The movement that eventually saved Iraq laid ignored and unsupported until General David Petraeus changed that when he arrived to command The Surge that Obama said he would still oppose.

Obama's (et al) 'plan' and 'political' demands would have fed them to the wolves, slaughtered with their families while we were to have breathed a sigh of relief that the war was finally over. Funny thing about the Iraqis: They want to live, no matter what our politicians profess.

Today's remarks simply could not be left to stand unchallenged.

An excellent history lesson. It's obvious Obama has no idea what he's talking about. Like someone who's spent his entire life pursuing politics, he doesn't understand anything that's not political. Like his fellow Democrats (and some Republicans), the military is a strange and alien thing that he cannot get his arms around. All he gets is big-government deal making and legislation.

What proved successful was not political deal making but securing the population. Security first, politics second. This is the lesson of counterinsurgency that Gen Petraeus and Lt. Gen. Odierno understood and implemented. It's the thesis of the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24; the one written by the team led by then Lt. Gen Petraeus in 2006 and is the basis for everything we've done in Iraq since then. You'd think that by this time Obama would get it.

Laid out more formally, let's once again go over the factors that have led to our success. In the February 11, 2008, print edition of National Review, Wesley Morgan identified four interconnected efforts:

1. The adoption of classic counterinsurgency tactics, with U.S. battalions spreading out among the population and earning their trust;
2. The grassroots reconciliation of many Sunni and some Shiite communities;
3. A series of meticulously planned corps-level offensives across Baghdad and its surrounding areas. All of these efforts have hinged on one major change:
4. During 2007, every echelon of the U.S. command -- from the four-star headquarters down through the critical corps and division levels to the brigades and battalions in the field -- was closely integrated into a cohesive whole. Without this integration, none of the four efforts that have brought Iraq forward would have made much difference.

Last December VOA reporter Al Pessin asked Maj Gen Walter Gaskin, the USMC commander in Anbar, about why the Anbar Awakening occurred and whether it would have occured without US troops and the Surge:

Q General, it's Al Pessin from Voice of America. I wanted to ask you about the Awakening, and you talked a little bit about how there's this blood feud, and how the Anbaris have rejected the brutality of al Qaeda. Would you say that the progress that we've seen this year in Anbar had to do with something that MNF-I did? Or was it entirely indigenous to the inner workings of the people who live in the province?

GEN. GASKIN: I think it's a combination. You know, you can't separate the fact that this multinational corps and force out here was designed to eliminate al Qaeda.

And al Qaeda is a part of why the Awakening came about, is to awake and see that you can have self-reliance. We can join with the coalition forces and rid ourselves of the brutality and the caliphate and the just plain disregard for how the Anbaris live.

Now, it kind of manifests itself out here in Anbar because these were Sunnis -- (audio break) -- and therefore, they resisted the Taliban-like life -- the life and ideology that al Qaeda was bringing to this area. But it did not come without a cost. Al Qaeda was very brutal to the sheikhs, and this is a very tribal society. As a matter of fact, the sheikhs often say that we were tribal before we were Muslim, and therefore, this is a(n) anchor point within our society. And so when al Qaeda attacked that, they did some very brutal things to the sheikhs, did not follow customs allowing the sheikhs to die in the desert and not burying them within 24 hours. That's what I mean by the blood feud and that they have created a schism that I don't think will ever be repaired.

And because they really want to return to a life where they can have control of their own destiny, I see this as an opportunity since -- (audio break) -- have joined with al Qaeda -- with the sheikhs and the people against al Qaeda. This is going to work, and I think it's enduring.

Q But General, might that not have happened anyway without MNF-I, without the surge, without the new counterinsurgency strategy?

GEN. GASKIN: I doubt it. I think if you -- if you look at the history of the fighting here, you will see that several times the sheikhs have attempted to rid themselves of al Qaeda.

They started in about 2005 out in al Qaim, where the sheikhs raised up, calling themselves the Desert Protectors, put down brutally by al Qaeda. It started again in and around Ramadi, where 11 sheikhs raised up to try to rid themselves of al Qaeda and its caliphate and shura law. And 11 of -- of those 11 -- (audio break) -- were put down brutally.

And so again, in Ramadi with Sheikhs Sattar Abu Risi (ph) who started the Sahwa Allah Iraq, which is the Awakening movement. He had lost two brothers and a father in that fight. So he realized, too, that the joining of the coalition who had there to aid them in getting rid of al Qaeda, that we were better equipped, better trained and had a better principle (sic) of what was happening to them and all of that. This joining of us with them would not have happened -- it definitely would not have happened in the time frame for which we are experiencing now because al Qaeda was better organized, better financed and a lot more brutal than the Anbaris ever expected in dealing with them.

And so I think this was a -- (audio break) -- and it's proved to be ridding them of al
Qaeda and allow them to get on with their economic development and governance of this province.

I rather take Maj Gen Gaskin's word over that of Sen Obama.

Posted by Tom at 9:00 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

July 19, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 14 July 2008 - The British in Basra

UK Army Maj. Gen. Barney White-Spunner, general officer commanding, Multi-National Division-Southeast, spoke via satellite with reporters at the Pentagon, July 14, 2008. Gen White-Spunner was connected via telecommunications link to the Pentagon from Camp Victory in Baghdad.

From the MNF-Iraq website, "MND-SE operates in the southern most part of Iraq, including the cities of Basrah, An Nasiriyah, Al Amarah. The division is headquartered by elements of the British and Australian militaries."

This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. The transcript is at DefenseLink. More videos, briefings, and military news can be seen at The Pentagon Channel.

What is most interesting about this briefing is simply that it was the first one I've seen conducted by a non-American general in this setting. I fully realize that there's been no small amount of controversy surrounding the question of just how much the British have done over the past year. I've seen many reports that they more or less retreated to their compound outside the city and let the locals have at it. Word is then that it wasn't until recent operations by the Iraqi Army that Basra was secured.

But my purpose here is not to go through all that again, but simply to see what the British general has to say and what we might make of it:

GEN. WHITE-SPUNNER... But I think what I want to say just to start off with is that the last four months have seen a really overwhelming change in Basra.

If you'd been there in the spring -- and some of you may have been -- you'd have found a very different situation, because since then the tide has well and truly turned. And as a result of the Operation Charge of the Knights, which Prime Minister Maliki launched at the end of March, the Iraqi security forces reasserted their authority over Basra, which did degree -- had experienced a degree of violence and lawlessness. And whereas not so long ago the militias controlled parts of Basra, we now find people free to go about their daily business without fear of intimidation.

And the situation you find in Basra today is very similar to many other Middle Eastern cities, let alone Iraqi cities. And an air of normality has returned and the government of Iraq has very carefully managed the humanitarian situation, not that it ever got very serious, with only minimal coalition support. The curfew's been lifted and water and fresh food are obviously in plentiful supply.
...

But even more significantly, from our perspective, what Charge of the Knights did was to show that there was very little deep support for the militia in Basra. And once the leadership fled, the ordinary rank-and-file militia, if you like, very soon returned to normal life, which supports our contention that they weren't committed terrorists or committed militiamen. They were poor Shi'as who didn't have opportunities for jobs or whatever and have been perverted by the militias.
...

I don't deny that at the beginning, some elements of Iraqi security forces did wobble a bit, but the Iraqi government soon brought in reinforcements. And with a combination of our help and planning -- coalition help and planning and provision of combat and logistic support, the situation was very soon under control, showing a degree of speed and flexibility as I think would have been impossible only a year ago.

Central to the progress has been this concept of MiTTs, these Military Transition Teams that we have embedded with the Iraqi forces in roughly platoon-sized groups, as that gives us a far greater situational awareness about what's going on and allows us to go every step of the way with the Iraqis. And these MiTTs are still embedded across the city today.

I think the -- where we've got security, what we're doing at the moment is ensuring that security stays. With the Iraqi forces, we're putting in place in Basra a counterterrorist structure so that when those violent extremist elements do try to come back -- and some inevitably will -- then they're ready for them.
...

...the real issue now confronting Basra is economics, something the Iraqi government very much accepts. And this is really the key to the long-term success of Basra. The -- we've got security now, and we're going to make certain that security lasts. And at the moment, opinion polling shows us that security -- whereas it was 23 percent of population's prime concern a month ago, now only 8 percent of the population say that it is a major concern.

So we've got that security. What we've got to do now is get economic success. We've got to create jobs.

The first question went to the heart of the security issue; how permanent are the security gains?

Q General, this is David Morgan from Reuters. Would you say that the extremists in Basra have been decisively defeated? And when you say that many of them fled the city, where does it appear that they have gone to?

GEN. WHITE-SPUNNER: Yeah. The sound isn't the greatest, but I think I got the gist of that.

When I say the extremists have been decisively defeated, I think what has happened decisively is that the militias have lost control of the areas of Basra that they control. I do not think you will see militias reestablish control over areas of Basra again.

I do think that violent extremists, some of whom -- the leadership of whom fled, will try to come back, and I think we need to be ready for them. And that is why we are concentrating, with the Iraqi security forces, in putting this counterterrorist structure in place.

So I think the militias -- I think the insurgency has been decisively defeated. I think there will be an ongoing terrorist campaign for some time, because there are violent extremists who have seen their aims frustrated by what the Iraqis and the coalition have done together, and they're the people we've got to be ready for.

During the interview, Gen White-Spunner said that logistics was still a problem for the Iraqi Army, something we've heard time and again in these briefings. In the next question, Mike Mount with CNN asks whether the Iraqi Army can handle operations on their own:

Q (Mike Mount with CNN) If I could follow up, how much of that control is now you all or U.K. troops as opposed to Iraqi troops?

GEN. WHITE-SPUNNER: It's us in support of Iraqi troops. It's Iraqi troops in the lead with us very much in support. And the plans see the Iraqi troops being there and the Iraqi security forces, I should say, because obviously when you come to things like the border, it's not just the Iraqi army. It's the Iraqi police and also the DBE, the department of border enforcement which includes the coastal border guard because, of course, there is a large water border in the Basra area.

So what we're trying to do here is to get sustainable structures in place. We're out in support at the moment, and the Iraqis are in the lead. There will come a time when the Iraqis won't need us.

But I would emphasize that it is us supporting them. They're very much in the lead. This is an issue which they are really concerned about and they're absolutely determined to get right.

The next big issue Iraq faces is the upcoming elections

Elections go the heart of legitimacy. If people see the government as legitimate and as representing them, they will get "off the fence" and support the government. If not, they'll allow the insurgency to come back.

From the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 (Essentially the "bible" for our troops in Iraq since it was published in Dec of 2006. Gen. Petraeus led the team that wrote it). A few excerpts:

1-4 Long term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule.

1-113 LEGITIMACY IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

"Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose bieng to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population" David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 1964

Here's the part of the briefing where they discussed elections:

Q This is Jim Mannion again. Did the provincial elections have any -- raise any special security concerns from your perspective?

GEN. WHITE-SPUNNER: Yeah. Elections are a big issue for us. What's really encouraging about elections is how seriously people are taking them, because if people weren't taking elections seriously, they wouldn't begin to take the results seriously, if you follow my logic. So the fact that there is so much interest in the elections, I think, is hugely encouraging. I think it shows how far Iraq has come. And it's really fitting in this current climate of increased security. So the elections -- i.e., the establishment of a democratic process -- should be so much to the fore, and I take enormous heart in that.

What are my particular concerns, to answer your question? I think to make certain that the voter registration goes ahead from the 15th of this month. We've got 34 voter registration centers across Basra province. And I'm confident -- having reviewed the plans of those in detail with the Iraqi security forces --I'm confident that that process will go ahead smoothly.

When we get to the elections themselves, I'm at the moment pretty confident that we will have free and fair elections here. Again, as I say, they're being taken very seriously. The security of the polling centers is something that's been taken very seriously by the Iraqis. So, if you like, concern in that we are determined that elections and the voter registration is going to go really well.

Specific concerns at the moment, not a huge number of detailed ones. You know, a few things like individual voting stations here and there, but nothing significant. Nothing at the moment that makes me think we're not going to have a really successful election in the autumn. And as soon as, of course, the election law is passed in Baghdad, then we'll be clear about a date for that.

Posted by Tom at 8:33 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 12, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 10 July 2008 - Changes Since 2006

This briefing was by Maj. Gen. Michael Oates, Commander of Multi-National Division-Center, and the 10th Mountain Division, and Major General Ali Salih Farhood OOothman (I am not certain of his unit's designation). They are connected via telecommunications link to the Pentagon from Camp Victory in Baghdad.

From the MNF-Iraq website, "Multi-National Division - Center, also known as Task Force Mountain, assists Iraqi Security Forces with security and stability missions in the area south of Baghdad ranging from Najaf to Wasit provinces. MND-Center is headquartered by the 10th Mountain Division (Light) from Fort Drum, New York."

The 10th Mountain Division replaced the 3rd Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch) in this role on June 3.

Maj. Gen Oates reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last March. Until Petraeus takes his new position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

I have no information about the Iraqi chain of command and frankly do not have time to do the research.

This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. The transcript is at DefenseLink. More videos, briefings, and military news can be seen at The Pentagon Channel.

What is most interesting about this briefing are the differences Oates sees in Iraq from his last posting here in 2006:

GEN. OATES: Ladies and gentlemen, I would just like to make a couple of brief observations. I've been back to Iraq now for about six weeks, and I previously departed here in late 2006. And there's three very distinct changes that I've observed. The first is the security situation is much improved over my last two tours here. In fact, it's indisputable that the level of attacks are phenomenally low, and that's a great development.

The second is the capability, competency and initiative of the Iraqi security forces is significantly better than when I left here in 2006.

And the third most significant thing I've seen different is that there is now a measure of Iraqi government action to address the basic needs of their population, and that was virtually unseen previously.

So we have some work left to go, and I'd like to highlight a couple of those. We are going to continue to work to improve the professionalism of the Iraqi security forces. But quite frankly, in most of my area of southern Iraq, they are already doing great work, most of it through their own initiative.

The second is, I believe we can coach some practical civics classes to some of the local governance to help them understand the sheer mechanics of assessing the Iraqi population's needs and how to go about funding and getting those programs under way.

Third is we need to continue to kill or capture the extremist group leaders and al Qaeda in Iraq, who threaten both the coalition force and the government of Iraq.

And finally, we need to focus on defeating the Iranian malign influence, principally the transfer of lethal munitions that comes largely through southern Iraq.

So we have some work yet to go. I've assigned some focus areas for my division for this year. The first will be that we assist the Iraqi government with achieving fair and safe elections in the fall this year.

The second is we will look at ways we can assist them at the local level in developing economics, so that they can begin a robust employment program for a great number of their males that still lack work.

Third is, we're going to professionalize the Iraqi army. This army, since it's been formed, has been fighting. They did not have the luxury we do of going to schools; they were fighting right out of the box. And now we intend to go back and rework some of those areas. We will work to defeat the Iranian clandestine lethal smuggling network as it proceeds through southern Iraq.

And finally, we will continue to work to defeat al Qaeda's influence and the special group leaders that operate in this area. And that's our focus for this year.

In summary, the improvements Maj. Gen. Oates sees are:

1. Improved secutity, as evidenced by a lower level of attacks
2. Improved Iraqi security forces
3. The Iraqi government is starting to provide basic needs

The first lead to the second, which led to the third. You can have no progress without security, but in the end the Iraqis have to step up.

The things we have still to do are:

1. Make sure the upcoming elections are free and fair. This is vital because gaining the confidence and trust of the populace is crucial to winning a counterinsurgency.
2. Assist the Iraqis in their economic development, which means putting more men to work.
3. Professionalize the Iraqi Army. In other words, take it from a "start up" to where it can not only fight on it's own but earn the respect of the Iraqi people.

Note this and virtually everything else coming out of Iraq against the blatantly false statement Obama still has on his website regarding violence in Iraq and lack of political progress

At great cost, our troops have helped reduce violence in some areas of Iraq, but even those reductions do not get us below the unsustainable levels of violence of mid-2006. Moreover, Iraq's political leaders have made no progress in resolving the political differences at the heart of their civil war.

Maybe Mr "fight the smears" should work on getting his facts straight. No less a source than The New York Times says that "throughout Iraq, violence is at its lowest level in four years." Further, as of three months ago the Iraqis had met 12 of the original 18 benchmarks and have made substantial progress on 5 more. Not exactly "no progress."

What amazes me about our troops is how they are able to perform all sorts of tasks beyond direct warfighting. Winning an insurgency is about a lot more than killing bad guys. It's about building up the local economy and government, and you can't just rely on the State Department and USAID to do that.

Q General Oates, yesterday, General Dubik told the House Armed Services Committee that he felt as though Iraqi ground forces will be able to operate largely autonomously by the middle of next year, by next summer. Based on what you've seen so far there in your area of operations, would you agree with that assessment, in terms of what sort of progress they're making?

GEN. OATES: That's a great question. My observation over the last six weeks, watching the Iraqi army in particular operate in the southern areas and most recently in Maysan province and Amarah, is that they're very capable. They are seeking the initiative in planning their operations. And they just recently completed a very successful operation in Maysan province logistically and with their own planning.

I do believe that they are very capable.

I'm not prepared to give you a date on when they can operate autonomously, but I will tell you that my partner here, General Oothman, operates in his area with very little support from us, and when he needs certain capabilities that he does not possess, he asks and we provide. And I might ask him maybe to assess when he thinks his division might be fully capable without assistance.
...

Contrary to popular opinion, their maintenance program has actually gotten much better than what I recall from '06. And so while it's not where they want it to be, it is getting better.

And I would tell you, personally, the rate of change in the Iraqi army is what has impressed me the most. They plan their operations. They consult us but they do plan them. And then they initiate the action.

GEN. OOTHMAN: (Off mike) -- and to be independent in our effort now combating in this battle. We have some of our battalions are fully ready. In Karbala and Najaf, we have the authority over all the matters in Najaf and Karbala -- (inaudible). In the next five days we are going to have the authority of Al Qadisiyah.

The challenge we do face in general in the whole Iraqi army is the logistic and the supplies and the administrative work. For instance, we don't have any medic facilities or hospitals where we could take our injured or killed people to. We don't have the garages or the shops to fix and maintain our vehicles, especially the humvees.

At the beginning, we started concentrating on the battle and we neglected the administrative and logistic work. We are seriously working in concert with coalition forces to establish such administrative institution.

Time and again we hear this about the Iraqi Army. I've listened to just about every press briefing held by a division or brigade commander and they all say the same thing; the problem is not so much in the fighting capability of the Iraqis as it is in their logistics. They simply do not have all that they need. No medical facilities or hospitals is pretty bad.

We can't send them any more money. We can provide advice, but this is something that they're going to have to solve on their own.

Al Pessin gets to the heart of the matter and what most concerns most Americans; did the surge work and when can our troops come home?

As with all American commanders, Gen Oates is cautious in his response and won't provide dates or a timeline.

Q General Oates, this is Al Pessin from Voice of America. Can you tell us what the impact is on your area of the end of the surge and whether you think during the time that you're scheduled to be in Iraq, whether it would be possible to further draw down U.S. forces in your area without endangering the gains that have been made?

GEN. OATES: Sure. Let me start with the impact of the surge. I think the security situation is probably the best we've ever seen it, at least in my area, and I attribute that to three different things all working together. The first is, in fact we have done a great job both with the Iraqis and with coalition forces to really weigh into al Qaeda and the militia groups. They have been severely attrited, and although not completely defeated, they are not the force that they were a year ago.

The second is the capability of the Iraqi forces -- to include their police, but mostly their army -- has significantly improved. And they are largely in control of most of the neighborhoods in Iraq. And then the third thing is that the government of Iraq itself has taken positive steps to reach out to its population. And this can't be discounted. It's a significant impact in that people begin to realize, although they're not where they need to be to deliver essential services, they've made huge strides. And that's a major component of the security situation.

From the U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 (Essentially the "bible" for our troops in Iraq since it was published in Dec of 2006. Gen. Petraeus led the team that wrote it):

Chapter 6: Developing Host Nation Security Forces

6-1 Success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations requires establishing a legitimate government supported by the people and able to address the fundamental causes that insurgents use to gain support. Achieving these goals requires the host nation to defeat insurgents or render them irrelevant, upholding the rule of law, and provide a basic level os essential and security for the populace. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.

6-6 U.S. and multinational forces may need to help the host nation improve security; however, insurgents can use the presence of foreign forces as a reason to question the HN government's legitimacy. A government reliant on foreign forces for internal security risks not being recognized as legitimate. While combat operations with significant U.S. and multinational participation may be necessary, U.S. combat operations are secondary to enabling the host nation's ability to provide for it's own security.

6-29 Training HN (host nation) security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a "quick fix".

Back to the briefing:

GEN. OATES: (continued) With regards to our own troop status, I think right now we're looking at the current situation, and our mission really is to sustain the security environment we have. The next real milestone for me personally is the election period in the fall. I believe that if we can hold the security gains we have and continue to make progress in the areas I've already described, I think it would be an appropriate time at the election to make an assessment of where we're at. And if asked, I'll make that recommendation to my boss. I know that we are in this self-described period of assessment now and observing.

I will caution that the absence of attacks does not necessarily mean you have security. We do have fewer attacks. We're trying to see -- observe this time period to determine whether the security situation will hold.

Q Do you see the potential for further drawdowns as you move later into your time in the country into the winter and next spring?

GEN. OATES: I think the force allocations will be determined based on the situation on the ground. So, if the situation remains in good shape and we're able to continue to make progress with the professionalism of the Iraqi army, especially in the areas that General Oothman and I have described, I think that would be appropriate. Obviously, those decisions will be made by my seniors, but they'll certainly ask me about that and we'll provide an assessment at that time.

"The absence of attacks does not necessarily mean you have security." At first glance this seems to contradict what he said at the beginning, but I think here mostly serves as a caution. We on the right have been (rightly) trumpeting the decrease in the level of violence, and that's all fine and good as far as it goes. We should just be cautious about declaring victory too soon.

On the other side, the left needs to understand that we cannot withdraw the troops too soon, or we risk losing all that we have gained. Whoever wins the White House needs to listen to incoming MNF-Iraq commander Gen. Odierno before making decisions.

What threats remain?

Q General, this is Lisa Burgess with Stars and Stripes. A question for both of you, please. Which would you say is the greatest threat right now, with the understanding that both groups have been attrited, al Qaeda or the special militias?

GEN. OATES: I'll put that to the subject-matter expert first. And then I'll attempt to comment. Which, does he think, is the greatest threat? Or what is the greatest threat?

GEN. OOTHMAN: In my area of operations, I have the al Qaeda organization and I have the militias. In the capital cities of my provinces, I have the militias.

Actually the more threat in my AO are the militias, especially the special forces, Special Groups, they call them. They are trained and equipped by the Iranians.

Those groups, they don't face you in the field. I mean, they put IEDs and they try to stab our forces from the back of the politicians. The militias reach a level. They can't face our Iraqi army. Therefore most of them are in Iran.

Therefore the Iranians, they train them, equip them, provide the necessary materials they need. And they send them back through our borders, to assassinate some of the targets and politicians or our military leaders.

They can't face us, but they have certain missions, or they do have the rockets -- some rocket attacks. They have different kind of groups, some of them to launch rockets, others to put IEDs. Others try to assassinate leaders.

GEN. OATES: I would say currently my greatest concern is al Qaeda, not because they're terribly strong right now but because they remain very virulent. They remain dedicated and set in destruction of both the coalition force and Iraqis. They really don't have any problem attacking anyone, to include all innocent civilians. And so we know that they're actively trying to reenter Iraq and reestablish -- they have been seriously attritted, but they are very virulent and they are very dedicated.

The Shi'a extremist groups are very worrisome. As long as they continue to be supported by external actors, Iran in particular, I believe that they'll practice mischief in Iraq, and that's not helpful. But I believe that they present probably a longer-term threat than al Qaeda to the government of Iraq. And we're dealing with both these threats right now.

MR. WHITMAN: Generals, we have actually gone past the time that we've allocated for this. We certainly appreciate you taking the time. But before we bring it to a close, let me just throw it back to you in case there's any final thoughts that you have before we end this.

GEN. OATES: I appreciate the opportunity today.

It's not by mistake that General Oothman and I are here together. We do -- literally, in our area, everything is done together in partnership, and that's a very fundamental change across Iraq today as well. The Iraqi army is very capable, and I'm very proud to serve along with them. Make no mistake about it; they're taking the initiative in driving most of the operations, at least in my area right now. I remain here as a full partner to assist him in areas where he's still developing -- logistics, medical, intelligence, signal, those kinds of things -- and to provide whatever additional assistance I can to develop his officer corps and his NCO corps. But they are making huge strides.

I believe that this year we have a great opportunity, with the government of Iraq, with the elections beginning in the fall and the continued focus on developing economics, especially employment opportunities; that we can hold this security situation; that it will continue to improve.

And I'm very optimistic about the future.

There is no reason at this point for undue pessimism regarding Iraq. Caution, yes. There are many dangers and things that could go wrong. But we're on the right track and there's no need to change strategy now.

Posted by Tom at 10:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 11, 2008

Odierno and Petraeus Confirmed

Yesterday the Senate confirmed Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno for his new position of commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, and Gen. David Petraeus as commander of CENTCOM. The vote for Odierno was 96 - 1, with Petraeus by a vote of 95-2. The Hill reports that "Sens. Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) and Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) opposed the confirmation of Petraeus, while only Harkin opposed Odierno."

Why did they oppose his confirmation?

Byrd's office released a statement saying his vote against Petraeus's confirmation reflects concern over constant turnover among U.S. commanders in Iraq, as well as Petraeus's "unwillingness to address questions regarding other regional issues, such as in Afghanistan or Iran, during his confirmation hearing."

Byrd also criticized the U.S. military's "stop-loss" policy, which he says is preventing 12,000 service members from leaving the service even though they have fulfilled their obligations.

"Sen. Harkin opposed these nominations because he does not believe that either Gen. Petraeus or Gen. Odierno will take us in the direction we need in Iraq, namely setting a timetable for redeployment of U.S. forces so that our country can begin to more effectively address the very real threat posed by terrorists around the globe," said Harkin spokeswoman Jennifer Mullin.

I'll give Byrd and Harkin this, at least they're honest. On the one hand I am happy to see the Democrats vote for them. On the other I wish they'd be consistent and come out in favor of the policies the two generals have been and will implement.

Most everyone is familiar with Gen. Petraeus. Lt. Gen. Odierno has received much less press, which is understandable, given the way the press operates. You just don't get anything beyond the surface in the mass media.

The short version is that during the "surge", Odierno was to Petraeus what Patton was to Eisenhower. He has been rightly described as "The Patton of Counterinsurgency"

Odierno took command of Multi MNC-Iraq on Dec 14, 1007, and on Feb 14 2008 was succeeded by Lt. Gen. Lloyd J. Austin III as part of normal rotation. Odierno had been nominated to become the Army's next vice chief of staff, a four star position. With the forced resignation of Admiral Fallon at CENTCOM, and the promotion of Petraeus to fill that void, someone was needed to command MNF-Iraq. There is no one better suited than Odierno.

Of course, the whackjobs at Code Pink had to stage a protest in the hearing room. Four of their members were arrested, something they brag about on their website. One of them even held up a sign saying "Generals Lie Soldiers Die." This particularly grates because Odierno's son, Army Capt. Anthony K. Odierno, lost his left arm in an August 2004 RPG attack in Iraq.

Petraeus will also be invaluable at CENTCOM, where his main task will be to thwart Iranian expansion. Adm. Fallon failed at this, and went public with his criticism of the administration, which is a big no-no, so was rightly fired (those who think he should not have been relieved of command should consider what they would say if a sitting general publicly criticized a President Obama). Also, if things should get rough with Iran, I can think of nobody better suited to handle sht situation than Gen. Petraeus.

Senator Joe Lieberman issued this fitting statement on their confirmation.

"I am very pleased by the Senate's bipartisan vote today to confirm General David Petraeus as the next Commander of U.S. Central Command, and General Raymond Odierno to become the Commander of Multi-National Forces - Iraq.

"There is no doubt in my mind that General Petraeus and General Odierno are the two best men to assume these two critically important commands.

"General Petraeus has won the admiration and respect of the entire country over the past eighteen months. As commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, he has overseen one of the most dramatic turnarounds in American military history, quite literally seizing victory out of the jaws of defeat. There is no one better qualified or more capable to lead America's brave men and women in uniform in the Middle East, which remains one of the most strategically vital regions of the world for America's national security.

"I also have full confidence in General Odierno. As commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq, General Odierno brilliantly adapted General Petraeus' overarching counterinsurgency strategy into operational art. As much as anyone else, he deserves credit for the extraordinary transformation in security conditions in Iraq over the past year.

"In addition, General Odierno's willingness to accept another tour in Iraq -- having only just recently returned to his family in the United States after fifteen months there -- is a testament to his extraordinary patriotism and inspiring dedication to duty. There is no one better qualified to succeed General Petraeus in Baghdad than General Odierno."

The Middle East, and indeed our nation's security, is in good hands with these two at the helm.

Posted by Tom at 8:35 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 6, 2008

This is Encouraging

From today's Sunday Times of London

Iraqis lead final purge of Al-Qaeda

American and Iraqi forces are driving Al-Qaeda in Iraq out of its last redoubt in the north of the country in the culmination of one of the most spectacular victories of the war on terror.

After being forced from its strongholds in the west and centre of Iraq in the past two years, Al-Qaeda's dwindling band of fighters has made a defiant "last stand" in the northern city of Mosul.

A huge operation to crush the 1,200 fighters who remained from a terrorist force once estimated at more than 12,000 began on May 10.

Operation Lion's Roar, in which the Iraqi army combined forces with the Americans' 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment, has already resulted in the death of Abu Khalaf, the Al-Qaeda leader, and the capture of more than 1,000 suspects.

The group has been reduced to hit-and-run attacks, including one that killed two off-duty policemen yesterday, and sporadic bombings aimed at killing large numbers of officials and civilians.

American and Iraqi leaders believe that while it would be premature to write off Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the Sunni group has lost control of its last urban base in Mosul and its remnants have been largely driven into the countryside to the south....

Major-General Mark Hertling, American commander in the north, said: "I think we're at the irreversible point."

In February Maj. Gen. Hertling said he had AQI on the run. Looks like he wasn't blowing smoke.

But wait, there's more. From another story in the Times

Al-Qaeda is driven from Mosul bastion after bloody last stand
The murder toll is dropping, the insurgents are on the run. Our correspondent is on the front line as the Iraqi army takes control

Brigadier-General Abdullah Abdul, a senior Iraqi commander, said: "Al-Qaeda in Mosul is pretty much not able to do the attacks that they could do previously. They are doing small attacks and trying to do big ones but they are mostly not succeeding."

The Iraqis and Americans have got Al-Qaeda on the run. How have they come so far, so fast? ON the night of May 9, 87 "target packets" landed on the walnut desk of Abdul, the commander of the Iraqi army's 2nd Division.

The details of each named target were specific. One read: "Action: capture. Characteristics: white hair, hazel eyes, sunburnt skin. Alias: Abu Mohamed. Car: drives a station wagon. Residence: a two-story house painted black (with map attached showing location). Credibility of source: reliable."

By early the next morning - the launch day for Operation Lion's Roar to recapture Mosul - hundreds of police and army checkpoints had been set up across the city.

Iraqi security forces began conducting raids to round up the targets in the packets on Abdul's desk. Many of them were detained in the first two days. Two weapons caches were found and cleared.

It quickly became clear that the Iraqi army and the Americans' 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment were combining their forces effectively. American tanks formed cordons while Iraqi soldiers went from house to house.

First they said the surge wouldn't work. They were proven wrong. They they said the Iraqi government would never meet the benchmarks. They've met most of them. They still denigrate the Iraqi Army. It looks like the critics are being proven wrong on this one too.

Update

This story in USA Today is also a must-read

Security in Iraq continues to improve even after the withdrawal of nearly 25% of U.S. combat brigades, increasing the prospects of further cuts in American forces.

Although U.S. commanders are cautious about predicting further withdrawals, interviews with military experts and recent official statements indicate growing optimism about the potential to pull out more forces.

"I believe the momentum we have is not reversible," said Jack Keane, a retired Army vice chief of staff who helped develop the Iraq strategy adopted by President Bush in January 2007.

There will be "significant reductions in 2009 whoever becomes president," said Keane, who regularly consults with Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki echoed Keane's optimism Saturday by declaring that "we defeated" the terrorists in Iraq. U.S. commanders remain cautious.

It was only a year and a half ago that we seemed on the verge of losing. It just shows how wars can sometimes be turned around by those determined to do so.

Posted by Tom at 8:43 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

July 1, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 30 June 2008 - Support Needed from the Central Government

This briefing is by Col Lewis Craparotta, Commander of U.S. Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team 1. He is connected via telecommunications link to the Pentagon from Camp Fallujah, which is in the Anbar Province of western Iraq.

Regimental Combat Team 1 is part of Multi-National Force-West. MNF-W is headquartered by the U.S. I Marine Expeditionary Force. Their area of operations include the cities of Ar Ramadi and Fallujah.

Col Craparotta reports to the commander of I MEF, Maj. Gen. John Kelly. Kelly reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last March. Until Petraeus is confirmed by Congress for this position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. The transcript is at DefenseLink. More videos, briefings, and military news can be seen at The Pentagon Channel.

While many things were discussed, it seems that the ,main theme of this briefing is that localities in Col Craparott's area of responsibility need more support from the central government:

Q Hi Colonel, it's Courtney from NBC News again. Just to clarify, so the support that the area is looking for from the government of Iraq, is that all monetary or is there another -- any other kind of support that's still lacking? And is that the number one thing that you're hearing from the sheikhs when you go out and meet with them, or what are their main concerns? Are they concerned that the U.S. is going to draw down and the violence will return? Could you talk a little bit about those meetings that you have with them?

COL. CRAPAROTTA: Yes, Courtney. I think they're concerned about funds and the availability of funds down to the local governments. And we're still working through the whole process of how the money actually gets from the provincial government down to the local governments. But we're working that very hard and I think we're on- track in that area.

The other element of support that we need comes from the ministries. And I will tell you that we need support from the Ministry of Interior, for example, when it comes to our police force. We're short vehicles; we're short other resources. So again, some of the support from the ministries directly to the province have been lacking. And we expect that that support should pick up as we transition to provincial control and we tie that link between the provincial government and the national government.

Q Has this lack of resources caused any kind of operational problem? I mean, has the Iraqis -- have they not been able to complete a mission or have they had to borrow things from the United States?

COL. CRAPAROTTA: Well, we've been providing them training and support all along. That's part of our mission. But we're at a point now where if we can get this additional support from the central government, that in my view the -- certainly the policemen that I work with, we would see a -- we could see a dramatic increase in their effectiveness with some additional support.

Q Colonel, it's Mike Mount again from CNN. Keeping on the theme with this support, is this -- what's the cause of the delay? Is this the continued friction between -- you know, a Sunni-Shi'a thing between the two governments? I mean, why do you think the support will come after the turnover and why hasn't their been support up to now?

COL. CRAPAROTTA: I think, quite frankly, it's a matter of priorities.

And if you look at the provinces, the 18 provinces across the country, the priority is probably not as high in Al Anbar, based on the success we've had in the security situation here.

Therefore they've put some resources in other provinces that have been higher up on the priority list. But again I expect that some of that will change when we transfer to PIC(Provincial Iraqi Control).

There was more along these lines but you get the point. It's all part of what Clautzwitz called the friction of war. Yes we've made much progress since the "surge", but there are still problems and things that we and our Iraqi partners need to do better.

It will come as not surprise that another concern is how soon the Iraqis can take control of their own affairs

Q Colonel, you were pretty optimistic in your opening statement about the Iraqi police. I'm just wondering, have they caught up in terms of training to the Iraqi army? And how would you assess their readiness? And what more needs to be done?

COL. CRAPAROTTA: I think the police, certainly the police here in Fallujah and the police in Ramadi, are ready to take the lead.

I will give you an example. Yesterday, certainly, we sat down with the police and the army and talked about this incident in Karmah. And we decided there was a need to conduct an operation that has been -- was completed this morning. And the Fallujah District police chief, Colonel Faisal, when I asked him what he needed to execute the operation he told me that he would just as soon I watch my students go out there and execute and that he was confident he could do it, and if I was available to provide a QRF, that that would be enough.
...

Q Colonel, it's Luis Martinez with ABC News.

The Iraqi operation down in Basra required a shifting of forces within Iraq by the Iraqis themselves. How does that affect your situation or the security posture for your people inside Anbar province?

COL. CRAPAROTTA: Well, initially, we had some concern, because again, we're at a point where the surge was over here in AO East, and we were relying heavily on the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police. And when we transitioned forces outside of Anbar, we really reduced the amount of Iraqi army available to me by two-thirds. But the Iraqi police have been able to get the job done. And I know I keep saying it, but I have complete confidence in the police force, and I think their record over the past four or five, six months certainly speaks for itself if you look at the security situation here in AO East.

And this lead to a discussion on the impact of increased effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces

Q Yeah, I was -- Colonel, it's Luis Martinez again. I was going to continue on this line of questioning. Sound like a prosecutor -- (chuckles) - sorry about that. With the Iraqi forces no longer being -- with that brigade still remaining in Basra, how -- are you increasing patrols? I mean, you said that you were increasing reliance on the Iraqi police, but how does that affect your posture, in the sense that obviously they have different capabilities and different missions? COL. CRAPAROTTA: Well, without going into too much of what we're doing operationally, we are reducing some of our presence in the urban areas and relying more on the police there.

Good news, and hopefully the Iraqi forces will be able to keep a lid on the violence and destroy AQI if they raise their head.

The Colonel's closing statement is worth reprinting

COL. CRAPAROTTA: ...I'd just maybe close by saying that I hope as the Fourth of July approaches that everybody's as proud of the service of the fighting men and women as I am. They continue to do a tremendous job over here under very difficult circumstances. And they've earned both the respect and the admiration of the Iraqi people here in eastern Anbar.

The cooperation with the State Department and the work of the Embedded Reconstruction Teams cannot go unrecognized here today. They've enabled success, and the accomplishments that we've made in governance, economics and reconstruction would not have been possible without them. And I expect that their role will increase in the coming months as we transition to provincial Iraqi control.

And then lastly -- and I've said it several times -- is our Iraqi partners. These are brave leaders, and they see a future for this province and this country, and they work every day with that future in mind. They're sheikhs; they're soldiers; they're policemen, mayors, city council members. Each of them has stepped up for the people and the future of this country.

And we know the fight's not over, but we're going to win the fight together, with the support of the Iraqi people. And success for us is simply providing these citizens with the greatest opportunity to enjoy a safe and a prosperous future here in al Anbar.

So thank you very much.

Craparotta's mention of the vital work don by the ERT's illustrates the point that reconstruction facilitates reconciliation and solidifies security gains.

Reconstruction in Anbar was also discussed at a GRD Roundtable briefing in Iraq the other day. Col. Robert Vasta said that the reason why reconstruction is proceeding is that now there is security. No security, no rebuilding. That and partnership with the Iraqis are responsible for recent successes. 21 minutes into the video he says that improvements in security are "...impossible to emphasize how important that has been to the reconstruction of Iraq"

Posted by Tom at 9:00 PM | Comments (1) | TrackBack

June 29, 2008

"Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" - June 2008

Last week the Department of Defense released it's latest quarterly report to Congress; "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" June 2008.

The short version is that as measured in May, violence in Iraq dropped to its lowest level in four years. This is very good news.

This said, I do not have time to go through all 74 pages of the report, so readers can download it and judge for themselves.

Here is the bottom line from the Executive Summary

In summary, the security, political and economic trends in Iraq continue to be positive; however, they remain fragile, reversible and uneven. Recent events in Basrah, Sadr City and elsewhere have generated new challenges and opportunities for the future. As in the past, continued progress will require Iraqi leaders to yake additional selfless and nationally-oriented actions in the spirit of reconciliation and compromise if Iraq is to achieve its potential as a stable, secure, multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian democracy under the rule of law.

This seems pretty consistent from what our commanders have been saying. Readers will note that I've covered most press briefings that have come out of Iraq for the past year and a half.

Here are some additional key quotes from the report's summary:

The security environment in Iraq continues to improve, with all major violence indicators reduced between 40 to 80% from pre-surge levels. Total security incidents have fallen to their lowest level in over four years. Coalition and Iraqi forces' operations against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) have degraded its ability to attack and terrorize the population. Although AQI remains a major threat and is still capable of high-profile attacks, the lack of violence linked to AQI in recent weeks demonstrates the effect these operations have had on its network. Equally important, the government's success in Basrah and Baghdad's Sadr City against militias, particularly Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Iranian-supported Special Groups, has reinforced a greater public rejection of militias. This rejection, while still developing, is potentially as significant for Iraq as the Sunni rejection of AQI's indiscriminate violence and extremist ideology. Overall, the communal struggle for power and resources is becoming less violent. Many Iraqis are now settling their differences through debate and the political process rather than open conflict. Other factors that have contributed to a reduction in violence include the revitalization of sectors of the Iraqi economy and local reconciliation measures. Although the number of civilian deaths in April 2008 increased slightly from February and March 2008, in May 2008 civilian deaths declined to levels not seen since January 2006, when the Coalition began tracking this data....

The emergence of Sons of Iraq (SoIs) to help secure local communities has been one of the most significant developments in the past 18 months in Iraq. These volunteers help protect their neighborhoods, secure key infrastructure and roads and locate extremists among the population. What began primarily as a Sunni effort, now appears to have taken hold in several Shi'a and mixed communities....

Recent operations in Basrah, Sadr City and Mosul remind us, however, that security gains can be uneven, fragile and tenuous if not accompanied by continued progress toward national reconciliation and economic development....

In a broader sense, the government's efforts in Basrah reflected two positive and long-awaited improvements. First, Prime Minister Maliki demonstrated a willingness to confront militias and extremists, regardless of sectarian identity....

Second, Iraqi forces demonstrated an improved capability to lead and execute significant
counterinsurgency operations....

Iran's negative role in Iraq has emerged as a major security challenge....

The Iraqi economy grew 4% in real terms in 2007 and is projected to grow 7% in real terms for 2008, reaching an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of $60.9 billion. Oil production increases of 9-10% this year--coupled with the higher prices of oil--should drive growth in that sector and support increased government spending. The non-oil sector is likely to grow at 3%. Core inflation fell to 12% in 2007 compared to 32% in 2006--the result of an improving security environment in the second half of 2007....

The GoI's inability to execute its capital budget remains a concern. The GoI is hampered by spending units' lack of capacity and cumbersome budgetary approval and funding
processes. Despite these difficulties, the overall trend for capital budget execution
continues to improve....

Due to greater emphasis by government leaders, Iraqis have seen an increase, albeit uneven, in the delivery of essential services such as electricity, water, sanitation and healthcare. Despite these improvements, the population's level of satisfaction with essential services remains low.

So from this it looks like we're doing pretty well. Gains are fragile, yes, but the same could be said about the situations in Japan or Germany in the late 1940s. It would be a shame to throw it all alway with a precipitous pullout.

One last quote from the section of the report titled "Political Stability":

With recent improvements in security, the current political environment in Iraq is becoming more hospitable to compromises across sectarian and ethnic divides.

What is it that Petraeus and his coauthors said in U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24? Oh yeah, that you have to have security before you can have political progress. Looks like they kind of got that one right too.

Posted by Tom at 9:33 PM | Comments (4) | TrackBack

June 28, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 26 June 2008 - Operation Basha'er as-Salaam

This briefing is by U.S. Army Colonel Charlie Flynn, commander of the 1st Brigade, , 82nd Airborne Division, based out of Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is linked via telecommunications to the Pentagon from Contingency Operating Base Adder at Tallil Air Base. They deployed to Iraq in July of 2007. This is their fourth combat rotation, with two each to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Update: I do not have an independent source to prove this, but commenter Ginny says that the 1st Brigade is part of Multi Multi-National Division - Center . Until recently, MND-C was headquartered by Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch's 3rd Infantry Division. They have redeployed home, and have been replaced by the 10th Mountain Division (Light) from Fort Drum, New York, whose current commander is Maj. Gen. Micheal L. Oates.

I am also not entirely sure of the chain of command with regards to the 1st Brigade, because some of the 82nd is in Afghanistan. The commander of the 82nd Airborne is Major General David Rodriguez, and on April 7 he gave a briefing from Afghanistan, so Col Flynn must report to someone in Iraq, most probably the commander of MNSTC-I, who I am unable to identify. Anyway, the commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq is Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, who reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq. Petreaus reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last March. Until Petraeus is confirmed by Congress for this position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This and other videos can be found at DODvClips. The transcript is at DefenseLink. More videos, briefings, and military news can be seen at The Pentagon Channel.

COL. FLYNN: ...I'm sure you've been following the events unfolding these past 10 days in southern Iraq and in Amarah with keen interest. First Brigade has played a supporting role in advising and assisting this Iraqi- planned and -led operation, and I'll be happy to discuss that with you today....

The operation in Amarah, Basha'er as-Salaam, is a clear sign of the development and professionalism of the Iraqi forces and will only serve as a model of transformation occurring in the government of Iraq, the Iraqi security forces and our area here in southern Iraq....

In light of recent events in Maysan province, security in southern Iraq can be assessed overall as stable, dotted with occasional periods of tension. These periods of tension are due to intra-Shi'a clashes. These clashes have been the workings of JAM special groups and local criminals. All of these groups have casual attitudes towards violence. This attitude has backfired, and they've lost significant support from the population due to their careless actions.

A concern remains with special groups and the spikes of violence they perpetrate for their convenience. While they are disruptive, they will not disable the government of Iraq. Special groups and criminals seek to drive a wedge between political progress and the population. As such, they'll attack Iraqi forces, coalition forces and civilian aid organizations just to make their point.

In an effort to eliminate these malign groups and extremists, Iraqi forces and government officials have stepped up and assumed active roles against these threats. Specifically, in Amarah, we've seen tribal leaders and citizens actively engage the Iraqi forces to enforce the rule of law. They've provided valuable information on the location of weapons caches and criminals. During a four-day amnesty period before operations began, tips produced caches, two of which resulted in over 200 artillery rounds, 51 antitank mines and 44 mortars.

Thursday, June 19th officially started clearing operations within the city of Amarah. The local populace was hesitant to come out of their homes at first, but by mid-morning the people began greeting the Iraqi forces in the streets, displaying a positive attitude about the government of Iraq taking care of the city and creating a safer environment to call home.

Everything we're doing has the objective of getting the populace off of the fence and into our camp. This is done by achieving local security, which has the effect of convincing the populace that the government will win and it is futile to resist, and that it is in their interest that the government win.

There were many good exchanges between the journalists and Col. Flynn, but Jim Michaels and Al Pessin got to the heart of the matter; when can the Iraqis handle their own security?

Q Colonel, Jim Michaels with USA Today. You described the relationship with -- in the Amarah operation with U.S. forces as kind of a supporting and overwatch. I'm wondering: From what you've been able to see, when do you think that the Iraqi security forces will be capable of conducting these types of operations with little or no U.S. support?

COL. FLYNN: I think to a degree -- I'm not sure if they can conduct any unilateral operations by themselves other than the standard patrolling that can go on day to day, which is relatively significant. You know, what -- I think what we are able to provide them, as a partner, is a degree of technical assistance, advice and some unique enabling capabilities that we have because of the maturity of our force.

For example, their EOD teams are performing great up there, their explosive ordnance teams against IEDs. However, their engineer clearing teams don't have quite the equipment that we have. So if we match them up together, they can do their own counter-IED work, but over time, they'll get there. And right now, they're just doing great work with the capabilities that they do have, and I think our enabling and our assistance and our partnering with them really, when they're -- when we are shoulder to shoulder with them, gives them a degree of confidence in doing their operations, and I think that's what's most helpful here.

Q Colonel, it's Al Pessin from Voice of America. Two sort of related questions.

One is, how would you put this Amarah operation in the broader context, of trying to bring stability to that part of the country and especially to combating the Iranian influence?

And secondly you said in your opening statement that people know they won't be abandoned when they see the Iraqi troops come in. How do they know that? And is that accurate? Do you have enough sources down there to have that sort of persistent presence, that we've heard about, that we've heard is necessary to bring stability?

COL. FLYNN: First of all, I'll say that having watched the operation and partnered with forces in Basra, in late March, and then watching and partnering again, providing assistance to the Iraqi forces here in Amarah, in June, they have learned some great lessons. And they've applied those in this operation.

In terms of having a persistent presence and having forces available to do what needs to be done, certainly at the period of time we're in right now in Amarah, the Iraqi ground forces commander, Lieutenant General Ali, identified a need for more forces, during the initial phase of the operations, in order to establish security, remove the caches and then arrest the criminals that they had warrants for.

In terms of their presence staying after, they are going to move forces elsewhere. And they're going to bolster the Iraqi army and the police in that area.

And they're going to afford them a window of opportunity to create that stable, secure environment, so that the threats don't reemerge, and the criminals don't come back into that area and try to reestablish their networks.

Q Colonel, I'd also asked about the bigger picture, as to how significant you think the Amarah operation is. Is it of major significance or is it just another in what's going to be a long series of these?

COL. FLYNN: Well, there's nearly 10,000 Iraqi forces in the province conducting operations. We've got a little over 500 in various stages -- capabilities helping them. So I think that the forces that the Iraqi government has chosen to use in Amarah are significant. I think the combined efforts of the police and the army are significant. And seeing them work together and in unison is a positive trend.

I've said this time and again, but the truth is that training host nation forces is a time consuming process and there are no shortcuts. The only question is if whether the Iraqi security forces will be ready to stand on their own Sen. Obama wins in November and makes good on his promise to withdraw U.S. troops no matter what.

Previous
Iraq Briefing - 07 January 2008 - Col Charles Flynn

Posted by Tom at 11:00 AM | Comments (2) | TrackBack

June 25, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 23 June 2008 - Reasons for Success

This briefing is by U.S. Army Lt. Gen Lloyd Austin, Commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Via telecommunications link he is linked to the Pentagon from Baghdad.

The Corps commander runs the day-to-day (or "tactical") operations in Iraq. The various commands in Iraq, the biggest of which are headquartered by a U.S. Army division or the Marine Corps MEF unit, report to Austin. Gen. Petraus sets overall policy and Austin implements it.

Lt. Gen. Austin reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last March. Until Petraeus is confirmed by Congress for this position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. The transcript is at DefenseLink. More videos, briefings, and military news can be seen at The Pentagon Channel.

During his opening statement, Austin gave several reasons for our recent success in Iraq. This was followed up by some good, hard, questions from the press corps, which is just how it should be.

GEN. AUSTIN: ...Now I attribute most of these hard-fought gains in security to a few key factors: Our coalition forces are aggressively pursuing the enemy; the improving capability of the Iraqi security forces; and the Iraqi people participating in the rebuilding process of Iraq.

The first factor is the incredible hard work by our young soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines, as well as our coalition partners. And because of their efforts, we've been able to make significant security gains by maintaining our pursuit of al Qaeda and special groups criminals. And we believe that we have al Qaeda on their heels, and we do not intend to let up....

And since I arrived here, I've seen the Iraqi security forces conduct both offensive and stability operations, and I've seen them do it in Basra, in Sadr City, in Mosul and now in Amarah, which is in the Maysan province. And what I've seen is that the Iraqi security forces are performing extremely well, and operations in these key cities have demonstrated that they have improved from where they were just a year ago in terms of deploying their combat formations; for example, the Charge of the Knights operation in Basra, where the Iraqi security forces moved several brigades to Basra from other provinces, and this would just have absolutely have not been possible a year ago....

In addition, the Sons of Iraq program that developed from the Sunni Awakening movement has helped tremendously. It has helped in denying safe haven to the extremist groups and have assisted our coalition forces and our Iraqi partners in securing neighborhoods in previously contested areas....

Al Qaeda has been pushed out of Baghdad and other strategic population centers, and now the Iraqi security forces are leading operations against them in Mosul. And we're working with the Iraqis to support their efforts....

If we summarize, as reasons for our recent successes we have

1. The adoption of a true counterinsurgency strategy
2. Improved Iraqi security forces
3. The Iraqi people seeing the government as legitimate and worth fighting for

The first lead to the last. In the end, the last is vital to long-term success.

There were many good questions, and and I urge everyone to view the entire briefing, so I'll concentrate on the exchanges about the Iraqi security forces

Q General, Julian Barnes from the Los Angeles Times. You expressed some confidence that the Iraqi security forces are getting better. Are there specific areas of the country that you are ready to put U.S. forces into an overwatch role and give the day-to-day operations to the Iraqi forces? And where do you think that will happen first within the country?

GEN. AUSTIN: Well, there are no areas that we can -- that we would be willing to separate out right now to dedicate specifically to the Iraqi security forces.

We are working hand-in-hand with our coalition partners in all parts of the country. They have improved significantly, but we've been clear about saying that they're not there yet....

Q General, this is Dave Wood at The Baltimore Sun. Talk a little bit more about the Iraqi security forces' attempt to be more self-sustaining. We've been watching this and covering it for a number of years., It seems like they're always moving towards that goal and never quite getting there. What's your assessment of how long it will take to -- for them to become self-sustaining and all the things you mentioned? And is there anything that the United States could do to speed that up?

GEN. AUSTIN: Certainly we're doing everything that we can on a daily basis to enable them as quickly as we possibly can. But bear in mind that we're fighting at the same time that we're doing this. You know, the Iraqi security forces have grown significantly over the last year, and as they've grown, they've been equipping themselves and training and fighting all at the same time. And we've been helping them in that endeavor -- so very difficult to put a mark on the wall and say that we'll be fully trained and equipped by a certain time period, because, again, while we're doing that, we're fighting. I can just only guarantee you that we will do everything within our power to give them true capabilities as quickly as we can....

Q General, it's Ken Fireman from Bloomberg News. I'd like to go back to the question of the Iraqi security forces and their capabilities. What we've heard from a number of U.S. commanders over a period of time has been that the greatest limiting factor on the ISF is their weaknesses in logistics and supply, their inability to develop an infrastructure that can support their troops in the field, supply them and provide logistical support. Is that still a major problem? Is that getting better? Are they showing any evidence of curing those problems, or is that still a major limiting factor on them?

GEN. AUSTIN: That's a great question. And it's one that I certainly returned to the theater focused on -- an issue that I returned to focus on.

One of the things that we set out to do early on was to work to improve the Iraqi security force logistics system and help them improve their system. And I think we've been fairly successful since we came on board.

It was an area of emphasis for our entire command. I asked all of my commanders to partner with the Iraqi forces to help them make their system work. And it's important that we focus on making their system work versus making them adapt a system that we think is right for them. And that's been very successful for us.

What you've witnessed in recent days is that they deployed themselves to Basra, which was a significant movement. They resupplied themselves there and they actually learned from that, as well. And so when they deployed to Mosul, it was almost a seamless operation. They, again, learned from that they'd done in Basra and incorporated those lessons learned into what I consider to be a really successful movement. And again, as they moved forces into Amarah, they've done a pretty good job of supporting and sustaining themselves.

You know, the DOD IG was just here a while back, and on his way out, he was very complimentary about some of the improvements that he had seen in the logistics system.

It seems we are in a race against time. If Obama is elected, the clock runs out and either the Iraqi security forces are up to speed or we risk losing everything. If McCain wins, we'll have more time. Thing is, training an army is not something you can really shortcut.

"It is a persistently methodical approach and steady pressure which will gradually wear the insurgent down. The government must not allow itself to be diverted either by counter-moves on the part of the insurgent or by the critics on its own side who will be seeking a simpler and quicker solution. There are no short-cuts and no gimmicks - Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam, 1966

6-29 Training HN (host nation) security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a "quick fix".

Previous from Lt Gen Austin
Iraq Briefing - 23 May 2008 - Meet the New Commander of MNC-Iraq

Posted by Tom at 7:00 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 21, 2008

Iraq Briefing - 19 June 2008 - The Last Surge Brigade Reports

This briefing is by U.S. Army Colonel Terry Ferrell, Commander of 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, and John Smith, Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader. Via telecommunications link they are linked to the Pentagon from Operating Base Kalsu in southeast Baghdad.

The 3rd ID is part of Multi-National Division Central, otherwise known as Task Force Marne. Their area of responsibility extends to the southern edge of Baghdad to the border with Saudi Arabia, and then to the border of Iran.

Col Ferrell reports to the commander of the 3rd ID, Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch. Lynch reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Austin, in turn, reports to Gen. Petraeus, commander of Multi-National Force - Iraq, who reports to the commander of CENTCOM, who was Admiral Fallon until last March. Until Petraeus is confirmed by Congress for this position, Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey is the acting commander of CENTCOM. Dempsey reports to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.

This video and others can be viewed at DODvClips. The transcript is at DefenseLink. More videos, briefings, and military news can be seen at The Pentagon Channel.

In case you're not aware, we had 15 brigades in Iraq until the start of the "surge" at the beginning of last year. We sent 5 more brigades, which arrived in the first half of 2007, hence the term "surge". Col Ferrell's 2nd Brigade Combat Team was the last of those brigades to arrive.

COL FERRELL:...The primary enemies that we were dealing with in our area of operations was al Qaeda and Sunni extremists who had been left alone for long enough to create a sanctuary in Arab Jabour.

Al Qaeda had used this sanctuary to control the population through fear and intimidation. They used homes, farms and places of business as bases of operation and bomb-making factories, devastating the region's economy. People lacked consistent access to basic necessities, like clean water and electricity, let alone a functioning health care or education system.

They had -- the area had no sustained security presence provided by either coalition or Iraqi security forces. We began operations on June 15th, when elements of the Spartan Brigade Combat Team attacked to seize a foothold in Arab Jabour against a well-entrenched al Qaeda threat. Organized defensive belts existed throughout our area of operations, and deep-buried IEDs were common as the enemy was confident they would be able to keep coalition forces out and the local population controlled. They were wrong.
...

When we first arrived, we were experiencing on average of 30-plus attacks a week. Now we're seeing less than one per week.
...

The security environment that was created by these operations and increased the Iraqi army role in the area set the conditions for the local citizens to step up and begin to take control of their future. Over this past year, we've helped create city councils in each of our population areas. Neighborhood councils now give our communities a direct voice to the government.

All this is straight out of Gen. Petraeus' U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24. The objective in fighting any insurgency is that the counterinsurgents must achieve security first. Only then can political progress at any level take place. From FM 3-24:

1-4 Long term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule. Achieving this goal requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as possible.

1-113 LEGITIMACY IS THE MAIN OBJECTIVE. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

1-131 SECURITY UNDER THE RULE OF LAW IS ESSENTIAL The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads.

The first question hits on the all important topic of whether our gains are sustainable, but what's important is how Col Ferrell gives his answer

Q Sir, it's Kristin Roberts with Reuters.

In terms of the security situation, are there any events on the horizon that might threaten the security gains or raise specific security challenges? And can you talk a bit about the sustainability of the security gains you've seen, as the country moves toward provincial elections?

COL. FERRELL: I think, in our specific area of operations, that the security gains are sustainable. We have forces that will be staying there, coalition forces that will be staying in the battlespace.

The progress of the Iraqi army battalions, that are working with us, has made great strides. The people of the communities are making tremendous strides. They are working hand-in-hand to prevent the threats from coming back.

There's always a threat. We know that. But the communities work. We work. The Iraqi security forces work. They do not want it. They've experienced now fighting for so many years. They see the changes that they've worked so hard over the last year-plus to gain; that they will move this forward. That's the key.

Ferrell points more to the attitude of the people rather than the military strength of the Iraqi Army as being key. They must believe that the counterinsurgents will win, and that it is in their interests that they win. They must get off the fence and into our side. The question, then, is how to get the people from apathy to action.

Part of the way this is being done was explained by Mr Smith as he answered a question by Tom Bowman of NPR about the Iraqi government not sending ministers down t examine essential services and see what needed to be done.

MR. SMITH:... And through developing relationships, which -- this society is built upon relationships, and then they take it very seriously -- we were able to bring these officials into an area that they would not have dreamed of going into.

And that -- and as they came into the area and you saw the Shi'a meeting the newly formed town council of Arab Jabour for the first time, and that -- so you have a Shi'a district chairman sitting down with a Sunni town council and seeing them embrace. And the thing that I can't project here in words in that is the excitement in their eyes and the reunion and the reconciliation that took place at that moment. And that was the start. That was at the very beginning of that. That was the first part of October in that, when we engaged.

And from there, you know, we followed that protocol in that, and we have gotten assistance in that from the Ministry of Health. We've gotten assistance from the Ministry of Energy. We've gotten assistance from the Ministry of Irrigation and their representatives in those areas in that. So just speaking from our area, you know, they have been cooperative to the best of their ability, and funds are starting to break free in assistance.

In other words, the people are taking action at the local level in cooperation with officials at the national level. "Political progress" is a term much bandied about, and it's true that it needs to occur if we are to truly win this war. But what's important to understand is that it's not just a top-down process. It must occur at the local level too, and then hopefully the two meet in the middle.

Then, as is so often at these briefings, Al Pessin asks the hard question. I'm impressed that he seems to know what is really going on.

Q Colonel, it's Al Pessin from Voice of America. I wanted to follow up on Kristin's first question.

As you know, the surge was accompanied by a change in doctrine, a change of approach. That change of approach, I'm told, couldn't have been done without sufficient security forces.

Now, with the surge brigades leaving, what makes you confident that this approach will continue to succeed without all these extra U.S. troops there?

COL. FERRELL: I will tell you that I think that we were at the right place at the right time. And I understand the surge and the mission set that we got as we came in, and we were able to get after it. And I think it was very classic in the counterinsurgency aspects. It's the clear, hold, build as we moved through and a very slow, very methodical approach as we came in. But now we've been able to build the Iraqi security forces to come in.

As we move elements of the brigade combat team out of the battlespace -- and our brigade is very unique as the last surge brigade -- all of 2nd Brigade, 3rd ID, the brigade that works for me, is not working specifically here in this battlespace. So I have task- organized units that belong to other organizations that will be staying. So there will be a reduction, given, but there will be a coalition presence.

But what has changed is a significant increase in our area of operation of Iraqi security forces. When we first started, there was one Iraqi battalion -- no Iraqi police and one Iraqi battalion that was on the periphery of the brigade's area of operations. Nowhere did they really want to venture into our specific area of operations. And it took several weeks to get that to change. And it's taken time now to get them to the point that they do independent operations, the one battalion.

We have since, just in the last two months, received a second battalion. And we will see that it will continue to expand Iraqi security force presence over the coming weeks and months with plans that are designed for our specific piece of terrain with a larger presence of Iraqi army.

And additionally, we have just recently opened an Iraqi police station. We will have a permanent police station in Arab Jabour about the first of September, but there's a temporary station that now is open. We have over 400 candidates that is going through the process to become policemen. And we will see that bring more security to the area.

So you have Iraqi police officers. You have Iraqi army, the increased volume of Iraqi army. And then you still have that coalition presence that will facilitate the sustainment.

And don't forget the population. Don't forget the Sons of Iraq that are still there. But more importantly, don't forget the population and what they've been through and the changes and the transformation that they've been through and what they see now, what they have as they move forward. They wanted normalcy in their life. They're starting to see that and they're moving forward. I think that is one of the biggest keys that we have a tendency to overlook, here.

An entire chapter in FM 3-24 is devoted to building up the host nation forces. A few excerpts

6-1 Success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations requires establishing a legitimate government supported by the people and able to address the fundamental causes that insurgents use to gain support. Achieving these goals requires the host nation to defeat insurgents or render them irrelevant, upholding the rule of law, and provide a basic level os essential and security for the populace. Key to all these tasks is developing an effective host-nation (HN) security force.

6-29 Training HN (host nation) security forces is a slow and painstaking process. It does not lend itself to a "quick fix".

And from the much quoted "Zen-like" section

1-154 THE HOST NATION DOING SOMETHING TOLERABLY IS NORMALLY BETTER THAN US DOING IT WELL. It is just as important to consider who performs an operation as to assess how well it is done. Where the United States is supporting a host nation, long-term success requires establishing viable HN leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant US support....

Finally, in response to a question, Col Ferrell addresses the fighting spirit of the Iraqi Security Forces. While no doubt some Iraqi forces are sub-par, and even turn from the enemy, many or even most fight bravely, and get precious little credit for it in the American press. Ferrell has two Iraqi battalions in his battlespace.

COL FERRELL:...Over time, they will both improve. And as more forces come in and they get the strength and capabilities and build the capacity, we'll see independent operations across all of them. They have the desire. That's the one thing I want you to understand.

The soldiers I deal with, and I've got great, you know, great knowledge of working with them on the ground and being engaged with them in the fight firsthand. The company commanders, a couple of the battalion commanders, but the company commanders are the ones that I have personal knowledge of down there.

They are out leading soldiers. They want to take the fight. They want to rid their area just as much as any of our soldiers. They know what's right and they'll get after it.

Just as interesting as the questions the journalists ask are the ones they don't ask. They don't question the basic military progress or success we have achieved. They don't insinuate that the briefers are misleading them. To be sure, I didn't start to watch these briefings until early 2007, and I don't even know if they did this teleconference type earlier than that. But judging from how the war was reported, I have to think that reporters were more skeptical. Either way, I find these briefings a good source of information about what's happening, and in sum they tell me that as of now we are winning.

Posted by Tom at 8:30 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 15, 2008

Krauthammer Hits a Homer

Once again, Charles Krauthammer hits it out of the park. I'm just going to reprint the whole thing

In his St. Paul victory speech, Barack Obama pledged agai